JUDGMENT
S. R. Nayak, J.
1. This Writ Appeal is directed against the order of a learned single Judge of this Court dated 13-10-2000 in Writ Petition No. 23379 of 2000. The appellant is the writ petitioner. In the above writ petition, the appellant sought for a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 20-2-1999 of the Regional Transport Authority, Shimoga Region, Shimoga, respondent No. 2 herein, granting variation of conditions of permit of the fourth respondent bearing No. 19/97-98 and the order of the Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal, respondent No. 1 herein, dated 2-5-2000 in Revision Petition No. 1453 of 1999.
2. The background facts leading to the filing of the above writ petition may be noted briefly as under :
On an application made by the fourth respondent herein, the second respondent by his order dated 20-2-1999 granted variation of conditions of the permit of the fourth respondent bearing No. 19/97-98 by way of curtailment of the route from Anavatti to District border and extension of the route from Anavatti to Bankavalli. When the said order of the second respondent was assailed in revision filed by the appellant under Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for short “the Act”, the first respondent — The Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal summarily dismissed the same by holding that the revision is not maintainable and the same could be assailed in an appeal as provided under Section 89 of the Act. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal dated 2-5-2000, the appellant preferred Writ Petition No, 23379 of 2000. Learned single Judge of this Court without finding any flaw in the holding of the learned Member of the Tribunal, dismissed the writ petition and held that against the order of the second respondent dated 20-2-1999, an appeal lies under Clause (b) of Section 89 of the Act. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge, the writ petitioner has come up with this writ appeal.
3. We have heard Sri M.R.V. Achar, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and Sri C. V. Kumar, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 and Sri S. V. Krishna Swamy, learned counsel for the applicant in IA-I/ 2003.
4. Sri M.R.V. Achar, learned Senior Counsel, would contend that though literal reading of the provisions of Section 89 of the Act may indicate that any aggrieved person can prefer an appeal under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 89, such a construction is impermissible in law for more than one reason. According to Sri Achar, the rule-making authority in Rule 88 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules 1989, for short the Rules’, has prescribed limitation of thirty days to prefer an appeal under Section 89 of the Act and since the limitation of thirty days prescribed under the said Rule starts running from the date of receipt of the order by the person preferring an appeal under Section 89 of the Act, the words “the person” occurring in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 88 is referable only to that person who has made an application for variation of conditions of the permit and not anyone else. According to Mr. Achar that is the only reasonable way of understanding and construing the provisions of Section 89 of the Act Mr. Achar would also high-light that since the Appellate Authority under Section 89 of the Act is not invested with the power to condone delay in preferring appeals beyond thirty days, that circumstance would also provide an aid to interpret the provisions of Section 89 in the way suggested by him.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents while supporting the holding of learned single Judge would cite a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of N.S. Rama Rao v. Regional Transport Authority, ILR 1996 Kant 117: (1996 AIHC 1681) and submit that the opinion of the learned Judge in that case is unexceptionable and it is in accordance with the well settled principles of statutory interpretations and constructions. Meeting the contention of Sri Achar that the Appellate Authority under Section 89 of the Act is not vested with the power of condoning delay in preferring appeals to it, it is contended by placing reliance, on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, that the Act does not specifically exclude application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and therefore, a person who could not prefer an appeal under Section 89 of the Act within the specified period of thirty days can make an application to condone the delay in preferring appeal.
6. In reply, Sri Achar would point out that the above judgment of the Supreme Court has no application to the facts of this case, because, it is not a case where the statute does not prescribe limitation. According to learned counsel, since Rule 88 has prescribed limitation of thirty days, the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mukri Gopalan’s (supra 2) case has no application.
7. Before we proceed to consider the rival contentions of the parties, we may preface that in construing statutes, the Court in all normal circumstances, would attempt to give meaning and content to each and every word occurring in the statute and it will never interpret a statute so as to render a word or a phrase or a sentence in the statute either otiose or surplusage. It is also equally well settled principle of construction of statutes that the Court should interpret the statute in the normal way that is to say by adopting literal interpretations or what we popularly call ‘golden rule of interpretation’, however, keeping in mind the objectives of the statute concerned. No interpretation could be placed which tends to offend the clear, plain and unambiguous meaning of the statute unless the Court finds that the adoption of such interpretation would result in some avoidable mischief or absurdity or defeat objectives of the Act.
