JUDGMENT
M.R. Calla, J.
1. Through this writ petition the petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated 31.12.1988 whereby she had been retrenched.
2. The facts are not in dispute that the petitioner has been appointed on a daily wages basis for Rs. 14/- per day in the office of Irrigation Department and by the impugned order dated 3LI. 1988, her services were terminate after making a payment of Rs. 364/- for the period of 1.1.1989 to 31.1.1989 and a sum of Rs. 182/- as wages for 15 days and Rs. 280/- as wages for 20 days of the Dec, 1988. Thus, according to the respondents, they had fully complied with the requirement envisaged Under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
3. However, Mr. Keshote has raised a very interesting question and his submission is that the wages which have been paid to her i.e. a sum of Rs. 364/- is not as wages for the period from 1.1.1989 to 31.1.1989 but it comes out to be wages for 26 days only i.e. 26 X 14 = 364. Similarly a sum of Rs. 182/- which has been paid as 15 days wages in lieu of the compensation for a completed year of service is not an amount of wages for 15 days but it is for 13 days only i.e. 13 X 14 = 182, Shri Keshote has, therefore, raised an argument that this is not the full compliance of the requirement of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act and it amounts only to a partial compliance in as much as the requirement of Section 25F(a) is to pay the workman’s wages in lieu of a notice and the language of Section 25F contemplates one month’s notice. Since the wages are to be paid in lieu of one month’s notice, the wages have to be for a complete month and for the purpose of the compliance of Section 25F the period of a full month cannot be truncated merely because a person had been appointed on daily wages and had he continued to be in service, he would have earned the wages for 26 days only 4 days being the gazetted holidays i.e. Sundays etc. and on the same reasoning the compensation of Rs. 182/- which has been paid, is also only for 13 days where as it should have been for 15 days. The petitioner had completed one year’s service and the requirement Under Section 25F is to pay as compensation equivalent to 15 days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.
4. Shri B.K. Sharma’s argument on behalf of the respondents is that according to the language of Section 25F it has been provided that the payment of wages is in lieu of one month’s notice. So far as the employees who are working on daily wages, the effective period of one month is only 26 days and therefore such daily wages employees are to be treated for computation of compensation only with respect to the effective days for which they would have worked had they been in service. His argument is that had the petitioner continued in service, he could not have earned wages for a period of more than 26 days in a month and therefore, the payment of wages has been calculated for 26 days in lieu of the notice and the pay of 13 days wages as compensation which must be considered to be sufficient for the purpose of compliance of Section 25F.
5. I have considered the rival contentions made in this regard. The provisions Under Section 25F are the provisions of a beneficial legislation and such provisions have to be construed on the principle of benevolent construction with the same approach and orientation and not a hypertechnical approach. According to the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, the meaning of retrenchment with regard to a daily wages employee and even to a regularly appointed person is the same and so far as the retrenchment compensation Under Section 25F is concerned, no discrimination can be made while retrenching the employees, merely because one is daily wages employee and the other one is in the regular pay scales or even on the consolidated monthly pay. If the interpretation which has been urged by Shri B.K. Sharma is taken to be correct it will have two divergent consequences in as much as in a case of the retrenchment of the persons working in the regular pay scale or consolidated monthly salary, the full salary for the entire month will be paid in lieu of the notice and similar treatment will have to be given with reference to the compliance envisaged Under Section 25F(b) for the purpose of compensation of a completed year or any part thereof in excess of six months, whereas in the case of daily wages employees the pay in lieu of the notice will he reduced as for 26 days only and in a case governed Under Section 25F(b) compensation will be reduced to 13 days for every completed year or any part thereof in excess of six months. Such divergent consequences were not and could not have been contemplated while enacting Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
6. There is one more reason to accept the argument of Shri S.K. Keshote, and the same is that in case the amount to be paid in lieu of one month’s notice or the wages equivalent to 15 days Under Section 25F are to be counted on the basis of the effective days in the following month for which a notice has been given such days may be different i.e. if in a month there are 10 gazetted holidays, the daily wages employees would get wages only for 20 days and there may be cases in which there can be even lesser number of working days. Such a construction with regard to compensation for retrenchment as enacted in a beneficial legislation cannot be given a meaning with reference to varied circumstances and such provisions have to be given full effect on the basis of principle of uniformity. Besides this, the very language of Section 25F(a) goes to show that the first condition is giving of one month’s notice and to pay the salary in lieu of such notice in only an alternative to the notice of one month. When the law provides two equivalent alternatives, they cannot be interpreted to have the meaning which is not compatible. Thus, I find that if the notice has to be of one month, the pay in lieu of notice must be of one month and it cannot be calculated on the basis of number of days for which he would have worked. Similarly when Section 25F(b) speaks that the compensation be equivalent to 15 days, it cannot be less than what has been prescribed Under Section 25F(b) and once a person is found to be entitled to retrenchment compensation Under Section 25F he has to be paid the compensation Under Section 25F(b), the amount equivalent to 15 days pay and it cannot be made to be for a period of less than 15 days as has been done in the instant case. The question of strict compliance of such provisions, of course with reference to the notice period was considered by Justice P.N. Singhal in a judgment in Poonam ChandJoshi v. Union of India 1970 R.L.W. 487 and while quoting the following from para 166 of Halsbury’s Laws of England (third edition, Volume 37):
When a period is fixed before the expiration of which an act may be done, the person for whose benefit the delay is prescribed has the benefit of the entire period, and accordingly in computing it the day from which it runs as well as the day on which it expires must be excluded and the act cannot be done before midnight of that day.
It was held that as the notice in that case fell short of the minimum period of three months, petitioner was entitled to ignore it as an invalid notice in view of the clear requirement of the rule that the notice shall be of not less than three months.
7. In view of the aforesaid position of law and in view of the legal obligation under the Act which needs hardly any emphasis, the requirement of simultaneous payment of the salary in lieu of notice and the compensation Under Section 25F(b) is a condition precedent and pre-requisite for the purpose of full compliance of Section 25F, the order dated 31.12. 1988 (Annex. 2) whereby the petitioner was retrenched by payment of the amount falling short of the pay in lieu of a month’s notice and falling short of 15 days compensation as envisaged Under Section 25F cannot be sustained in the eye of law and the same is hereby quashed and set aside.
8. The petitioner has stated in para 9 of the writ petition that she has remained unemployed from the date of her retrenchment and Mr. Keshote submits that throughout the period from the date of retrenchment she has never remained in a gainful employment. These facts have not been controverted by the respondents and all that has been said in the reply is that the averment is denied for want of knowledge. No efforts have been made by the respondent to give any, fact regarding her employment else whether if any, and there is no reason to disbelieve the version submitted on behalf of the petitioner that through out the period after her retrenchment she has remained unemployed.
9. I accordingly allow this writ petition. I set aside the impugned order dated 31.12.1988 of the petitioner’s retrenchment. I direct that the petitioner be reinstated on the post she was working prior to the passing of the order dated 31.12.1988 and she may be paid all consequential benefits including the wages and continuity of service as if the order dated 31.12.1988 had never been passed against her.
No order as to costs.