JUDGMENT
Bopanna, J.
1. The question referred to us in this appeal is whether the suit seeking a declaration that the respondent’s correct date of birth is 19-8-1961 and for a mandatory injunction directing the authorities concerned to correct the date of his birth in the concerned registers is maintainable in the civil court.
2. The respondent/Plaintiff before the trial Court sought for a declaration that his correct date of birth was 19-8-1961 and for the consequential relief of mandatory injunction directing Defendants 1 and 2, viz., the State of Karnataka and the Secretary, K.S.E.E. Board (in short the State Government and the Board respectively) to enter his correct date of birth in the school records and to rectify the earlier records and for other incidental reliefs.
3. It is not in dispute that before filing the suit the plaintiff had issued a notice as required under S. 80 of the Civil P. C. (in short the Code) and in reply to this notice the 2nd defendant, viz., the Board, declined to comply with the request of the plaintiff on the ground that the entries in the Board’s records were done on the basis of the particulars furnished by the plaintiff while appearing for the S.S.L.C. Examination and duly accepted by his guardian and attested by the Head Mistress of the concerned school through which his application was routed and as such no change could be made at this stage in the date of birth of the plaintiff. The trial Court on a consideration of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff came to the conclusion that he was entitled to the declaration sought for and the consequential reliefs.
4. When this appeal by the defendants came up for consideration, it was brought to the notice of the learned Judge who made this reference (Kulkarni, J.) that the decision rendered by another learned Judge (Nesargi, J.) in State of Karnataka v. Vishwanatha Rao, ILR 1985 Kar 2460 was an authority for the proposition that such a suit for declaration of the correct date of birth was not maintainable and, therefore, the suit ought to have been dismissed solely on the ground that it was not in maintainable. But, Kulkarni,J. was of the view that the judgment in Vishwanatha Rao did not consider the earlier decision of this Court in K. P. Kulkarni v. Dy. Commr. Bangalore District (1969) 2 Mys LJ 503. In that case, it was held by this Court that suits for declaration of the correct date of birth were maintainable and a decree could be passed rectifying the date of birth. It was further noticed that in Hanmantgouda Alias Hanmantappa v. Dy. Commr., Dharwar (R.S.A. No. 650 of 1971 disposed of on 14-11-1973) this Court had held that the suit for rectification of the date of birth was maintainable. Again in K, V. Satyanarayana Rao v. Conservator of Forests. (Writ Petn. No. 1130 of 1968, disposed of on 4-1-1971) it was observed that subject to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court the State Government had undoubted power to determine the date of superannuation and the date of birth of every Government servant.
5. In view of these decisions which run counter to the decision of this Court in Vishwanatha Rao (ILR 1985 Kant 2460), the learned Judge has made this reference to the Division Bench.
6. It is unnecessary for us to examine the correctness of the findings of fact recorded by the learned City Civil judge, since the order of reference is limited to the question of law touching the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain suits of this nature.
7. The relevant provisions to be considered in this context are (1) S. 9 of the Code and S. 34 of the Specific Relief Act (in short the Act). To what extent the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is expressly or impliedly barred to entertain suits of this nature notwithstanding the provisions of S. 9 of the Code or the provisions of S. 34 of the Act will have to be considered in this regard.
8. Before we go into this question, the decision rendered by the learned Judge in Vishwanatha Rao (ILR 1985 Kant 2460) will have to be noticed, since that decision runs counter to the earlier decisions of this Court referred to above. That was a case for declaring the correct date of birth as 9-11-1956 and not 10-12-1954 as noted in the school records. The suit was decreed by the leanred Munsiff and he further directed that the date of birth of the plaintiff should be rectified to show 9-11-1956. In appeal, his judgment was affirmed by the lower Appellate Court. In Second Appeal before this Court, the question that arose for consideration was whether such a suit for a declaratory decree was maintainable in law. The learned Judge, after referring to S. 34 of the Act, held
“So far as the latter proposition narrated above is concerned, I have no hesitation in holding that when a person is born he acquires a legal entity and not a legal status. There is and legal status. In regard to the earlier part of the argument referred to above, I have no hesitation in agreeing with the fact that the consequences that flow out of the date of birth have a wide impact on various aspects of life of a person. But, even then, it is to be seen whether, in law, date of birth of a person will clothe him with legal status. In support of this proposition reliance was placed on the decision in K.M. Sastry v. Director, Post Graduate Centre, Ananthpur .
