JUDGMENT
V.K. Bali, J.
1. This revision has been directed against concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority dated
19.12.1981 and 18.10.1982 respectively rejecting the petition filed by the petitioner-landlady, who sought eviction of the respondent-tenant on the ground of bona-fide personal requirement and the demised premises being unfit and unsafe for human habitation.
2. The only ground that is pressed, into service at this stage is personal bona-fide necessity of the landlady. On the issue aforesaid, learned Appellate Authority held as fol-lows:-
“Turning to the case in hand, it was the admitted case of petitioner that she was presently putting up at Ambala Cantt along with her husband, who was employed there as major in 49 AD Regiment c/o 56 APO. Her case was that her husband was very likely to be transferred in the near future to a non-family station as he had remained posted in the peace area for the last several years. This ejectment application was filed on 26 Aug. 80. The matter remained pending with the Rent Controller for almost one year and four months. The husband of petitioner-2 has not so far been shifted to a non-family station in the duration of last 2 years. It was urged that in the event of the shifting of the husband of petitioner-2 to a non-family station, she will be left with no Govt. Accommodation. I am afraid, the position was not as taken by petitioner-1. The family of the husband of petitioner-1 can be asked to vacate the Govt. accommodation in the event of his transfer to a non-family station.As a matter of fact the learned counsel for the petitioner also subscribed to this view taken by me. Had the petition been as made out by petitioner-l above, she would have placed the relevant rules framed by the Army Authorities in regard to the allotment of the houses to their officers which require them to vacate the same on their posting to non-family stations. It appears that the ground of personal requirement taken by petitioner-l was a thinly disguised cover up to get the house in dispute vacated after petitioner-2 her mother had failed in a similar exercise as shown in the copies of the judgments passed by the Rent Controller in Rent Petition No. 150/2 of 1978 brought by her against the respondent and the Appellate Authority vide Ex. R1 and R2 decided on 8 December, 1979 and 17 March, 80 wherein it was observed that the real object of petitioner-2 in bringing the ejectment proceedings against the respondent was to get the house vacated so that she may sell it out as indicated by the letters Ex. R1 and R2 exhibited therein. Chaman Lal son of Niku Ram, who had appeared as RW2 has again deposed in favour of the respondent as RW2 that petitioner-2 had offered the respondent to purchase the house. The Rent Controller had not accepted the plea taken by petitioner-2 that she wanted to shift from Delhi to settle at Rohtak, for getting the transfer of her husband in MCH Rohtak, as it was found that he owned a house at Delhi, was in occupation of his maternal uncle’s house there and was under treatment of the Medical Doctors. AI1MS, New Delhi. As observed in R.K.Jain v. Khazan Singh, (1980)82 P.L.R., 142, the spreading distance between the word “need” and the word “excuse” has to be traversed by the landlord all through. In my view, from the given set of facts, the court is unable to spell an element of need of petitioner-1 to occupy the house in dispute. It must, therefore, be held that she was putting up a lame excuse the cause her so called element of need was merely speculative”.
3. No illegality, infirmity or impropriety has been pointed out from the facts of this case and, in particular, findings of the learned Appellate Authority, extracted above. The original landlord, after having lost her cause in March, 1980, transferred the property in dispute by way of a collusive decree in favour of her daughter. The ejectment application, giving rise to the present revision, was filed on 10.9.1980, i.e., within six months after the original landlady lost the cause upto the Appellate Authority. This, in itself, was enough to return a finding that the transfer of property in dispute by way of collusive decree in favour of the petitioner was not a bona-fide transaction and in fact it was so done to secure eviction of the respondent. Further, the only fact that was pleaded pertaining to personal necessity was that the landlady being wife of an army officer would
require to shift to the demised premises if her husband was to be transferred to a non-family station. Learned Appellate Authority has returned the finding, which, at that stage or at present, was not challenged that in case the Army Officer is posted at non-family station, his family is permitted to retain the government accommodation as such. This would further show that the present was not a case of bona-fide personal requirement of the landlady.
4. Finding no merit in this petition, I dismiss the same, leaving, however, the parties
to bear their own costs.