JUDGMENT
Kailash Gambhir, J.
1. By way of the present appeal the appellant seeks to challenge the impugned Award dated 18/09/2006 whereby, the claim petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. Brief summary of facts to deal with the contentions of the parties are:
On 18.05.2002, around 12 O’clock (noon) the deceased (who was working as driver on Truck No. DL – 1GA – 5414) Along with a helper S.L. Kalyan Mal was passing through Kanjhawla when all of a sudden a motorcycle was seen coming at a high speed on wrong side and in an attempt to save the motorcycle rider, his truck collided with a tree which resulted in a serious accident and death of the said driver. The deceased was taken to Sanjay Gandhi Hospital where he was declared as brought dead.
2. A claim petition was filed on 10.3.2003 and an Award was made on 18.9.2006. Aggrieved with the said award the appellant preferred the present appeal.
3. Counsel for the appellant has contended that learned Trial Court has not properly appreciated the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Baroda . The contention of the counsel for the appellant is that the claim petition filed by the appellant under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act was maintainable even in a case where the income of the deceased has been disclosed to be more than the limit of Rs. 40,000/- per annum as provided in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The counsel for the appellant thus sought to urge that the approach adopted by the Tribunal in dismissing the claim petition of the appellant only on the ground that the income as pleaded by the appellant is beyond ceiling limit of Rs. 40,000/- is absolutely perverse and illegal. Counsel further contended that Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act was brought on the Statute book by the legislature in the year 1994 to deal with those situations where the death or permanent disablement has resulted due to some accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle and not to burden the claimant to prove the factum of negligence or wrongful act on the part of the driver or owner of the offending vehicle. Counsel thus contended that merely because of the fact that the appellant had disclosed the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- per month, the claim petition could not have been dismissed by the Tribunal on the ground that the yearly income of the deceased exceeded the limit laid down in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act. At the most while granting the compensation the Tribunal could have decided the claim after taking into consideration the limit of Rs. 40,000/- alone while discarding the income over and above the said limit even if the same is pleaded and proved by the appellant. Drawing my attention to the said judgment of the Apex Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni (Supra), the contention of the counsel for the appellant is that in the said case the Apex Court has clearly distinguished the findings of earlier decision of the Supreme Court reported in case entitled Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala and Ors.
4. Per contra, Mr. M.B. Aggarwal, counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 refuted the said submissions of the counsel for the appellant. The counsel contended that once the ceiling limit has been prescribed under the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act no petition under Section 163-A can be entertained, in a case where claimants themselves plead the income of the deceased over and above the said limit. The contention of the counsel for the respondent is that two alternative remedies for filing a claim petition are available under the Motor Vehicles Act and in a case where the income set up by the claimants is more than Rs. 40,000/- per annum then the remedy to file claim petition lies only under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act and not under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Counsel further contended that in the facts of the present case admittedly the appellant had disclosed the income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- per month and the same was also proved during the course of the evidence and, therefore, no fault can be found with the findings of the Tribunal in dismissing the claim petition of the appellant. Entertaining any petition where the disclosed income is more than the ceiling limit of Rs. 40,000/- per annum would itself be against the mandatory requirement of the Statute itself and the limit laid down under the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act and the same cannot be ignored for entertaining the petition under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Counsel for the respondent also placed reliance on the same judgment of the Apex Court reported in Kodala case (Supra).
5. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties at considerable length and have perused the record.
6. Before delving on the contentions raised by the parties, it would be appropriate that we may reproduce the following provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to properly appreciate the controversy involved in the present appeal.
140. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault.
(1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted I from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the 1 owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, I jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under Sub-section (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of 1[fifty thousand rupees] and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of 2[twenty-five thousand rupees].
(3) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.
(4) A claim for compensation under Sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement.
3[(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (2) regarding death or bodily injury to any person, for which the owner of the vehicle is liable to give compensation for relief, he is also liable to pay compensation under any other law for the time being in force:
Provided that the amount of such compensation to be given under any other law shall be reduced from the amount of compensation payable under this section or under Section 163A.]
