ORDER
T.N. Singh, J.
1. Two contentions in this review application are forcefully urged by Shri K.S. Tomar appearing for the applicant, and those I proposed to dispose of because counsel has rightly submitted that he has not been able to lay his hands on any decision on the controversy mooted. On the other hand, it is also true that in the order passed on 30-4-1991 (impugned before me in Misc. Appeal No. 138 of 1991 disposed of by me on 1-7-1991) the Court below had relied on my decision rendered on 8-7-1986 is Second Appeal No. 147 of 1976, Shri Gopal Shastri v. Purushottam Das. It is necessary, therefore, to clarify the scope of that decision as well.
2. First contention of the counsel can be easily and summarily disposed of as that is of a preliminary nature. He has contended that the appeal before me was not maintainable because the trial Court’s order should be regarded as order passed under Rule 11 of Order 7 C.P.C. There is nothing indicated in the order as to the provision invoked to exercise its jurisdiction by the Court concerned, but there is reference in the order of the application of the defendant (herein review-petitioner) being made under Order 7 R. 10, C.P.C. Whatever that may be, the effect of the order was plain and simple: the plaint was returned for filing in the “proper Court”, I wonder, how that order can be taken out of the purview of Rule 10, which empowers the Court to return the plaint to be presented in the Court in which the suit ought to have been instituted. In the instant case, the trial Court took the view that clubbing in reliefs of different natures was impermissible and, therefore, the suit had to be instituted in the Court of Civil Judge, who had jurisdiction to grant relief of eviction in terms of the provisions of Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, for short, ‘the Act’. Review cannot, therefore, be granted on the first ground urged that my order dated 1-7-1991 was with out ‘jurisdiction as the appeal itself was not maintainable. That contention has no leg at all to stand even for a moment’s scrutiny.
3. However, counsel’s second contention deserves attention and that I proceed to deal with. Let it be recalled that in my order dated 1-7-1991 a simple direction was made because the trial Court had overlooked Clause (k) of Section 12(1) of the Act. 1 took the view that the plaintiff should have been given an opportunity to amend his plaint and to include therein ground of eviction embraced by Clause (k) because it was permissible to lay out more than one foundation as the cause of action of his suit for eviction. Beyond that I said nothing though 1 had, nevertheless, also made the observation that if that was not done and if the plaintiff-appellant was denied that opportunity he will have an occasion to rue the day he failed to frame his suit properly. Because, provisions of Order 2 Order 2 C.P.C. would come in his way. It may be mentioned that through typographical error in my order dated 1-7-1991 instead of Order 2 the words ‘Order 3’ has been typed and that mistake is brought to my notice today. Provisions of Civil Procedure Code concerning the frame of a suit are exhaustively detailed in Order II and in my order dated 1-7-1991 I had taken care of the legitimate apprehension of plaintiff-appellant’s missing the bus for not including in his plaint relief founded on Clause (k) of Section 12( 1) of the Act keeping in view Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order II.
4. Law, Shri Tomar submits, is otherwise and therefore, that position is to be examined by me today. If not for any other reason but for making the law clear for the subordinate Courts to enable them to avoid pit-fails, that I have considered, if necessary, to pass the detailed order. As to the competence of a Court to try suit for eviction under Section 12(1) of the Act, “Any Civil Court” is empowered there under in express terms to accept a plaint of a landlord instituting a suit against a tenant for his eviction on any one or more of the grounds variously enumerated under different sub-clauses. One of the grounds of Clause (k): “that the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation”. In Section 12 there is no whisper of any curb on the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit has been instituted for eviction regarding scope of trial of the suit in respect of the cause of action relating to “substantial damage to the accommodation”. In any other provision of the Act also no impairment of jurisdiction of “any Civil Court” to entertain and try such suit is contemplated. On the other hand, there are no provision either in the Act laying d own special procedure for trial by the Civil Court of the suit instituted under Section 12(1) of the Act nor is there any provision denying to the Court the jurisdiction for applying any of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 45 of the Act is the only ouster clause contemplating: “no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to the fixation of standard rent in relation to any accommodation to which this Act applies or to any other matter which the Rent Controlling Authority is empowered by or under this Act to decide”. Evidently, the bifurcation of jurisdiction contemplated under the Act is in relation to certain matters and in respect of some matters exclusive jurisdiction is vested expressly in the Rent Controlling Authority; nothing beyond that. Any Civil Court trying a suit for eviction under Section 12(1) is obviously required to deal with the matter in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Only when the landlord belongs to any of classes specified in Section 23-J and he files an “application” under Section 23-A for tenant’s eviction on the ground of bona fide necessity that “application” is to be tried and disposed of by the Rent Controlling Authority and in that case a different situation arises.
