JUDGMENT
Batta, J.
1. The controversy in all these appeals centers around the agreement for sale entered into between the parties on 9th March, 1977 in respect of urban property described in Conservatoria of the Land Registration of IIhas under No 1701 in which there exists a house. The
said agreement was executed between the parties in the chamber of Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira.
2. The undisputed facts are that Inventory proceedings were pending in the Court of Civil Judge, S.D. Panaji, wherein Maria Eduarda Apolonia Gonsalvese Mesquita was one of the parties. The said Inventory proceedings were fixed on 9th March, 1977 and on that day auction between the parties to the said Inventory proceedings was to be held. Advocate, Shri Rui Gomes Pereira, who was appearing for the said Maria, had informed her that the sale price in the auction may go up to Rs. 4 lakhs and that she should arrange the said amount in order to bid for the auction. It is not disputed that auction money is not required to be deposited on the date of auction itself, but it is to be deposited within five days from the demand made by the parly. On 8th March, 1977 the said Maria reported to her Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira that she has been able to arrange only Rs. 40,000/-. On the next day i.e. on 9-3-1977 the said Maria went to the office of her Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira and there she found Shripad Vishnu Tarcar, Sanjeev Tarcar and Advocate Shri Bharne. The said Shripad and Sanjeev Tarcar had agreed to advance money to the extent of Rs. 2 lakhs in case the same was required by the said Maria for the purpose of bidding in the said auction. Thereafter the said Maria along with her advocate went to the Court, attended the action in which the auction bid of Rs. 15,001/- of the said Maria was accepted in respect of the said urban property including the house which is spoken of in the agreement for sale. The said Maria along with her Advocate returned back to the chamber of Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira where the agreement in question was entered between the parties.
3. It is the version of Maria that she had informed her Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira that she did not want to sell the said urban property and house since she needed the same for her occupation. However, in spite of her objections Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira typed the agreement for sale and insisted that she should sign the agreement. According to Maria, as the talk of sale cropped up suddenly and unexpectedly and as she was suffering from hypertension, she felt suddenly unwell and herblood pressure started rising, as a result of which she became nervous
and confused. In order to avoid collapsing in the house of strangers, she signed the said agreement even though it was not read over and explained to her since her own Advocate as well as said Shripad and Sanjeev continued insisting that she should sign the agreement. Her son Caesar, who knows Portuguese was present along with her. The agreement in question was typed in Portuguese. After the execution of the said agreement, a cheque of Rs. 5000/- was given by the said Tarcars to her and she was taken in a car to her house. Her case further is that on the same day namely 9-3-1977, she got the agreement for sale read over and explained to her by one of her friends and came to know that the suit papers were a copy of the agreement. She was shocked at the deception and fraud practised upon her by the said Tarcars with active connivance of her own Advocate and she terminated the services of her Advocate at the first available opportunity. She sent the cheque for Rs. 5000A to Shripad Tarcar by registered A.D. letter on 11-3-1977 and asked him to meet her on 12-3-1977. It is pertinent to note at this stage that the said Maria in the Special Civil Suit No. 214/77 which was filed by her on 17th Aug. 1977 for declaration of the said contract as voidable and rescinded, did not make any reference that the said cheque of Rs. 5000/- was encashed by her on 10-3-1977 itself and this vital fact was suppressed by her. On 12-3-1977 she informed Shripad Tarcar who came to meet her that the said agreement be cancelled. The cheque sent by Maria was returned back by Shripad Tarcar on 15-3-1977. Her main contention in the suit filed by her is that the said agreement was got prepared and signed otherwise than by her free consent mainly with a view of deceiving and defrauding her by selling the suit house at a throwaway price of just Rs. 65,000/-when the market value of the suit house was worth more than Rs. 2 lakhs.
3A. Taracar respondents had first filed a suit for permanent injunction against Maria seeking to restrain her from dealing with or disposing of or alienating or encumbering the suit house or any part thereof in any manner or in any way committing any act involving breach of the agreement dated 9-3-1977. The suit was field on 21-7-1977. Written statement was filed by Maria in the said suit on 17th Aug. 1977 and on the same day she had also filed the Special Civil Suit No.