8. Sub-section (1) of Section 89 reads as follows :–
“Section 89. Appeals Any person-
(a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, or
(b) aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof, or
(c) aggrieved by the refusal to transfer the permit under Section 82, or
(d) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to countersign a permit, or by any condition attached to such counter signature, or
(e) aggrieved by the refusal of renewal of a permit, or
(f) aggrieved by the refusal to grant permission under Section 83, or
(g) aggrieved by any other order which may be prescribed, may within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under Sub-section (2), who shall, after giving such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard, give a decision thereon which shall be final.”
The language employed in Sub-section (1) is quite clear, plain, precise, unambiguous and does not admit more than one meaning. The only meaning flowing from Sub-section (1) is that any person, if he is aggrieved by an order made by the authorities under the Act covered by Clause (a) to (g) could avail in appeal remedy under Section 89 of the Act. The words “any person” occurring in Sub-section (1) are rather quite significant and material in deciding who can avail of appeal remedy under Section 89 of the Act. The word “any” may have one or several meanings, according to the circumstances and it may mean “all”; “each”; “every”; “some”, or “one or more out of several”. In A. Satyanarain Biswanath v. Harakchand Rupchand, , while interpreting the word “any” in Rule 10 of Bengal Chamber of Commerce Rules of Tribunal of Arbitration, the Calcutta High Court held that the word “any” means “one or more out of several and includes all”. In Ashiq Hassan v. S.D.O., , interpreting the word “any” occurring in Rule 2(g) of Bihar Panchayat Election Rules (1959), the High Court held that the word “any means all. In Lucknow Development Authority v. M. K. Gupta, , while interpreting Section 2(10) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the Apex Court held that the word “any” means ‘one or same or all’. However in Darshan v. Atma Ram, (1913) 11 All LJ 313 the Calcutta (Allahabad) High Court held that the words “any person” in Section 495 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898) would not include an absolute stranger who had no connection in the remotest degree with the prosecution and whose desire to help the prosecution was based on a personal grudge only. In Md. Sharfuddin v. R. P. Singh, , the Apex Court held that the words “any person” in Section 24 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (1950.) can only mean a person whose properties have been declared to be evacuee properties by the custodian or a person who moved the custodian to get the properties so declared or any other such aggrieved person. The Court held that the words “any person aggrieved” in the context of the Act cannot include any custodian as defined in the Act. It is true that having regard to the context of the statute and to translate the intendment and objectives of the statute, it is permissible for the Court when it is called upon to interpret or construe a provision of the statute either to enlarge or to restrict the ordinary meaning of a word or phrase in the statute Generally speaking, in the absence of such limitations or factors which would warrant enlargement or restriction of the meaning of a word in the statute, the Court would extend the normal literal meaning to the words and phrases in construing the statutes. Therefore, in order to restrict or enlarge the meaning and content of a word or a phrase in the statute, there should be special reasons as indicated above. For instance, the mischief rule/purposive rule is quite often applied in interpreting/construing statutes to sub-serve clear intendment and objectives of the statute and to avoid avoidable mischief or harm to a person never intended by statute. Further, in a catena of decisions, the Apex Court and High Courts have dealt with the meaning of the words “any” and “any person”. We do not wish to burden this judgment with more” case-law. What could be deduced from those pronouncements is that the words “any person” may not include each and every person regardless of the context or the circumstances in which the word “any” as an adjective is used. Generally speaking, in interpreting the words “any person” occurring under Section 89 of the Act in the context of availing an appeal remedy, perhaps, it cannot be said that a total stranger or a person who is not at all aggrieved can prefer an appeal under Section 89 of the Act. But, the words “any person” in the context should undoubtedly include “every aggrieved person”. Therefore, the appeal remedy provided in Section 89 of the Act is available to any aggrieved person. In this case, even according to the appellant, it is aggrieved by the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal impugned in the writ petition. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant does not fall within the expression “any person aggrieved” occurring in Section 89 of the Act. Therefore, we hold that the appellant is entitled to prefer an appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal under Section 89(b) of the Act.
