ORDER
T.K. Chandrashekhara Das, J.
1. This matter arises out of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter called as “Bombay Rent Act”). The petitioners are the tenants of the respondents who challenge the order passed by the Appellate Court in Appeal No. 129 of 1993 on the file of the Court of Small Causes at Bombay whereby the appeal of the petitioner for setting aside the eviction order passed by the trial Judge was rejected. The respondents have filed petition before the Small Causes Court as RAE & Suit No. 1130/3714 of 1985 with the prayer that second plaintiff in that suit i.e. Hiranath Shamrao Nawalkar requires the suit premises for his own occupation as he was occupying a Block No. 18, 2nd Floor, Suprabhat Apartments Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Dayan Mandir Road, Dadar, Bombay – 400 028 as a tenant and he was evicted from there by the order of the Court and the said eviction order though went upto the Supreme Court, he was unsuccessful and therefore, he was compelled to vacate his tenanted premises and therefore, he has no other premises where he can shift with his family and household articles. Therefore, he was compelled to shift to Nawroj Building, Hughes Road, Bombay 400 007 where the first petitioner and family along with members of the family were residing which was already crowded. By coming back to Nawroj Building, the same became over crowded and impossible to occupy. Therefore, it is necessary to shift one of the families of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to the suit building after evicting petitioner.
2. The defence mainly set up by the petitioner was that the respondents have got other rooms which was occupied by tenants and that even when the tenants vacated these rooms, instead of occupying himself he has again inducted new tenants and therefore, there is no bona fide in the requirement of the respondent. He also contended that comparative hardship will be greater than that of the landlord if the tenant is being vacated. During the pendency of the petition, the original defendant died and the present petitioners are the legal heirs of Mahadeo Damodar Kale, who was the original tenant. Therefore, by virtue of sub section (2) of section 13 no order can be passed for evicting the petitioners. Both these contentions of the defendant were rejected by the Small Causes Court and against that appeal was filed by the petitioners as Appeal No. 129 of 1991. The same was also dismissed by the Court below.
3. The learned Counsel for the respondent has mainly relied upon his argument that it is proved before the Court that during the pendency of the proceedings, certain tenants of the respondents were vacated the premises and the same were transferred to some other tenants and transfer took place even before 1980 and creation of tenancy during the period should be held against the landlord.
4. It is seen from the record that this factual aspect of the matter has been considered by the original authority and appellate authority and found that the respondent did not get at any point of time vacant possession of those rooms and it was transferred inter se between the previous tenants and present tenants. The contention of the respondent is that the respondent had to cope up with the situation. Instead of going for litigation against tenant as otherwise he will loose his rent also, he was recognizing tenancy of the new tenants even though they have been transferred from previous tenant to new tenant as without consent of the respondent. This contention of the landlord were accepted by both the courts and found that as respondents have established the bona fide need as the need was reasonable and legal.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Abhyankar argued on the comparative assessment of the hardship of the parties. The petitioner is put to more hardship in such situation than that the respondents, because he was an employee of the Co-operative Society which has not provided any accommodation nor has be become member of any of the Housing Society whereas the respondents have other premises to occupy. He submits that the landlord has even Nawroj Building to occupy and this circumstances ought to have weighed by the courts below in assessing the hardship of the parties as contemplated under section 13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act. However, this contention was also rejected by the courts below on appraisal of evidence in this case.
6. I do not find these contentions of the petitioner could be sufficient to interfere with the orders passed by the Court below. It is in this context, the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent had to be considered. Mr. Walawalkar for the respondent argued that this Court has limited jurisdiction to interfere in this case. Even he cited decision of this Court reported in Shaniwad Dhandu Dharrukar v. Prabhavati Chandrakant Panji 1979 M.L.J. 838 and Paygonda Survgonda Patil v. Jingonda Surgonda Patil.. In those cases, it has been held that as on evaluation of evidence, even if the courts below has arrived at wrong conclusion, this Court is not competent to interfere in the exercise of the jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. He also cited a decision of the Supreme Court in in Nagendra Nath Bora and another v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and others wherein the Supreme Court has laid down norms within which this Court should exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In para 26 of the judgment in that decision, the Supreme Court has held:
“But the question still remains as to what is the legal import of the expression ‘error of law apparent on the face of the record.’ Is it every error of law that can attract the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, to quash the order impugned? This Court, as observed above, has settled the law in this respect by laying down that in order to attract such jurisdiction, it is essential that the
error should be something more than a mere error of law; that it must be one which is manifest on the face of the record. In this respect, the law in India and the law in England are, therefore, the same. It is also clear, on an examination of all the authorities of this Court and of those in England, referred to above, as also those considered in the several judgments of this Court, that the common-law writ, now called order of the certiorari, which was also adopted by our Constitution, is not meant to take the place of an appeal where the statute does not confer a right of appeal. Its purpose is only to determine, on an examination of the record, whether the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has not proceeded in accordance with the essential requirements of the law which it was meant to administer. Mere formal or technical errors, even though of law, will not be sufficient to attract this extraordinary jurisdiction.”
7. In exercise of powers conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution, wrongs and errors committed by the courts below are not liable to be corrected untill and unless those errors do manifest on the face of the record and amounts to failure of justice. Only in such cases those orders are liable to be corrected and interferred by the Court. As I stated earlier, of two grounds taken by tenant before the Court below, both the courts have concurrently rejected those grounds and found that the respondents have established that requirement is bona fide and reasonable and for the suit building should be vacated by the petitioner for their occupation. It may be noted in this case that the respondent is asking his tenant to vacate his building only when had to be evicted from his tenament after tough legal resistance extending upto Supreme Court. These circumstances cannot be ignored where the reasonableness of the requirement of the landlord is examined. He was just asking his tenant to vacate only when his landlord asked him to vacate his tenant. Nothing more is required for the landlord to show his bona fides. In view of the above, I find no merits in the writ petition. Writ Petition is dismissed, In the circumstances, no orders as to costs.
8. At this stage, learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Abhyankar requested for stay of this order for another eight weeks. Accordingly this order is stayed for another eight weeks with a condition that petitioner files an undertaking before this Court that he will hand over possession voluntarily of the suit premises and also not to create any third party interest. Of course, subject to the orders of the Apex Court.
9. Petition dismissed.