214/77. Subsequently on 10-7-1978Tarcars filed suit for specific performance, possession, compensation and/or damages.
4. The case of Tarcar is that they own a building in Panaji wherein they run ‘Vistar Hotel’ and the property, subject matter of the said agreement for sale, is adjoining to the said building on account of which they were interested in purchasing the said property for the expansion of Hotel Vistar. Accordingly, they had entered into an agreement with Maria for purchase of the said property which was to be allotted to her since her bid for the same had been accepted. A cheque of Rs. 5000/- was given as earnest money which was got realised by Maria on 10th March, 1977 itself. According to them Maria had met them on 12-3-1977 and expressed her intention of going back on the agreement but they informed her that they were willing and ready to perform their part of the contract; that the sale deed was required to be executed within one month from the judgment of the Court confirming the allotment in the Inventory proceedings.
5. On the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed in all the three suits and the issues centered around the execution of the said agreement for sale. The main issues pertained to the fact whether the said agreement was signed by Maria with free consent and whether Tarcars were entitled to specific performance.
6. On the side of Tarcars six witnesses were examined and on the side of Maria three witnesses were examined. Civil Judge, S.D. Panaji passed a common judgment on 25th Oct. 1988 which is impugned in all these three appeals. All the three appeals have been filed by the said Maria. The trial Judge after considering the arguments advanced before him and assessing the evidence on record negatived the contentions of Maria that the agreement lacked free consent and held that Tarcars were entitled to specific performance.
7. Learned Senior Advocate Shri S. Dessai appearing on behalf of appellant Maria, who expired during the pendency of the appeals and legal representatives are brought on record, after relying upon various provisions of the Contract Act and Specific Relief Act, took us through the evidence on record and his main submission is that the attending circumstances on record at there time of execution of the said agreement
established that the appellant Mariahad not signed the agreement on account of her free will, but her will was influenced by her Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira. The factors which have been placed by learned Senior Advocate for the appellants for ourconsideration in this connection are : (a) that the appellant was 60 years old and was suffering from blood pressure; (b) that Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira was appearing in her matters for over three years prior to the said agreement and he was in a position to influence her in signing the agreement; (c) that respondent Shripad Tarcar is classmate of Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira; (d) that the talk relating to the agreement took place through Advocate namely Advocate Shri Bharne and Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira; (e) Appellant Maria had to arrange money in order to bid in the auction fixed on 9-3-1977 and in the morning of 9-3-1977 respondents Tarcars had agreed to advance her money to the tune of Rs. 2 lakhs;
(f) that after the acution appellant Maria had flatly refused to sell the said property; but even in spite of her insistence that she did not want to sell the property Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira not only typed the agreement in question but forced her to sign the said agreement.
8. According to learned Advocate for the appellants these circumstances are sufficient to come to the conclusion that appellant Maria had not signed the agreement on account of her free will but undue influence was exercised on her by Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira. In this connection, it is submitted by him that if the agreement suffers from the vice of free consent at the time of execution, the same cannot become good on encashment of the earnest money of Rs. 5,000/-
9. Alternatively, it was contended b y him that the trial Court had not at all examined the question of discretion involved in granting relief of specific performance and that the agreement in question is not only inequitable but unconsciousable as well. According to him, the agreement in question cannot be said to have taken place in normal circumstances and even if this Court comes to the conclusion that the agreement does not suffer from the vice of free consent, specific performance should not be allowed in view of Section 20(2)(a) and (c) of the Specific Relief Act.
