JUDGMENT
G.R. Majithia, J.
1. This judgment will dispose of F.A.O. Nos. 518/1985, 765/1985, 487/1986 (including X-objections No. 87-CII/1986), 572/1987, 446/1984 and 566/1984 (including X-objections No. 86-CII/1984) as a common question of law arises in these appeals.
2. We shall refer to the facts of FAO No. 518/1985 for the purpose of appreciating the matter in controversy and the points arising for adjudication.
3. A claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act was filed by the parents and sisters of the deceased child Mange alias Manoj, claiming compensation to the tune of Rs. 2,00,000/- on account of his untimely death. The tribunal found that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by the driver as a result of which Mange alias Manoj died, and his age at that time was 12 years and he was a student of 5th class. With regard to the quantum of compensation, the learned Tribunal found that the deceased was quite hale and hearty and he used to assist his father, who ran a small tea shop, after the school hours. The Tribunal further held that even if a servant of the age of 12 years is employed at a amall tea-stall he has to be paid not less than Rs. 5/- per day, and in this situation, the Tribunal found that the deceased was contributing to the earnings of his father to the tune of Rs. 150/- per month. Applying the ratio of Lachhman Singh v. Gurmit Kaur reported as 1979 Acc CJ 170 : (AIR 1979 Punj and Hry 50) (FB), and a multiplier of sixteen, the total pecuniary loss suffered by the parents of the deceased Mange was held to be Rs. 28,800/-. The claim of the sisters of the deceased was not accepted since they were not proved to be dependent on the deceased.
4. The parents and the sisters of the deceased child filed an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act in this Court. When the matter came up for motion hearing, it was contended by the counsel for the appellants that a Division Bench of this Court, in FAO No. 38/1984 (Zenith Papers v. Gurmeet Kaur) decided on April 6, 1984, had held that a child of one year was capable of sparing Rs. 100/- per month for his parents. The Bench felt that the decision in FAO No. 38/1984 (supra) ran counter to the Supreme Court decision, and needed reconsideration by a larger Bench. The appeal was admitted to hearing by the Full Bench and it is in this manner that the matter is before us for decision.
5. In the appeal, the controversy is confined to only one point, as to the quantum of damages the appellants are entitled to. Negligence on the part of the respondent resulting in the death of Mange alias Manoj is not denied and the appellants’ version as to the manner in which the boy met his end has not been questioned,
6. The right to recover damages for having wrongfully caused the death is wholly a statutory one. The basic rule to which the English statute and the Indian Act, subscribe, is, that the designated beneficiaries are entitled to compensation for a pecuniary or a material loss, resulting from the death of a person, from whom there was a reasonable expectation of a monetary benefit, assistance or support; which the claimant has been deprived of. In the absence of statutory guidelines, we think that for the purpose of securing uniformity some workable formulae should be evolved which can be usefully followed by the courts after making marginal adjustments in the light of peculiar facts of each individual case.
7. The law as to the assessment of damages is stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England (Third Edition) Vol. 28, thus :–
“III. Pecuniary loss must be sustained by claimants. The pecuniary toss is not limited to the value of money lost, or to the money value of benefits lost (c), but includes the monetary loss incurred by replacing services rendered gratuitously by the deceased (d), if there was a reasonable prospect of their being rendered freely in the future but for the death of the deceased (e). Pecuniary loss may be evidenced by proof of a reasonable expectation of some future pecuniary benefit (f), and it is not necessary that the claimant should have a legal right to such a benefit from the deceased or should have actually received before the death any benefit of the same nature (g)…..So, also, account can be taken of a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from services rendered or assistance given by the deceased (s), even if he was a child ‘t), and even if such services or assistance had not actually commenced at the time of death (u).”
In Benham v. Gambling, 1, 1941) AC 157, the House of Lords had, for the first time, to decide what should be the quantum of damages to be awarded for loss of expectation of fife. In that case, a child aged two-and-a-half year old was involved in a car accident. The only question was the diminution of the child’s expectation of life. Evidence showed that the child was living in modest but otherwise favourable circumstances. At the trial, Asquith, J. fixed the damages at £ 1,200 as it was neither unreasonably excessive nor unreasonably deficient. Finally, when the matter came up to the House of Lords, Viscount Simon, L.C. posed the question what were the main considerations to be borne in mind in assessing damages under the head of loss of expectation of life, and observed
“….I am of opinion that the right conclusion is not to be reached by applying what may be called the statistical or actuarial tesi……And in any case the thing to be valued is not the prospect of length of days, but the prospect of apredominently happy life. The age of the individual may, in some rases, be a relevant factor. The ups and downs of life, its pains and sorrows as weft as its joys and pleasures all that makes up ‘life’s fitful fever’ have to be allowed for in the estimate. In assessing damages for shortening of life, therefore, such damages should no! be calculated solely, or even mainly, on the basis of the length of life which is lost…..’
The noble Lord thought that in the case of a very young child, there was uncerrainty about the future, that happiness did not depend on wealth or status and it would be an attempt to equate income mensurables and that therefore in assessing damages whether in the case of a child or an adult, very moderate figure should be chosen. In the end, the House of Lords agreed that the proper figure in that case would be £ 200. They also observed that even that amount would be excessive if it were not that the circumstances of the infant were most favourable. T his case has been reviewed in the law Quarterly Review Vol. 65 at page 10, thus :–
“Perhaps the most remarkable instance of judicial legislation to be found in the books is Benham v. Gambling, (1941 AC 157) in which the House of Lords, faced with the insoluble problem of giving a reasonable construction to an Act which was itself unreasonable, established a fixed limit to control the award of damages for loss of expectation of life under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act. 1934.”
8. In Hart v. Griffiths Jones, (1948) 2 All ER 729, Streaifield, J., while dealing with damages for the death of a child aged four, observed :
“I must also bear in mind the age of the deceased child, and the fact that the child had yet to pass through the ordinary dangers of childhood, and I do not think that as large an award of damages is applicable to a child of that age. I have also to take into account the chance of the child’s happiness of life…..”
It was also held in that case that in assessing the amount of damages to be awarded in respect of the loss of expectation of life of a child, regard must be had to the depreciation in value of money since the decision in Benham v. Gambling, (1941 AC 157). Since then, however, the courts in England as well as in our country have raised this figure due to a fall in the value of money. The House of Lords in England in the case of Naylor v. Yorkshire Electricity Board reported as 1967 Acc CJ 223, Danchwerts and Salmon, LJJ raised the conventional award to £ 500. In the case of McCann v. Sheppard reported as 1974 Acc CJ 1, it was increased to £ 750 by the Court of Appeal.
9. In our country, the following cases would reveal that when a boy between one and five years is killed, the Court has been awarding the compensation ranging from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- :–
S. No.
Age of the child at death (in year)
Sex (Male/ Female)
Annual dependency awards towards dependency
Rs.
Citation.
1
2
3
4
5
1)
4
–
5,000/-
1966 ACJ 148
2)
l1/2
Male
2,000/-
1966 ACJ 382
3)
1
–
5,000/-
1967 ACJ 90 : (AIR 1968 Madh Pra 47)
4)
4
Female
2,000/-
1969 ACJ 405 : (AIR 1970 Pat 172)
5)
5
Male
6,000/-
1971 ACJ 324
6)
31/2
Male
5,000/-
1972 ACJ 380
7)
4
–
3,000/-
1972 ACJ 375
8)
5
”
8,000/-
1977 ACJ 359
9)
7
”
4,000/-
1977 ACJ 362
10)
5
Male
6,000/-
1981 ACJ 420
11)
5
Female
2,500/-
1983 ACJ 61
12)
5
Male
6,000/-
1983 ACJ 478
13)
31/2
Female
5,000/-
1985 ACJ 123 : (AIR 1985 Him Pra 41)
14)
5
Male
20,000/-
1986 ACJ 252
15)
11/2
Male
10.000/-
1986 ACJ 591 : (AIR 1985 Punj & Har 81)
16)
2
Male
10,000/-
1986 ACJ 1062
17)
2
Male
25,000/-
1986 ACJ 1087
18)
3
”
5,0007/-
1987 ACJ 209
19)
2
Male
10,000/-
1986 ACJ 605
(Note :– Except in the cases cited at Sr. Nos. 14 and 17, the compensation was ranging between Rs. 5,000/- and Rs. 10,000/-. For the reasons given in the later part of this judgment, the judgment reported as 1968 Acc CJ 252 (Punj & Har) has been overruled. In 1986 Acc CJ 1087 (All), the Bench awarded a sum of Rs. 25,000/- as compensation for the death of a two-year old child. No reasons have been given by the Bench while awarding this much compensation. The basic judgment of the Supreme Court reported as C. K. Subramonia Iyer v. T. Kunhi Kuttan Nair. 1970 Acc CJ 110 : (AIR 1970 SC 376) (SC) was not noticed in the judgment).
