ORDER
L. Mohapatra, J.
1. This writ application is directed against the order dated 26.6.1999 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhubaneswar in T.S. No. 64 of 1992 allowing an application filed by the defendants 1 to 4 and 9 under Order 6, Rule 16 of the C.P.C. in Challenging the said order, the petitioner had earlier filed Civil Revision No. 287 of 1999 before this Court and the said Civil Revision was disposed of as not maintainable in view of the amendment in the C.P.C. and accordingly this writ application has been filed.
2. The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed as Field Officer in October, 1976 under opposite party Nos. 1 and 2. There were several allegations regarding sex abuse in the office and some instances of sex abuse by the high officials of opposite party No. 1 were witnessed by the petitioner accidentally and he had brought them to the notice of the highest authority of the opposite party No. 1 with the sole intention of eradicating such activities from the office. However, the conduct of the petitioner in intimating the highest authority about those activities going on in the office resulted in initiating of a disciplinary proceeding and ultimately he was terminated from service. Challenging the said termination, the petitioner filed T.S. No. 64 of 1992 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhubaneswar. In the said suit, he has made allegations against several officers who were indulged in such activities in the office in order to prove mala fide on the part of the employer even though such officers are not made parties to the suit. Further case of the petitioner is that such officers had not been made parties to the suit, as the petitioner does not claim any relief against them but at the same time he had no option except bringing the fact to the notice of the Court in order to prove his case that the entire action taken by the employer is mala fide as the petitioner had drawn attention of the highest authority of the opposite party No. 1 regarding the activities of the Senior Officers.
3. In course of the proceeding, the defendants 1 to 4 and 9 filed an application under Order 6, Rule 16 of the C.P.C. to strike down the allegations in the plaint, which are unnecessary and scandalous. An objection was filed by the petitioner to the aforesaid petition and after hearing the parties, the learned Civil Judge directed for deletion of those portions from the plaint, which relate to officers who are not parties to the suit. Challenging the said order, the present writ application has been filed.
4. Shri Sarangi, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner challenges the order on the ground that the allegations made in the plaint are not only against the defendants but also some other officers are intended to prove mala fide on the part of the employer in initiating a departmental proceeding and terminating the services of the petitioner. The petitioner does not claim any relief against those senior officers who were involved in such activities and, therefore, they have not been made parties to the suit. The entire purpose of putting forth such allegations is only to prove that the disciplinary proceeding was started against the petitioner for the purpose of terminating his services since he had brought to the notice of the highest authority about the conduct of some senior officers.
5. Shri B. Pal, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting opposite parties, on the other hand, submitted that even in order to prove mala fide, it is not necessary to make wild allegations, which are scandalous in nature against the Senior Officers who are not parties to the suit. It is further contended by Shri Pal that those officers not being parties to the suit, have absolutely no opportunity to defend themselves and in the event, the Court accepts such allegations to be correct, such finding shall be arrived at without hearing those officers against whom allegations have been made. It was also contended by Shri Pal that the jurisdiction of the Court under Order 6, Rule 16 of the C.PC. is wide enough to expunge those parts of the averments made in the plaint, which are not necessary for the purpose of deciding the suit effectively.
6. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, it is necessary to look into the plaint where such allegations are made against some officers who are not made parties to the suit. In Paragraph 6 of the plaint it is alleged that on 15.5.1982 the plaintiff found the then Administrator in a compromising position with a lady staff inside the CARE office. In Paragraph 7 it is alleged that due to such activities of the Administrator, the office was Hooded with anonymous letters alleging corruption, nepotism and sex abuse. In Paragraph 8 it is alleged that when the petitioner brought it to the notice of the Country Director, it resulted in unusual harassment to the petitioner as the Country Director appeared to be encouraging such activities as a part of the policy of CARE. In Paragraph 9 it is alleged that the successor of the Administrator was also found to be involved in such activities in the office and the same was also brought to the notice of the highest authority by the petitioner. In spite of such fact brought to the notice, the Country Director even did not ask for an explanation from the Administrator. Similarly, such allegations have been made in Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the plaint. Admittedly both the Administrators are not parties to the suit. The question that arises for consideration is as to whether such allegations made against those two Administrators should be allowed to remain in the plaint or should be expunged.