141. Provisions as to other right to claim compensation for death or permanent disablement.
(1) The right to claim compensation under Section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be in addition to 1[any other right, except the right to claim under the scheme referred to in Section 163A (such other right hereafter] in this section referred to as the right on the principle of fault) to claim compensation in respect thereof under any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force].
(2) A claim for compensation under Section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement under Section 140 and also in pursuance of any right on (he principle of fault, the claim for compensation under Section 140 shall be disposed of as aforesaid in the first place.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), where in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, the person liable to pay compensation under Section 140 is also liable to pay compensation in accordance with the right on the principle of fault, the person so liable shall pay the first- mentioned compensation and-
(a) if the amount of the first-mentioned compensation is less than the amount of the second-mentioned compensation, he shall be liable to pay (in addition to the first-mentioned compensation) only so much of the second-mentioned compensation as is equal to the amount by which it exceeds the first mentioned compensation;
(b) if the amount of the first-mentioned compensation is equal to or more than the amount of the second-mentioned compensation, he shall not be liable to pay the second-mentioned compensation.
144. Overriding effect.
The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force.
163A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis.
[163A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, “permanent disability” shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923).
(2) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.
(3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule.
163B. Option to file claim in certain cases.
1[163B. Option to file claim in certain cases.
Where a person is entitled to claim compensation under Section 140 and Section 163A, he shall file the claim under either of the said sections and not under both.]
166. Application for compensation.
(1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 165 may be made-
(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or
(b) by the owner of the property; or
(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or
(d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be:
Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be imp leaded as respondents to the application.
1[(2) Every application under Sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed:
Provided that where no claim for compensation under Section 140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant.]
2[***]
3[(4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under Sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act.]
167. Option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases.
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) where the death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both.
168. Award of the Claims Tribunal.
On receipt of an application for compensation made under Section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of Section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be:
Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under Section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X.
(2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award.
(3) When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct.
8. As would be seen from the plain language of the aforesaid provisions, all the provisions are beneficial in nature and, therefore, they have to be interpreted in a manner so as to achieve the main objective and intendment of the legislature, which is social welfare of the victims of the accidents.
9. The provisions with regard to the no fault liability were inserted having regard to the fact that road accidents in India have reached an alarming proportion and in many of the cases it could be noticed that the victims were being deprived of the compensation amount in the absence of proving rash or negligent driving due to inability in producing any independent witness. To come to the rescue of such victims, earlier Section 140 was brought on the Statute book whereby the provision was made to pay a fixed sum of Rs. 50,000/- (through an amendment by Act 54 of 1994 to substitute the amount of Rs. 25,000/- by Rs. 50,000/-) in respect of the death of any person and a fixed sum of Rs. 25,000/- (through an amendment by Act 54 of 1994 to substitute the amount of Rs. 12,000/-to Rs. 25,000/-) is payable in respect of the permanent disablement of any person on the principle of no fault liability. This right given under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act was in addition to the right to claim compensation in respect of any such death or permanent disablement under any other provisions of Act or of any other law for the time being in force. Section 163-A was introduced in the Act again by way of a social security scheme. It would be evident from the objects and reasons of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 that after the enactment of 1988 Act several representations and suggestions were made by the State Governments, transport operators and members of public in relation to certain provisions thereof and after taking note of the said suggestions made by the various Courts and the difficulties experienced in implementing the various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Government of India appointed a Review Committee. The Review Committee appointed by the Government in its report made the following recommendations:
The 1988 Act provides for enhanced compensation for hit and run cases as well as for no fault liability cases. It also provides for payment of compensation on proof-of-fault basis to the extent of actual liability incurred which ultimately means an unlimited liability in accident cases. It is found that the determination of compensation takes a long time. According to information available, in Delhi alone there are 11214 claims pending before the Motor Vehicle Accidents Tribunals, as on 31.3.1990. Proposals have been made from time to time that the finalisation of compensation claims would be greatly facilitated to the advantage of the claimant, the vehicle owner as well as the Insurance Company if a system of structured compensation can be introduced. Under such a system of structured compensation that is payable for different clauses of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of the minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc., can be notified. The affected party can then have the option of either accepting the lump sum compensation as is notified in that scheme of structured compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal channels.