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Their Lordships of the Andhra Pradesh High Court did not go into the question whether a declaratory decree of the nature sought could be passed by a Court because of S. 9) of the Civil P. C. The Patna High Court has gone directly into this question in the decision in Tata Iron -and Steel Company Ltd. v. Padala Appanna (1984) 48 Fac LR 202. It has been held as follows:
‘Birth on a particular date does not clothe a person with any status or character. Date of birth is only an event in a person’s life. It is quite possible to contemplate that serious consequences might follow from such date of birth but in substance it would always amount to asking for the declaration of an event.’
I respectfully agree with the above and am clearly of opinion that what is asked for by the plaintiff is declaration of an event. It is not any relief in the eye of law.”
On the applicability of S. 9 of the Code the learned Judge ruled :
“When it is seen that date of birth does not clothe a person with any legal status, then it is easy to see that he would not be entitled to any such declaratory relief by way of a suit, for declaration in the guise that his suit is of a civil nature as it is not of a criminal nature.
“What is important to note is that the declaration sought for-was not to the effect that an event had happened. The declaration had everything to do with a relief that could be granted or refused by a Civil Court in a suit of civil nature. The other side was denying and was interested to deny the claim of the deity represented by Ramaraghava Reddy. In the suits of the nature on hand “it is impossible to imagine that either the Deputy Commissioner or the State or the Board under the Act or the Department of Education represented by the Director of Public Instruction would be interested in denying the date of birth of a person that too when such a person was not under the employment in any of the Departments of the State Government. This is one of the necessary ingredients of S.34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Hence, I have no hesitation in concluding that even to claim a declaratory decree that civil Court is competent to pass in a suit of civil nature, under the ordinary law covered by S. 9 C.P.C. or 0. VII R. 7 C.P.C., the plaintiff has got to have legal statues and what he claims should amount to a relief because of denial by a person interested to deny it being involved.”
According to the learned Judge, the remedy for the plaintiff in such a case was to approach the authorities constituted under the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969, and the Karnataka Registration of Births and Deaths Rules and in this view of the matter, the learned Judge observed:
“He cannot, in law, be permitted to bypass the aforementioned provisions and approach the Court directly that too with a suit for declaration of this nature.”
This Judgment in Vishwanath Rao has presented before us important questions for our consideration, they are:
1. What is the meaning of the words ‘legal character’ as they appear in S. 34 of the Act?
2. What is the meaning of the words suits of a civil nature as they appear in S. 9 of the Code?
9. It is common knowledge that the age of a person determines his entry into innumerable institutions – educational, social, cultural and political – in the present day world. His very right to live, if he is not self-employment, is controlled by the age at which he enters service and the age of superannuation. Any mistake in the declaration of his age would have serious civil consequences. Under S. 82 of Penal Code, a child under seven years of age does not commit any offence. under S. 83 of I.P.C. nothing is an ‘ offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion. Likewise under the Contract Act, a contract entered into with a minor who has not attained the age, of majority is avoidable contract in the eye of law and he can repudiate the same at any time within 3 years of attaining minority. Instances of this kind could be multiplied under the various laws in the statute book. Certain legal propositions that have come up for consideration with reference to the date of birth could be found in the book “A Second Miscellany-at-Law” by the Rt. Hon. Rober Megarry. At pages 302 to 304 of 4he Book, the learned Judge has advert6d to certain interesting case relating to date of birth
They are:
“Infancy has always been troublesome before 1970 it was ancient law that an infant was deemed to attain full age at the first moment of the day preceding the twenty-first anniversary of his birth. This was so no matter the hour at which his birth occurred; for this purpose English law ignored fractions of a day. If the birth occurred just before midnight on Jan1, 1940, the child was accordingly demo to be of full age at the first moment of Dec. 31, 1960, (see, eg., Nichols v. Ramsel(1677) 2 Mod Rep 280 at 281; and see generally Prowse v. McIntyre (1961) 3 CLR 264), even though this was nearly forty-eight hours before he had lived for twenty-one complete years. Consequently as soon as December 31, 1960, began the former infant could make a valid will. (Herbert v. Turball (1663) 1 Keb, 589; Howard’s case (1699) 2 Salk. 625; Fitzhugh v. Dennington (1704) 2 Ld.Raym. 1094at 1096) At the same moment he would become entitled to a gift made to him conditionally upon attaining the age of twenty-one years, (Toder v. Sansam (1775) 1 Bro. P.C. 468; Re Shurey (1918) 1 Ch. 263 (age of 25 years), although if the gift had been to him ‘upon the day he attains his twenty first year’, he could have claimed it a year earlier (Grant v. Grant (1840) 4 Y & C Ex. 256-(Twenty-fifth year).
