JUDGMENT
S.B. Sinha, C.J.
1. The order dated July 25, 2001, passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour has been challenged in this writ petition. By the impugned order, the second respondent directed the petitioner to pay to the unofficial respondents herein full wages for the total period of suspension, which was extended for more than one year. In view of the contentions raised in this writ petition for consideration of this Court, it is not necessary for us to refer the factual aspect of the matter.
2. Mr. Kasturi, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner, firstly, contended that Section 47(6) of the Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), is ultra vires. He, secondly, contends that by reason of the impugned order dated July 25, 2001, the second respondent misinterpreted and misconstrued the provisions of Section 47(6) of the Act.
3. Mr. Kasturi, in support of his first contention, submitted that the provisions contained in Sub-section (6) of Section 47 of the Act must be held to be unreasonable in so far as the period of suspension having been confined only to one year is concerned. Learned counsel would contend that the employer may not be in a position to complete the departmental proceedings within a period of one year for various reasons including non-cooperation on the part of the employee concerned.
4. Our attention in this connection has been drawn to the provisions contained in Section 10-A(1)(b) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and it is submitted that in terms thereof, subsistence allowance at the rate of 75 per cent. of wages would be paid after a period of one year only in the event of delay in the completion of disciplinary proceedings against the workman is not directly attributed to his conduct.
5. The submission of learned counsel cannot be accepted for more than one reason. Statutory provisions of a statute cannot be declared ultra vires having regard to the phraseology used in another statute and only because the provisions of one statute dealing with workmen may contain slightly a different provision. The same, in our considered opinion, would not attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In any event, comparison of the provisions of Section 10-A(1)(b) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, with the provisions of Section 47(6) of the Act would clearly go to establish the purport and the object behind the same. Section 10-A of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, reads thus:
“10-A. Payment of subsistence allowance.-(1) Where any workman is suspended by the employer pending investigation or inquiry into complaints or charges of misconduct against him, the employer shall pay to such workman subsistence allowance-
(a) at the rate of fifty per cent of the wages which the workman was entitled to immediately preceding the date of such suspension, for the first ninety days of suspension; and
(b) at the rate of seventy-five per cent of such wages for the remaining period of suspension if the delay in the completion of disciplinary proceedings against such workman is not directly attributable to the conduct of such workman.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, where provisions relating to payment of subsistence allowance under any other law for the time being in force in any State or more beneficial than the provisions of this section, the provisions of such other law shall be applicable to the payment of subsistence allowance in that State.”
6. Even in terms of the aforementioned provision, subsistence allowance is to be paid at the rate of 50 per cent of the wages for the first ninety days of suspension and, thereafter, at the rate of 75 per cent for the remaining period of suspension, subject, of course, in the event no delay can be attributed on the part of the workman in relation to completion of the disciplinary proceedings. Sub-section (6) of Section 47 of the Act contains almost similar provisions. Having regard to the fact that the power of suspension may not be exercised arbitrarily by the employer, the Legislature thought it fit that the total period of suspension should not exceed one year in any case. A period of one year, according to the Legislature, is sufficient for the purpose of completion of a domestic enquiry. In the event an employee does not render co-operation with the enquiry officer or the disciplinary proceedings, the same does not preclude the employer from proceeding with the enquiry ex parte. In a given case, the employer can proceed with the departmental proceedings even on day-to-day basis. In a departmental proceeding, what is required is only compliance with the principles of natural justice and the procedure laid down in the Acts and Rules. But any enquiry officer worth his salt must be presumed to be aware of the procedure as to how a departmental proceeding is to be conducted. The legislative policy of the State is that if enquiry is not completed within the aforementioned period of one year, the employee shall be treated on duty. He shall, therefore, be entitled to the full salary as he would be deemed to be on duty and not under suspension. It is trite that an employer has an inherent right to suspend the employee in the sense that he will not be taking any work from him. The power of suspension during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings or in contemplation thereof is a power conferred upon the employer under a statute. The: Legislature of the State in a situation of this nature would, therefore, be entitled to impose conditions in exercise of such power of the employer. By reason of Section 47(6) of the Act, the period of suspension has been kept: confined to one year. The same by itself, in our opinion, cannot be termed to be so unreasonable as to attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The employees under the Act are a class by themselves. The conditions of service of such employees can, by no stretch of imagination, for the purposes of rendering the provision unconstitutional, be equated with the conditions of service of the employees provided under another statute.
7. In so far as the second contention is concerned, for dealing with the same, we feel it necessary to set out the impugned order dated July 25, 2001, which reads thus :
“In the reference cited, it is represented that the management suspended nine employees on May 28, 2000, and the period of suspension was continued for more than one year and not paid full wages even after expiry of one year as per Section 47(6) of the A.P. Shops and Establishments Act. Section 47(6) of the Act states that:
“Where an employee is placed under suspension pending enquiry into grave misconduct, the employer shall pay a subsistence allowance equivalent to fifty per cent of the last drawn wage for the first six months and at seventy-five per cent of the last drawn wage beyond six months during the period of suspension. The total period of suspension shall not, however, exceed one year in any case. If the misconduct is not established or the total period of suspension exceeds one year, the employee shall be entitled to full wages during suspension period and the period of suspension shall be treated as on duty.”
Therefore, the management is directed to pay the full wages for the total period of suspension which was extended for more than one year to the nine employees as per Section 47(6) by adjusting the payments already made at 50 per cent and 70 per cent.”
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Kasturi, would draw our attention to Annexure P-1 to suggest that for non-completion of disciplinary proceedings against the employee, the respondents themselves were responsible. This may be so but in a writ proceeding, the vires of a statute cannot be considered on the aforementioned ground. The provisions of the statute are mandatory in nature and that the consequences therefor shall ensue. Even the petitioner contends that the said provisions are directory in nature. He may, therefore, file an appropriate application before the said authority or prefer an appeal there against in terms of Section 53 of the Act. But such contention, in our opinion, cannot be raised in a writ proceeding.
9. We, therefore, see no merit in this writ application. It is accordingly dismissed with the aforementioned observations.