10. In cases in the age-group of 5 to 10 years are tabulated as under : —
20)
8
Male
6,000/-
1970 AC3 1 10 : (AIR 1970 SC 376) (Date of accident 28-2-1956)
21)
8
”
6,000/-
1966 ACJ 321 : (AIR 1966 Mys 346)
22)
7
”
10,000/-
1969 ACJ 344
23)
9
”
5,000/-
1969 ACJ 28 : (1969 Lab IC 501) (P & H)
24)
8
Female
5,000/-
1971 ACJ 144
25)
8
”
5,000/-
1971 ACJ 456
26)
6
”
6,000/-
1974 ACJ -470 : (AIR 1975 Gauhati 20)
27)
10
Male
7,000/-
1975 ACJ 237
28)
10
”
11,200/-
1977 ACJ 459
29)
6
”
6,000/-
1978 ACJ 215 : (AIR 1978 Madh Pra 209)
30)
10
”
8,100/-
+
1979 ACJ 186 : (AIR 1979 Guj 26)
3,000/-
31)
6
Female
7,200/-
1981 ACJ 296
32)
6
”
6,0007.;
1982 ACJ 1 : (AIR 1981 Kant 161)
33)
10
”
2,000/-
1982 ACJ 63
34)
7
Male
21,000/-
1987 ACJ 501
35)
10
”
12,000/-
1988(1) ACJ 223
11. In C.K. Subramania Iyer’s case (supra), the deceased was aged 8 years and the claimants were his parents. The claim was for Rs. 30,000/-. The District Judge awarded Rs. 5,000/- towards the pecuniary loss to the dependants, as also towards the loss to the estate, but the High Court determined the loss towards the dependency at Rs. 5,000/- and the loss to the estate at Rs. 1,000/-. On appeal by the parents to the Supreme Court, the judgment of the High Court was affirmed. Their Lordships observed that even though at the time of fatal accident, the parents were not dependant on the child still they had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits. Their Lordships considered the assessment of the loss to the dependency in the following manner : —
“It is seen that the deceased child was only 8 years old at the time of his death. How he would have turned out in life later is at best a guess. But there was a reasonable probability of his becpminga successful man in life as he was a bright boy in the school and his parents could have afforded him a good education. It is not likely that he would have given any financial assistance to his parents till he was at least 20 years old. As seen from the evidence on record, his father was a substantial person. He was in business and his business was a prosperous one. As things stood, he needed no assistance from his son. There is no material on record to find out as to how old were the parents of the deceased at the time of his death. Nor is there any evidence about their state of health. On the basis of the evidence on record, we are unable to come to the conclusion that the damages ordered by the High Court are inadequate.”
Thus, it appears to us that if the age of the deceased child is between 5 and 9 years (below ten years) there is not much scope for evaluating the multiplicand exactly but at the same time, the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits in the future is not totally ruled out. It is true that certain High Courts have computed the dependency for these children also but, as pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, this is a mere guess work. In our view, it may not be very much correct to proceed to compute mathematically the future damages when the annual dependency is likely to be a pure guess.
12. In 1936, their Lordships of the Supreme Court took Rs. 5,000/- as a ‘conventional figure’, and the same can be upgraded on the basis of inflation. Even on that basis, at least a sum of Rs. 10,000/- will be payable for an accident in the late eighties having regard to the inflation between 1956 and 1988.
13. We shall now deal with the cases of children below five years.
14. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act to award just compensation is very wide and comprehensive. However, the element of speculation cannot be ruled out. The determination of compensation would turn upon the particular facts of each case, viz., family environments, the members of the family; the health, the age of the victim, his outlook in life, the interest which the parents were taking in the child and the totality of circumstances tending to show whether the victim had a predominantly happy life or life of misery or an insipid life. Apart from this, it las also to be taken into consideration whether the child was subject to risks of illness, disease, accident and death. His education and upkeep would have been a substantial burden to the parents for many years if he had lived. He might or might not have turned out a useful young man. He would have earned nothing till about the age of 16 years. He might not have aided his father at all. He might have proved a mere expense. We cannot adequately speculate one way or the other. It was in these circumstances that in C. K. Subramania Iyer’s case, (AIR 1970 SC 376) (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to observe :
“In assessing damages, the court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent is inevitable. As a general rule parents are entitled to recover the present cash value of the prospective service of the deceased minor child. In addition they may receive compensation for loss of pecuniary benefits reasonably to be expected after the child attains majority,”
15. From the cases tabulated above, it will be revealed that the tribunals/courts have been awarding compensation ranging between Rs. 2,000/- to Rs. 6,000/-. In peculiar circumstances, like the one in Pushpinder Kaur Sekhon v. Corporal Sharma, 1986 Acc CJ 591 : (AIR 1985 Punj and Hry 81) where the mother of the deceased child had undergone tubectomy and section evacuation of the uterus, and could not, therefore, have any more children, S. S. Sodhi, J., awarded a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as compensation to the parents. In those special circumstances, the courts may be justified in awarding a higher compensation. There may be peculiar circumstances which might influence the court to reduce or enhance the amount but in other cases where no such special circumstances are shown, a maximum sum of Rs. 5,000/- appears to have been awarded as compensation. In view of the fact that the value of money has declined, a sum of Rs. 6,000/- may be a reasonable figure to be awarded as compensation to the parents.
16. In the light of the above we shall now examine the correctness of the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in FAO No. 38/1984 (supra). In that case, the mother, Smt. Gurmit Kaur, was carrying her one year old son in her lap when she met with an accident. The child died while the mother sustained serious injuries as a result of the accident. While determining the quantum of compensation payable to the parents, the Tribunal adopted the following formula and allowed a sum of Rs. 19,200/- as compensation : —
“Even if it be assumed that the deceased child was of average intelligence, he may reasonably be expected to have secured at least a class III post in the Government or elsewhere. Even as unskilled worker, he could have earned as much as person getting a job of the said nature. In that situation, in all probability, he would have been able to spare at least a sum of Rs. 100/- p.m. for his parents after being in earning position. Thus, the probable annual dependency of the parents from his income on the said basis would come to Rs. 1200/- p.a. Both the parents are young and a multiplier of 16 may justifiably be applied which will reflect a just and reasonable amount of compensation to them. So computed the compensation to which the parents are entitled comes to Rs. 19,200/-which the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are liable to pay jointly and severally. But liability being covered by the policy of insurance issued by respondent No. 3 in favour of owner, the insurer will pay the said amount to the claimant with interest and costs.”
The correctness of this decision was challenged in this Court in first appeal from the order, Under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, by the defendants in the claim application. The appeal was dismissed in limine and the award of the Motor Accident Claim Tribuanl was upheld. The attention of the Bench was drawn to C. K. Subramania lyers case, (AIR 1970 SC 376) (supra) and numerous other decisions where the formula propounded by the Tribunal for adopting a multiplier was never accepted.
17. In the case of children of tender age, the compensation to be awarded is only for the loss of expectation of future happy life which, of course, forms a conventional figure, and their Lordships of the Supreme Court in C. K. Subramania lyer’s case. (AIR 1970 SC 376) (supra! took Rs. 5.000/- as a conventional figure and upheld the decree of the court. There is no scope for evaluating the multiplicand exactly. Thus, the view taken by the Division Bench in FAO No. 38/1984 (supra) is contrary to the one taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in C.K. Subramania Iyer’s case (supra). We hereby overrule the same.
18. While we were dictating the judgment, it came to our notice that the decision rendered in FAO 38/1984 (supra) was followed in K. L. Pasrija v. The Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. reported as (1985) 87 Pun LR 623. In that case a child aged five years was killed in an accident and a sum of Rs. 20,000/- was awarded as compensation to the parents of the child. Gokal Chand Mital, J., while determining the quantum of compensation payable to the parents of the deceased child in that case, observed as under : —
“Next question is how much compensation the parents of the deceased minor are entitled to. The Tribunal was of the opinion that the rule of multiplier was not applicable while assessing damages in case of death of a child. A Division Bench of this Court in F.A.O. No. 38 of 1984 (Zeniih Papers v.Gurmit Kaur) decided on 6th April. 1984, has held that dependency and multiplier in case of death of a child in accident has also to be evaluated. Therein one year old child when carried by the mother in her lap died as a result of accident. It was ruled that even a labourer would have been in a position to contribute Rs. 100/- per month for his parents and on that basis Rs. 19,000/- was allowed to the parents. In view of the aforesaid decision, I hold that the parents of the deceased minor child are entitled to Rs. 20,000/- as compensation. They shall further be entitled to interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the claim application till payment thereof.”
We have already overruled the judgment rendered in FAO No. 38/1984 (supra). Consequently, for the same reasons we overrule the decision in K. L. Pasrija’s case (supra) in so far as it relates to the principles for determination of the quantum of compensation payable to the parents of the deceased child.
19. The award of the Tribunal has not been challenged either by the insurance company or the owner/driver of the vehicle either on the ground of negligence or the quantum of compensation. It has been assailed only by the claimants. Accordingly we are left with no alternative but to uphold the award. The Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum. We think it will be just if the interest is awarded at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. We modify the award to this extent. The appeal is disposed of with these observations,
20. In F.A.O. No. 487/1986, a young boy aged 12 years, who was a student of 4th class, was killed in an accident. The parents of the victim made a claim for damages. The Tribunal allowed compensation of Rs. 43,200/- on account of loss of life. In arriving at this figure, it adopted the following criteria :–
“It is common knowledge that even the farm labourers these days arc available only at Rs. 20/- per clay and as such the earning capacity of the deceased can in no case be less than Rs. 600/- per month. The claimants have not brought on record their ages, i.e., the ages of the parents of the deceased, to work out the possible years of contribution towards their dependency by the deceased, had he remained alive. Be that as it may, keeping in view the circumstances of the deceased, he is expected to have earned a sum of Rs. 600/- per month out of which he was likely to contribute Rs. 300/- towards his parents i.e. Rs. 3600/- per annum. Keeping in view the possible age after which the deceased was likely to contribute towards the dependency of the claimants, multiplier of 12 as purchase factor, is reasonable to assess the loss of dependency in the instant case. The formula adopted is not supportable by any logic or at law. No evidence was led that the deceased was rendering any services to the parents. There may be chances of his doing so in the near future. It is all in the realm of conjectures. There are no peculiar circumstances justifying a higher amount of compensation. We think it will meet the ends of justice if a sum of Rs. 15,000/- is awarded as compensation to the claimants. We order accordingly. The claimants will also be entitled to interest @ 12% per annum on the amount awarded from the date of the application till its realisation.
21. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. Cross-objections No. 87-CII/1986 arc dismissed. We, however, make no order as to costs in both the cases.
22. In F.A.O. Mo. 572/1987, a ten years old student was killed in an accident. The Tribunal assessed compensation for Rs. 20,000/-. In doing so, it relied on K. L. Pasrija’s case. (1986 Acc CJ 252) (supra). We have already overruled this judgment in so far as it relates to the principles applicable for determining the quantum of compensation. The appeal has been filed only by the claimants, and the Insurance Company or the owner/driver of the vehicle have taken no exception to the award. In this view of the matter, we maintain the award and reject the appeal filed by the claimants. No order as to costs.
23. Coming to F.A.O. No. 446/1984. the Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 18,000/- along with interest @ 6% p.a. from the dale of the decree till the realisation of the decrial amount. The deceased, in this case, was aged 19 years at the time of the accident. The Tribunal has not given any reasons in support of the assessment made by it. It is proved on record that the deceased was a student of an Industrial Training Institute. He was also doiny some part-time job to render financial help to his parents. It cannot be lost sight of here that after some time he is likely to have married and may not have been in a position to render financial help to the extent he was doing before his marriage. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, we think it would meet the ends of justice if a sum of Rs. 25,000/- is awarded as compensation to the claimants. The amount awarded shall be payable along with interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of the application till the realisation of the amount a warded. The appeal is allowed to the extent stated. We, however, make no order as to costs.
24. In F.A.O. No. 566/1984, the victim of the accident was a 17 years old student of 9th Class. His mother made a claim for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 24,000/-as compensation. The same is held to be correct for the reasons given in this judgment, and not for the reasons stated by the Tribunal in its order. In the result, we dismiss the appeal filed by the claimants, but with no order as to costs. No meaningful arguments were addressed by the counsel or the cross-objectors-Insurance Company in support of X-Objections No. 86-CII/1984. Consequently, we dismiss the same. No order as to costs.
25. In F.A.O. No. 765/1985, the deceased is stated to be 17 years of age on the date of the accident. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 24,000/- as compensation to the claimants. It has given special reasons justifying the quantum of damages to the parents. No meaningful arguments were advanced by the appellants to disturb the finding on the quantum of compensation arrived at by the Tribunal.
26. All what has been stated above by us will be applicable to the accidents which took place prior to Oct. 1, 1982. By Act 47 of 1982, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1935 (Act No. 4 of 1939) was amended and Chap. VII-A was inserted in the principal Act. The principal object for inserting this provision was to provide immediate aid to the helpless victims of the motor accidents under the Motor Vehicles Act. Sections 92-A and 92-B read as under : —
“92-A. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault. –(1) Where the death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under Sub-section (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of fifteen thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of seven thousand five hundred rupees.
(3) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.
(4) A claim for compensation under Sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement.”
“92-B. Provisions as to other right to claim compensation for death or permanent disablement.
(1) The right to claim compensation under Section 92-A in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be in addition to any other right (hereafter in this section referred to as the right on the principle of fault) to claim compensation in respect thereof under any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force.
(2) A claim for compensation under Section 92A in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement under Section 92A and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for compensation under Section 92-A shall be disposed of as aforesaid in the first place.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), where in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, the person liable to pay compensation under Section 92A is also liable to pay compensation in accordance with the right on the principle of fault, the person so liable shall pay the first-mentioned compensation and —
(a) if the amount of the first-mentioned compensation is less than the amount of the second-mentioned compensation, he shall be liable to pay (in addition the first-mentioned compensation) only so much of the second-mentioned compensation as is equal to the amount by which it exceeds the first-mentioned compensation ;
(b) if the amount of the first-mentioned compensation is equal to or less than the amount of the second-mentioned compensation, he shall not be liable to pay the second-mentioned compensation.”
The provisions of Section 92-A are prospective. A plain reading of these provisions makes it clear that they create a fixed liability of a quantified sum even when no fault is found. No wrongful act, neglect or default of any person need be proved. It is a payment which the owner of the vehicle has to make or the insurer has to make for him. The award Under Section 92-A of the Act is final between the owner of the offending vehicle and the claimant. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 92-A, irrespective of the age, the Tribunal is obliged to make an interim award and award a sum of Rs. 15,000/-by way of compensation to the next kith and kin in case of death, and Rs. 7,500/- in respect of disablement of any person resulting from accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles.
27. Under Sub-section (3) of Section 92-B, the Tribunal has to award just compensation on the principle of fault and this compensation is in addition to the one awarded under Section 92A. If the compensation awarded under Sub-section (3) of Section 92-B is less than the one mentioned under Sub-section (2) of Section 92-A the Tribunal has to award the one mentioned under this section. In case the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that a higher compensation is to be awarded over and above the sum mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 92-A, he will keep the principles of determining the compensation enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of the judgment.
28. With these observations, these appeals are disposed of but with no order as to costs.