This rule however was neither universal nor pellucid. Thus for certain limited purposes Parliament (By the National “Insurance Act, 1946, S. 78(4)(c)) gave effect to the understandable preference of the populace in English and the judiciary in Scotland for birthdays instead of birthday eves. And what of leap years? If X was born on Feb. 29, 19-36 (whether early in the morning or late at night), he was of full age at the first moment of Feb. 28,1957. But consider Y, born a day later, on Mar. 1, 1936: did he attain full age at the same moment? – If X was born early on Feb. 29, and Y late on March 1, X might have been born nearly fortyeight hours earlier than, Y, and yet on this footing he might in law Lave attained full age eo instanti with him. If t 6re was a gift to the first of a class of beneficiaries to attain full age, and X and Y were both members of the class, Y’s chances might be as good as Xs, despite Xs start.
What, too, of international differences in time? Thus Hong Kong time is eight hours in advance of English time when it was 12-01 a.m. on Feb. 28, 1957, in Hong Kong, it was stil.14.01 p.m. on Feb. 27,1957, in England. If Y was born in England on Mar. 1, 1936, would he have attained full age “earlier (and so beaten the less enterprising X in the testamentary stakes) if he had gone to Hong Kong? And if he had died at I a.m. on Feb. 28, 1957, in Hong Kong, had he attained full age even though he died seven hours before February28 began in England? (see (1957) 73 .1,.Q.R. 462 at 463, based on R v. Logan (1957) 2 QB 589).
On Jan. 1, 1970, however, great changes were made. Leap years and international differences still remained capable of posing their problems; but birthdays have now come into their own in law as well as in popular belief. In addition to altering the age of majority from twenty-one years to eighteen, (Family Law Reforms Act, 1969, S. I (I), statute has now provided that after 1969 the time at which a person attains a particular age expressed in years should be the commencement of the relevant anniversary of the date of his birth (Ibid, S. 9(l). A child born on Dec. 31, 1960, will accordingly be eighteen years old at the first moment of Dec. 31, 1978, instead of a day earlier. One consequence of this change is “that Jan. 1, 1970, became a unique day, for it was the only day under English law upon which nobody attained any given age. Thus a child born on Jan.1, 1969, attained one year of age on Dec. 31, 1969, for the old law was still in force then, whereas a child born on Jan. 2,1969, attained one year of age on Jan. 2,1970, since the new law applied (Ibid., Ss. 9(2), 2813); S 1. 1969 No. 1140). The one day upon which neither he nor anybody else could attain the age of one year, or any other age was Jan. 1, 1970.”
