JUDGMENT
V. Sivaraman Nair, J.
1. This appeal is filed by the Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Jangareddigudem in West Godavari from the judgment in Writ Petition No. 10181/91 dt.29-1-1992 of the learned Single Judge of this Court. The question which arises for consideration is whether it is open to a landholder to claim the benefit of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, on the basis of a Judgment of this Court in an appeal filed by another landholder in respect of a notification, by which, the lands of both were acquired. The facts in brief are the following:
2. An extent of Ac.18-07 cents of land in Survey No. 396/2 and 397/2-b was notified for acquisition under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act briefly referred to as the Act on 3-1-1980. Ac. 13-30 belonged to one D. Seetharama Raju and the remaining extent belonged to the petitioners in W.P.10181/91. After completion of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, the present appellant passed the award on 31-10-1981 assessing the market value of the land as Rs. 4,500/- per acre. Respondents accepted the amount as awarded to them. But Sri Seetharama Raju accepted compensation under protest and sought a reference to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act. In that reference, which was numbered as O.P.79/92, the learned Subordinate Judge, Eluru in his judgment dt.21-11-1983 enhanced compensation as Rs. 12,000/- per acre instead of Rs. 4,500/-. The Land Acquisition Officer filed A.S. 1483/84 seeking reduction of the quantum of compensation, whereas Sri Seetharama Raju filed cross-objection seeking further enhancement. By judgment dated 1-2-1989, this Court dismissed the appeal but allowed the cross-objection enhancing the compensation at the rate of Rs. 20,000/- per acre. On 16-5-1989, respondents filed an application under Section 28-A of the Act before the Mandal Revenue Officer seeking re-determination of compensation and payment of solatium and interest at the enhanced rates as was granted to Sri Seetharama Raju in the judgment of this Court allowing the cross-objection. On 23-5-89, a registered letter was sent to the Land Acquisition Officer making a similar request. By his order dt.1-6-1991, the Land Acquisition Officer dismissed the application as not maintainable. Respondents then filed Writ Petition No. 10181/91 seeking a declaration that the order of the Land Acquisition Officer was illegal, misconstrued and unsustainable. They sought a direction to the appellant to make an award re-determining the amount of compensation payable to the petitioners in the light of the decree dated 1-2-1989 of the High Court in A.S.1483/84 and cross-objection by granting enhanced solatium and interest as per the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984.
3. The appellant resisted the above plea stating that respondents, who had not filed any application under Section 28-A of the Act within the time prescribed therein viz., 3 months from the date of the award of the Civil Court were not entitled to seek any relief in the Writ Petition. The Land Acquisition Officer also contended that the petitioners having been satisfied with the amount of Rs. 4,500/- per acre which was granted in the award dt.31-10-81 and not having filed any application under Section 18 for reference to the Civil Court, had forfeited their right to seek redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Act.
4. The learned Single Judge who heard the matter allowed the Writ Petition on the basis of the Judgment in Talluri Ventata Subba Rao v. L.A.O., 1982 ALT 29. In that decision, Ramaswamy, J., held:
“the non-applicants after the decision under Section 18 are not disabled to take aid of the enhancement of the compensation by the High Court on appeal under Section 54.”
Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Anant Ram v. State of Haryana, .
5. Government Pleader (Land Acquisition) submits that as a consequence of the judgment under appeal, the respondents who had accepted the award of Rs. 4,500/- per acre as compensation without any demur had got a windfall which they had never bargained for. He submits that the view taken by the learned Single Judge is unsustainable.
6. Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act is in the following terms:
“28-A: Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court:
(1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector, may, not with standing that they had not made an application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court, require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court:
Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this Sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
(2) The Collector, shall, on receipt of an application under Sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.
(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under Sub-section (2), may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18.
7. The argument of the Government Pleader is that redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A can be made only on the basis of the ‘award’ of the ‘Court’. He submits that both the terms have acquired special meaning under the Act and will not take in the ‘appellate judgment’ or ‘appellate decree’ made by the High Court under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. Specific reference is made to Section 3(d) which defines the expression ‘Court’ as meaning ‘a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government has appointed (as it is hereby empowered to do) a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform functions of the Court under this Act”. He submits that ‘Court’, the award of which is comprehended by Section 28-A, is only the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction and not an appellate Court. He also invited our attention to Section 26 dealing with “form of awards”, Sub-section (2) of which is to the effect that-
“Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of Section 2, Clause (2), and Section 2, Clause (9), respectively of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).”
