JUDGMENT
Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. The pertinent question that arises for consideration of the Court in this writ petition is, whether an order of determination of charges for re-transfer of plot passed by the Estate Officer is appealable and/or revisable within the provisions of The Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and the Chandigarh (Sale of Sites and Buildings) Rules, 1960, hereinafter referred to as the Rules.
2. the controversy arising out of undisputed facts is that the petitioner is the owner of the site No. 28, Sector 10-C, Chandigarh, a 5 kanals Plot. This was resumed on account of misuse by the petitioner as a ‘Guest House’. The order of resumption was challenged by the petitioner upto the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India without any success. The petitioner on 4.10.1999 submitted an application to the Estate Officer for re-transfer of the site under Rule 11(d) of the Rules. On this application, an order was passed by the Estate Officer on 12.1.2000 declaring that the petitioner was liable to pay Rs. 88,73,671/- as re-transfer charges. Objections were filed by the petitioner to this assessment on 3.2.2000. However, the Estate Officer, maintained his earlier order and rejected the objections vide order 13.6.2001. Against this order the petitioner filed a revision petition No. 176 of 2001 before the Chief Administrator, Chandigarh, copy of which is annexed to the writ petition as Annexure P/4, the petitioner also deposited the required amount before filing the revision in accordance with law. The Chief Administrator, Chandigarh, vide his order dated 1.4.2003 dismissed the revision on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to hear the revision petition. Aggrieved from this order, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner primarily raised the following two submissions before the Court:-
a) The order of the Estate Officer was revisable by the Chief Administrator and the Chief Administrator has failed to exercise the jurisdiction lawfully vested in him. Thus, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
b) The computation of charges of Rs. 88,73,671/- is in violation to the statutory rules as well as the norms for determination of such charges. The computation is also violative of the principles of natural justice.
4. We have already noticed that the facts are not in controversy. As such, the learned counsel appearing for Chandigarh Administration argued the matter to contend that under the provisions of the Act and the Rules, the order of the Estate Officer is final and cannot be questioned either in appeal or in revision before the authorities. He further contended that the computation of re-transfer charges is in consonance with law and does not call for interference and as such the writ petition should be dismissed.
5. The jurisdiction of the Estate Officer to compute and to pass an order in relation to determination of retransfer charges is not the question before us. The Estate Officer had passed the orders Annexure P/1 dated 13,1.2000 and Annexure P/3 dated 13.6.2001 determining the sum of Rs. 88,73,671/-. The question now that arises for consideration is whether such an order is appealable and/or revisable under the provisions of the law afore-referred. Apparently, the Estate Officer while exercising his powers under Rule 11-D of the Rules determined the premium payable for re-transfer of the property in favour of the petitioner. Rule 16 is the provision relating to appeals. Rule 16 is referable to Sections 10 and 22 of the Act. Under the Act as well as under the Rules, an order under Section 8 or Section 8-A of the Act is appealable before the Chief Administrator or such other officer as may be nominated by him. The impugned order is not an order under Section 8 or 8-A of the Act and as such is not appealable under Rule 16 read with Section 10 of the Act.
6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, while relying upon Sub-rule (3) of Rule 11-D of the Rules, vehemently contended that the order passed by the Estate Officer in determining the premium for re-transfer is an order under Rule 11-D and as such is a final order and is not even revisable. We do not find any merit in this contention. An order under Rule 11-D is an order founded on resumption of the property under Section 8-a of the Act. Under Sub-section (1) computation is arrived at and order is passed by the Estate Officer. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 11-D reads as under:-
“11-D(3) The prevailing price shall be assessed by the Estate Officer or such other authority as may be prescribed by the Chief Administrator and in doing so the Estate Officer or such other authority shall give the applicant reasonable opportunity of being heard. The assessment made by the Estate Officer shall be final.”