5. Section 9, C.P.C. contemplates that a Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting such suit of which cognizance is expressly and impliedly barred. There may be cases of implied bar arising from misjoinder of causes of action where there is express ouster of jurisdiction in respect of any particular cause of action or part thereof and indeed there may be a case of which the cause of action is such that as per provisions of the Civil Procedure Code itself, such a suit is to be instituted in a Court of Small Causes. Unless there is any manner of bar shown to exist in respect of any part of cause of action of the suit instituted, the Civil Court trying the suit of a civil nature will have jurisdiction to try the suit in its entirety. In the instant case, I have failed to read any express or implied bar either in Section 9 C.P.C. or in any of the provisions of the Act supporting the | view taken by the trial Court. I found it difficult to accept Shri Tomar’s contention that in respect of one part of cause of action founded on Clause (k) of Section 12, the Court wherein the suit for eviction is instituted, is barred. His submission is that when “damages” are also claimed along with eviction the same Court cannot try the suit. Compensation can be undoubtedly claimed in a Civil Court for any action of tort including that of damage to the premises in his occupation done by the tenant. The Act does not expressly bar trial of such a claim against the tenant whose eviction is sought.
6. The question of pecuniary jurisdiction in respect to two reliefs of eviction and damages is a different one. Shri Tomar contended that the tenant-defendant is likely to be deprived of one stage of appeal but that argument has not carried any weight with me. Care of that evidently is taken in my view by the provisions of Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act. It cannot be disputed that Court-fees are paid on suit instituted under Section 12 of the Act foreviction in accordance with the provisions of Court-Fees Act of 1870 and indeed application of the provisions of Suits Valuation Act to such a suit is evidently not excluded. When an eviction suit is instituted the Court-fees payable is on the basis of one year’s rent and when compensation is claimed ad valorem Court-fees are payable on the amount claimed. In Court trying a suit in which relief of eviction is claimed and also “damages” in terms of Clause (k) additionally, the plaintiff will be required to pay Court-fees on the total amount computed accordingly. That amount shall be the amount to be deemed as valuation of the suit and so stated in the plaint for the purpose of jurisdiction. The right of appeal would be regulated accordingly because appeal as an extension of the suit.
7. If the plaintiff is entitled to value his own suit legally and lawfully as held in Jagdish Prasad (1977 MPLJ 452) that he cannot be deprived of his right to institute his suit at the forum or the proper Court so determined. The defendant cannot complain that he is affected in any manner, because the plaintiff would be merely exercising his statutory right. On the other hand, if two causes of action can be tried together and in the same suit two reliefs can be given and yet two suits are instituted there may be separate appeals in such a case. The result would be protraction of trial of two suits separately and of being separately of two appeals with the litigation’s end finally delayed. 1 do not think if that situation is compatible with the constitutional mandate of Article 39-A envisaging speedy trial in all cases because the litigants are supposed to get cheap and ready justice under a just legal system. In my view, the provisions of Order II, Rule 2 CPC implement effectively that mandate and are to be so construed; to restrict its field of operation would be a constitutional sin.