10. On the other hand, learned Advocate Shri J.P. Mulgaonkar submitted before us that the appellant had failed to establish lack of free consent; that no specific details were pleaded by appellant in support of her plea of undue influence and that the trial Court after due assessment of evidence on record and taking into consideration all relevant aspects has rightly negatived the plea taken by the appellant. He further submitted that the normal and ordinary rule is to allow specific performance, unless for some sufficient justification the party seeking specific performance is held to be disentitled from grant of such relief. It was also urged by him that the provisions of the Contract Act found in Chapter II deal with the contracts or agreements being void or voidable inter se the parties and free consent as defined in Section 14 of the Indian Contract Act read with Section 16 of the said Act has to be determined inter se the parties and the undue influence which has to be proved is in relation to parties to the contract alone. According to Shri Mulgaonkar, the appellant had encashed the cheque of Rs. 5000/- on the very next day of the execution of the agreement and the said fact, by itself negates lack of free consent theory. It is further contended that this theory was developed by the appellant at the time of filing of the written statement as well as in the suit by her on 17th August, 1987 and prior to that there was no plea of undue influence. Advocate Shri Mulgaonkar has also urged that the transaction in question cannot be said to be unconscionable and since the price agreed to be paid cannot be said to be so extremely low that prima facie it could be said that the contract in question was unconscionable. He, therefore, contends that the appeals are liable to be dismissed.
11. Learned Advocates for the parties had placed reliance on some rulings. We shall refer to the same hereinafter while dealing with the matter on merits.
12. The first point which is required to be determined in these appeals is whether the agreement in question is voidable on account of lack of free consent on the part of the appellant. On this aspect the respondents had examined three witnesses namely Shripad Tarcar -respondent No. 1, Advocate Shri Bharne – P.W. 2 and Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira – P.W. 6. The original appellant had only examined herself.
Even her son Caesar, who is said to be knowing Portuguese and who was accompanying her at the time when the agreement in question was executed was not examined. As we have already pointed out the plea taken by the appellant is that her consent was influenced by Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira and as such it is necessary to briefly refer to the salient aspects of her deposition. She has stated that in the first week of March she had contacted Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira and had informed him that she had only Rs. 40,000/- plus Rs. 10,000/- upon which Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira asked her if she had spoken to Tarcar but she informed him that he had never asked her to speak to Tarcar; that she told him that if she could talk to Tarcar, but he told her that it was not necessary for her to speak and he would speak to him as he was his classmate. After two days when she met him, he told her that he had already talked to Tarcar who had promised to give money. On 9-3-77 when she went to the chamber of her Advocate, she found respondents Shripad and Sanjeev with Advocate Shri Bharne sitting there. She asked Shripad whether he would give money if needed and he nodded his head in the affirmative. Thereafter she along with her Advocate and her son Caesar went to the court where her bid for the suit property was accepted for Rs. 15,001/-. When she returned back to the chamber of her Advocate, Shripad asked her if she was selling the house, but she replied in the negative. Advocate Shri Bharne removed a bundle of papers from the cupboard and gave them to Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira who started typing them on typewriter. She reportedly told Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira that she did not want to sign the papers and would come for the said purpose either in the afternoon or on the next morning, but Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira told her that if she were not to sign the agreement, Shripad would take her to court. She became nervous and afraid and signed the said agreement. She was taken by her son Caesar and on reaching home around 3.30 p.m. she became unconscious. Doctor was called and at about 7 p.m. she regained consciousness. On the same day she told her son Caesar to call her tenant Vasude v Dhume and she told him to read those papers which were given to her, but he was not able to understand and could not explain the same. On the next day i.e. 10-7-77 at about 9.00 a.m. Vasudev Dhume came with
those papers and told her that she had been cheated. He also told her to return the plaintiff’s money/cheque given by Vistal Hotel. He advised her to return the amount by making a draft. She went to the Bank, signed on the cheque on both sides and presented the same to the Bank Clerk and told him to give a draft of that amount. The said Bank Clerk informed her that no draft could be sent within Panaji and he advised her to send a cheque for that amount. She told him to keep the cheque of Vistal Hotel with him for two day. She then obtained cheque book and signed the cheque for Rs. 5000/- and sent by registered post to Shripad but he returned the cheque to her and again she sent it to him. After four days she went to the said Bank Clerk to inquire about the Vistar Hotel cheque and he told her that as she did not turn up that he had already credited it to her account and the cheque of Rs. 5000/- which she had given to him was torn by him. She admitted that her son Caesar was fully conversant with Portuguese and knew to read and write Portuguese. She denied that any meeting had taken place on 8th March. But in further cross-examination she stated that she did not know whether in the meeting held on 8-3-77 it was decided that the agreement for sale would be made in the office of Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira on 9th March, 1977.