7. Section 10 of the Act deals with appeals and the revisions which are maintainable under the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Appeals are provided against order passed under Section 8-A while Sub-section (3) of Section 10 empowers the Chief Administrator to either on his own motion or on an application received in this behalf, at any time, calls for the record of any proceedings in which the Estate Officer has passed an order for the purposes of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such orders. He is further empowered to pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit. The power vested in the Chief Administrator under Sub-section (3) does not define the kind of the orders in which he could exercise such a power. In other words, there is no limitation, much less a bar, on the power of the Chief Administrator to entertain application and exercise the revisable power as stipulated under these provisions. In clear contradiction to the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 10 where appeal is provided only against specifically prescribed orders, Sub-section (3) of the Section does not contemplate the language of any such restriction. The Chief Administrator is expected to exercise much wider power for determining the legality or propriety of any order which is passed by the Estate Officer. The order imposing premium/re-transfer charges is an order of serious consequences and the petitioner has been held liable to pay a sum of Rs. 88,73,671/-. In our view, the petitioner would have the right to submit an application to the Chief Administrator and show him if the said order suffered from any illegality or impropriety in law or on facts.
8. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Maya Devi and Anr. v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (2001-2)128 The Punjab Law Reporter 145, construed Rule 21-A of 1973 Rules, which is para-materia to Rule 11-D of the present Rules before us, and held as under:-
“The order apparently had serious consequences for the petitioner. The authority was exercising its power under a statutory rule. It was bound to exercise its discretion in a just and equitable manner. This discretion had to conform to the rules of fair play. As opportunity of hearing should have been given to the petitioners to explain their position. None having been given, we are unable to sustain the order.
It also deserves mention that the Chief Administrator while dismissing the petitioner appeal has inter alia observed that there is no right of appeal or revision “against such administrative decisions of the Estate Officer.” We are afraid that the statutory power vested in the Estate Officer is not purely administrative. Since valuable rights of the citizens are involved, the power has to be exercised in conformity with the statutory rules and the principles of justice. Still further, it is not a purely administrative power. The authority is dealing with public property and the rights of the citizens. Its actions must conform to the rules applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings.”
9. Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 1 \~D provides that the assessment order passed by the Estate Officer shall be final. The expression ‘final’ must be understood and construed in its correct perspective. Once the Act and the Rules specifically vest revisional powers in the Chief Administrator, they cannot be taken away by giving a restricted interpretation to the expression ‘final’ as it is not the intention of the rule-making authorities. It may not be uniform rule that the expression ‘final’ or ‘finality’ would necessarily exclude jurisdiction of the Courts or such other forums under, the provisions of the Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shri Kihoto Hollohan v. Shri Zachillhu and Ors., J.T. 1992(1) S.C. 660 held that a finality clause is not a legislative magical incantation which has that effect of telling off Judicial Review. Statutory finality of a decision presupposes and is subject to its consonance with the statute. ‘Final’ may mean without appeal but not without application for review.
10. ‘Final’ necessarily does not mean infolable and so as to exclude jurisdiction of a superior authority which has sufficiently been indicated under the provisions of the Act. ‘Final’ understood in its plain language would mean concluded decisions and the decisions which would be final as far as the Court or forum render it is concerned. To stretch the meaning of this expression beyond that would tantamount to doing violation to the settled principles of interpretation.
11. In view of our discussion, we are of the considered view that the Chief Administrator, Chandigarh, has fallen in an error jurisdiction in not exercising a power legally vested in him. The Chief Secretary, Finance, Chandigarh, while exercising the powers of Chief Administrator, has fallen in error of law in not entertaining the application of the petitioner within the meaning and scope of the provisions of Section 10(3) of the Act read with Rule 17 of the Rules.
12. Having decided the basic legal issue in the present case, we do not find it necessary for us to go into the question of determination and fixation of the re-transfer charges in the present writ petition. The concerned authorities have to hear the petitioner and decide the matter on its merits and in accordance with law. Consequently, we
set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to the appropriate authority for its
determination in accordance with law. We make it clear that the concerned authority
shall also go into the questions of determination of re-transfer charges as raised by the
petitioner before us. The writ petitions accordingly allowed in the above terms, leaving
the parties to bear their own costs.
Sd/-
Mehtab S. Gill, J.