10. The main thrust of the argument before the learned Judge in Vishwanatha Rao OLR 1985 Kant 2460) was that the plaintiff must establish that he had a riot to maintain the suit either under S. 9 of the Code or under S. 34 of the Act and for that purpose he must establish that he acquired a legal status on the date of his birth and consequently entitled to a declaration as to his correct age. The provisions of S. 34 of the Act and the provisions of S. 9 of the Code are not in pari materia. Under S. 34 of the Act any person as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief. The remedy under S. 34 of the Act is a discretionary remedy subject to the proviso mentioned therein, i.e., no court shall make such a declaration where the plaintiff being able to seek a further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. But, under S – 9 of the Code, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is extended to all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. In our view the words ‘legal character’ tinder S. 34 of the Act do not have the same meaning as the words ‘civil nature’ under S. 9 of defined under the Code and, therefore, we have to fall back on the meaning of these words, as understood in civil law, that means to say, in the law of jurisprudence that deals with the branch of civil law. The words ‘legal character’ are found in our Constitution with reference to the duties of the Attorney General and Advocate General – See Art.76(2) and 165(2) of our Constitution. But, it would be correct to proceed on the basis that the words ‘legal character ‘mean’ legal status’. The learned Judge in Vishwanatha, Rao has also proceeded on the basis that ‘legal character’ means ‘legal status’. If that be so, what is the meaning of ‘legal status” as is generally understood in civil law? In ‘Salmond on Jurisprudence’, dealing with the word status’ it is observed thus:
“Although the term estate includes only rights (in the generic sense), the term status includes not only rights, but also duties corights, subjections and disabilities. A minor’s contractual disabilities are part of his status, though a man’s debts are not part of his estate,
The term status is used in a variety of senses. It is used to refer to a man’s legal condition of any kind, whether personal or proprietary. A man’s status in this sense includes his whole position in the law – the sum total of his legal rights, duties, liabilities or other legal relations, whether proprietary or personal, or any particular group of them separately considered. Thus we may-speak of the status of a landowner, of a trustee, of an executor, of a solicitor and so on. “More commonly it is used to denote his personal legal condition in so far as concern personal rights and burdens, to the exclusion of his proprietary relations. A person’s status, in this sense, is made up of similar groups of personal rights and their correlative burdens, and each of these constituent groups is itself also called a status. Thus the same person may have at the same time the status of a free man, of a citizen, of a husband, of a father and so on. So we speak of the status of an alien, a lunatice, or an infant; but not of a landowner or trustee.
The term may be used to refer to personal capacities and incapacities as opposed to other elements of personal status (c). The law of status in this sense would include the rules as to the contractual capacities and incapacities of married women, but not the personal rights and duties existing between her and her husband.
Status is used by some writers to signify a man’s personal legal condition, so far only as it is imposed upon him by the law without his own consent, as “opposed to the condition which he has acquir6d for him agreement. The position of a slave is a matter of status the position of a free servant is a matter of contract. Marriage creates a status in this sense, for although it is entered into by way of consent, it cannot be dissolved in that way, and the legal condition created by it is determined by the law, and cannot be modified by the agreement of the parties. A business partnership, on the other hand, pertains to the, law of contract and not to that of status.”
In Chapter XVI of ‘A Text-Book of Jurisprudence ‘ by George White cross Paton, the learned author dealing with the term ‘status’ has said:
“The test is that status is a condition which affects generally, although in varying degree, a person’s claims, liberties, powers and immunities in the case of a trustee there are particular powers relating to the trust property and particular duties owed to the beneficiary of the trust. But the fact that a man is a trustee does not affect his general powers. The particular “rights and duties of a trustee spring from one particular title (the trust) and extend no farther. But an infant suffers from a lack of contractual power which affects not only one contract or relationship but all his contracts save those which relate to necessaries.”
11. So the juristic concept of ‘status” in relation to a person’s age has to be understood in the context of his right as a natural person the moment he is born. No doubt, birth is an event in. a man’s life. Likewise marriage is also an event in his life. Birth occurs only once in one’s life. But, marriage being left to the volition of the parties may occur more than once depending on the circumstances. But once a marriage is performed, one acquires a marital status. Likewise, a person as soon as he is born acquires a status and that status in jurisprudence is the status of a natural person. To quote G.W.Paton again,,
“In ancient systems not all human beings were granted legal personality. The case of the slave is too well known to need stressing. A monk who enters a monastery is regarded in some systems, as being ‘civilly dead’ and his property is distributed “just as if death had in fact taken place. In modern times it is normal to grant legal personality to all living within the territory of the State.
