Regular Second Appeal No.1062 of 2009 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
Regular Second Appeal No.1062 of 2009
Date of Order: 12.10.2009
Smt. Sadhna Chandi Das
....Appellant
Versus
Allahabad Bank, New Delhi and another
..Respondents
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIVE BHALLA
Present: Mr. Vinod S. Bharadwaj,Advocate
for the appellant.
RAJIVE BHALLA, J (Oral).
The appellant challenges the judgments and decrees dated
04.07.2008 and 17.01.2009, passed by the Civil Judge (Senior
Division),Faridabad and the Additional District Judge, Faridabad,
rejecting her plaint.
The petitioner filed a suit for declaration and cancellation of
a mortgage deed dated 07.03.2006, alleging that she had not
executed any such mortgage deed in favour of Allahabad Bank-
respondent no.1. The appellant also prayed that the notice of sale
issued under Section 13 (2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction
of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
(hereinafter referred to as the Act), dated 19.09.2007, be set aside.
The trial court rejected the plaint by holding that the
appellant was required to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal in
Regular Second Appeal No.1062 of 2009 -2-
accordance with Section 17 of the Act. It was also held that as per
Section 34 of the Act, the jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain such
a suit is barred.
Aggrieved by the aforementioned judgment and decree, the
appellant filed an appeal. Vide judgment and decree dated
17.01.2009, the Additional District Judge, Faridabad, dismissed the
appeal by holding that the trial court has rightly rejected the plaint.
Counsel for the appellant submits that as the appellant has
raised a plea of fraud, the Debt Recovery Tribunal cannot consider
and decide this plea as it is a Tribunal with limited jurisdiction. It is
argued that as the Debt Recovery Tribunal cannot grant any relief
with respect to plea of fraud, the judgments and decrees passed by
the court below should be set aside.
I have heard counsel for the appellant, perused Sections
13, 17 and 34 of the Act and do not find any impediment in the way
of the Debt Recovery Tribunal considering and deciding the plea
raised in the plaint. It is apparent that all disputes, relating to a
notice issued under Section 13 of the Act would have to be
challenged by way of filing an application under Section 17 of the Act
before the Debt Recovery Tribunal.
As the impugned judgments and decrees do not suffer from
any error of law, the appeal is dismissed.
October 12, 2009 (RAJIVE BHALLA) nt JUDGE