JUDGMENT
Jagannathan, J.
1. Whether a driver who is not made a party before the Tribunal, but who is found responsible for causing the accident in question can claim compensation even though the insurer of the vehicle in question accepts the finding of the Tribunal and deposits the award amount and the said finding of the Tribunal has attained finality, is the question that is involved in this appeal.
2. To state briefly, the appellant herein was the driver of the KSRTC bus, which was involved in an accident on 18.4.1995 and a collision took place between the KSRTC bus driven by the appellant and the truck CAM 6939 driven by its driver. Some of the passengers of the KSRTC bus were injured and the appellant herein was also injured in the accident Claim petitions were filed before the MACT Belgaum by the injured passengers as well as the appellant herein and the claim petition filed by the injured passengers were allowed and the appellant herein who was driving the KSRTC bus was held responsible for causing the accident. The KSRTC on its Part, accepted the said finding of the Tribunal and deposited the compensation awarded to the injured passengers and it did not prefer any appeal against the said finding of the Tribunal on the question of negligence on the part of the appellant-driver. The above facts are not in dispute between the parties. In other words, by accepting the finding of the Tribunal and not preferring any appeal, the KSRTC had in effect rendered the award of the Tribunal in those cases reachEd finality.
3. So far as the claim petition filed by the appellant herein is concerned, the Tribunal recorded a finding that the driver of the KSRTC was responsible for the accident and therefore, dismissed the claim petition filed by the appellant Aggrieved by the dismissal of his claim petition, the driver of the KSRTC bus is in appeal before this Court.
4. We have heard the arguments addressed by the learned Counsel for the appellant as well as the learned Counsel for the second respondent insurance company.
5. Learned Counsel Sri. Nargund contended that though the Tribunal had recorded a finding that the appellant was responsible for the accident and consequent to the said finding and award being passed in other cases, the KSRTC had deposited various amounts, yet, as the appellant was not made a party by impleading him as one of the respondents, the finding of the Tribunal on the point of negligence will not come in the way of the appellant challenging the finding of negligence in the appeal that is filed by him. In support of this, learned Counsel placed reliance on a decision reported in ILR 2000 Karnataka 3286 (Patel Roadways and Anr. v. Manish Chhotalal Thakkar and Ors.).
6. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the second respondent-insurance company submitted that once the finding of negligence has been accepted by the KSRTC itself by depositing the amount in other cases viz., M.V.C.Nos. 1007/98, 1008/98 and 1009/98 and further the appellant himself having been examined as RW1 in those cases, it is not permissible for the appellant now to contend that the finding of negligence does not operate against him since the driver of the KSRTC as well as the KSRTC are joint tort-feasors. The finding of negligence, which had attained finality in other cases cannot now be disturbed merely because the appellant has questioned the same in his appeal. In support of this, learned Counsel has placed reliance on a decision reported in ILR 1999 Karnataka 367 (Kumari Sandhya and Anr. v. Karnataka State road Transport Corporation).
7. So far as the negligence aspect is concerned, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence on record does not give room to hold that the appellant was solely responsible for the accident, but the fact that the truck was also involved in the accident and that there was collision between the two vehicles, it is, but inevitable to take the view that the driver of the truck had also contributed to the accident in question. This argument was countered the learned Counsel for the insurance company by submitting that the Tribunal had discussed the evidence in great detail and has come to the conclusion that the driver of the KSRTC bus was responsible for the accident.
8. In the fight of the contentions put forward, the following points arise for consideration:
i) Whether the finding on negligence will operate against the driver even though he is not made a party before the Tribunal?
ii) Whether the finding of the Tribunal that the accident took place due to the fault of the appellant herein is just and proper?
9. Point No. 1: The contention of the appellant’s counsel is that the appellant herein was not made a party in the claim petitions filed by the injured passengers of the bus and therefore, the finding on the point of negligence recorded in those cases will not prevent him from questioning the same in his appeal. It is also submitted that without impleading the driver of the KSRTC bus as one of the parties, if the Tribunal records a finding that the driver is negligent, the said finding cannot prevent the driver from filing the claim petition and question the finding of negligence once again. It was further submitted that the award was passed only against the KSRTC and therefore, it cannot be said that the driver is an aggrieved party and as such, the said finding and the consequent award cannot prevent the driver from filing the claim petition and questioning the finding of negligence. We are unable to agree with the above submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellant for more than one reason.
10. So far as the submission that the appellant-driver was not a party to the proceedings before the MACT is concerned, it is necessary to mention at this juncture that the appellant himself was examined as RW1 on behalf of the KSRTC and it was after considering the evidence let in by both the parties on the question of negligence that the Tribunal recorded a finding that the appellant who was the driver of the KSRTC bus was responsible for the accident. In fact, even the conductor of the KSRTC bus RW2 has deposed to the same effect. Thus, it is clear that this appellant did give evidence on the question of negligence in the claim petitions filed by the injured passengers. To say that, merely because he was not shown as one of the respondents in the claim petitions filed by the injured passengers, it does not lead to the inference that the appellant was not a party to the proceedings.
11. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to the meaning of the word ‘party’ in Words and Phrases’ (Volume 31 West Publishing Company), the word ‘party’ has been explained as under.
i) In its broadest meaning, the word “party” includes one concerned with, conducting, or taking part in any matter or proceeding whether he is named or participates as formal party or not. Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles C.A. Cal. 226 P.2d 74, 81.
ii) A “party” to a judicial proceeding is one whose interest in subject matter, whether favourable or adverse, is such that his presence on the record is either necessary or proper. In re Stafford’s Estate, 103 N.Y.S.2d 153, 156.
iii) “Parties” to an action are all who are directly interested in the subject matter and could make defense, or control proceedings and appeal from judgment, adduce testimony, and cross-examine witnesses adduced upon the other side. Gibbons V. Belt 33 N.W.2d 374, 239 Iowa 961.
