PETITIONER: STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: DEWAN SINGH & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT06/11/1995 BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. KIRPAL B.N. (J) CITATION: 1996 AIR 675 1996 SCC (7) 394 JT 1995 (8) 348 1995 SCALE (6)480 ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
Leave granted.
The notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 [for short, “the Act”] was furnished
on January 22, 1981. Notices were given under Section 9 of
the Act. The Collector after conducting an enquiry made an
award on April 19, 1984 and allegedly took possession of the
land on the even date. The respondents assert that they are
in possession. The respondents filed the writ petition on
May 13, 1985 challenging the notification under Section 4
[1] of the Act on the ground that dispensing with an enquiry
under Section 5-A exercising power under Section 17 [4] of
the Act was bad in law as there was no urgency and the award
was, on the face of the case, valid in law. The High Court
by order dated May 27, 1985 allowed the writ petition
following Dharam Singh vs. State of Haryana [C.W.P. No. 2891
of 1984 decided on 9th November, 1984]. Thus this appeal by
special leave.
It is contended by the appellant that after the award
had been made, the respondents received compensation and
also sought reference under Section 18. The Land Acquisition
Officer was competent to make the award within two years
under Section 11-A of the Act after the Amendment Act 68 of
1984. The award came to be made within that period. So the
proceedings under Section 4 and 6 shall not stand lapsed by
operation of Section 11-A of the Act.
It is contended for the respondents that enquiry under
Setion 5-A is a valuable right and a minimum right by which
the owner is entitled to show that the land is not fit to be
used for public purpose. It would be open to show that some
other land would be more suitable for public purpose, viz.,
land for market committee. Exercising the power under
Section 17 [4] dispensing with the enquiry conducted under
Section 5-A is clearly illegal. Though there was delay on
the part of the respondents in challenging the notification,
delay does not mitigate to take away the valuable right of
approaching the High Court. The order of the High Court in
Dharam Singh’s case [supra] was not challenged. It is open
to the appellants to canvass the correctness of the award on
that premise, though the award had become final.
The question for consideration is whether the High
Court was justified in interfering with the award dated
April 19,1984 made by the Collector and the notification
under Section 4 [1]. It is seen that the notification under
Section 4 [1] and the declaration were not challenged till
May 13, 1985 while the award came to be made on April 13,
1984. The respondents in fact received the amount under
protest but that fact was not brought to the notice of the
High Court. It is also not in dispute that at that point of
time an application for reference under Section 18 was made
within the limitation provided therein. It would appear that
after the writ petition was allowed the appliation was
withdrawn. After the award was made, the Court would not be
justified to quash the notifcation under Section 4 [1] and
declaration under Section 6 for dispending with the enquiry
under Setion 5-A.
In these circumstances, we think that the appropriate
course would be to sustain the notification under Section 4
[1] and the declaration under Section 6 and the award made
under Section 11. It would be open to the respondents to
make an application under Section 18 within 30 days from to-
day to the Collector for reference to Civil Court for
determining the compensation.
The appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment of
the High Court under appeal is set aside. However, in the
circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.