JUDGMENT
N.N. Tiwari, J.
1. This is the tenant’s civil revision filed under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the BBC Act’ or ‘the said Act’ for short) against the judgment and decree dated 21.3.2002 passed by the Munsif, Jamshedpur in Eviction Suit No. 25/92, whereby the learned Munsif has decreed the landlord’s suit for eviction sought on the ground of their personal necessity.
2. The plaintiffs case was, that they are the owners of the house standing over Holding No. 6, Thakurbari Shop Area, Sakchi, town Jamsedpur, consisting of four shop rooms on the ground floor. The defendant was inducted as a tenant by the plaintiffs in one shop room as a monthly tenant, on monthly rent of Rs. 300/- plus electric charges. The defendant was carrying on business of Electronics and other allied goods. Two shop rooms are in occupation of other tenants, namely, Himmat Singh and Jadunath Pathak and the rest one shop room is in occupation of the plaintiff No. 2 who is running business of TV and other Electronics goods. The plaintiffs averred that they belong to a trading family and earn their livelihood by carrying on their business. The plaintiff No. 1 is the mother of the plaintiff Nos. 2-5 and they are living jointly in a portion of first floor of the building. The plaintiff Nos. 3 and 5 have not been able to engage themselves in business due to want of accommodation. The wife of the plaintiff No. 4 has taken a shop on rent at Sakchi Market and is running business there. The plaintiff No. 3 Umesh Chaudhary required the said premises for his business of courier services and courier parcels and he has got fund for the said business. The plaintiff No. 5 Bimlesh Kumar Choudhary since married in March, 1995 is also unemployed and he also needs the suit premises for running his business of Electrical goods. The plaintiffs, therefore, required the suit premises for the plaintiffs No. 3 and 5, reasonably and in good faith. The suit premise is located in the centre of Sakchi Market and is suitable for the said business of the plaintiff Nos. 3 and 5. The plaintiffs requested the defendant to vacate the suit premises to which they had agreed and assured to vacate it by 30.9.1991, but subsequently refused to vacate. Hence the suit.
3. The defendant appeared and filed written statement obtaining the leave to contest the suit. The defendant’s case is that the suit is not maintainable and the plaintiffs have to cause of action for the suit nor they have right to institute the suit. The suit does not come within the purview of Section 14 and Section 11(1)(C) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982. According to the defendant, she was not inducted by all the plaintiffs. The plaintiff No. 1 is the exclusive landlady with respect to the said premises. The plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 have no concern with the suit premises. It was also stated that the Holding No. 6 over which the building stands, belonged to Nathulal Chaudhary, the husband of the plaintiff No. 1 and the father of the plaintiffs No. 2 and 5. Nathulal Chaudhary had two wives. The plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 are sons of Nathulal Chaudhary through his first wife while plaintiff Nos. 4 and 5 are sons through his second wife i.e. the plaintiff No. 1. It was further stated that on the ground floor there are four shop rooms from East to West and the first floor was occupied by United Commercial Bank and on the second floor some rooms belonged to the plaintiffs No. 1, 4 and 5. The first floor has been vacated by the UCO Bank and the plaintiffs are in occupation of the same. There was a partition in the family of Late Nathulal Chaudhary. Four shop rooms were also partitioned and memo of partition dated 17.6,1981 was drawn up. The plaintiff No. 1 inducted the defendant on monthly rent of Rs. 300/-. The plaintiff Nos. 1, 4 and 5 are the owners of the two shops in the ground floor on eastern side which are in occupation of the tenant Jadunath Pathak and the defendant. The plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 are the owners of the shop rooms on the Western side which are in occupation of plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 and one tenant namely Himmat Singh. The plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 thus can not claim the suit shop for their use as they are completely separate from the plaintiff Nos. 1, 4 and 5. The plaintiff Nos. 2-5 are engaged in different kind of business. The plaintiff No. 3 is engaged with the plaintiff No. 2 who runs his business in the name and style of Audio Vision. The plaintiff Nos. 4 and 5 are doing business. Recording Electronics at Sakchi Handi Line, near Shiv Mandir. The plaintiffs did not require the suit premises either individually or jointly. Their intention is to induct another tenant after taking heavy salami (premium) and on higher rent. The suit premises measuring 7′ x 14′ is a small room and the same can not accommodate the intended business of the plaintiffs.