Most systems lay down the rule that, in cases where legal personality is granted to human beings, personality begins at birth and ends with death.”
He does not acquire merely a recognition in the society that he was born to a particular father or mother. Therefore, the observation in Vishwanatha Rao (ILR 1985 Kant 2460) that birth is only an event in a person’s life and birth on a particular date does not confer any status has to be examined in greater detail.
12. The authority on which this ruling was postulated by the learned Judge is found in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Padala Appanna (1984) 48 Fac LR 202 Patna High Court, Ranchi Bench.’ The other decision canvassed in Vishwanatha Rao was K. M. Sastry v. Director, Post Graduate Centre, Ananthapur . This did not commend itself to the learned Judge since he was of the view that the Andhra Pradesh High Court did not go into the question whether a declaratory decree of this nature comes within the scope of S. 9 of the Code. We are in respectful agreement with this view of the learned Judge.
13. That takes us to the decision of the Patna High Court which found favour with the learned Judge. That was a case which arose under the provisions of the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946. The workman who was the respondent before the Patna High Court was an employee of Tata Iron awl Steel Co. Ltd. (1984-48 Fac LR 202). His conditions of service were governed by the Standing Orders certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act. He instituted a suit for a declaration that his record of age I as maintained by the appellant/Company’ was erroneous and his date of birth should be recorded as 15-7-1922. There was also a prayer for an order of injunction in a mandatory form against the company from superannuating him before the age of superannuation on the basis of his date of birth as 15-7-1922. The trial Court granted the declaration prayed for and the same was affirmed in appeal. In second appeal before the High Court the plea as to the maintainability of the suit under S.34 of the Act was canvassed by the employer. The Patna High Court came to the conclusion that the words ‘legal character’ as used in S. 34 of the Act are equivalent to the words ‘legal status’. Dealing with the merits of the case it observed in para 10 thus:
“From what has been quoted above, it is obvious that the main prayer of the plaintiff in the suit is for a declaration that he was born on 15-7-1922 and the records maintained by the defendant be accordingly corrected. Therefore the question that falls for, consideration is whether such a declaration is permissible in law? Section 34 of the Act. 1963 is in the same terms as S. 42 of the old Act. Under S. 34 of the Act a person can ask for a declaration to any ‘legal character’ or to any right as to property and the Court may, in its discretion make a declaration that he is so entitled. Therefore what has to be determined is whether the date of birth of a person is a ‘legal character attaching to that person’. The trial Court did not discuss this aspect (if the matter however, the appellate Court. in considering this matter has held that the expression of ‘legal character and right to property’ as used under S.34 are equivalent to legal status. The conclusion of the lower appellate Court that legal character is equivalent to legal status has rightly not been challenged by Mr. Chatterjee ……..
‘The Patna High Court further observed as follows:
“In considering whether a declaration of a date of birth can be given or not distinction has got to be made between private employment and public employment. In public employment rights are protected under the general law, for example, under Art. 311 of the Constitution “while in private employment, relationship, is contractual except in cases where the act is in violation of mandatory obligation imposed by statute. In private employment an employee cannot have as many declarations as are stipulated in the agreement or contract. Mr. Sinha, on the other hand contended that on the basis of the declaration of his correct date of birth the plaintiff would superannuate only at a later date and. therefore, he was entitled to a declaration that he would superannuate only when he attains the age of 60 years by computing his age on the basis that he was born on 15-7-1922 ……
13A. In our view either on authority or in principle there is no warrant for the proposition that the date of birth is only an event in a person’s life. Birth and Birthdays may be events in a man’s life. Every birthday reminds a person of his age and may be an occasion for joyous celebration. But, when a person goes to a Court for a declaration that he was born on a particular date and for other consequential reliefs, he does not seek .a declaration of an event. The event has already occurred over which he had no control. But the date on which he was born is not an event. It is a question of fact and the Court has to view the possible civil consequences which will entail in establishing that factor by its refusal to establish that fact. As noticed earlier, age of a person, both under Civil Law and under Criminal Law, becomes material for the determination of his rights and liabilities and that age, if there is any dispute, calls for adjudication. Who is the adjudicator? Is there any authority other than Courts constitute4 tinder the ‘Code 9 Further that part of the judgment of the Patna High Court distinguishing public employment from private employment for the purpose of determining the person’s status with reference to his age, in our view, does not for a moment bear the scrutiny of law. No doubt, a person may enjoy the protection under Art. 311 of the Constitution if he is in Government Service and the person who is not in Government service will have no protection under that Article. But, how the employment in a particular sector, private or public, would make any distinction in understanding the concept of legal status, we are at loss to understand. It is unfortunate that though the case before the Patna High Court did arise under the Industrial Employment. Standing Orders Act, the right of the workman to continue, in employment till the age f superannuation was negatived on account of the fact that the workman chose the wrong forum instead of raising an industrial dispute. In the circumstances, we are constrained to take the view that the Patna High Court decision is hardly of any assistance for the determination of the question whether under S. 34 of the Act or under S. 9 of the Code, a suit of this nature was maintainable.