13. As against the evidence of appellant Maria, the respondents had examined respondent No. 1 as P.W. 1, Advocate Shri Bharne as P.W. 2 and Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira as P.W. 6. All three of them speak of the meeting which took place with appellant Maria on 8th March, 1977 in which the appellant had agreed to sell the said property including the house for Rs. 60,000/-. The said contention of the respondents which is supported by Advocate Shri Bharne and Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira is further corroborated by the fact that the stamp paper for the purpose of preparing agreement to sell had been purchased by Advocate Shri Bharne in the evening of 8th March, 1977 itself. In the light of the said evidence it is not possible to believe the appellant that there was no meeting at all on 8th March, 1977 regarding sale of the said property.
14. No undue influence is alleged against the respondents nor anything material could be elicited during the cross-examination of respondent No. 1 (P.W. 1). The case of the
appellant is that the said agreement was never read over or explained to her and imspile of the said stand taken by the appellant it was suggested to Advocate Shri Barnc (P.W. 2) that Advocate Shri Monteiro had explained the said agreement in English to enable only the plaintiffs namely Tarcars to understand it.
15. Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira, who was examined on commission stated that on 8th March, 1977 the appellant had agreed to sell the said building for Rs. 60,000/- and on the next day after discussion the appellant refused to sell the said building. However, after further discussion the appellant agreed to sell the building for Rs. 65,000/-. He also stated that the appellant was in good health and had signed the agreement voluntarily. Nothing material could be elicited during his cross-examination to indicate that any kind of undue influence was exercised by him. Therefore, we have to scrutinise the evidence of the appellant in order to find whether there are any circumstances to justify her stand that her consent was obtained by exercising undue influence over her. A close scrutiny of her evidence would go to establish that her testimony on this aspect cannot be believed and we are of the opinion that this story has been evolved by her just prior to the filing of the suit and written statement by her. Before proceeding to discuss the said aspect, it is necessary to deal with certain other aspects relating to her evidence in order to demonstrate that her testimony cannot be believed.
16. Admittedly her son Caesar was present along with her when the agreement in question was signed and the appellant has chosen not to examine him who was actually eye witness to what had transpired and who could throw light on the question whether any undue influence had been exercised on her to sign the said agreement. In the suit filed by her no specific details of undue influence were given, except that in spite of repeatedly insisting that she did not want to sell the property, Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira insisted that she should sign the agreement. Order VI, Rule 4 CPC provides that in all cases in which the party pleading relies on misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence and in all other cases where particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates) and items if necessary) shall be stated in the
pleading. Though it is not necessary to quote any ruling on this aspect, yet it may be mentioned that the Apex Court in Afsar Shaikh v. Soleman Bibi has laid down that such matters are required to be separately pleaded with specificity, particularity and precision. It was further observed therein that a general allegation in the plaint, that the plaintiff was a simple old man of ninety who had reposed great confidence in the defendant, was much too insufficient to amount to an averment of undue influence. We have already pointed out that the plea taken by the appellant appears to be the result of afterthought and our conclusion is based upon the fact that even though the appellant has deposed in her evidence that in spite of her repeatedly telling that she did not want to sell the property and in spite of her telling that she would come later either in the afternoon or the next morning, she was forced to sign the agreement, yet on the very next day she encashed the cheque of Rs. 5000/- which was given as earnest money by the respondents. The appellant had stated in para 20 of Special Civil Suit No. 214/77 filed by her that on the same day i.e. on 9-3-77 she got the agreement read over and explained to her by one of her friends and came to know that the said papers were a copy of the agreement. However, during the cross of her evidence, she admitted that she had called one of her tenants Vasudev Dhume on 9-3-77 itself, but he was not able to understand the said agreement