Therefore, it is clear from the above meaning attached to the word ‘party’ that the appellant herein by entering the witness box by giving evidence on the question of negligence on behalf of the KSRTC, did in effect took part in the proceedings and therefore, the submission that the appellant was not party to the proceedings before the MACT does not appeal to us as having any merit.
12. So far as the contention that the award was against the KSRTC and as such, the appellant cannot be called as an “aggrieved person” is concerned, the said submission also has to be rejected. This is because, a plain reading of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act as provided under Sub-section (1) reads thus:
(1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:
13. It is, therefore, clear that any person aggrieved by an award can prefer an appeal to the High Court within the time limit prescribed therein. Since the appellant herein gave evidence on the question of negligence and a finding was handed down by the Tribunal against the driver of the KSRTC bus by holding that the driver of the KSRTC bus was responsible for the accident, nothing prevented the appellant from questioning the said finding on negligence when his own claim petition was also pending before the very same Tribunal.
14. The expression “person aggrieved” has been explained in the case of Buxton v. Minister of Housing (1961) 1 QB 278, wherein it was held that:
The expression ‘person aggrieved’ meant a person who has suffered a legal grievance and against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something. In King V. Middles Justices, it was further clarified that the person should be immediately aggrieved and not consequently aggrieved. A nominal or speculative adverse effect on the right or interest of a person is insufficient.
Further, in the case of United India Firm and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmi Short Ganjoo 1982 ACJ 470 (J&K), a full Bench of the High Court has observed thus:
Expression ‘aggrieved party’ contains the inherent limitations in the matter of filing of an appeal. The expression in the context of Section 110-D has to be interpreted and understood in common parlance. It is not possible to give an exhaustive definition of the expression, which has to be interpreted in the context in which it appears in a particular statute. As a general principle, it has to be held by the court that a person who feels disappointed with the result of a case is not necessarily a ‘person aggrieved’ to be so classified, he must be disappointed of a benefit which he would have received if the order had gone other way. The order must cause him the legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of something. If he was not entitled to relief in first place, he cannot be aggrieved if the relief was denied to him. But if he was entitled and the same has been denied to him, he would be a ‘person aggrieved’. Thus, a party would be regarded as an ‘aggrieved party’ for the purpose of Section 110-D where the claim or defence available to that party does not find favour with the Tribunal in making an award.
15. Prom the above, it is, therefore, clear that in the instant case, the appellant comes within the expression ‘aggrieved person’ and as such, nothing prevented the appellant from questioning the finding on negligence in the claim petitions filed by the injured passengers because, the said finding has been accepted by the KSRTC and therefore, the appellant herein has to be construed as an aggrieved person and consequently, when he has not chosen to file any appeal against the finding of negligence, it is not permissible now for the appellant to say that he is not an aggrieved person and therefore, the finding on negligence and the consequent award of the Tribunal does not operate to his detriment especially in the face of his own claim petition pending before the very same Tribunal. Had the finding on negligence been answered in his favour, the appellant would have succeeded in his claim petition. Under the circumstances he is “an aggrieved person”.
16. So far as the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the appellant reported in ILR 2000 Karnataka 3286 is concerned, in the said decision, the Division Bench of this Court has held that any finding of negligence recorded in the petition against the owner, or owner and insurer without impleading the driver cannot be held to be an adverse finding against the driver nor can it lead to any civil consequences against the driver and without impleading the driver no civil consequences for the purpose of fastening the liability will arise. In the case on hand, we are not concerned with any liability being fastened on the driver of the KSRTC bus, but whether the driver of the KSRTC bus who was found to have driven the bus in question in a rash and negligent manner after the driver himself gives the evidence before the Tribunal on the said issue, can turn around and say that the finding of negligence will not operate against him, particularly where the said finding attains finality and accepted by the KSRTC itself. Therefore, the said decision in our considered opinion is not applicable to the case on hand in so far as the question involved in this appeal are concerned.
17. In the light of the above discussions and the law bearing on the questions raised in point No. 1 has to be answered in the affirmative.
18. Point No. 2: So far as the question of negligence is concerned, the Tribunal has discussed the evidence let in by the parties in great detail and has come to the conclusion that the driver of the KSRTC bus was responsible for the accident, The Tribunal also noted that there was no dispute with regard to the KSRTC bus trying to overtake a parked truck. Soon after overtaking a parked truck, the KSRTC bus dashed to the truck bearing No. CAM 6939. The cleaner of the truck lodged complaint with the police against the KSRTC bus driver. The documents produced as per Exs.P-1 to P-4 supported the finding of the Tribunal that the KSRTC bus was responsible for the accident Even the photographs produced, tells the story much more vividly. The photographs indicate that the KSRTC bus went to the extreme right side and dashed to the incoming truck. Under the said circumstances, the finding of negligence on the KSRTC bus driver cannot be termed as perverse. Absolutely, there is no evidence placed to show that the driver of the truck was negligence. The evidence of RW1 along with the photographs Exs.R2 and R3 coupled with the complaint Ex.P-1 does not give room to take the view that there was negligence on the part of the truck driver also. Therefore, we do not find any defect in appreciation of the evidence by the Tribunal in so far as the question of negligence is concerned. Hence, in the said finding of the Tribunal that the accident took place only on account of fault on the part of bus driver is sustained.
19. In the result, the dismissal of claim petition filed by the appellant herein cannot be termed as erroneous in law from any angle and as such, the appeal lacks merit and is, therefore, dismissed.