PETITIONER:
STATE OF GUJARAT
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
GUJARAT REVENUE TRIBUNAL & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT08/08/1979
BENCH:
SEN, A.P. (J)
BENCH:
SEN, A.P. (J)
UNTWALIA, N.L.
CITATION:
1980 AIR 91 1980 SCR (1) 233
1979 SCC (4) 40
CITATOR INFO :
D 1992 SC 221 (2)
ACT:
Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949-S. 6-Bombay
Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952-S. 7-Scope of.
Words & phrases-Waste lands-Meaning of.
HEADNOTE:
The object and purpose of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure
Abolition Act, 1949 and the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition
Act, 1952 was to abolish taluqdari and inamdari rights as a
measure of agrarian reform. Section 6 of the former Act and
s. 7 of the latter Act (both of which are identical in
terms) provide that among others "....all unbuilt village
site lands, all waste lands and all uncultivated lands
(excluding lands used for building or other non-agricultural
purposes), which are not situate within the limits of the
wantas...... " shall vest in the Government. The
Explanation to this section provides "for the purposes of
this section land shall be deemed to be uncultivated, if it
has nor been cultivated for a continuous period of three
years immediately before the date on which this Act comes
into force."
The respondents were former Taluqdars and Inamdars.
Vast stretches of hilly tracks which were incapable of
cultivation, but on which there was spontaneous growth of
grass formed part of the taluqdari estates and inams. When
grass was cut from these lands, care was taken not to cut
stubs but they were allowed to remain in tact so that in the
following year grass grew with the onset of rains. The
respondents secured income from the grass grown on the
lands; for earning income they kept watchmen so that
unauthorised pasturing by cattle did not destroy the growing
grass.
With the abolition of the taluqdari rights and inams
the lands were regarded as having vested in the Government.
The respondents thereupon sought a declaration that the
lands were neither vacant lands nor uncultivated lands and
being in their possession they became the occupants thereof.
The Mahalkari held that the lands were not waste lands or
uncultivated lands and since the respondents were in
possession thereof they became occupants. The Collector
reversed this order and held that by reason of Explanation
to s. 6 of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and Explanation to s.
7 of the Inams Abolition Act, the lands should be treated as
unoccupied lands and, therefore, they vested in tho
Government. The Revenue Tribunal reversed the order of the
Collector.
On further appeal the High Court held that the land
were productive lands in the sense that grass grew naturally
and that the Explanation contemplates only those lands which
could be cultivated but which were left fallow and
uncultivated for a continuous period of three years
234
Dismissing the appeals;
^
HELD: 1. The High Court as well as the Revenue Tribunal
were right in holding that the disputed lands did not vest
in the Government under s. 6 of the Taluqdari Abolition Act
and s. 7 of the Inams Abolition Act. [242A]
2. It would be evident from s. 6 that the vesting is in
respect of properties which could be put to public use. It
leaves private properties, of the taluqdars untouched.
Public properties situate in a taluqdar's estate vested in
the Government because they were meant for public use. In
spite of vesting of such property in the Government, the
conferral of the rights of an occupant on a taluqdar under
s. 5(1)(b) in respect of the lands in his actual possession
is saved. [239D-F]
3. The contention that the grass lands on hilly tracks
which were incapable of cultivation were waste lands and
uncultivated lands within the meaning of s. 6 cannot be
accepted. The expression "all waste lands" has been joined
by the conjunction "and" with the expression "all
uncultivated lands". They indicate two distinct types of
lands. If the legislature had intended that the aforesaid
expression should indicate one class of lands the expression
would have been "all waste and uncultivated lands" as
against the expression "all waste and uncultivated lands".
There are, therefor, two distinct categories of properties
viz., waste lands and uncultivated lands. [240A-B]
4. The expression "waste lands" means lands which are
desolate, abandoned and not fit ordinarily for use for
building purposes. In the sequence in which the expression
waste lands appears in the two sections it cannot but have
its ordinary etymological meaning viz., lands Lying desolate
or useless without trees or grass or vegetation, not capable
of any use. [240C]
Rajanand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P. & Ors. [1967] 1
SCR 373, Ishwarlal Girdharilal Joshi etc. v. State of
Gujarat & Anr., [1968] 2 SCR 267; referred to.