14. In our view, whether the relief that is sought for by the plaintiff could be adjudicated by the plaintiff before the Civil Court either under S. 34 of the Act or under S. 9 of the Code does not appear to be very material, since, in our view, both the words ‘legal character under S. 34 of the Act and the words ‘suits of civil nature’ under S. 9 of the Code are comprehensive enough to include the relief of this nature since a declaration that he was born on a particular date clothes him with various legal rights, immunities, privileges and powers and the refusal of such a declaration may visit him with certain duties liabilities and disabilities. That is sufficient for us to come to the conclusion that declaration of date of birth is not merely a declarative on of an event but a declaration of a legal status. A contrary view would be opposed to jurisprudential concept of status.
By way of illustration, we shall take the cases that may arise under the Indian Majority Act. Section 3 of that Act reads as under:
“3. Age of majority of persons domiciled in India.
Subject as aforesaid, every minor of whose person or property, or both, a guardian, other than a guardian for a suit within the meaning of Chapter XXXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, has been or shall be appointed or declared by any Court of justice before the minor has attained the age of eighteen years, and every minor of whose property the superintendence has been or shall be assumed by any Court of Wards before the minor has attained that age shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Succession Act or in any other enactment, be deemed to have attained his majority when he shall have completed his age of twenty-one years and not before.”
How the age has to be computed is provided for under S. 4 of that Act.
There cannot be any doubt that any disputes arising under this Act are disputes of a civil nature and thus the civil Courts will have jurisdiction to entertain such disputes. In such disputes the incidental question will always be the person’s age in relation to his status – whether a major or minor under that Act. That depends on the date of his birth. If the Civil Court could decide that question incidentally, there is no principle in law to exclude its jurisdiction for making. a declaration as to a person’s age with a view to seek other consequential reliefs.
Likewise under the Specific Relief Act, a suit for a declaration that X is the legitimate son of Y could be maintained in civil court (See S. 34 of the Act). In such a suit, date of birth of that person would be an incidental issue and could be gone into by the civil Court. If legitimacy or illegitimacy could be a matter of status, how could we treat date of birth merely as an event and as not relating to legal status? A special rule of evidence is enacted to decide this status under S. 112 of the Evidence Act. (See Coral Indira Gonsalves v. Joseph Prabh4ar Iswariah – and KM. Nafees Ara v Asif Saadat Ali Khan). If a suit for declaration that the defendant is not the legitimate son could be maintained there, is no principle or authority to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil courts to grant a declaration regarding the age of a person which is dependent on his date of birth if that declaration is followed by consequential relief as in this case.
Incidentally, the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Supreme General ‘Films Exchange Ltd. v. His Highness Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji Deo or Maihar, requires to be considered since that decision was cited before the learned judge but he was of the view that it was of no assistance for the purpose of this case. That decision lays down the scope of S. 42 of the old Specific Relief Act which is pari materia with S. 34 of the Act. The Supreme Court observed:
“Section 42 merely gives statutory recognition to a well-recognised type of declaratory relief and subject it to a limitation, but it cannot be deemed to exhaust every kind of declaratory relief or to circumscribe the jurisdiction of Courts to give declarations of right in appropriate cases falling outside S. 42. The circumstances in which a declaratory decree under S. 42 should be awarded is a matter of discretion depending upon the facts of each case. No doubt a complete stranger whose interest is not affected by another’s legal character or who has no interest in another’s property could not get a declaration- under S. 42 with reference to the legal character or the property involved.”
