JUDGMENT
Ajay Kumar Mittal, J.
1. Kashmir Kaur, petitioner-respondent No. 1 filed an application for leading secondary evidence to prove agreement/compromise between the parties. The application was rejected by the trial Court by order dated 12.12.2001. It is this order which has been impugned by defendant No. 1 in this revision petition.
2. Plaintiff-respondents 1 and 2 filed a suit for declaration that they were owners of land measuring 242 Kanals 16 Marias and perpetual lessee of land measuring 40 Kanals on the basis of Will dated 29.5.1994 executed by one Inder Singh son of Ganga Singh. A prayer was also made for a decree for possession of two rooms in the house of the share of aforesaid Inder Singh. It was stated that mutation No. 2582 of inheritance of aforesaid Inder Singh sanctioned on 8.8.1994 in favour of defendants 1 and 2 and subsequent resultant entries in the revenue record and registered sale deed executed by defendant No. 1 i.e. the petitioner in favour of defendant No. 4 in respect of 481/4856 share of aforesaid land measuring 242 Kanals 16 Marias on the basis of mutation No. 2582 and resultant mutations Nos. 2609 and 2608 sanctioned on 31.8.1995 were wrong, illegal, null and void and not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs. As a consequential relief, it was also prayed that the plaintiffs were entitled for possession of land measuring 242 Kanals 16 Marias and 40 Kanals on the basis of their title.
3. In the application for leading secondary evidence, it was stated that a compromise had taken place between the parties whereby the plaintiffs had admitted ownership of defendants 1 and 2 over the suit property. In lieu of a tractor belonging to Inder Singh purchased by plaintiff No. 1, the plaintiff had agreed that after getting the land redeemed, the mortgaged property shall be handed over to defendants. It was stated that the said compromise had taken place in the presence of the Panchayat of three villages and the original compromise was in possession of the plaintiffs. It was further prayed that the plaintiffs be asked to produce the said compromise and in case they do not do so, the petitioner may be permitted to lead secondary evidence by producing photostat copy of the compromise.
4. The application was resisted by the plaintiffs. It was denied that any compromise had taken place between the parties or that the original compromise was with the plaintiffs. It was stated that if the petitioner possessed any compromise as has been stated by her, the same was a forged document.
5. The trial court declined petitioner’s prayer primarily on the ground that the factum of existence of the compromise had not been pleaded in the written statement and, therefore, the petitioner could not be permitted to lead secondary evidence in respect of such document which is not a registered document and had not been relied upon by her.
6. Shri Sukhbir Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner assailed the order of the trial Court and submitted that the application for leading secondary evidence has been erroneously declined as the petitioner in para 3(f) and (g) of the written statement had specifically pleaded regarding compromise between the parties. He next referred to the cross-examination of Sukhwant Kaur where a specific question regarding compromise had been put to her. The counsel then submitted that document of compromise did not require registration as the same was a memorandum of settlement and it did not create/extinguish any right so far as the land in dispute was concerned and it acknowledged the previous title of the parties. In support of this, the counsel relied upon two decisions of this Court in Mool Chand v. Udho Ram (1994-2) 107 P.L.R. 736 and Bhagwan Singh v. Hardial Singh and Ors. . The counsel also relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in Nawab Singh v. Inderjit Kaur and submitted that case of the petitioner is governed by Clause (a) of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short “the Act”) and since the original compromise was in the possession of the plaintiffs and was not being produced by them, the petitioner was entitled to lead secondary evidence to prove the same.
7. Shri R.S. Khakh, counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 submitted that photo copy of a document is not admissible in evidence. In support of his submission, the counsel placed reliance on a judgment of Madhya Pardesh High Court in Ramesh Verma and Ors. v. Smt. Lajesh Saxena and Ors. 1998(2) Civil Court Cases 67. The counsel further supported the order passed by the trial Court.
8. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the record and am of the view that the revision petition deserves to succeed. Para 3(f) and (g) of the written statement as has been incorporated in the grounds of revision as well, reads thus:
3(f)’ There was a litigation between Swaran Kaur defendant No. 2 and Kashmir Kaur defendant No. 1 regarding land in question house and Tractor belonging to the Sadi lnder Singh i.e. in the month of August, September, 1995 and was got resolved between them and the plaintiff and their husbands took active part in resolving the same, if there was any Will of the disputed land in their favour then they must have brought in the notice of the defendant No. 1 and 2 husband of one of the plaintiff Sukhwant Kaur, Shri Dilawar Singh has signed that written compromise as well.
(g) Sukhwant Kaur plaintiff have purchased the disputed Tractor in question belonging to Inder Singh deceased as per above said compromise from the Kashmir Kaur defendant No. 1 and Swaran Kaur defendant No. 2 and got their land out of the dispute land redeemed which was under pledge against the Tractor which was purchased by Sukhwant Kaur plaintiff. The land which was redeemed was out of the disputed land if this land was of the plaintiff as per alleged will then this they should not have done.
9. Further in the cross-examination of Sukhwant Kaur, a specific question had been put to her with regard to the aforesaid compromise.
10. The Apex Court in Nawab Singh’s case (supra) has laid down as under:
Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the trial Court was not justified in rejecting the prayer seeking leave of the Court for production of secondary evidence. The prayer has been rejected mainly on the ground that the copy of the rent note sought to be produced by the appellant was of doubtful veracity. The trial Court was not justified in forming that opinion without affording the appellant an opportunity of adducing secondary evidence. The appellant has alleged the original rent note to be in possession of the respondent. The case was covered by Clause (a) of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
11. The petitioner had pleaded in the application for leading secondary evidence that the original of the compromise was in possession of the plaintiffs and they be asked to produce the same. The case of the petitioner is covered by Clause (a) of Section 65 of the Act. The petitioner cannot be denied permission to lead secondary evidence to produce the compromise but the petitioner shall be required to prove the authenticity and genuineness of the photo copy of the document sought to be produced by way of secondary evidence. The judgment relied upon by the counsel for respondents 1 and 2 did not relate to leading of secondary evidence and is thus not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
12. In view of the above, the revision petition is allowed. The impugned order of the trial Court dated 12.12.2001 is set aside and the trial court is directed to permit the petitioner to lead secondary evidence to produce photo copy of the compromise which shall however, be subject to petitioner’s proving the authenticity and genuineness of the photo copy of the said document. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.