8. On the basis of the above provision, he submits that the award of the Court which is mentioned in Section 28-A is only the award of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, which may, for the purpose of appeal, be considered as a decree. He submits that there is no warrant for extension of the term ‘Court’ to include the ‘appellate Court’ and the term ‘award’ to include an ‘appellate judgment’. It is his submission that to stretch the meaning of the words to that extent would be an unnatural extension. Reference is also made to Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, which deals with appeals in proceedings before the Court. An appeal is provided in any proceeding under this Act to the High Court – “from the award or from any part of the award”. A further provision is made for a further appeal to the Supreme Court “subject to the provisions contained in Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and in Order XLV) therefore” – The argument in relation to the above provision is that appeal to the High Court is from the ‘Award’ of the Court, whereas appeal to the Supreme Court is from any ‘decree’ of the High Court passed on such appeal. A distinction between ‘Court’ and a ‘High Court’ as also ‘award’ and ‘decree’ is maintained by the statute and that shall not be obliterated by interpretative exercises.
9. It is agreed by Counsel on both sides that it is not necessary to look into any other provision to resolve the controversy involved in this case. Government Pleader submits that in W.P.No. 6410/90 where a similar question came up for consideration, the learned Single Judge did not accept the judgment of the single Judge (Ramaswamy, J.) in Talluri Venkata Subba Rao (1 supra) and had referred the matter to a Division Bench; and in the present case the learned single Judge also ought to have done so. Now that the matter is before a Division Bench in appeal this need not detain us any further.
10. Sri Sitharama Raju, Counsel for the respondents submits that notwithstanding the definition in Section 3(d) of the Act, the term ‘court shall not be confined to the trial Court or the ‘Civil Court of original jurisdiction’, but shall comprehend appellate Court also, because appeal is an extension or continuation of the proceedings and therefore the appellate Court also would be the ‘Court’ for the purpose of Section 28-A of the Act. He submits further that the very purpose of introduction of Section 28-A will be considerably impaired if a narrow and restricted meaning is adopted for the term ‘Court’ to mean only the trial Court or the ‘Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction’, the intention of the provision itself being to confer additional benefits on persons who had not gone to Court. Counsel submits that the purpose will be defeated if it is taken that the application under Section 28-A should be filed within a period of three months from the date of the award of the trial Court. He referred us to the decision in Nachiappa Chettiar v. Subrahmaniam Chettiar, wherein the Supreme Court, with reference to the provisions of the Arbitration Act held:
“Therefore the word ‘Court’ cannot be interpreted to mean only the trial Court as contended by the appellants. Similarly, the word ‘suit’ cannot be construed in the narrow sense of meaning only the suit and an appeal. In our opinion ‘Court’ in Section 21 includes the appellate Court proceedings before which are generally recognised as continuation of the suit; and the word ‘suit’ will include such appellate proceedings. We may add that whereas Section 41 of the Act is consistent with this view no other Section militates against it.”
11. We are of the opinion that the above decision does not apply to the present case, since there are provisions in the Land Acquisition Act which militate against the above interpretation. Apart from the definition of ‘Court’ in Section 3(d) and ‘form of awards’ in Section 26, there are other provisions which cannot be reconciled with the interpretation advanced by Counsel for the respondents. One such provision is Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act which requires that the award shall be filed in the Collector’s Office, whereby it becomes final and conclusive evidence between the Collector and persons interested in the true area and value of the land and apportionment of compensation among the persons interested. If we are to hold that the award comprehends not only the award of the Collector or the trial Court, but also appellate decrees at various hierarchial levels, the finality of the award which is statutorily recognised will be disrupted. The other provision is Section 18 of the Act which confers on ‘any person interested and who has not accepted the award’ to require the Collector to refer the matter for determination of the Court-whether it be objection to the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, the persons entitled to receive the same or the apportionment. If we confine the award mentioned in the above section to the award of the Collector, there is no problem in giving effect to the enabling provision. On the other hand, if we are to extend the meaning of the word ‘award’ to appellate decrees also, there will be an unending chain of invocation of jurisdiction of the Collector under Section 18 every time when the appellate Court renders a decision. Another provision which may be irreconcilable to the interpretation advanced by the respondent is Section 26 which provides for the form of award and is in the following terms:
“Section 26. Form of awards:
(1) Every award under this Part shall be in writing signed by the Judge, and shall specify the amount awarded under clause ‘first’ of Sub-section (1) of Section 23, and also the amounts (if any) respectively awarded under each of the other clauses of the same Sub-section, together with the grounds of awarding each of the said amounts.”
