JUDGMENT
N.C. Kochhar, J.
1. This appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the Code”), is directed against the Ex parte decree dated 20th August, 1990, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Gangapur City, in Civil Suit No. 31/88.
2. The brief facts are as under: On 18th August, 1988 the plaintiff-respondent had filed a suit, for recovery of Rs. 19,412/-, against the appellant-defendants, with the allegations that the appellant-defendant had, vide the agreement date 19th August, 1985, agreed to sell the property in dispute, to him, for Rs. 50,000/- and he had paid Rs. 14,200/- by way of advance to her, and that the defendant had undertaken to execute a sale deed in respect of the property in dispute in favour of the plaintiff, within a period of one month, on receiving the balance amount of Rs. 35,800/-, but that she had filed to do so in spite of the fact that the plaintiff was prepared to pay the balance amount to her and had asked her to do so and had served notices on her, and that in reply to one of the notices, the defendant-appellant had wrongly alleged that she had come to Gangapur City, for executing the sale-deed, but, in fact, she had not done so. The plaintiff further pleaded that he had later on learnt that the defendant had mortgaged the property in dispute in favour of one Panna Gurjar, for Rs. 58,000/-, and had also sold the same in favour of the brother-in-law of Panna Gurjar, and that these facts were not told by the defendant to him, and that the defendant thus appeared to have no saleable title and was thus not getting the sale-deed registered. The plaintiff claimed a sum of Rs. 14,200/- by way of principal-amount and Rs. 5,212/- by way of interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, and prayed that a decree for the suit-amount be passed against the defendant. On receipt of the notice of the suit, the defendant filed her written-statement on 9th January, 1989, admitting that the agreement dated 19th August, 1985, was executed but pleaded that no advance-amount was paid by the plaintiff to her, but that a sum of Rs. 12,000/- was due from her husband to. the plaintiff, and that after calculating interest thereon, a sum of Rs. 14,200/- was found to be due to him, and the said amount was mentioned in the agreement, and that thereafter also, the defendant had been ready and willing to do her part of the contract, but that the plaintiff, having failed to pay the balance-amount, the contract of sale could not be completed. She also denied the liability to pay interest and callenged the validity of the agreement. It was also pleaded that if the defendant was held liable to pay the amount, she was entitled to pay the same in instalments. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed the following issues on 12th September, in presence of the learned Counsel for the parties, and the case was adjourned to 10th November, 1989:
1-vk;k izfroknh;k ls oknh bdjkjukes fn- 19-8-85 ds isVs dh jkf’k 14]200 :i;s izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gSA
2-vk;k oknh izfroknh;k ls C;kt ,d :i;k lSdM+k ekgokjh ls izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gSA
3-vk;k eqgk;nk voS/k gSa A
4-vk;k izfrokfn;k fd’rs djk ikus dh eq’rgd gsSA
5-nknjlh A
On 10th November, 1989, no witness of the plaintiff was present, and the case was adjourned to 22nd January, 1990, and the same was the position on 22nd January, 1990, and the case was adjourned to 15th March, 1990. On 15th March, 1990, neither the defendant, nor her learned Counsel appeared in the court and, as such, ex parte proceedings were taken against the defendant-appellant, and the case was adjourned to 31st March, 1990, for the ex parte evidence of the plaintiff. On 31st March, 1990, no witness of the plaintiff was present, and at the request of his learned Counsel, the case was adjourned to 26th April, 1990, and thereafter, to 9th may 1990 and to 1st June, 1990, and thereafter, to 13th July, 1990. Neither the defendant-appellant, nor her counsel appeared on either of the above-said dates, and on 13th July, 1990, the plaintiff appeared as his own witness, as PW 1, and closed his evidence, and the case was adjourned to 18th August, 1990, for arguments, and the arguments were heard on 18th August, 1990, and the case was adjourned for pronouncement of judgment, to 20th August, 1990, on which dale, vide the impugned judgment, the suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed for the suit-amount of Rs. 19,412/-, with pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum, against the defendant-appellant, who has approached this Court by filing this appeal.
3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also perused the record of the case.
4. The first points, raised by Shri Gupta, the learned Counsel for the appellant, is that the appellant is a resident of Jaipur, and she had engaged a counsel at Gangapur City, and for no reasons, the counsel absented and had not sent to her any information in regard to the date of hearing and, as such, no appearance could be made in the learned trial court, and in this view of the matter, the impugned decree is liable to be set aside. He has contended that for the fault of the counsel, no litigant should be allowed to suffer, and has relied on the decision of the Apex Court, in case, Rafiq and Anr. v. Munshilal and Anr. reported as .
5. It is not disputed before me that no application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code, had been moved by the appellant-defendant, for setting aside the decree, on the ground that she could not appear in the court on the above-said dates, for the reasons mentioned above or for any other sufficient cause. This Court has to see on the basis of the record, whether the decree passed by the learned trial court is in accordance with law and the learned trial court proceeded in accordance with the procedure, prescribed by the Code. This Court has not to go into the question as to whether there was sufficient cause for the for the appellant to have absented on the dates starting from the date that the ex parte proceedings were taken against her. If the argument of Shri Gupta, is accepted, this Court will have to go into the question by recording evidence of the parties, in regard to the contention being raised in this Court, which could have been raised only by moving an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code, before the learned trial court. Here, the record shows that no appearance was made before the learned court below from 15th March, 1990 till the case was decided on 20th August, 1990, and this fact has not been disputed. The learned trial court was, therefore, within its power to proceed exparte against the defendant-appellant, and no defect can be found in the impugned decree. The first contention of Shri Gupta, is therefore, rejected. The authority relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant, is of no assistance to the appellant in this appeal.