The General Insurance Company with whom the matter was taken up, is agreeable in principle to a scheme of structured compensation for settlement of claims on “fault liability” in respect of third party liability under Chapter XI of M.V. Act, 1988. They have suggested that the claimants should first file their Claims with Motor Accident Claims Tribunals and then the insurers may be allowed six months time to confirm their prima facie liability subject to the defenses available under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. After such confirmations of prima facie liability by the insurers the claimants should be required to exercise their option for conciliation under structured compensation formula within a stipulated time.
40. The recommendations of the Review Committee and representations from public were placed before the Transport Development Council for seeking their views pursuant whereto several sections were amended. Section 163A was inserted in the Act to provide for payment of compensation in motor accident cases in accordance with the Second Schedule providing for the structured formula which may be amended by the Central Government from time to time.
10. It would be thus noticed that Section 163-A was brought on the Statute of Motor Vehicles Act to grant urgent relief to that section of people whose annual income is not more than Rs. 40,000/- having regard to the fact that compensation in such cases would be paid on the basis of the structured formula after taking into account the age of the victim and his income and all other factors as laid down in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act. The emphasis of the counsel for the respondent was that according to Section 163-B the claim petition cannot be filed under both the provisions of the Statute i.e. under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act and Section 163-A as a person has been given the option to file claim petition in either of the said Sections and not under both. The second contention of the counsel for the respondent is that under no circumstances claim petition can be entertained by the Tribunal where the income of the deceased has been disclosed above the limit of income as circumscribed in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicle Act i.e. Rs. 40,000/- per annum. Both the contentions raised by the counsel for the respondent at the first blush appeared to be quite attractive and forceful, but after deeply examining the entire scheme of the Act the same are found to be of no substance. The embargo under Section 163-B of the Motor Vehicles Act gives an option to file claim petition either under Section 140 or under Section 163-A and not under both the provisions, but no such restriction has been placed under the Act in choosing either of the two remedies i.e. under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act or under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 140 of the Act deals with grant of interim compensation, but Section 163-A provides for a situation to grant a pre-determined sum without insisting on a long drawn trial or without proof of negligence in causing the accident. The said Section 163-A was a kind of new mechanism evolved by the legislature so as to grant quick and efficacious relief to the victims falling within the specified category, which was not available to the victims under Section 166 of the Act. The provision of Sub-Section 5 of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act further clarified that the amount of compensation payable under any other law for the time being in force is to be reduced from the amount of compensation payable under Section 140 or under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. It would be thus amply clear that right to claim compensation on the basis of no fault liability under Section 140 is in addition to the right to claim compensation on the principle of fault liability or right to get compensation under any other law. Such amount as awarded under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act is required to be reduced from the amount payable under the fault liability or compensation, which may be received under any other law including under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. If no further amount is payable under the Act or under any other law then the claimant is not required to refund the amount so received by him under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. As against this, there is a specific bar in the scheme envisaged for paying compensation under Section 163-A as the same nowhere provides that the payment of compensation or no fault liability on the basis of structured formula is in addition to the liability to pay compensation on the principle of fault liability and therefore, once compensation is determined and paid under the structural formula of the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act no further compensation can be paid to the claimants again.
11. From the aforesaid discussion, it would be thus manifest that under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally as are determined under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act unlike the situation under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which is an interim measure and a fixed amount is payable in the case of death or permanent disablement, as the case may be. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the remedy of payment of compensation both under Section 163-A and Section 166 are independent of each other as statutorily provided and claimant cannot pursue both the remedies simultaneously. It would be worthwhile to refer paras 57, 67 & 68 of the Apex Court judgment cited by the counsel for the appellant in the case of Deepal Girishbhai (Supra) which are reproduced as under:
57. We, therefore, are of the opinion that remedy for payment of compensation both under Section 163A and 166 being final and independent of each other as statutorily provided, a claimant cannot pursue his remedies there under simultaneously. One, thus, must opt/elect to go either for a proceeding under Section 163A or under Section 166 of the Act, but not under both.