7. Order 6, Rule 16 of the C.P.C. prescribes that the Court may at any stage of the proceeding strike out or amend any matter in the pleading which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass, or delay the fair trial of the suit or otherwise as abuse of the process of the Court. The Apex Court in the case of Roop Lal Sethi v. Nachhaltar Singh reported in AIR 1982 SC 1559 also held that unless one of the ingredients of the aforesaid provisions as indicated above is satisfied, the Court has no power to direct striking out of any pleading.
8. Shri Sarangi, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that while deciding a petition filed under Order 6, Rule 16 of C.P.C. the Court has to look into the pleadings as a whole and should not pick up isolated words or sentences. Reliance is placed by the learned Counsel in this connection on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Katlkara Chintamani Dora and Ors. v. Guatreddi Annamanaidu and Ors. . The Apex Court in the aforesaid decision observed that in construing a pleading the Court should not look merely to its form or pick out from it isolated words or sentences and it must read the petition as a whole, gather the real intention of the parties and reach at the substance of the matter. A similar view has also been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia .
Shri B. Pal, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties submitted that the allegations made against the officers, who are not parties to the suit, are scandalous and irrelevant for the purpose of suit and they should be struck out from the pleadings. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on a decision of this Court in the case of J.B. Pattanaik v. Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. and Ors. reported in AIR 1990 Orissa 107. This Court in the aforesaid case held that the Court under its inherent power under Section 151 can order for expunction of unnecessary and scandalous matters from any petitions or affidavits whatsoever even if they may not be pleadings within the meaning of Order 6, Rule 16 of the C.P.C. Reliance was also placed on another decision of this Court in the case Prasanna Kumar Patasani v. Janaki Ballav Pattnaik reported in AIR 1997 Orissa 115. The aforesaid case arose out of a petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the Court held that the issue involved in the election case is with regard to corrupt practices allegedly restored to by the winning candidate. Therefore, the pleadings regarding character assassination of the elected candidate not having nexus with the facts in issue are liable to be struck off.
9. In the present case there cannot be any doubt in mind that scandalous allegations have made against the officers who are not parties to the suit. In Paragraph 6 of the plaint, it is alleged that on 15.5.1982 the plaintiff was unfortunate to find one Nurulla, the then Administrator of the defendant No. 2 in a compromising position with a lady staff inside the CARE office, In Paragraph 7 it is alleged that due to such activities the Director was flooded with anonymous letters alleging corruption, nepotism and sex abuse of CARE Officials. In Paragraph 8 of the plaint, it is alleged that the Country Director was encouraging such activities as a part of the Policy of CARE. In Paragraph 9 of the plaint, it is alleged that Mr. Lobo who succeeded Mr. Nurulla as Administrator was also found by the plaintiff-petitioner on 29.9.1985 in a similar position as that of Mr. Nurulla. In Paragraphs 10 and 11 allegations have been made against the Country Director who is alleged not to have taken any action. Admittedly neither Mr. Nurulla nor Mr. Lobo are parties to the suit and accordingly they have no occasion to refute such allegations. The learned Counsel challenges the impugned order only on the ground that those allegations are required to prove mala fides. In order to prove mala fide, it is unnecessary to make such scandalous allegations and the same could be put forth in a different form. After reading of the plaint as a whole, I find that even if such allegations are struck out from the plaint, the plaintiff can still raise the question of mala fide on the basis of other averments made in the plaint. I am, therefore of the view that such allegations made in the plaint against the officers who are not parties to the suit are not only scandalous but also unnecessary for the purpose of deciding the issue involved in the suit.
10. I accordingly do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order. The writ application is accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed.