ORDER
1. This is tenants’ writ petition directed against the order dated 9th of June, 1986 passed by the second respondent-Tribunal rejecting the claim of the petitioners to register them as owners in respect of the house and the surrounding land measuring 20 cents bearing Revision Survey No. 260, situated at No. 104, Yelluru Village, Udupi Taluk and District, as provided under Section 38 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).
2. I have heard Sri J.S, Shetty, learned Counsel for the third respondent, who strongly supported the order impugned.
3. Having heard Sri Shetty and gone through the order, I am of the view that the order impugned is liable to be quashed on the short ground that it is not a speaking order and no reasons have been assigned by the Tribunal to reject the claim of the petitioners to register them as owners of the land in question.
4. However, Sri Shetty pointed out that the husband of the first petitioner was permitted by the third respondent to occupy the house in question by virtue of a rent bond and as such, the petitioners, after the death of the husband of the first petitioner, are not entitled to be registered as owners in terms of Section 38 of the Act.
5. I am unable to accede to the said submission of Sri Shetty. In Kusuma Poojarthy v Land Tribunal, Udupi Taluk, Dakshina Kannada and Others, I have negatived the similar contention and held that if a person, who is an agricultural labourer, is in occupation of the house located in a village, such a person is entitled to be registered as owner of the house as provided under Section 38 of the Act notwithstanding the fact that the person in occupation of the house, gets into possession of the house by virtue of the rent bond. The principle laid down by me in the said decision, in my view, would fully apply to the facts of the present case. Therefore, the Tribunal is required to consider the claim of the petitioners to register them as owners of the house and the surrounding land without being in any way influenced by the fact of the rent bond having been executed by the husband of the first petitioner. The only question which the Tribunal is required to consider, is whether the petitioners are agricultural labourers and the house and the land in question is situated in a village and whether the petitioners were residing in the dwelling house on the date of coming into force of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act (Act No. 1 of 1979)? As noticed by me earlier, the Tribunal has not addressed itself on this aspect of the matter. Therefore, on this short ground, the order impugned is liable to be quashed.
6. However, it is necessary to refer to the contention strenuously urged by Sri Shetty that this petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court. He submitted that since the order impugned was produced before the Civil Court in the suit filed by the third respondent seeking decree for possession of the house in question in the year 1987 and this petition having been filed in the year 1993, the same is liable to be rejected.
7. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the protection given to an agricultural labourer under Section 38 of the Act, I find that if I am to dismiss this petition only on the
ground of delay and laches, it would result in great injustice to the petitioners. While wide discretion is conferred on this Court while exercising its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the said power is required to be exercised by this Court keeping in mind the justness of the claims of the parties and the nature of the protection given to them under the provisions of a State legislation on the basis of which they claim certain rights. In the instant case, the petitioners are claiming their right to register them as owners as provided under Section 38 of the Act. The husband of the first petitioner has admittedly expired and the first petitioner is admittedly in occupation of the house. Section 38 of the Act provides that if, in any village, an agricultural labourer is ordinarily residing in a dwelling house on a land not belonging to him, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, but subject to sub-sections (2) and (3), such dwelling house along with the site thereof and land immediately appurtenant thereto and necessarily for its enjoyment, shall, on the date of publication of the
Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1078, in the Official Gazette (i.e., Act No, 1 of 1979), vest absolutely in the State Government, free from all encumbrances and the agricultural labourer shall be entitled to be registered as owner thereof. Therefore, if the petitioners were agricultural labourers in occupation of the dwelling house and the surrounding site in question as on 1st of January, 1979, statutorily the house and the surrounding land, which is required for their enjoyment, would, absolutely vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The consequence of such vesting is to register the occupants of the house who are agricultural labourers, as owners thereof. Therefore, when the Act statutorily vests the dwelling house located in a village and occupied by an agricultural labourer, absolutely with the State Government free from all encumbrances, I am of the view that it would not be appropriate for this Court, while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, to deny relief to such agricultural labourers the benefit of the legislation. There cannot be any dispute that the Act is a beneficial legislation intended to confer occupancy right on agricultural tenants; and ownership right in respect of the dwelling house occupied by agricultural labourers located in a village. There also cannot be any dispute that agricultural labourers belong to very poorer section of the society, who eke out their livelihood while working in the agricultural lands of others and earning wages on day-to-day basis; and who do not have even a shelter to live in. In this background, if Section 38 has been incorporated in the statute stating that such dwelling houses occupied by agricultural labourers vest in the State Government free from encumbrances and such agricultural labourers are entitled to be registered as owners thereof, the claim of such agricultural labourers, unless the Court is satisfied that on the face of it, it is unrighteous and baseless, should not be rejected by this Court once this Court is satisfied that the order impugned is liable to be quashed and the matter requires to be reconsidered by the Tribunal, on the ground of delay and laches. May be, in the suit filed by the third respondent, the impugned order was filed before the Civil Court in the year 1987. But, this Court cannot be oblivious to the fact situation that the petitioners are agricultural labourers and their place of residence is situated far away from the seat of the High Court and access to justice within a reasonable time from the date of the knowledge, is not easy to them. Further, many a time, in view of the pendency of the litigations before the Civil Court, the parties are misled with regard to the necessity of their approaching this Court invoking its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of the Tribunal. Ultimately, in a given case, whether this Court should exercise the discretion in favour of the person who approaches this Court on the ground of delay and laches or not, is a matter for this Court to consider depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case including the justness of the claims of the parties. Therefore, good cause and the beneficial legislation like the Act, should not be allowed to be defeated on the ground of delay. By quashing the order impugned and remitting the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration, no serious prejudice or injury will be caused to the contesting respondents. On the other hand, by doing so, the petitioners will be given one more opportunity to establish their claim before the Tribunal wherein the contesting respondents also will have an opportunity to put forward all their contentions disputing the claims of the petitioners. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the view that the relief sought for by the petitioners cannot be denied on the ground that there is delay on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court.
8. In the light of the discussion made above, I make the following:
ORDER
(i) Order Annexure-A, dated 9th of June, 1986 passed by the second respondent-Tribunal is hereby quashed.
(ii) The matter is remitted to the Tribunal for fresh consideration.
(iii) The Tribunal is directed to conduct fresh enquiry and pass fresh orders after giving an opportunity to the parties and in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in the course of this order.
9. In terms stated above, this petition is allowed and disposed of. Rule is issued and made absolute,
10. Sri R.K. Hatti, learned High Court Government Pleader, is permitted to file his memo of appearance within four weeks from today.