67. We, therefore, are of the opinion that Kodala (supra) has correctly been decided. However, we do not agree with the findings in Kodala (supra) that if a person invokes provisions of Section 163A, the annual income of Rs. 40,000/- per annual shall be treated as a cap. In our opinion, the proceeding under Section 163A being a social security provision, providing for a distinct scheme, only those whose annual income is up to Rs. 40,000/- can take the benefit thereof. All other claims are required to be determined in terms of Chapter XII of the Act.
68. However, in this case, we may notice that the parties have proceeded to file two applications – one, under Section 163A and another under Section 166 of the Act. Both have been entertained. Both the Tribunal as also the High Court have proceeded on the basis that the amount of compensation under Section 163A is by way of an interim award and the same would not preclude the claimants to proceed with his claim made in terms of Section 166 of the Act. It is submitted at the Bar that the appellants have withdrawn 50% of the amount and rest of the amount has been invested. The appellants have lost both of their parents in the accident. Only one of the appellants at the relevant time was a major. It appears that 70% of the amount permitted to be withdrawn has been deposited in the Fixed Deposit. We agree with the submission of Mr. Banerjee that the claim of the appellants made under Section 163A be treated to be one under Section 140 of the Act and upon adjusting the amounts provided for there under, the appellants may refund the rest thereof to the insurer.
12. Based on the above discussion and after considering the ratio of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court, it becomes manifest that the bar is on taking simultaneous remedies under Section 163-A and Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, but there cannot be any bar that claimant cannot choose at any stage of the case to convert their petition from Section 166 to Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Denying such right of conversion during the pendency of case would defeat the very social objective of granting speedy and expeditious compensation to the victims of the accident cases. Once the claimants have taken recourse to Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act the only hindrance, which will come in the way of the claimants would be that the compensation in their favor would be payable under the said structured formula of the Motor Vehicles Act and once the claimants seek an amendment to convert their petition from Section 166 to 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, then, at the same time the claimant cannot be allowed to take the advantage of the income which the deceased/victim might have been earning over and above the amount of Rs. 40,000/- per annum as restricted in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act.
13. As already discussed above, the only restriction created by the Statute under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act is that the said provision is meant only for those whose annual income is up to Rs. 40,000/- and all other claimants can approach the tribunal under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Apex Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni & Ors. (Supra) has already taken a view that Section 163-A being a social security provision and providing for a distinct scheme was brought on the statute book only with a view to provide benefit to all those whose annual income does not exceed more than Rs. 40,000/-. In the facts of the present case the appellant earlier filed claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act and after withdrawing the same preferred the same petition under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. In the petition under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the appellants have claimed income of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- per month meaning thereby the annual income of the deceased would come to Rs. 60,000/- per annum. After placing reliance on the said judgment of the Apex Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni & Ors. (Supra) the tribunal has dismissed the claim petition of the appellants on the ground that the income pleaded by the appellants in the claim petition goes beyond the restriction of Rs. 40,000/- as placed in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act. The precise question to be answered is that in a claim petition where income pleaded is more than Rs. 40,000/- per annum, whether the claim petition still can be entertained under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act or not. It has been generally seen that claimants approach the tribunals by pleading hefty incomes of the deceased which ultimately they fail to prove in evidence. The question for consideration before this Court is as to whether simply by pleading a particular income which goes beyond the cap of Rs. 40,000/- per annum, the remedy, otherwise available under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act can be denied to the victims.