5(a). The grass lands on hilly tracts were not waste
lands. They were productive lands in the sense that grass
grew naturally and so they were not desolate, abandoned or
barren waste lands with no vegetation. The expression "waste
lands" in the context would be clearly in the original sense
of the term waste as meaning barren or desolate lands which
are unfit for any use or worthless. That test is not clearly
satisfied. [240H]
(b) The expression "uncultivated lands" in s. 6 must in
the context m which it appears means "cultivable but not
cultivated", "allowed to lie fallow". It is uncultivable or
unfit for cultivation. [241B]
6. The Explanation below s. 6 has a two-fold function:
(1) to explain the meaning of the expression "uncultivated
lands" in the substantive provision and (2) it is a key for
ascertaining the meaning of the expression "uncultivated
lands". Without the Explanation any land Lying uncultivated
on the date of the vesting even for a year i.e. allowed to
lie fallow according to the normal agricultural practice
would vest in the Government. But the Explanation steps in
and seeks to mitigate the rigour. It says that the land
allowed to lie fallow continuously for a period of three
years shall alone be deemed to be uncultivated land. meaning
there-by that a piece of land allowed to lie
235
fallow intermittently for a period of less than three years
will not be deemed "uncultivated lands . [241 C-E]
7. In the instant case there were no basic operations
as tilling of the land, sowing or disseminating of seeds and
planting of grass. The subsequent operations viz., the act
of securing the income of the grass by engaging watchmen
etc. by themselves would not tantamount to cultivation of
the land. [241G]
8. The Acts make no provision for payment of
compensation for the acquisition of the rights of the former
Taluqdar and Inamdars in such lands. Section 7 of the former
Act and s. 10 of the latter Act speak of the extinguishment
of any right or interest in land which is waste or
uncultivated but is culturable. The lands in question not
benefit for cultivation were not culturable and therefore,
they do not fall within the ambit of these provisions. If
the contention of the appellants were to prevail it would
have the effect of taking these lands out of the purview of
s. 14 of the former Act and s. 17 of the latter Act though
such lands are not governed by s. 17 and s. 10 respectively.
This would result in deprivation of property without payment
of compensation. [242B-D]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2411-
2427 and 2431-2440 of 1969.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated 5-11-1968 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. Nos.
570/63, 629, and 634/63. 283-286 of 1966 and 287-296 and
300-309/66.
G. A. Shah and M. N. Shroff for the Appellant.
D. V. Patel, I. N. Shroff, P. V. Hathi and H. S.
Parihar for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SEN J. These twenty-seven appeals, by special leave,
directed against judgment of the Gujarat High Court dated
November. 5 1968 raise a common question and are, therefore,
disposed of by this common judgment.
The short question involved in these matters relates to
interpretation of s. 6 of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure
Abolition Act, 1949, “the Taluqdari Abolition Act”, and s. 7
of the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952, “the
Personal Inams Abolition Act”.
In the present appeals, certain facts are no longer in
dispute. The respondents are the erstwhile taluqdars or
inamdars what was known as Ghogha Mahal, which now forms
part of the Bhavnagar district. There were vast stretches of
hilly tracts described as ‘Dunger’, which were incapable of
cultivation, but on which there was spontaneous growth of
grass. These lands formed part of their taluqdari estates or
inams. They used to sell the grass growing on these
236
lands and it was a definite source of income to them. It
appears that the lands were recorded as Kharaba in the
record of rights and, therefore, consequent upon the
abolition of taluqdari rights by the Taluqdari Abolition Act
and with the Abolition of inams under the Personal Inams
Abolition Act, the lands were recorded as having vested in
The Government. Thereupon, the respondents made separate
claims before the Mahalkari, Ghogha Mahal, seeking a
declaration under s. 37(2) of the Bombay I and Revenue Code,
1879 that the lands were neither vacant lands nor
uncultivated lands and being in their possession, they
become the occupants thereof.
In an enquiry held under s. 3(2), the Mahalkari
examined the claimants individually, the village talatis and
the relevant entries in the records of rights which showed
that the taluqdars and inamdars were deriving income from
the grass growing on the lands. It was also in evidence that
considerable effort and expenses had to be incurred by them
for securing the income of this grass i.e., by keeping
watchmen etc. to see that unauthorised pasturing by cattle
brought on land or trespassing on it did not destroy the
growing grass, but that it grew to full stature so as to
give a fair and full yield. When operation for cutting of
the grass used to commence, the stubs were not cut off but
were allowed to remain intact so that the next year after
The rains, the grass would grow naturally again. A portion
of the grass-lands were also kept apart by the respondents
for the grazing of their cattle by fencing of the area. The
Mahalkari, Ghogha Mahal by his order dated October 28, 1958
held on this evidence that the lands could not be treated as
waste lands or uncultivated lands, and since the respondents
were in possession thereof, they became the occupants.