6. It has next been contended by Shri Gupta that even in his ex-parte evidence, the plaintiff had failed to prove his case and, as such, the impugned decree is liable to be set aside.
7. From the record, I find that in support of his case, the plaintiff had appeared as his own witness and had deposed that he was ready and willing to pay the balance-amount of Rs. 35,800/-, to the defendant, who did not come forward for executing the sale-deed in spite of the fact that notices were sent by him, and in the notices dated 11th October, 1985; 19th September, 1985; and dated 4th July, 1988 respectively (Exs. 2, 3 and 4), he had called upon the defendant-appellant, either to get the sale-deed executed, or to refund the amount of Rs. 14,200/-, received by her from him, along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. The plaintiff also proved on record the Exhibit-1 as the agreement, admittedly executed by the defendant-appellant, in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. In the funder part of his statement, the plaintiff deposed that after some days of the execution of the agreement (Ex.1), the plaintiff had learnt that in fact, the defendant had already created a charge on property in dispute by mortgaging it in favour of Panna Gurgar, and had thereafter, sold the same to his brother-in-law, and this fact was not known to him.
8. Shri Gupta has contended that the latter part of the statement of the plaintiff shows that he himself was not prepared to get the sale-deed executed by paying the balance-amount, and not that the defendant was not ready to execute the sale-deed in his favour.
9. I am unable to read in the statement of the plaintiff what Shri Gupta contends. As noted above, the plaintiff had specifically deposed that he had asked the defendant to get the Sale-deed executed by receiving the balance-amount, but, she had not done so. It is not disputed that no sale-deed was executed by the defendant-appellant, the statement of the plaintiff that he had requested the defendant to execute the sale-deed and that he was prepared to the balance-amount-of Rs. 35,800/- to her, has remained unchallenged and unrebutted for the reasons that the appellant-defendant did not appear in the court, at any time, after 15th March, 1990. The plaintiff had thus proved his case about the non-execution of the sale-deed by the defendant-appellant, during the period in question, or at any time thereafter, till the filing of the suit, despite his sending the notices (Exs. 2, 3 and 4). In this view of the matter, the defendant-appellant having failed to perform her part of the contract, the claim of the plaintiff for the refund of the advance-amount, paid by him, could not be denied.
10. The next contention, raised by Shri Gupta, is that there was no condition in the agreement that interest would be paid on the amount in question and, as such, the learned trial court erred in awarding interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, till the date of the filing of the suit.
11. The plaintiff, in his statement on oath, has proved on record, a copy of the notice dated 19th September, 1985, as Exhibit-3, and vide this notice, the plaintiff had called upon the defendant, to refund the amount in question, with interest at the rate of 1 per cent per mensem. Even otherwise, the sale-deed was to be executed within a period of one month from the date of the execution of the agreement (Ex.1), and if the sale-deed was not so executed, the amount was liable to be refunded to the plaintiff on the expiry of the period of one month from the date of the execution of the agreement. The plaintiff thus remained deprived of the use of the money, which was to be paid to him on the expiry of the above-said period of one month. Section-3 of the Interest Act, 1978, clearly empowers the Court to award interest on the amount, and from the date that it is payable and has not been paid. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the learned trial court erred in granting the interest. However, it may be seen that the learned trial court has awarded the interest for the period from the date that the agreement (Ex.1) was executed, whereas, the interest was chargeable from the date a month later thereto. The amount of interest for a period of one month at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, comes to Rs. 142/- and, as such, the amount, allowed by way of interest, has to be reduced to Rs. 5070/-.
12. The learned Counsel for the appellant has next submitted that the appellant-defendant had pleaded in the written-statement that she might be allowed to pay the decretal amount in instalments, but the learned trial court did not fix any instalments.
13. From the record, I find that a specific issue was framed by the learned trial court on the plea of the defendant in this respect, but the defendant-appellant did not appear before the learned trial court, to furnish any reason for allowing her to pay the decretal amount in instalments. Admittedly, even after the passing of the decree, not a single paisa has been paid by the appellant-defendant, to the plaintiff-respondent, and in this view of the matter; this submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant also cannot be accepted.
14. Before parting with this judgment, it is noticed that the learned trial court has also awarded pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum, in favour of the plaintiff. Under Section 34 of the Code, the court is empowered to grant interest at a rate, not exceeding 6 per cent per annum, except when the transaction between the parties, out of which, the liability for the amount in question arises, is commercial in nature, and it is admitted before me that the transaction in question was not commercial in nature. In this view of the matter, the decree requires to be amended in regard to the pendente lite and future interest also.
15. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal is partly accepted, and the decree passed by the learned trial court, is modified to the extent that the suit, filed by the plaintiff is decreed for Rs. 19,270/-, with proportionate costs and pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, on the principal sum of Rs. 14,200/-, from the date of the institution of the suit, till the payment of the amount. Except the modification mentioned above in the impugned decree, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.