ORDER
Tapen Sen, J.
1. The petitioner prays for quashing the order dated 22/24.4.2000 (Annexure-8) passed by the respondent No. 7 whereby and whereunder the petitioner was informed that his application for compassionate appointment had been rejected by the competent authority.
The petitioner further prays for issuance of an appropriate writ directing the respondents to provide employment to the petitioner.
2. The short facts are that while he was in service, the father of the petitioner, Benga Nunia, a loader at Murlidih 20/21 Pit Colliery, died on 15.3.1984. After his death, his wife (mother of the petitioner) applied for compassionate appointment in place of her husband, but while the matter was under process, she met with an accident in Burdwan on 28.2.1997 and died. At the time of death of both the father and the mother, the petitioner was a minor and therefore, could not apply for compassionate appointment. Upon attaining majority, he applied for compassionate appointment whereafter the respondents issued a letter on 21/23.5.1997 (Annexure-3) informing the petitioner that his application suffered from, various shortcomings and he was accordingly asked to rectify the same. One of the major question/shortcomings, which obviously the petitioner could not rectify, was specific at Sl. No. 1 thereof informing the petitioner that his father had expired on 15.3.1984. Mr. Mahesh Tewari learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the application filed by the petitioner was in the year 1997, i.e., after he had attained majority and therefore, it has to be borne in mind that the application itself was filed after almost 13 (thirteen) years.
3. Be that as it may, upon receiving the aforementioned letter, the petitioner submitted all his certificates including an affidavit giving all necessary details. His photographs was also duly attested by the Block Development Officer. However, nothing happened as a result whereof the petitioner filed various representations requesting early action in the matter. Thereafter the impugned communication vide Annexure-8 was sent informing, the petitioner that his application has been rejected.
4. A counter affidavit in the instant case has been filed wherein it has been stated that from the facts as pleaded in the Writ Application it is evident that the father of the petitioner died almost 18 years ago, i.e., 15.3.1984 and therefore, the Writ Application is liable to be dismissed. They have further stated that as per application submitted by the petitioner in the year 1997, his age was shown as 19 years–meaning thereby his age was 6 years on the date of death of his father. It has further been stated that there is no provision under the relevant rules which provides that a dependent, upon attainment of majority, can file an application for appointment on compassionate grounds.
5. It is true that when the father of the petitioner died, he was just about 6 years old. A minor dependent could obviously not have been considered for appointment and rightly therefore, the petitioner’s mother had applied, but before her application could see a logical conclusion, even she met with an accident and died. Thirteen years thereafter, the petitioner attained majority and applied.
6. A similar matter was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State of U.P. and Ors. v. Paras Nath, reported in (1998) 2 SCC 412. Their Lordships have held that the purpose of providing employment to a dependent of an employee dying in harness in preference to anybody else, is to mitigate the hardship caused to the family on account of his unexpected death while in service and in order to alleviate the distress of the family, such appointments on compassionate considerations are given, provided of course, there are rules for such appointment. In the instant case, the National Coal Wage Agreement -IV are the relevant rules, but the Supreme Court has held thai where an application is made after a long period of time, the aforementioned consideration cannot be said to be operational. In the case referred to above, the deceased employee had left behind a two year old son. The son filed the application for compassionate appointment after seventeen years and in the backdrop of such a factual matrix, the Supreme Court held that such a belated application of the son cannot entitle him to any relief.
7. In yet another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Haryana State Electricity Board v. Naresh Tanwar and Anr., reported in (1996) 8 SCC 23, the Supreme Court has held that compassionate appointment cannot be granted after a long lapse of reasonable period. They have further held that the very purpose of compassionate appointment, as an exception to the general rule of open recruitment, is intended to meet the immediate financial problems suffered by the members of the family and this consideration cannot be kept binding for years.
8. Let it be recorded that the normal procedure for appointment is open recruitment following a lawful and legal procedure–that is appointment on the basis of detection/declaration of vacancy followed by proper advertisement, screening and so on and so forth. The concept of compassionate appointment bye passes such an elaborate transparency only for purposes of enabling the bereaved to tide over the colossal loss and misery which the family is suddenly faced with on account of the death of its bread winner. This consideration is the only consideration, but such a consideration cannot be allowed to be kept alive for an indefinite period of time because if it is allowed to do so, it will encroach and create inroads into an otherwise transparent procedure commonly known as open recruitment. The effect would be that all of a sudden, when other persons are in the queue waiting for their turn for regular appointment their legitimate expectation would abruptly be snatched away by a seeker of compassionate appointment at a time when the consideration for such appointment was non existent–the deceased parent having died long time ago–an event which can hardly be said to be reasonable vis-a-vis persons waiting for regular appointment.
For the reasons stated therefore, this Court is unable to issue any writ either quashing the impugned communication or mandating the respondents to appoint the petitioner. The Writ Application is accordingly dismissed.