ORDER
B.P. Das, J.
1. This revision application arises out of an order passed by the Additional District Judge, Bhubaneswar, vacating the order of injunction passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhubaneswar.
2. The petitioner has filed T. S. No. 541/99 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Bhubaneswar, alleging therein that she was a permanent employee of the Kalinga Law College, Bhubaneswar, and opposite party No. 1, the Principal, falsely posing himself as the Secretary of the said college, illegally terminated her service. Petitioner’s further case is that there was no legally constituted Governing Body to manage the affairs of the college and the existing Governing Body had no jurisdiction to terminate her service. With the aforesaid background, the petitioner, who is the plaintiff in the trial Court, has prayed for a declaration that the order terminating her services is illegal. She has also prayed for a permanent injunction against the present O.P. No. 1 restraining him from acting as the Secretary of the College.
Along with the plaint, the petitioner also filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure registered as M.C. No. 482 of 1999, praying for issuance of an ad interim injunction against the present O.P. No. 1 restraining him from withdrawing money from the account of the college in the State Bank of India till disposal of the suit.
3. The trial Court after hearing parties passed an order restraining the present O.P. No. 1, the Principal of the College, not to withdraw any money in the capacity of the Secretary of the Governing Body of the College till disposal of the suit. Admittedly, the prayer of the plaintiff is the suit is for a declaration that the order of termination of her services was illegal, The trial Court passed the order of ad interim injunction on the reasonings stated in para 8 of the order, which are as follows :–
“Considered. As it is seen that the O.P. No. 2 the Principal of Kalinga Law College is acting as O.P. No. 1 violating the Orissa Education Act and Rules after expiry of the term of the Governing Body of the college, I hold that the petitioner has been able to establish that she has got prima facie case, and that if O.P. No. 2 is not prohibited till disposal of the suit to act as O.P. 1, irreparable loss will be caused to her and the institution. Further as the balance of convenience loans in favour of the petitioner I feel that O.P. No. 2 must be prohibited to act as O.P. No. 1 till disposal of the suit. Hence It is ordered
ORDER
The Misc. Case is allowed on contest against O.P. Nos. 1 and 2, and without contest against O.P. No. 3, in the circumstance without cost. O.P. No. 2 the Principal of Kalinga Law College is directed not to withdraw money from the account of Kalinga Law College in the capacity of O.P. No. 1, the Secretary of the Governing Body of Kalinga Law College till disposal of the suit.”
4. The aforesaid order was challenged in appeal before the learned Addl. District Judge who has come to observe that :–
“If the plaintiff ultimately succeeds in her suit, she will be entitled to reinstatement in service with all arrears. Therefore, she stands to lose nothing if her prayer for interim injunction is refused. On the other hand, if the Secretary is not permitted to operate the bank account, the other employees of the college cannot get their salary and the day to day expenditure of the college cannot be set. Thus, the functioning of the college is bound to come to a stand-still. ………”
On the aforesaid reasonings, the appellate Court allowed the appeal and vacated the order of injunction granted by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argues that the sole question to be determined here is as to whether the learned Additional District Judge has noted without jurisdiction and/or with material irregularity in meeting aside the order of injunction passed by the trial Court. He also reiterates that the term of the Governing Body of the college had expired on 27-2-1999 and there was no reconstitution of the same by the D.P.I. There is neither any specific provision in the Orissa Education Act, 1969 for interim arrangement on expiry or supersession of a Governing Body of an unaided college nor is there any deeming provision for automatic continuance of the old Governing Body. The learned counsel further argues that the property in dispute is in danger of being wasted or alienated by O.P. Nos. 1 and 2 as they do not have any legal entity to manage the affairs of the college. At this stage it is not appropriate for this Court to express any opinion in this regard as the same may be likely to affect the merits of the pending suit. The question, however, here is whether the petitioner will suffer any irreparable loss and substantial Injury if the order of injunction is refused. The termination of the service of the petitioner is sub judice and the same will ultimately be decided in the suit itself. It is needless to record that the trial Court has transgressed its jurisdiction in recording the findings and expressing opinion on the merits of the case in para 8 of the order. The law trial Court should have kept in mind that there are self-contained provisions in the Act and the Rules which can take care of the situation of the present nature. It is well settled in law and the principle of service Jurisprudence is that when service of any employee is terminated and the same is challenged in a Court of law, the employee is entitled to his/her back wages in case he/ she succeeds in the case. In the present case, the trial Court has lost sight of this aspect. Learned counsel for the petitioner during the course of his arguments relied on the decisions, namely, (1990 1 Orissa LR 293, Secretary, C.D.A. v. Dolagobinda School and AIR 1999 SC 3106, Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. amongst others, as indicated in his written note of argument. Even though the aforesaid decisions are not matters relating to service jurisprudence, the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Colgate Palmolive’s case (supra), which is relied upon by the petitioner speaks as follows :
“We, however, think it fit to note hereinbelow certain specific considerations in the matter of grant of Interlocutory injunction, the basic being non-expression of opinion as to the merits of the matter by the Court, since the issue of grant of injunction usually, is at the earliest possible stage so far as the time-frame is concerned. The other considerations which ought to weigh with the Court hearing the application or petition for the grant of injunctions are as below :–
(i) Extent of damages being an adequate remedy;
(ii) Protect the plaintiffs interest for violation of his rights though however having regard to the Injury that may be suffered by the defendants by reason therefor;
(iii) The Court while dealing with the matter ought not to ignore the factum of strength of one party’s case being stronger than the others;
(iv) No fixed rules or notions ought to be had in the matter of grant of injunction but on the facts and circumstances of each case-the relief being kept flexible;
(v) The issue is to be looked from the point of view as to whether on refusal of the Injunction the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss and injury keeping in view the strength of the parties’ case;
(vi) Balance of convenience or inconvenience ought to be considered as an important requirement even if there is a serious question or prima facie case in support of the grant;
(vii) Whether the grant or refusal of injunction will adversely affect the interest of general public which can or cannot be compensated otherwise.”
On a bare reading of the principles as laid down by the Apex Court and after looking into the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, it can be fairly concluded that the petitioner whose service has been terminated can be duly compensated in money value if ultimately it is held that the order of termination is illegal. On the other hand, grant of injunction against the management not to operate the bank account shall certainly have an adverse effect on the interest of the other members of the staff as well as the management of the Institution. There is nothing in the order of the trial Court to indicate as to how the petitioner shall suffer irreparable loss if the prayer for injunction restraining the opposite parties from operating the bank account is refused. In my view, the trial Court should not have interfered with the Internal administration of the institution while there is no good prima facie case made out by the petitioner to get such a relief which is not only harsh to the opposite parties (defendants) but shall also bring injuries to the institution.
6. While dealing with the application for injunction it should be kept in view that an Injunction should not be granted on mere allegation of irreparable injury. The facts on which the allegation is founded must appear which is absent in the present case.
7. In the aforesaid promises, I have no hesitation to hold that the trial Court instead of proceeding on well settled principles has come out of its way to pass the order of Injunction restraining O.P. Nos. 1 and 2 from operating the bank account. The appellate Court has rightly set aside the order of the trial Court and as there is no irregularity or illegality in the order of the appellate Court, I am not inclined to admit this revision application. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs.