ORDER
G.S. Chaube, J.
1. This second appeal has arisen from order dated 2.4.98 of the District Judge of Hazaribagh, declining to condone the delay in filing of Title Appeal No. 5/97 against the judgment and decree of the trial Court in Title Suit No. 4./95 and consequently, dismissing the appeal aforesaid as barred by limitation.
2. It appears that the plaintiffs/respondents 1 to 16 had instituted Title Suit No. 4/95 in the Court of the Subordiante Judge at Chatra for declaration of their title in respect of 22 acres land of plot Nos. 10 and 1148 of khata No. 150 situated at Barisakhi and for permanent injunction restraining the present appellants and respondent Nos. 17, 18 and 19 from interfering with the peaceful enjoyment of the plaintiffs of the said lands. Their case was that their ancestors Bandhan Bhuian, Ganesh Bhuian, Dhanu Bhuian and Bhaura Bhian @ Moti Bhuian had taken settlement of 62.23 acres of gairmajarua land of plot No. 1148 and 44.70 acres of gairmajarua land of plot No. 10 aforesaid from the ex-landlord on the basis of hukumnama dated 1.4.1923 The settles came in possession. After taking settlement, the settlees and their descendants including the plaintiffs reclaimed those lands and were enjoying the usufructs thereof. Their names were also mutated and they were obtaining rent receipts on payment of rent; However, on 15.11.1994 the Anchal Amin as well as the Circle Inspector of Itkhori Anchal accompanied by forest guards went to those lands to measure the same for digging for pits for plantation of trees on the strength of an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Chatra on 20.10.94. Since the plaintiffs-respondents were threatened of the prospect of being dispossessed from the suit lands, they instituted the suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Chatra for the reliefs of declaration of their title and permanent injunction. The defendants appeared and filed a written statement to contest the suit on the ground inter alia that all the gairmajarua lands vested in the State of Bihar. Since the lands in question were forest lands, the plaintiffs had no right, title and interest in respect thereof. Issues were settled and evidence led on both the sides; On consideration of the evidence on record, the learned Subordiante Judge decreed the suit declaring the title and interest as well as possession of the plaintiffs over the lands in suit. The judgment was delivered on 29.8.1995. The decree was drawn, signed and sealed on 8.9.95. Against the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 4/95, the State preferred an appeal before the District Judge on 27.1.95.
3. At a subsequent stage, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay was filed on behalf of the appellants on 14.9.97. The copy of the limitation application filed in the Court of the District Judge in Title Appeal No. 5/97 is Annexure-4. In their application, the appellants took a plea that since the local Forest authorities, particularly, the D.F.O. of Chatra was not impleaded as one of the defendants, they could not know of the judgment and decree in appeal. They also took a plea that due to paucity of sufficient fund, certified copy was not obtained in time. When the local authorities came to know of the judgment and decree, they obtained certified copy of the judgment and decree and after obtaining necessary permission from higher authorities, the appeal was preferred on 27.1.97. On the grounds stated in application at Flag A, the appellants had sought Condonation of the delay. However, by the impugned order, the learned District Judge of Hazaribagh declined to condone the delay and rejected the limitation application on the ground that the appellants had failed to make but a case that there was sufficient cause which prevented then appellants from filing the appeal within time. Simultaneously, the appeal Was also dismissed.
4. After hearing the earned Counsel for both the sides, this appeal is admitted arid being disposed of at this stage on the only substantial question of law; whether the learned District Judge committed an error of law in not following the; rule laid down by the apex Court in AIR 1996 SC 1633 enjoining upon the courts to except a liberal approach in the matter of condoning the delay in making of any application or preferring an appeal within the prescribed period?
5. Admittedly, the appeal was presented in the Court of the District Judge of Hazaribagh with a delay of 516 days and that too without making any prayer for condoning the delay. However, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was presented before the District Judge on 14.9.97 and that application was rejected on the ground that there is a limit of latitude to be shown to the State while considering the question of condonation of delay. Section 5 of the Limitation Act extends the prescribed period of limitation in filing an application or appeal on condition that the applicant/appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot and could not be laid down by hard and fast rules. The discretion vested in the Court by Section 5 of the Limitation Act should hot be defined or crystalised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should receive from the Courts a liberal construction AIR 1967 SC 237, more so when the applicant/appellant seeking extension is the State. The reason for adopting a most possible liberal attitude in favour of State is very succinctly stated the apex Court in , State of Haryana v. Chandra Matu and Ors. In para 10 of the report at page 1626, the apex Court has held that when the State is an applicant praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay-intentional or otherwise-is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism injustice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizance to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. Their Lordships of the apex Court further have proceeded to observe that State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision Whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injuried while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from the perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay.
6. The learned District Judge appears to have fallen in errors in Not applying the principle laid down by the apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. (supra) on the ground that in the case before the apex Court, the delay was only of 109 days while in the present case delay was of 516 days. He lost sight of the fact that in the matters of condoning delay on the ground of sufficient cause shown by the appellant/applicant, it is not the number of days of the delay, but the reason for the delay which matters for condoning or not condoning the delay. As observed by the apex Court in the case of Kishanganj Municipality and Anr. v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee and Anr. AIR 1999 SC 1570 even delay of few days may be inordinate in the facts of case and delay of 100 or more days may not be inordinate in set of facts of other case.
7. As has been observed by the apex Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishna Murthy 1998 SAR (Civil) 739, in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. However, that alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fide or does not putforth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the Suitor. But, when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation.
8. From the impugned order, it does not appear that any such thing was either canvassed by and on behalf of the respondents nor any such misconduct on the part of the appellants had been noticed by the learned District Judge so as to decline to condone the delay of 516 days. In the case of N. Balakrishna (supra), delay of 883 days in making an application for setting aside ex parte decree had been found fit to be condoned. The plea of the appellants that local authorities of the Forest Deptt. who were the only persons interested in the matter of the forest and Forest Deptt. were not aware of the judgment and decree of the trial Court. As soon as they came to know of the trial Court judgment, they took steps for obtaining certified copy thereof and undergoing the bureaucratic channel, the appeal was preferred with the delay of 516 days. Since there was no counter-affidavit disputing the averments made in the condonation application on oath, there was no justification for the learned District Judge to decline to condone the delay and dismiss the appeal as time-barred. The proper course would have been to serve the respondents with notice of the limitation application as required by Rule 3(A) of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure and thereafter, the limitation application could have been disposed of in accordance with law depending on the stand taken by the respondents.
9. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order made in Title Appeal No. 5/97 is hereby set aside. The appeal is remitted to the District Judge of Hazaribagh, for passing appropriate order in the limitation matter after hearing both the parties. But, before disposing of the limitation application, the District Judge shall serve a copy of the limitation application on the respondents as provided under Rule 3A, of Order XLI, C.P.C. If the appellants so like, the District Judge may permit them to file supplementary affidavit enumerating the details of the reasons which prevented them from presenting the appeal within time.
10. In the facts and circumstance of the case, there is not order as to costs.