The Collector, Bhavnagar, in exercise of his suo motu
powers of revision under s. 211 of the Code by his order
dated February 28, 1961 set aside the orders of the
Mahalkari and held in all these twenty-seven cases, that
since the lands in question were not being cultivated by
taluqdars or inamdars, they must, by reason of Explanation
to s. 6 of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and Explanation to s.
7 of the Inams Abolition Act, be treated to be ‘unoccupied
lands’, and, therefore, the lands vest in the Government.
The Revenue Tribunal, however, by its two orders dated June
19, 1962 and March 26, 1965, reversed the order of the
Collector and restored that of the Mahalkari holding the
respondents to be the occupants of the lands in question.
The State Government of Gujarat filed twenty-seven writ
petitions in the High Court for quashing the orders of the
Revenue Tribunal.
237
Agreeing with the Revenue Tribunal, the High Court held
that there was evidence that the lands in dispute were not
lying desolate, abandoned or barren with no vegetation, but
were, in fact, productive lands, in the sense that grass
grew naturally and so, they could not be regarded as ‘waste
lands’, although they were wrongly recorded as such. It also
held that the hilly tracts on which grass grew naturally, by
their very nature were unfit for cultivation and, therefore,
could not be treated as ‘uncultivated lands’. It relied on
the Explanation to the two sections and observed that it
contemplates only those lands which could be cultivated but
which were left fallow and uncultivated for a continuous
period of three years. In its opinion, the expressions
‘waste lands’ and ‘uncultivated lands’, therefore, did not
cover grass-lands on hilly tracts which by their very nature
are incapable of cultivation, but which are not useless so
as to be not capable of any use.
The question for consideration in these appeals is
whether the High Court was right in holding that the
respondents, who were taluqdars or inamdars, were entitled
to settlement of these grass-lands on hilly tracts as
‘occupants’ thereof under s. 5(1) (b) of the Taluqdari
Abolition Act and s. 5(2) (b) of the Inams Abolition Act.
Before dealing with the judgment of the Court below, it
will be convenient to refer to the scheme of the two Acts
and to set out the relevant sections. The provisions of the
two Acts are identical in terms. It would source, for our
present purposes, to generally refer to the provisions of
the Taluqdari Abolition Act. The object and purpose of the
Act, as is clear from the preamble, was to abolish the
taluqdari rights as a measure of agrarian reform. Section 3
abolished the taluqdari tenure and extinguished all
incidents of the tenure attached to any land comprised in a
taluqdari estate save as provided in the Act. Under s. 4,
all revenue surveys and settlements made under s. 4 of the
Gujarat Taluqdars Act, 1888 are deemed to have been made
under (Chapter VIII and VIII-A of the Land Revenue Code. By
s. 5(1)(a) all taluqdari lands are henceforth liable to the
payment of land revenue in accordance with the provisions of
the Land Revenue Code.
The abolition of the taluqdari tenure, however, did not
deprive the taluqdars of the lands in their possession, and
s. 5(1)(b) provides that a taluqdar holding any taluqdari
land shall be deemed to be an occupant within the meaning of
the Land Revenue Code or any other law for the time being in
force. Than comes s. 6 which provides that all public roads,
lanes etc., not situate within the wants belonging to a
taluqdar, shall vest in the government and all rights
238
held by a taluqdar in such property shall be deemed to have
been extinguished. Section 7 provides for payment of
compensation to taluqdars for extinguishment of rights under
s. 6 Clause (b) (i) thereof provides that if the property
acquired is ‘waste or uncultivated but is culturable land’,
the amount of compensation shall not exceed three the
assessment of the land. Section 14 provides for payment of
compensation to taluqdars for extinguishment or modification
of any other right where such extinguishment or Modification
amounts to transference to public ownership of such lands or
any right in and over such land, i.e. in any land other than
those in respect of which provision for the payment of
compensation has been made under s. 7.
The scheme under the Personal Inams Abolition Act is
more or less similar. Section 4 provides that
notwithstanding anything contained in any usage, settlement,
grant, sanad, or order or a decree or order of a Court or
any law for the time being in force (1) all personal inams
shall be deemed to have been extinguished, with effect from
and on the appointed date; (2) all rights legally subsisting
on the said date in respect of such personal inams shall be
deemed to have been extinguished, save as expressly provided
by or under the provisions of the Act. Similarly s. 5(2) (a)
provides that an inamdar in resect of the inam land in his
actual possession or in possession of a person holding from
him other than an inferior holder referred to in cl.(b),
shall be entitled to all the rights and shall be liable to
all obligations in respect of such land as an occupant.
Under cl.(b) an inferior holder holding an inam land is
entitled to the same rights.
