JUDGMENT
S.S.Sudhalkar,J.
1. C.W.P. No. 11264 of 1999 is filed by the employer challenging the award of the Labour Court dated 12.5.1998 (copy annexure P/6) vide which respondent No. I was ordered to be reinstated with continuity of service and back wages from the date of demand notice. C.W.P. 14469 of 1999 is filed by the workman for ordering implementation of the award and for lodging criminal prosecution of respondent No. 1 to 5 for not implementing the award.
2. 1 have heard learned counsel for the parties.
3. I shall refer to the State of Haryana as “employer” and Shri Kartar Singh respondent as “workman” for the sake of convenience. Counsel for the employer argued that the demand notice was raised at a belated stage and, therefore, the Labour Court has erred in granting the relief. Counsel for the workman has argued that no limitation has been prescribed for raising a dispute in the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). There are various judgments of the Supreme Court on this point. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. and another, JT 1999(3) S.C. 38 : 1999(2) SCT 667 (SC), the Supreme Court was dealing with a case in which there was a delay of 7 years. The Supreme Court held in that case that the provisions of Article 37 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay.
4. In the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and others, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 839 : 2000(1) SCT 1088 (SC) it has been held by the Supreme Court that when a bank employee was dismissed after enquiry and unsuccessfully availed of remedy of appeal and seven years thereafter he came complaining of discrimination on the ground that two other dismissed employees were reinstated by the bank, it was alleged that a complaint made after seven years cannot give rise to an industrial dispute and that it cannot be said that the industrial dispute could be apprehended.
5. Relying on the principles laid down in both the aforementioned cases, a Division Bench of this Court (in which I was a member) has laid down certain guidelines in C.W.P. 9580 of 1999 (Surjit Singh v. Presiding Officer and others). The guidelines are as under :
“1. No limitation is prescribed under the Act.
2. If plea of delay is not taken the delay may not be
considered.
3. If plea of delay is taken, it should be considered.
4. If a dispute has become stale, it should not be revived after a lapse of long period if the plea regarding delay has been taken.”
6. Considering the above principles, I will have to see whether the plea of delay was taken in this case and if so, what is its effect. A copy of the written statement before the Labour Court is at annexure P/5. In the written statement filed by the employer, the plea rex garding delay taken is as under:
“That the present reference is time barred, as per ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 2219.”
It is, therefore, clear that the plea taken is that the reference is time barred and not that it is barred because of delay and laches. It is also clear that no time limit has been prescribed either under the Act or under the Limitation Act for raising a dispute. Therefore, the reference cannot be said to be time barred as pleaded in the written statement. In this case the plea regarding delay being only as quoted above, and there being no time limit prescribed for raising a dispute, the plea regarding reference being time barred is brushed aside. As no plea regarding delay or laches is taken in the written statement, the question for consideration of the plea regarding the same does not arise.
7. It may be mentioned that in the case of the Nedungadi Bank Limited (supra) the employee was dismissed. He availed of statutory remedy of appeal and after seven years he came complaining of discrimination that similarly situated persons were reinstated. The Supreme Court found that the matter had become stale. This is not the position in this case. There is another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gurmail Singh V. Principal, Govt. College of Education and others, JT 1999(10) S.C. 367. In that case it has relied on the judgment in the case of Ajaib Singh (supra).
8. Considering all the above authorities and the facts
of the present case as discussed above, I find that the workman cannot be denied the relief of reinstatement and continuity of service. Back wages are allowed only from the date of demand notice. However, because of the above mentioned delay and following the principles laid down in the case of Ajaib Singh (supra) where it has been held that court can mould the relief of back wages, I find it proper to restrict the backwages to 75 per cent.
9. In view of the above, writ petition 11264 of 1999 deserves to be allowed to the extent of modification of award qua back wages. So far as C.W.P. 14469 of 1999 is concerned, the employer can be directed to implement the award within a reasonable time. Because the employer has also challenged the award before this Court, I do not find proper to deal with the prayer regarding prosecution of the employer.
10. As a result C.W.P. No. 11264 of 1999 is partly allowed. The award qua reinstatement and continuity of service is upheld. However, the award of back-wages is modified and it shall be restricted to 75 per cent from the date of demand notice.
11. C.W.P. No. 14469 of 1999 is partly allowed and the employer is directed to implement the award within a period of two months from today.
12. A copy of this judgment be given dasti to the learned counsel for the parties on payment.
13. Petition partly allowed.