4. Both the parties led evidences, documentary as well as oral, in support of their respective claims. The learned trial Court framed several issues. Issue No. 3 is regarding the personal necessity of the plaintiffs, as to whether the plaintiffs’ need is bona fide and reasonable. The same issue also included the issue as to whether partial eviction is a practicable solution. The learned trial Court also framed an issue as to whether the plaintiff is a landlord within the meaning of Section 11(1)(c) of BB (L, R and E), Control Act, 1982, as issue No. 6. After thorough appraisal and consideration of the evidences on record and after considering the factual and legal aspects, the trial Court decided both the issue Nos. 3 and 6, in favour of the plaintiff (landlord) and held that the plaintiffs required suit premises reasonably and in good faith for the purpose of business of the plaintiff Nos. 3 and 5 and that partial eviction will not satisfy the need of the plaintiff. The learned trial Court decided other relevant issues in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit.
5. The defendant felt aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, has preferred this revision under the provisions of Section 14(8) of the said BBC Act, 1982.
6. Mr. L.K. Lal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, tried to assail the impugned judgment and decree mainly on two grounds. Mr. Lal, firstly, contended that the plaintiffs are not the landlord within the meaning of Section 11(1)(c) of the BBC Act and they are not entitled to get a decree for eviction on the ground mentioned in Section 11(1)(c) of the said Act. According to him, the suit holding is a leasehold property of TISCO standing in the name of Bhola Ram Chaudhary. The said Bhola Ram Chaudhary has not executed any document in favour of Nathulal Chaudhary and that the said position has been admitted by PW 1, Kamlesh Chaudhary in his deposition. In view of the said admission the plaintiffs are not the actual owners, having right against the whole world to occupy the premises. They are, thus, not the landlords within the ambit of Section 11(1)(c) and at their instance the instant suit under the said provision is not maintainable. According to Mr. Lal, the learned trial Court failed to take into consideration the said legal position and erroneously decreed the suit holding the plaintiffs as the landlord for the purposes of Section 11(1) (c) of the said Act. The Court below has also committed errors in law in applying the principles of estoppel against the defendant which is not applicable in the instant case as the defendant had no knowledge regarding the actual ownership of the suit building at the inception, but he subsequently came to know that the suit premises does not belong to the plaintiffs. Thus the rule of estoppel has no application against the defendant in this case. Mr. Lal relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1981 SC 1113, M.M. Quasim v. Manoharlal Sharma and Ors. Mr. Lal submitted that the Court below has further erred in not taking into consideration the subsequent development brought by way of amendment in the written statement, also supported by the evidence, that the UCO Bank which was admittedly a tenant on the first floor of the suit building vacated the suit premises and the same became available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of doing the intended business. According to Mr. Lal, the trial Court failed to take into consideration that in that event the requirement of the plaintiffs for the suit premises, is not reasonable and in good faith and they are not entitled to the relief as prayed for.
7. Mr. P.K. Pd., learned counsel appearing on behalf of the landlord-OP, on the other hand, submitted that the trial Court on the basis of the evidences on record has come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are the landlords within the meaning of Section 11(1)(c) and that they required the premises reasonably and in good faith. According to Mr. Prasad, the plaintiff No. 1 is the mother and Nos. 2 and 5 are the sons and it has been validly proved by the plaintiffs that they required the suit premises for the purposes of starting the business of plaintiff No. 3 and plaintiff No. 5. According to the learned counsel, the defendant having been inducted, by the plaintiffs, as the tenant, can not deny the title of the plaintiffs and they are estopped from denying the same under the statutory provision of Section 116 of the Eviction Act. According to Mr. Pd., the defendant having signed the agreement dated 29.7.1981 (Ext. C) accepting the plaintiff No. 1 as the landlord, cannot now turn round and challenge the title of the plaintiff. According to him, the defendant has been continuously paying rent to the plaintiffs pursuant to the said agreement and that the said plea of denial of the plaintiffs’ title is wholly malicious and has been taken in order to make out a ground for defence in the suit. The learned counsel submitted that once the tenant was inducted by the landlord and the tenant proceeded to occupy and enjoy the grant of that tenancy, he can not challenge the title of the landlord later on. According to him, the defendant took possession under a contract to pay rent so long she is in occupation. The defendant thus can not be allowed to say that the plaintiffs of whose title she admitted and took possession have now no title. The defendant is debarred from making such claim under the well established doctrine of estoppel as well as under the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act which contains the said principles. In support of his said submission, the learned counsel relied on the decisions reported in AIR 1976 SC 2335, Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jaganath and Ors., 1997 (1) PLJR 230, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Mohammad Amber Yunus and 2000 (4) PLJR 678, Bihar State Sales Representative Union and Anr. v. Amrit Lal Seth and Ors. Mr. P.K. Pd, then urged that the term ‘owner’ includes various rights and incidents of ownership, all of which need not be necessarily present in every case. It may include a right to possess, use and enjoy the things owned. All that is required is that the landlord has better title than the tenant and his ownership is good against whole world except the true owner. Mr. Prasad placed his reliance on a case reported in AIR 1992 SC 1590, Swadesh Ranjan Sinha v. Haradeb Banerjee to fortify his said submission. Mr. P.K. Pd. in reply to the second ground raised by Mr. Lal, submitted that the vacation of the first floor by the UCO Bank can not be a ground for non-consideration of the personal need of the plaintiffs, of the shop rooms at the ground floor. According to Mr. Pd., it is the landlord who has to choose which premises is suitable for satisfying his particular need and the tenant has no right to question such preference. Mr. Prasad submitted that the plaintiffs required the suit premises for starting the business of courier services and courier parcel and portion vacated by the UCO Bank is now being used by the plaintiffs family for the residential purpose. The said space was actually a residential space which was earlier let out to a Bank. Now the number of family members having been increased, the said premises Is being used for the residential purpose. The plaintiff Nos. 3 and 5 thus can not satisfy the need of the plaintiffs as they require the premises to start their business and the suit premises which is at the ground floor is suitable for business purposes. The Court below has thus rightly came to the finding that the plaintiffs required the suit premises reasonably and in good faith. According to Mr. Prasad, since the said findings of facts have been recorded on the basis of proper appreciation of the evidences and materials on record, the same requires no intervention by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdciton.
8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials and evidences on record. I find merits in the submissions of Mr. Prasad. Section 2(f) of the BBC Act defines ‘landlord’ thus :
“Landlord” includes the persons who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf of, for the benefit of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver, guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant”.
Section 11(1)(c) of the said Act provides one of the grounds for eviction of the tenant, as follows :
“Where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord :
Provided that where the Court thinks that reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall henceforth constitute the building within the meaning of Clause (b) of Section 2 and the rent to fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under Section 5 :
Explanation I.–In this clause the word “landlord” shall not include an agent referred to in Clause (f) of Section 2.
Explanation II.–Where there are two or more premises let out by the landlord, it will be for the landlord to choose which one would be preferable to him and the tenant or tenants shall not be allowed to question such preference.”