Turning now to s. 6 of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and
s. 7 of the Personal Inams Abolition Act, which are
identical in terms, the first thing to be noticed is that
they deal with specific properties alone, which arc
enumerated therein and in which all the rights of the
taluqdars or inamdars are completely extinguished.
Section 6 of the Taluqdari Abolition Act reads:
“6. All public roads, lanes and paths, the bridges
ditches, dikes and fences, on or beside, the same, the
bed of the sea and of harbours, creeks below high water
mark, and of rivers, streams, nallas, lakes, wells and
tanks, and all canals, and water courses, and all
standing and flowing water, all unbuilt village sit
lands, all waste lands and all uncultivated land
(excluding lands used for building or other non-
agricultural purposes), which are not situate within
the limits of the wantas belonging to a taluqdar in
239
taluqdari estate shall except in so far as any rights
of any person other than the taluqdar may be
established in and over the same and except as may
otherwise be provided by any law for the time being in
force, vest in and shall be deemed to be, with all
rights in or over the same or appertaining thereto, the
property of the Government and all rights held by a
taluqdar in such property shall be deemed to have been
extinguished and it shall be lawful for the Collector,
subject to the general or special orders of the
Commissioner, to dispose them of as he deems fit,
subject always to the rights of way and of other rights
of the public or individuals legally subsisting.
Explanation-For the purposes of this section,
land shall be deemed to be uncultivated, if it has not
been cultivated for a continuous period of three years
immediately before the date on which this Act comes
into force”. (Emphasis supplied)
On a fair reading of the section, it would be evident
that the vesting is in respect of properties which could be
put to public use. It leaves the private properties of the
taluqdar untouched. The legislative intent is manifested by
clear enumeration of certain specific properties not situate
within the wantas of a taluqdar. It begins by specifying
‘All public roads, lanes, paths, bridges, etc.’ and ends up
with ‘all village site lands, all waste lands and all
uncultivated lands’. and these being public properties
situate in a taluqdar’s estate must necessarily vest in the
Government because they are meant for public use. In spite
of vesting of such property in the Government, however, the
conferral of the rights of an occupant on a taluqdar under
s. 5(1)(b) in respect of the lands in his actual possession,
is saved.
Pausing there, it is fair to observe that the words in
parenthesis ‘excluding lands used for building or other non-
agricultural purposes’, exemplify the intention of the
legislature not to deprive a taluqdar of such land, even
though such property is uncultivated land, due to its
inherent character as well as by reason of the Explanation.
lt is therefore, evident that the determination of the
question whether a particular category of property belonging
to a taluqdar in a taluqdari estate is vested in the
Government or not, and the determination of the question
whether the rights held by a taluqdar in such property shall
be deemed to have been extinguished or not, will depend upon
the category of that property. The expression ‘all
240
waste lands’ has been joined by conjunctive ‘and’ with the
expression ‘all uncultivated lands’. They, therefore,
indicate two distinct types of lands. If the legislature had
intended that the aforesaid expression should indicate one
class of lands, the expression rather would have been ‘all
waste and uncultivated lands’ as against the expression ‘all
waste lands and all uncultivated lands” were we have,
therefore, two distinct categories of properties viz. ( 1 )
waste lands, and (2) uncultivated lands. The contention that
the grass-lands on hilly tracts which are incapable of
cultivation were ‘waste lands’ or ‘uncultivated lands’
within the meaning of s. 6 cannot be accepted.
Now, the expression ‘waste lands’ has a well-defined
legal connotation. It means lands which are desolate,
abandoned, and not fit ordinarily for use building purposes.
In Shorter oxford English Dictionary 3rd Ed., vol. 2, p.
2510, the meaning of word waste’ s given as
“1. Waste or desert land, uninhabited or sparsely
inhabited and uncultivated country; a wild and desolate
region; 2. A piece of land not cultivated or used for
any purpose, and producing little or no herbage or
wood. In legal use, a piece of such land not in any
man’s occupation but lying common. 3. A devastated
region.”
In the sequence in which the expression ‘waste lands’
appears in the two relevant sections, it cannot but have its
ordinary etymological meaning as given in the Shorter oxford
Dictionary i.e.. land lying desolate or useless, without
trees or grass or vegetation, not capable of any use. In
Rajanand Bramha Shah v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors this
Court, while discerning the meaning of ‘waste and arable
land’ in s. 17(4) Of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
observed that the expression ‘waste land’ as contrasted to
‘arable land’, would mean ‘land’ which is unfit for
cultivation and habitation, desolate and barren land with
little or no vegetation thereon. To the same effect is the
decision in Ishwarlal Girdharilal Joshi etc. v. State of
Gujarat & Anr.
