High Court Madras High Court

Sree Karpagambal Mills Limited … vs The Union Of India (Uoi), … on 26 July, 1996

Madras High Court
Sree Karpagambal Mills Limited … vs The Union Of India (Uoi), … on 26 July, 1996
Equivalent citations: (1996) 2 MLJ 549
Author: K Swami


ORDER

K.A. Swami, C.J.

1. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has sought for quashing the Notification Nos.214/Customs/80 dated 1.11.1980, No. 215/Customs/80, dated 1.11.1980 and No. 171/80 C.E., dated 1.11.1980 in so far as they affect the petitioner and further to direct the respondents to refund the sum of Rs. 86,993.38 collected from the petitioner as customs duty and to pass such other and further orders as may be deemed fit and proper, in the matter.

2. By the Notification dated 1.11.1980, bearing No. 214-Customs/80, issued under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) the earlier notifications bearing No. 6 Customs, dated 5.1.1979 and No. 8-Customs dated 5.1.1979 were rescinded. Whereas under Notification No. 215-Customs/80 dated 1.11.1980, issued under Section 25(1) of the Act, the Central Government exempted viscose staple fibre and viscose tow, falling within Chapter 56 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (51 of 1975) when imported into India, from so much of the duty of customs leviable thereon under the said First Schedule as is in excess of 10% ad valorem. The said Notification also further stated that nothing contained in the Notification shall apply to:

(i) high performance viscose staple fibre and high performance viscose tow;

(ii) high tenacity viscose staple fibre and high tenacity viscose tow;

(iii) high west modulus viscose staple fibre and high wet modulus viscose tow; and

(iv) polynosic staple fibre and polynosic tow.

3. Under Notification No. 171/80, dt. 1.11.1980 the Government exempted excise duty as in excess of Rs. 2.50 per kilogram.

4. Thus, under the notification No. 214-Customs/80, dated 1.11.1980, the concessions that were given in the customs duties under Notification Nos.6 and 8 dated 5.1.1979 were rescinded, whereas under Notification No. 171/80, with effect from 1.11.1980, exemption was granted in excise duty as is in excess of Rs. 2.50 per kilogram.

5. The contentions raised in this writ petition are that the notifications, rescinding the earlier, notifications under Section 25 of the Act, are bad in law, inasmuch as they cannot be considered to be in Public interest, that they are not applicable to the petitioner, as on the date when the exemptions were withdrawn, the petitioner had already placed orders for importing the goods in question and letter of credit was opened on 6.8.1980, though bill of entry was subsequent to 1.11.1980.

6. The above two contentions have been specifically dealt with by the Supreme Court in Kasinka Trading and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. . That was also a case in which the Notification, according concession in Customs duty, was withdrawn in exercise of powers under Section 25 of the Act. The Supreme Court has held that Notification can be withdrawn at any time and such Notification issued under Section 25 of the Act in public interest does not enable the party for applying the principle of promissory estoppel.

7. In paragraph 24 of the said judgment, it has been specifically held as follows:

We are unable to agree with learned Counsel for the appellants that Notification 66/79 could not be withdrawn before 31.3.1981. First, because the exemption Notification having been issued under Section 25(1) of the Act, it was implicit in it that it could be rescinded or modified at any time if the public interest so demands and secondly it is not permissible to postpone the compulsions of “public interest” till after 31st March, 1981 if the Government is satisfied as to the change in the circumstances before that date. Since, the Government in the instant case was satisfied that the very public interest which had demanded a total exemption from payment of customs duty now demanded that the exemption should be withdrawn, it was free to act in the manner it did….

8. Regarding ‘promissory estoppel’, it has been observed as follows:

In our considered opinion therefore the High Court was perfectly right in holding that the doctrine of promissory estoppel had no application to the impugned notification issued by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under Section 25(1) of the Act in view of the facts and circumstances, as established on the record.

9. A Division Bench of this Court, while dealing with the withdrawal of the export quota relating to garments, applying the ratio laid down in Kasinka Trading and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. held that the principle of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation could not be applied to the case, (vide order dated 7.3.1996 in W.P.No. 17744 of 1995 etc. M/s. Tehzeeb Katari v. Government of India).

10. Another Division Bench of this Court, applying the ratio laid down in Kasinga’s case (supra) on 15.7.1996 dismissed W.P.No. 245 of 1981 (M/s. Techno Impex (India) v. Union of India.

11. Following the decision in Kasinga’s case J.T. (1994)7 S.C. 362 the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.