12. The form of ‘appellate decree’ may be entirely different from that of an ‘award’ as provided in Section 26(1). It will not comply with any of the requirements of the above Section in a case where the appeal or cross-objections is either dismissed or partly allowed. We do not propose to be exhaustive. We are of the view that atleast the above provisions do militate against accepting the term ‘court’ in Section 28-A to mean the ‘appellate Court’ also, and the term ‘award’ to mean ‘appellate decree’ of a High Court or the Supreme Court as the case may be. Even among appellate decrees, there may be first appellate decree or Second appellate decree or decree in Letters Patent. How far shall we stretch and how long shall the proceedings wait for finality are matters of speculation and conjecture. That itself militates against finality which the Act confers on ‘awards’ of ‘Courts’.
13. We are of the opinion that it will be unduly harsh to accept the interpretation which found favour with the learned Single Judge, because application under Section 28-A is to redetermine compensation and consequently additional solatium with additional rate of interest, not from the date of the decree of the appellate Court or the date of application by a non-applicant-land owner, but from the date of dispossession. The result of any such interpretation will be that the acquiescing non-applicant may wait for not only the Civil Court of original jurisdiction deciding the reference under Section 18 of the Act, but also till such time as the High Court after a first appeal and a L.P.A. and the Supreme Court in a Special Leave Appeal gives finality to the award. That will be to stretch the provisions of the Act to a farther extent than would have been within the contemplation of the Parliament when the provision was enacted. If we accept that interpretation, it may completely unsettle all budgetary allocations involving land acquisitions. We may also state that it may operate as a windfall for a non-applicant land holder who may claim and obtain a premium on his inaction and delay or lethargy. That may be larger than what a vigilant landholder who received the amount of compensation under protest, sought a ¦reference under Section 18 and filed appeals under Section 54 would have got. We are of the view that it will be an unnatural and undeserved extension of the terms of Section 28-A of the Act.
14. In Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court had to consider the question of condonation of delay in filing an appeal to the Supreme Court to claim enhanced rates of compensation, pursuant to an earlier decision in favour of another land owner in relation to acquisition of land under the same notification. The Court held that there was no reason to condone delay. The Supreme Court relied on that decision in The Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India, on almost identical circumstances and held that the newly added Section 28-A does not apply to a case where the claimant had sought and secured a reference under Section 18 and had even preferred an appeal to the High Court. If we adopt the interpretation which Counsel for the petitioner urges viz., that ‘Court’ must mean the ‘appellate Court’ which may even include the Supreme Court, that will fall foul of the above two precedents of the Supreme Court.
15. We are not persuaded by the decision of a single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Atlanta Ram (2 supra). We do not find much of a discussion on this question with reference to the definition of ‘Court in the Land Acquisition Act, in that decision. We also overrule the observations in Talluri Venkata Subba Rao (1 supra) which also are of the same effect as Ananta Ram (2 supra).
16. For all the above reasons, we hold that the term ‘Court’ in Section 28-A means only the Court as defined in Section 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act namely “the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction” and the term ‘award’ as a determination which satisfies the requirements of Section 26 of the Act. We hold that any other view will impair the finality and conclusiveness of an award as provided under Section 12 of the Act, and will give an undeserving premium for inordinate delay and lethargy of some of the land-owners (non-applicants) who acquiesced in the proceedings and an undue preference to the more diligent who filed appeals before the various Courts. We do not find any law or logic in awarding more amounts to such lethargic land-owners, who had not spent any of their time or money in assailing the award, by reason of Section 28-A than what the diligent would have obtained.
17. We therefore allow this Writ Appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P.10181 /91 and dismiss the above Writ Petition. We affirm the order of the appellant refusing relief to the respondent/petitioners under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
18. Immediately after the judgment is pronounced, Counsel for the appellant made an oral request for leave to file an appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 134-A of the Constitution of India. We are of the opinion that this Writ Appeal does not involve any such question of law as requires to be decided by the Supreme Court. We therefore, refuse leave.