but he took the agreement with him for explanation from some . learned man. She further states in her deposition that on the next day morning at about 9 a.m., the said Vasudev Dhume came and told her that she. was cheated. Thus as per para 20 of the plaint in the suit filed by her, she had categorically stated that she had come to know the contents of the agreement on 9-3-77 itself, yet in the course of her deposition she stated that she came to know about the same on 10-3-77. She has further deposed that on the next day i.e. on 10-3-77 at about 9 a.m. the said Dhume had asked her to return the plaintiff’s money/cheque given to her by Vistar Hotel and not by the plaintiffs and that she should return it by making a draft. Thus, it is the case of the appellant herself in the course of her deposition that at about 9 a.m. on 10-3-77 she had come to know the contents of the agreement
and that she was cheated and that Vasudev Dhume
had even told her to return the cheque of the respondents. No bank opens at 9 a.m. and in spite of Vasudev Dhume telling her to return the cheque, she deposited the cheque witht the Bank on 10-3-77 and encashed the same. In order to support her theory she went to the extent of coining another story that she had gone to the Bank, signed the ‘ cheque on both sides and told the Bank Clerk to give a draft, but he told her that a draft could not be given as the same had to be sent to Panaji. She told him to keep the cheque with him for two days. There was absolutely no necessity for the cheque to be kept with the Bank Clerk and she could have taken the same back. She then states that on 10th March itself she sent a cheque by registered post to Shripad, but he returned the same. After four days she went to the bank but the Clerk had told her that he had already credited the said cheque in the account and the cheque of Rs. 5000/- which she had given to him was torn by him. The said Clerk has not been examined and in the absence of the same can this story put up by the appellant that she had kept the cheque given by Tarcars with the Bank Clerk for two days and had also given him another cheque but the said cheque was torn by the said Bank clerk, be believed? Even Vasudev Dhume has not been examined.
16A. Another circumstance which is pleaded by the appellant in support of her theory of undue influence is that she was suffering from blood pressure and when Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira insisted that she should sign the agreement she became nervous and did not want to collapse in the house of a stranger and signed the agreement. Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira, in the circumstances, can by no stretch of imagination be said to be a stranger insofar as the appellant is concerned. She further states that when she reached home at 3.30 p.m. she became unconscious. Dr. Dhume was called at 4.00 p.m. and she regained consciousness at 7.00 p.m. Dr. Dhume was not at all examined by the appellant in order to corroborate her theory of illness, due to which she had signed the said agreement. On the other hand, the lower court has rightly rejected the testimony of D.W. 2 and it is not necessary to deal with his evidence.
17. The appellant has stated in her deposition that she had sent a letter to the respondents to meet on 12th March, 1977 and in the said meeting
she told respondent no. I that she did not want to sell. She nowhere states the reason as to why she did not want to sell or did not want to perform the agreement. In the letter (Exh. P-4) written by the appellant to the respondents, asking them to meet her on 12th March, 1977, no reason is given whatsoever as to why the cheque was being returned. Therefore, no plea of undue influence or that she had signed the agreement on account of undue influence had been taken. In the subsequent letter (Exh.P-6) dated 22-4-77 also, there is no reference of any undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation etc. and what is stated therein is that if respondent No. 1 does not meet her soon, it will be taken that he is not interested in the same. It appears to us that what the appellant wanted was enhancement of the sale price and the plea of undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation etc. is clearly result of afterthought. At this stage we may point out that the evidence on record shows that initially the appellant had agreed to sell this property for Rs. 60,000/- on 8-3-77 but subsequently demanded Rs. 65,000/- and signed an agreement to that effect after taking earnest money of Rs. 5000/- which was encashed by her on the very next day. In addition, we would like to point that even her contention that she wanted the house for her own use, is not correct since negotiations in respect of the same house were going on between the appellant and M/s. Chowgule & Co. We are not inclined to believe the evidence of appellant and her plea of undue influence taken by her.