From the bare reading of the said provisions, it is evident that by Explanation-I an agent referred to in Clause (f) of Section 2 of the said Act has not been included within the word “landlord”. Except that, the definition of landlord given in Section 2(f) is equally applicable in a case falling within Section 11(1)(c) of the Act which includes the person who for the time being receives or entitled to receive rent of a building. In the instant case, the defendant has been paying rent to the plaintiff No. 1 who is the mother of the plaintiffs Nos. 2-5. According to the plaintiffs, the family is joint and there is no partition. By entering into an agreement and accepting the plaintiffs as the landlord followed by payment of rent continuously, the defendant is estopped from denying the plaintiffs’ title during the continuation of the tenancy in view of the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act. It is an admitted position that the plaintiffs have better title than the defendant as they inducted the defendant as a tenant. In the case of Swadesh Ranjan Sinha v. Haradeb Banerjee, (supra) it has been held by the Apex Court that all that the plaintiffs need to prove is that he has a better title than the defendant. He has not to show that he has the best of all possible titles. It has been also held that the rights of the owners are seldom absolute and often, are in many respects controlled and regulated by statute. The question, however, is whether he has a superior right or interest vis-a-vis the person challenging it. In the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Mohammad Amber Yunus, reported in 1997 (1) PLJR 230, it has been held that once a person is inducted as a tenant by a person claiming himself to be a landlord, the tenant can not be permitted in law to challenge the title later on. In that view of the established principle of law, the defendant can not be allowed to deny the title of the plaintiffs during continuation of the said tenancy, which has been rightly held by the trial Court. The decision rendered in the case of M.M. Quasim v. Manoharlal Sharma and Ors. (supra), cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, was on different footing. In that case the plaintiffs-landlord had sought eviction of the tenant from the suit premises on the ground that he required the same for his own use and occupation. The suit was decreed. The tenant then preferred appeal. During the pendency of the appeal an application supported by an affidavit was filed under Order XLI, Rule 27, CPC contending that there had been a partition of the properties among the members of the firm and the suit shop was allotted to one Pyarelal who is neither a plaintiff nor a party to the proceeding and the suit shop exclusively belonged to Pyarelal and in such event Manohar Lal can not seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement of the suit shop. The Supreme Court on the said facts and other facts of the said case noticed that a person claiming to be a landlord and seeking to evict the tenant from his own occupation but having lost his interest in entirety in the building during, the pendency of the appeal which is in continuation of the suit, would not still be entitled to maintain or continue the action and came to the finding that by subsequent event the landlord’s interest in the property is extinguished. The plaintiffs of that case were thus non-suited as the eviction was sought on the ground of their personal requirement. The facts of this case are obviously different. In the instant case the tenancy was created by an agreement between plaintiff No. 1 and the defendant and the defendant has been paying rent to the plaintiffs continuously and there was no subsequent extinguishment of the plaintiffs interest. The nature of the right, title and interest at the inception of the tenancy remained the same and the defendant has admitted the plaintiffs’ right and interest and is still admitting by payment of rent, can not now shift his stand and deny the plaintiffs’ title. So far as the availability of the first floor on vacation of the same by Bank is concerned, it has been found by the Court below that the same is being used by the plaintiffs as the residential purpose as the family has grown large. The said finding is based on appraisal of evidences and is a question of fact. Section 14(8) of the said Act confers on the High Court the revisional powers. In the case of Hiralal Kapur v. Prabhu Chaudhar, reported in 1988 (2) SCC 172, , it has been held in the context of Section 25(B)(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, that even though the revisional powers were somewhat wider than similar powers under Section 115, CPC, yet the High Court is not entitled to enter into merits of factual controversy between the parties. In another decision reported in (1988) 8 SCC 119 rendered in the context of Section 25(B)(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 the Apex Court held that the powers of the Court under the said Sections are revisional in nature. Reappraisal of the evidences can be made only for the limited purposes of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is wholly unreasonable. In view of the said law laid down by the Apex Court, I find that the findings arrived at by the Court below are neither unreasonable nor perverse nor patently illegal. The same are based on thorough scrutiny and consideration of the evidences and material on record. The Court below has adequately answered the points raised by the petitioner on the issue of the personal necessity of the plaintiffs and also on the point of the subsequent even i.e. availability of the space at the first floor after vacating the same by the UCO Bank. The learned trial Court has held that the plaintiffs No. 3 and 5 can not run their business in the said space vacated by the UCO Bank. Apart from the above, Explanation-II of Section 11(1)(c) of the said Act clearly provides that when there are two or more premises let out by the landlord, it will be for the landlord to choose which one would be preferable to him and the tenant or tenants shall not be allowed to question such preference. In the case of Savitri Sahay v. Sachindanand Prasad, reported in 2003 (1) JCR 55 (SC): 2003 (1) JLJR 171 (SC), it has been held by the Supreme Court, “In our view, Explanation-II to Section 11(1)(c) permitted the landlord to ignore other premises and to prefer a particular premise. The appellant having made a preference can not be forced to occupy other premises which may become available. Further, the appellant was not required to keep those premises vacant because her eviction suit was pending, nor was there any duty cast of the appellant, under any provision of law, to offer those other premises to the respondent.
9. In view of the above discussions, I find no merit in this civil revision application which is, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.