Posted On by &filed under Andhra High Court, High Court.


Andhra High Court
Smt. Qamar Begum vs Pyata Srinivasa Rao And Ors. on 1 January, 1800
Equivalent citations: 1992 (1) ALT 307
Author: N Rao
Bench: N Rao


ORDER

Neeladri Rao, J.

1. Respondent in R.C.C. No. 479/78,1 Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad is the revision petitioner. Eviction was prayed on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent from 1-1-76 to 31-10-78. The case of revision petitioner is that she is not a tenant at all in the petition schedule premises and hence she need not pay the rent and the eviction petition cannot be filed against her. Both the Courts below held that the revision petitioner is the tenant in the premises in question and there was wilful default in payment of rent and accordingly eviction was ordered. The same is challenged in this revision petition.

2. Smt. Ajmath Khatoon Sayeedha filed the eviction petition by alleging that she is the owner of premises No. 4-3-618, situated at Ramkbti and Sri Mohd. Osman had taken one room out of it on monthly rent of Rs. 25/- as per rental deed dated 15-3-63 and later it was enhanced to Rs. 30/- and the revision petitioner herein is the daughter of the said Osman and she lived with him and after the death of Osman, she continues to reside in the same house but she failed to pay the rent from 1-1-76 till the end of October, 1978 and hence the eviction petition was filed. During the pendency of the eviction petition Smt. Ajmath Khatoon Sahab sold to R-2 here in and he had come on record as the second petitioner in the eviction petition as per orders in I.A. 214/85.

3. The case of the revision petitioner is that she is not the daughter of late Mohd. Osman and her father is Sri Sardar Ali, and the latter had constructed the premises in question in the site belonging to the original owner late Saraswathi Bhai, and she continues to reside in the said house after the death of her father in her own right. She further pleaded that the door number of the premises in question is 4-3-620/A.

4. It is also contended in this revision petition that as she had denied the title of the respondents, it is necessary for the Rent Controller, and the appellate court to consider whether the denial is bonafide or not as required under Section 10 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short ‘Rent Control Act’).

5. I will consider the last contention first. It is convenient to read Section 10(1). Rent Control Act to consider the above contention for the revision petitioner and it is as under:

“Section 10(1). A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section or Sections 12 and 13;

Provided that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court and the Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in the said section, notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded.”

Proviso to Section 10(1) lays down that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims the right of permanent tenancy, it is necessary for the controller to decide whether the said denial or claim is bonafide and if he records a finding to that effect is bonafide. It is manifest from the said proviso, that it is applicable only in a case where the person in possession against whom the eviction petition is filed admits that he is a tenant, but denies the title of the landlord. It is not applicable in a case where the respondent in the eviction petition claims title for himself, as rightly submitted for the respondents herein. There might be cases where the respondent in the eviction petition is admittedly a tenant and he bonafidely believes that the person who filed eviction petition is not the landlord. In such came, he can deny the title of the landlord. Such a question generally arises when the original land lord dies and when there is a dispute as to who succeeds to the came. Any how there is no need to further advert to the same, and suffice, it to observe that as the revision petitioner herein is not admitting that she is a tenant of the premises in question, proviso to Section 10(1) is not attracted and hence, the contention for the revision petitioner that it is necessary for the Rent Controller to decide as to whether the plea of the revision petitioner that the eviction petitioner is not the landlady is bonafide or not, has to be repelled.

6. The revision petitioner filed Ex.R-2 by alleging that it is the marriage certificate of her sister and she contends that it discloses that her father is Sardar Ali but not Mohd. Osmah. The appellate Court observed that the revision petitioner had not chosen to examine her brothers and sister, and she did not even produce her Shianama which would.show her father’s name and though she relied upon Ex.R-2, Smt. Badrunisa in regard to whom Ex.R-2 certificate was issued was not examined to prove that she is her natural sister. The appellate court further observed that P.W.1 the husband of the deceased landlady and P.W.2 the husband of late Saraswati Bhai the original owner would not come up with a false plea that the father of the revision petitioner is Osman instead of Khadai Ali. As the said finding was given in appreciation of evidence, and as it cannot be said that the marriage certificate dated 21-5L1963 which is said to be in regard to the revision petitioner and which is filed along with CMP 13052/ 91, would conclusively show that the said finding is wholly erroneus, it is not just and proper to permit the revision petitioner to file it in this revision petition. Of course the said certificate discloses the name of the father of the revision petitioner as Khadar Ali. But the lower courts proceeded on the basis that he might also having an alias Mohd. Osman.

7. Then a question had arisen as to whether the municipal number of the premises in question is 4-3-618 or 4-3-620-A. After referring to Ex.P-10, the plan sanctioned by the municipality, the lower court held that the room in question is within the premises No. 4-3-618 purchased by the deceased landlady from late Saraswathi Bhai and not within the premises purchased as per Ex.P-5 by Sri Ramachandra Rao from late Saraswathi Bhai. No reliance was placed on Exs.R-3 to R-5 the extracts of voters-lists relied upon for the revision petitioner by holding that they are not having evidential value is regard to the door number. The revision-petitioner now wants to rely upon the extracts of the assessment registered issued by the Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad for the years 1953 to 1990 for the premises in regard to D. Nos. 4-3-616 to 620 and 4-3-618 which were filed along with C.M.P. 13052/91 to urge that 4-3-618 belongs to Sri P. Ramachandra Rao, and not to the deceased-landlady.

8. But it is not stated that Sri P. Ramachandra Rao claimed plaint schedule room as belonging to him. Any how, after reference to the recitals in the sale deeds in favour of the deceased-land lady and Sri. P. Ramachandra Rao and Ex JMO sanction plan, the appellate court held that the suit premises is within 4-3-618 as claimed by the deceased-land lady. It is not stated for the revision-petitioner that the said finding cannot be arrived at on the basis of the recitals in those documents. Any how when Sri P. Ramachandra Rao is not claiming the suit premises as belonging to him, no purpose will be served in looking into the extracts of registers of the Municipal Corporation, for there may be some mistake in noting the door numbers. But when the appellate court on the basis of Ex.P-10 and the recitals in the sale deeds held that it is within the premises purchased by the deceased-landlady and it is the latter that constructed the premises in question, there is neither illegality nor irregularity nor impropriety in arriving at that conclusion, and it cannot be said that the court would have come to a different-conclusion if these extracts from Municipal records are filed.

9. Thus the findings of the appellate court that the revision petitioner is the daughter of late Mohd. Osman, and that the deceased-landlady constructed the premises in question and that originally late Mohd. Osman was the tenant and later the revision-petitioner was the tenant and there was wilful default in payment of rent from 1-1-76 to 30-10-78 do not warrant interference in the revision petition.

10. Accordingly the C.M.P. No. 13052/91 and the C.R.P. are dismissed. No costs.


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