9. There is an apparent flaw in the argument advanced by Mr. Achar by drawing support from that fact the rule-making authority has fixed thirty days limitation under Rule 88 to avail of appeal remedy under Section 89 of the Act without vesting power in the Appellate Authority to condone delay in preferring appeal if there is delay in preferring appeal. It is true as contended by Sri Achar that Rule 88 forms part of the statute. Nevertheless, the Courts have made distinction between provisions of the parent Act and the provisions of the delegated or subordinate legislations. Under no circumstances, a piece of delegated legislation could be allowed to be pressed into service either to take away some substantial right granted by the parent Act or to give such rights not granted by the parent Act. It is not the argument of Sri Achar that the provisions of Section 89 left to themselves would exclude the right of a person like the appellant to avail of appeal remedy. What learned Senior Counsel would contend is that such exclusion should be read into the provisions of Section 89 by the Court having regard to the thirty days limitation fixed by the rule-making authority under Rule 88. In sum and substance, the argument tantamounts to saying that though Section 89 of the Act itself does not exclude the right of the writ petitioner to avail appeal remedy, that remedy should be denied to the appellant having regard to provisions of Rule 88. This contention is unacceptable to us for the reason already stated. Be that as it may, we also find force in the contention of Sri Krishna Swamy, learned counsel for the applicant in I.A.I./2003, that in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in Mukri Gopalan’s case (supra 2) and having regard to the fact that the Act does not specifically exclude application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, an application could be made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in presenting an appeal under Section 89 of the Act in case where an appellant could not prefer appeal within the period of limitation. The ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court in Mukri Gopalan’s case (supra 2) applies to the facts of this case also. The Supreme Court in para 15 of the above judgment held as under :–
“After repealing of Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and its replacement by the present Limitation Act of 1963 a fundamental change was made in Section 29(2). The present Section 29(2) as already extracted earlier clearly indicates that once the requisite conditions for its applicability to given proceedings under special or local law are attracted the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 both inclusive would get attracted which obviously would bring in Section 5 which also shall apply to such proceedings unless applicability of any of the aforesaid Sections of the Limitation Act is expressly excluded by such special or local law. By this charge it is necessary to expressly state in a special law that the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to the determination of the periods under it. By the general provision contained in Section 29(2) this provision is made applicable to the periods prescribed under the special laws. An express mention in the special law is necessary only for any exclusion. It is on this basis that when the new Rent Act was passed in 1965 the provision contained in old Section 31 was omitted. It becomes therefore apparent that on a conjoint reading of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act of 1963 and Section 18 of the Rent Act of 1965, provisions of Section 5 would automatically get attracted to those proceedings, as there is nothing in the Rent Act of 1965 expressly excluding the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals under Section 18 of the Rent Act.”
10. Perhaps, realising the weakness in his first leg of the argument, Sri Achar would next contend that the Appellate Authority under Section 89 of the Act could not be regarded as a Court’ for the purpose of applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. This contention is also squarely met by the Supreme Court itself in para 16 of the judgment in Mukri Gopalan’s case (supra 2). It reads as follows :–
“Mr. Nariman, learned counsel for respondent, tried to salvage the situation by submitting that even if conditions for applicability of Section 29(2) get satisfied, Section 29(2) itself will not apply to them unless it is held that the appellate authority functioning as a Court was constituted under the Civil Procedure Code. He contended that unless such Courts functioning under special law or local law are constituted under the Civil Procedure Code, Section 29(a) cannot apply to them. This submission is required to be stated to be rejected as it would amount to moving in a circle. If according to Mr. Nariman Section 29(2) can apply to only those Courts which are constituted under the Civil Procedure Code then the entire scheme of Limitation Act from Sections 3 to 24 onwards would apply to proceedings of such Courts on its own force and in that eventuality provisions contained in Section 29(2) for applying Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act, 1963 to such Courts proceedings would be rendered otiose and redundant Mr. Nariman tried to get out of this situation by submitting that because of provisions of first part of Section 29(2) Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is treated to have applied to the periods of limitation prescribed by such special or local law by a deeming fiction. There may be situations wherein even Courts constituted under special or local law which are governed by Civil Procedure Code may have prescribed period of limitation for suit, appeal or application under such special or local law and for which provision might not have been made under schedule to the Limitation Act and only for such Courts an ex-press provision has to be made for applying Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act as found in second part of Section 29(2) but for which such a machinery may not be available for computing such periods of limitation even though by a legal fiction Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply. It is difficult to countenance this submission. The express language of Section 29(2) clearly indicates that such special or local law must provide for limitation for suit, appeal or application entertainable under such laws and for computing to period of limitation under such special or local law the Legislature has made available the machinery of Sections 4 to 24 inclusive as found in Limitation Act. Nowhere it is indicated that as per Section 29(2) the Courts functioning under such special or local law must be governed wholehog by Civil Procedure Code.”
11. In addition, our learned brother Sri Tirath S. Thakur, J., in N. S. Rama Rao’s case (1996 AIHC 1681) (supra), in similar fact situation has held that the appeal lies under Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act and that revision under Section 90 of the Act is not maintainable. The learned Judge has observed in paragraph No. 5 thus :–
“A plain reading of the above provision makes it abundantly clear that the same envisages an appeal at the instance of a person aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by “any variation of the conditions thereof. The expression “any variation of the conditions thereof implies that it is only In cases where variation is actually ordered that such an order can possibly be questioned in Appeal under the provisions aforesaid. In other words, an order by which the grant of a variation in the conditions of a permit is refused is not, on a plain reading of the Section, appealable. This is clear even from the expressions used in Sub-clauses (c), (d), (e) and (f) of Section 89(1) which make orders of refusal to transfer a permit, refusal to countersign the permit, refusal to renew the permit and refusal to grant permission under Section 83 of the Act appealable. In other words wherever an order refusing a particular order prayed for by an individual was meant to be made appealable the Legislature has clearly made it so by express words. In the case of variation of the conditions of the permit however, the refusal to grant such variation has not been made appealable. If the intention really was to make an order refusing the variations in the conditions of a permit appealable nothing prevented the Legislature from using the expression or “by grant or refusal of any variations of the conditions thereof” in Section 99(1)(b). This however, is not the position. Any other view would in my opinion, amount to re-writing Section 89(1)(b), Consequently, the Tribunal was in error in holding that the impugned order passed by the Regional Transport Authority refusing to grant the variation in timings was actually appealable under Section 89(1)(b) of the Act aforesaid so as to make a revision under Section 90 of the Act, untenable.”
The opinion of the learned Judge is unexceptionable and in conformity with the well established principles of interpretation of statute and we are in respectful agreement.
12. Sri Achar drawing our attention to the phrase “within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order” occurring in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 88 would maintain that the above phrase unmistakably suggests that limitation is applicable to a person receiving the copy of the order and not to others and if it is so understood, it goes without saying that only such person who receives the copy of the order sent under Section 80 of the Act could prefer an appeal under Section 89 of the Act and not a third party like the writ petitioner. This contention is not well founded for more than one reason. We are afraid that if the above contention is accepted, it would result in an awkward situation thereby meaning that if two or more persons are aggrieved by the same order with regard to the same cause of action, one aggrieved party has to pursue legal remedy by way of an appeal under Section 89 and the other by way of revision under Section 90 and such an interpretation cannot be placed because it will create an invidious discrimination violating Article 14 postulates because, an appeal is undoubtedly more comprehensive and better legal remedy compared to a revision or review remedies. It is not the contention of Sri Achar that in the event of not granting the variations, the fourth respondent could not have preferred an appeal under Section 89 of the Act and for him also the only remedy is revisional remedy under Section 90 of the Act. No dichotomy in the matter of providing legal remedies arising out of same cause of action and same order can be supported by any canons of law or supporting authorities be that as it may, while interpreting provisions of a parent Act, it is totally unsafe guide for the Court to take into account provisions of any delegated legislation framed under the said parent Act as a guide. The provisions of the parent Act should be interpreted independently and in the light of the principles governing statutory interpretations. Further, Sub-rule (1) of Rule 88 does not speak about the receipt of the order by the applicant who made application for variation of the conditions of permit. On the other hand, it speaks about receipt of the order by “the person preferring the appeal” looking from that angle also, the argument advanced by Sri Achar does not have a foot to support. It cannot be said that only that person who receives a copy of the order sent suo motu and freely by the maker of the order can prefer appeal and not a person who applies for copy of the order and receives it.
13. In conclusion, we do not find any good or weighty ground to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. The writ appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.