14. Another question which is of the vital importance is whether the petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act or visa-versa can be allowed to be converted into a petition under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and if the answer is yes, then what should be the stage for allowing such a petition. There cannot be any dispute that Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation and therefore, endeavor has to be as to how best the intention of the legislation can be achieved so as to safeguard the interest of the victims of the accident rather than defeating the same. The statute has to be construed according to the intent of the makers and it is the duty of the courts to interpret the statute to see that true intention of legislature is achieved. Taking a purposive interpretation of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act the clear intendment of the legislation was to come to the rescue of all those who in the absence of an evidence are not in a position to file a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act where death of the victim or permanent disablement of the victim is required to be proved by establishing the factum of negligence involving the offending vehicle resulting in to causing the accident but under Section 163-A, the requirement of proving the negligence has been dispensed with.
15. As regards grant of compensation in all such cases under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the same is payable as indicated in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act to the legal heirs of the victim or to the victim of the accident itself, as the case may be. The Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act places restriction at Rs. 40,000/- per annum while no such restriction is there under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Can such a restriction placed in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act prohibit filing of the claim petition itself where the income is pleaded at more than Rs. 40,000/- per annum. In my considered view, the answer has to be in the negative, it is not merely by pleading a particular income that the right to file petition under Section 163-A can be denied. In a particular case which is otherwise covered within the ambit and scope of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claim petition cannot be dismissed merely on the ground that the income pleaded therein in the petition is more than Rs. 40,000/- per annum. It is ultimately the proof of income which would determine the grant of relief under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, but restriction of Rs. 40,000/- per annum as indicated in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot also be taken as a cap as the government has failed to revise the structural formula of the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act as mandated by Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act was to be revised from time to time keeping in view the cost of living by an appropriate notification in the official gazette by the Central Government but since the time of its insertion w.e.f. 14.11.1994 no revision has taken place even after lapse of about more than 13 years. Since the criteria of revision was based on the cost of living, therefore, this Court has taken a consistent view by taking the help of Minimum Wages Act to revise the minimum wages after taking into account rise in the price index and inflation rates. There has been an average increase of up to 4% to 6% in the price index each year and within a gap of about 10 years there has been an increase of wages in the Minimum Wages Act, which comes out as more than double of the wages comparing the wages in the year 1994. For instance wages of an unskilled worker in the year 1994, when the IInd Schedule came into effect, was Rs. 1420/- which came to be Rs. 3312/- in the year 2006, the year in which the award was made. This would show an increase of 233.2% and based on the same analogy, it can be said that such an increase can be taken into consideration without considering the said cap of Rs. 40,000/- per annum in the structural formula of the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act.
16. In the facts of the present case, the appellant claimant has claimed income of the deceased at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- per month from his job of driver. The accident in the present case had occurred on 18.5.2002 while the claim petition was filed by the claimant on 10.3.2003 and the impugned award has been passed on 18.9.2006. Had the Government revised the IInd Schedule as per the mandate of Section 163-A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the said upper limit of Rs. 40,000/- would have got increased to a much higher amount, then the annual income of the deceased pleaded by the appellant claimant. Taking a note of the increase in the Minimum Wages Act, the said limit of Rs. 40,000/- inserted in the IInd Schedule in the year 1994 would have got increased minimum to about Rs. 80,000/- in the year 2002 as per the high rise in cost of living and the inflation rate during the past period, which factors are mainly the determinative factors taken into consideration by the Government at the time of revision of minimum wages of various categories of workers under the Minimum Wages Act. I am, therefore, of the view that in the absence of there being any revision by the Government to the said upper limit of Rs. 40,000/- in the IInd Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act, the wages of the deceased or victim of the accident can be raised to the same limit as has been taken into account under the Minimum Wages Act for the revision of minimum wages of various categories of workmen.
17. In the light of the above discussion, I do not find the wages of the deceased at Rs. 5,000/- p.m. or Rs. 60,000/- per annum would come in the way of the appellant claimant to file petition under Section163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
18. The impugned award passed by the Tribunal is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Tribunal for fresh trial of the case.
19. Parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on 25.5.2008.