18. The next question which now remains to be determined is whether the trial Court was justified in ordering specific performance of the contract. The contention of learned Senior Advocate Shri S. Dessai that this aspect has not at all been dealt with by the trial Judge is not correct; though it can be said that it has not been clearly spelt out in the judgment, yet issues relating to entitlement of respondents Tarkars for specific performance have been categorically answered in the affirmative. The learned trial Judge had in detail dealt with the contentions advanced with reference to Section 16 of the Contract Act and also the contentions relating to agreement being inconsistent and that the price agreed was extremely low. Chapter II of the Contract Act deals with void and voidable contractual agreements vis-a-vis parties. In order
to attract Section 16 of the Contract Act, undue influence by one of the parties is necessary and it is necessary to prove that the contracting party was in aposition to dominate the will of the other and that position was used in order to obtain an unfair advantage over the others. The Apex Court in Afsar Shaik v. Suleman Bibi, (supra) has laid down that in order to constitute undue influence two basic elements must be cumulatively present namely; first the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is able to dominate the will of the other and second the party in dominant position uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. Both these conditions must be pleaded with particularity and proved by the person seeking to avoid the transaction. In the same judgment, the Apex Court pointed out Sub-section (3) of Section 16 contains a rule of evidence and in order to avoid a transaction on the ground of undue influence, it has to be proved : (a) that the party who had obtained the benefit had at the material time been in a position to dominate the will of the other conferring the benefit; and (b) that the transaction is unconscionable. If these conditions are proved, the burden shifts on the party benefitting by the transaction to show that it was not induced by undue influence. If either of these two conditions is not established the burden will not shift. If the first condition is not established the question of shifting burden on the defendant would not arise. Therefore, the contention of learned advocate for the appellant that undue influence exercised by advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira would bring the transaction within the scope and ambit of Section 16 of the Contract Act cannot be accepted. Of course, we are not satisfied, on the basis of the evidence on record, that any undue influence was exercised by Advocate Shri Rui Gomes Pereira, on the appellant.
19. The trial Court has dealt with the question of inadequacy of consideration with reference to Section 20 or the Specific Relief Act since the question of inadequacy of consideration is dealt with by explanation (1) of Section 20 of the said Act. Learned Advocate for the appellant strongly relies upon Section 20(2)(a)(c) of the said Act in support of his submission that even though the transaction may not be voidable it gives an unfair advantage to the respondents over the appellant
and the transaction in question is inequitable. The Apex Court in Prakash Chandra v. Angadlal has laid down that the ordinary rule is that specific performance should be granted and it ought to be denied only when equitable considerations point to its refusal and in the circumstances show that damages would cause adequate relief. In the case before the Apex Court, it was found that the conduct of the appellant had not been such as to disentitle him to the relief of specific performance. Though, it is contended by Advocate for the appellant that the consideration for the transaction is such that no reasonable person would have entered into such agreement, we do not find any support for this argument from the material on record. In fact, Explanation (1) to Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act lays down that mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to defendant or improvident in its nature shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of Clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of Clause (b). Reading the evidence of the two experts who were examined on either side, we find that the sale price shown in the agreement can by no stretch of imagination be said to be inadequate. Admittedly the building is 100 years old and the entire area of the plot is 155 sq. metres. The expert examined by the respondents had taken the value of the plot at Rs. 300/- per sq.m., whereas the expert examined by the appellant had taken the value at Rs. 550/- per sq.m. The valuation of the plot according to expert examined by the respondents comes to Rs. 46,500/- to which he had added 10% of the value of the building being of salvage value only. According to the expert examined by the appellant the value of the plot would come to Rs. 82.250/-. It has to be borne in mind that there were six tenants in the said building, as a result of which the value of the plot would diminish and the party purchasing such land will have to take recourse to law if necessary to evict them which will involve expenditure. Moreover, in the new construction the entire area cannot be covered and the cover would be limited. All these aspects were not taken into consideration by the expert examined by the appellant. If those considerations are taken into account, the value of the plot even according to the contention of the
expert Rui Ribeiro Santana would not be more than Rs. 60,000/- to Rs. 70,000/-. Therefore, we find that neither the transaction can be said to be inequitable nor that it had given any unfair advantage to the respondents over the appellant. In the circumstances the trial court was justified in ordering specific performance of the contract and no fault can be found in ordering the specific performance.
20. In view of the above, we do not find any merit whatsoever in these appeals and the appeals are hereby dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, we leave the parties to bear their costs.