It is clear that these grass-lands on hilly tracts were
not waste lands. They were productive lands in the sense
that grass grew naturally and so they were not desolate,
abandoned or barren waste lands with no vegetation. The
expression ‘waste lands’ in the context would be clearly, in
the original sense of the term ‘waste’ as
241
meaning barren or desolate lands which are unfit for any use
or which are worthless. That test is not clearly fulfilled.
The appellants alternative contention raises,
primarily, the question whether upon a proper construction
of s. 6 these grass-lands on hilly tracts were uncultivated
lands. That depends upon the terms of the section. The
expression ‘uncultivated lands’ in s. 6, must, in the
context in which it appears, mean ‘cultivable but not
cultivated’ i.e. fit for cultivation, but allowed to lie
fallow. It is uncultivable or unfit for cultivation.
The Explanation below s. 6 has a two-fold function.
The purpose of the Explanation first is to explain the
meaning of the expression ‘uncultivated lands’ in the
substantive provision. It then seeks to curtail the effect
of the section. It is a key for ascertaining the meaning of
the expression ‘uncultivated lands’. Without the
Explanation, any land lying uncultivated, on the date of the
vesting, even for a year. i.e., allowed to lie fallow
according to the normal agricultural practice, would vest in
the Government. But then the Explanation steps in and seeks
to mitigate the rigour. It says that the land allowed to lie
fallow continuously for a period of three years, shall alone
be deemed to be uncultivated land, meaning thereby that a
piece of land allowed to lie fallow, intermittently, for a
period of less than three years will not be deemed
‘uncultivated lands’.
In that view of the matter, the grass-lands on hilly
tracts which ere incapable of any cultivation could not, in
law, be treated to be uncultivated lands’ within the meaning
of s. 6, read with the Explanation thereto.
There seems to be no doubt on the facts of the case
that there were no such basic operations as tilling of the
land, sowing or disseminating of seeds, and planting of
grass. The subsequent operations i.e., operations performed
after the grass grew on the land, e.g., the act of securing
the income of this grass by engaging watchmen etc. to see
that unauthorised pasturing by cattle brought on land or
trespassing on it did not destroy the growing grass but that
it grew to full stature so as to give a fair and full yield,
or when operations for cutting off the grass used to
commence, the act of tending the stubs so that they were not
cut off but were allowed to remain intact so that the next
year after the rains, the grass would grow naturally again,
by themselves would not be tantamount to cultivation of the
land.
242
In our opinion, the High Court as well as the Revenue
Tribunal were, therefore, right in holding that the disputed
lands did not vest in tile government under s. of the
Taluqdari Abolition Act and s. 7 of the Personal Inams
Abolition Act.
In reaching. that conclusion, we cannot but take into
consideration the fact that the Acts make no provision
whatever for payment of any compensation for the acquisition
of the rights of the former taluqdars and inamdars in such
lands. They are not entitled to any compensation either
under s. 7(1)(b)(i) of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and s.
10.(1) (b) (i) of the Personal Inams Abolition Act. These
provisions speak of the extinguishment of any right or
interest in land which is ‘waste or uncultivated but is
culturable’. The lands in question not being fit for
cultivation, were not ‘culturable’ and. therefore, they do
not fall within the ambit of these provisions. If the
contention of the appellant were to prevail, it would lead
to an anomalous position. It would have the effect of taking
these lands out of the purview of s. 14 of the Taluqdari
Abolition Act and s. 17 of the Personal Inams Abolition Act,
though such lands are not governed by s. 7(1)(b)(i) of the
former Act and s. 10(1)(i) of the latter Act. This would
result in deprivation of property without payment of
compensation.
Our attention was drawn to the decision in Ambabai
Janhavibai v. State of Maharashtra. (1) That judgment
proceeds on the footing that there was a conflict between s.
S and s. 7 of the Personal Inams Abolition Act. There is no
basis for this assumption. Further, the observation that
‘since it is admitted that no agricultural operations were
carried out on the lands for the purpose of raising or
growing grass on the lands’, the contention that ‘the lands
on which grass grew naturally could not be said to be
uncultivated, cannot be accepted’, even though the inamdars
were making use of these lands and were realising income by
selling the grass which grew thereon, appears to proceed on
a wrongful assumption that the sine qua non for the
applicability of s. 5 was actual cultivation. This
observation, in our view, cannot be supported.
In the result, these appeals must fail and are
dismissed with costs.
P.B.R. Appeals dismissed.
243