8. Before I proceed to examine decisions cited by Shri Thomar it is imperative that I clarify the position in regard to my own decision rendered in Second Appeal No. 147 of 1976, Gopal Sahstri’s case (supra). The plaintiff had claimed in that suit relief founded separately on the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and M. P. Accommodation Control Act. The causes of action pertaining to two reliefs were separate and distinct and jurisdictionally incompatible. In terms of the provisions of Section 12(l)(a)arrear-rentwas claimed while in terms of Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act apportionment of the rent was claimed which was contrary to the entitlement of the plaintiff contemplated under Section J2(l)(a); that relief of apportionment was impliedly barred by the Act. That position I noted in para 5 of the judgment observing that under Section 12(l)(a) of the Act the Court trying the suit had to determine the rent “legally recoverable” from the tenant who was sued for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent due payable by him. A statutory tenant’s liability to whom a “Rent Act” applies cannot be enforced in terms of Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act under the provisions of the relevant Rent Act. That position does not obtain in this case because in this case rather, on the other hand, the relief of “damages” and for that matter cause of action relating thereto, is an integral part of the cause of action for eviction; the two are inseparable. Indeed, unless and until it is pleaded that the tenant-defendants “caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the accommodation” for which compensation was payable by him and that was claimed the relief of eviction based on that ground in the suit instituted under Section 12 (1) would not be available.
9. Reliance on Sub-section (9), of Section 12, by Shri Tomar, in my opinion, does not advance his arguments. The stage for passing order under Sub-section (9) will be reached when the suit is tried and not when the suit is instituted. It will evidently be within the jurisdiction of the trial Court to reach appropriate conclusion on evidence adduced, as per pleadings, in respect of relief claimed under Section 12(l)(k). It would be open to the trial Court to refuse eviction in terms of Sub-section (9) if the trial Court is of the view that tenant is to be given time to carry out repair and that is duly carried out to the satisfaction of the Court. It will be clearly within the jurisdiction of the trial Court to frame issue as respects amounts of compensation payable to the landlord because in the event of tenant’s/defendant’s failure to carry out the repair it will be still required to pass order for payment of compensation without granting the relief of eviction. Thus, no threshold bar is evidently envisaged there under against trial Court’s entertaining a suit in which relief of eviction is claimed along with the relief of a compensation. Indeed, the trial Court is given, expressly, the jurisdiction to pass an order of compensation under Sub-section (9). Thus, in my view, Sub-section (9), even if the that is read along with the Subsection (l)(k) of Section 12, does not visit any| penalty on the plaintiff-landlord impairing his right of suing the tenant in the same suit in the same Court for arrears of rent and also for compensation for any damage caused to the accommodation for which entitlement is statutorily provided under Clause (k).
10. Shri Tomar cited few decisions, which may now be examined. In Pradesh Kumar, AIR 1980 SC 1214 : (1980 All LJ 549), it is held “once the requirements of rent Act are satisfied, the tenant cannot claim the double protection of invoking the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the terms of the contract.” The question considered ‘ therein was of relief against forfeiture con-templated under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act vis-a-vis clause 12 of the Rent Note. Accordingly, at para 13 of the report their Lordships reached the conclusion that the double protection the tenant could not claim because the provision of Rent Note in regard to the claim made had been satisfied. The decision in Naraj Studios, AIR 1981 SC 537 is to the effect that Rent Acts confer exclusive jurisdiction on certain courts to advance certain essential objects which the Legislature aims to achieve and that public policy requires that any contract to the contrary nullifying the right thereunder of the tenant should not be enforced. Smt. Nandita Bose, AIR 1987 SC 1947 is authority for the proposition that the question of mesne profit cannot be decided as a preliminary issue and the order returning the plaint accepting tenant’s contention in that regard was illegal. These decisions, evidently, do not make any dent on the view 1 have expressed in the controversy mooted.
11. Shri Naik has submitted that the amended plaint, as ordered by this Court, has been filed. That is done after the plaint was returned and, therefore, the suit shall now be deemed instituted afresh. Plaintiffs amended plaint shall be tried on that basis and he has to run the risk of limitation in respect of any part of his claim. It shall be open to the defendant (Review-petitioner) to agitate that contention in his written statement, if so advised.
12. The result is that no ground 1 could find made out for review of the order passed by me on 1-7-1991 in Misc. Appeal No. 138 of 1991. The application is dismissed but no order as to costs.