JUDGMENT
Bucknill, J.
1. This was an application made under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act of 1637, asking this Court to exercise its revisional powers in connection with a decision given by the Small Cause Court Judge of Purulia in September of last year under the following circumstances.
2. There was a tenure in a certain Mouzah called Shimulbera in the Manbhum District. The tenants (the pro forma defendants here) had apparently a money-decree against them and the petitioner No. 1 in 1919 appears to have purchased the property. At the time when the purchase was made, the outgoing tenants were in arrear with their rent and the landlord later on sued them therefor and obtained a decree. He then put the property up for sale in 1920. The property apparently was sold. The petitioner No. 1 made no effort to protest her tenure, but the plaintiff (the opposite party here), who professed to be interested in some way in the Mouzah, deposited the amount for which. the rent-decree had been obtained and the sale was set aside. The plaintiff then brought this action against the petitioners for recovery of the sum which they had thus paid.
3. Now it is difficult to say from the judgment which the Small Cause Court Judge given, what were really the points which were argued before him or which were brought to his notice; but he found that the defendants were liable to pay this rent and that the plaintiff had, what he called, “several rights and interest” in the property. He also found that the plaintiff believed in good faith that his interest was in danger by the rent sale and that, therefore, he was a person interested, in the sense contemplated by Section 69 of the Contract Act, in the payment of this sum and was in consequence entitled to be re imbursed by the defendant.
4. Now it is said that it is permissible under the provisions of Order XX, Rule 4, that a Judge, deciding a case in a Small Cause Court, can reduce his remarks to a minimum and that they need not contain more than the points for determination and the decision thereon. I can only say with regard to that that it is obvious that at any rate this minimum must be intelligible.
5. The first point which is suggested here–I do not know that it was raised in the Small Cause Court–is that under item No. 41 of the Second Schedule to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act this suit is excluded from the jurisdiction of that Court, on the ground that it may properly be regarded as a suit for contribution by a sharer in joint property in respect of payment made by him of money due from a co-sharer. I can, however, see no reason for thinking that any of the facts in this ease discloses any such conditions. I do not think that there was any question of contribution as such but, that the suit simply must rest upon its being a simple claim for money and if recoverable at all, recoverable under those principles of law which are codified in the Act and in particular in Section 69 or Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act.
6. The second question which is asked, and it is no doubt a somewhat pertinent question, is, if Section 69 is called in aid by the plaintiff, what was the interest which the plaintiff really had in the property and what interest did he really have in the payment of the amount for which he is now suing the defendant.
7. Now here I think that the expressions which are contained in the Small Cause Court Judge’s decision have certainly been reduced to a minimum, but at the same time he does find as a fact on evidence which was apparently before him that the plaintiff had certain rights and interest in the property. What exactly those rights really were and how the plaintiff stated they were or might have been affected by the sale of the property, if the money had not been paid into Court in order to set that sale aside, is certainly not very clear. But in his evidence the plaintiff’s son says that they, that is he and his father, held in 12 annas of the property “miadi and kobala lands,” and the note of the evidenae continues thus: “Witness proves documents executed by Chandi and Haradhan, Exhibits 2 to 2(f) and 3 and 3(a), Our mokarrari deed has been called for from the defendant.”
8. Now it is contended with a good deal of force that, in order that a person can take advantage of the provisions of Section 69 of the Indian Contract Act, such person’s interest must be clearly defined and that such person must show that his interest in the property would be adversely affected by the sale of the property in respect of which he has paid the money which he seeks to recover from the party who is bound to pay. The authorities, however, which have been quoted before me, and notably the case of Pankhabati Chaudhurani v. Nonihal Singh 21 Ind. Cas. 207 : 18 C.W.N. 778 19 C.L.J. 72, do not support so wide a contention. In that aase the judgment of the Court, which consisted of Mr. Justice Mookerji and Mr. Justice Benchcroft, contains a passage which indicates that there is no suach wide construction to be put upon this section. They say: “There is no foundation for the contention that a payment of this description must be deemed a voluntary payment unless and until it is established that the sale would have actually prejudiced the position of the person who pays the money.” It would seem that it is sufficient if the person who pays the money has an apprehension founded upon an impression that his interest will be adversely affected : and whether or not, he may, as the result of more careful investigation, find that his apprehension was really in law justified, it does not seem to matter.
9. The third point which was argued seems to me to be a point of considerably more substance. It is as to whether the petitioner No. 1 was here bound in law to pay the amount which the plaintiff paid ostensibly on his behalf and which he now seeks to recover.
10. Now it is argued for the opposite party here that the rent of the outgoing tenants was a charge on the tenure, and there is no doubt that that argument is quite sound : that is to say, supposing the landlord chose to sue the outgoing tenants for the rent which they had not paid and supposing they did not pay the amount which was found (on judgment being given in favour of th9 landlord) due to him, be could sell the tenure, It is true that a purchaser who has, as in this case, prior to the decree in the rent suit purchased the property from the outgoing tenants, can protect himself against the effect of the sale simply by paying the decretal amount into Court; but that he (such purchaser) is bound personally in law to pay the amount of the rent which was due by the outgoing tenants to the landlord, is a matter which to my mind is a very different thing. It is well pointed out in two cases which have been quoted before me that neither under Section 69 nor Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act is it the case that a person who makes a payment to protect his own interest can recover the amount which he pays from the person on whose behalf he ostensibly pays it, unless it can be shown in the case of Section 69 that that person was bound in law to pay the money or in the case of Section 70 that the person for whom he paid the money had not only benefited from the payment but has also had the opportunity of expressing his acceptance or rejection of such benefit.
11. Now as was clearly seen by the learned Vakil for the respondents, this really is the only important legal question in this case. Can it be said that the petitioner No. 1 was bound in law to pay the money for which the property had already been sold under the rent decree? I think the authorities are quite clear that he was not so bound. I, therefore, think that it was not a case under Section 69 in which the petitioner was bound to pay the amount and that, therefore, the plaintiff could not recover the sum which he had paid for him. No doubt the plaintiff was actuated by motives on his own behalf primarily, and no doubt he thought that in law the petitioner was bound to pay this sum : but it will be observed that the petitioner made no motion whatever to pay the decretal amount; he gave no indication that he intended to pay off or take the benefit of his possibility of discharging the amount for which the landlord had obtained his rent-decree. On the contrary, he allowed the sale to take place and did nothing. It has been said quite clearly, in more than one case which has been quoted before me, that under circumstances such as that, it cannot be said that a person is bound in law to pay a debt for which his property has already been sold. I think, therefore, that on this point the Small Cause Court erred in law and that, therefore, his decision must be set aside. The petitioner is entitled to his costs, which I assess at two gold mohurs.