In view of this enunciation of the law by the Supreme Court, even assuming for a moment that the relief claimed by the plaintiff was beyond the scope of S. 34 of the Act, S – 34 is not exhaustive – of all kinds of declaratory reliefs. In a proper case, therefore, independently of S. 34 of the Act, the plaintiff could have got the relief i.e., the declaration sought for under S. 9 of the Code. In AIR 1967 SC 4360 Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddy v. Konduru, Seshu Reddy the sarne view is reiterated by the Supreme Court. Of course, the facts in that case are not relevant for the purpose of the case before us.
15. The reasoning of the learned Judge on the second point, viz., ‘that the remedy of the plaintiff in a case of this nature’ is to approach the Director of Births and Deaths under R. 12 of the Rules framed by the State Government and get his age corrected is also not sound in law.
16. The decision which will have to be considered for the purpose of coming to a proper conclusion on this question is the decision of the Supreme Court in the Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantarain Wadke, . That is the leading case of the Supreme Court on the applicability of S. 9 of the Code in relation to the rights of a workman as provided for under the Industrial Disputes Act. It is well settled that the workman who is governed by the’ Industrial Disputes Act can raise an industrial dispute and have such dispute adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court as the case may be. Whet her such a person can approach the Civil Court and obtain the same relief from the Civil Court was the point for consideration before the Supreme Court in Premier Automobilies.The Supreme Court, laid down the following Rules while considering the scope of Section 9 of the Code vis-à-vis the special provisions applicable to the workmen who are governed by the Industrial Disputes Act.
“To sum up the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civii Court in relation to an, industrial dispute may be stated thus:
(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court.
(2) If the dispute is all industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common lam, and not under the Act. the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy.
(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act. then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act.
(4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a night created under the Act such as Chap. VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either S. 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be.”
17. Whether the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 is a complete code by itself providing the-remedy that the plaintiff had sought for in the civil Court should have been a matter for consideration-before coming to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted by virtue of the provisions of this Act and the rules framed by the State Government under this Act. In the absence of any consideration that that Act and the Rules framed by the State Government constitute a complete code for the determination of age of a person aggrieved by a wrong entry either in the registers maintained by the Director of Births and Deaths or in any other official entry, it is not possible to come to the conclusion that that authority under that Act and the Rules framed thereunder would oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts under S, 9 of the Code. On a proper examination of this Act, it is not even possible to come to the conclusion that the remedy of the plaintiff is optional and that he has the choice of either approaching the civil court or to- approach the other statutory authorities. That Act is a regulatory Act providing for the registration of births and deaths and no rights are created under that Act by the mere fact of registration of birth or death of a person. That is the reason. the Supreme Court had formulated :
“If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate io enforcement of any other right tinder the Act, the remedy lies only in the Civil Court.”
As a result, this discussion will answer the second point held against the plaintiff in VishwanathaRao (ILR 1985 Kant’2460), viz-, the plaintiff should have approached the Director General of Births and Deaths for the necessary declaration that he had sought f or.
18. For these reasons, we are of the view with respect to the learned Judge in Vishwanatha Rao’s case (ILR 1985 Kant2460) that declaration of a persons’s age is declaration of his status and that the’ jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted either expressly or impliedly by the provisions of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act and the Rules framed thereunder. We may also add that the decisions on which Kulkarni, J. relied, while making the order of reference do not directly deal with the point in issue and that is the reason we have not in detail adverted to those decisions in this judgment. It should also be noted that the State Government has prescribed a separate procedure for the determination of the age of Government servants by enacting what is known as the Karnataka State Servants (Determination of Age) Act, 1974. By that enactment the age of a Government servant who is a member of a Civil Service of the State of Karnataka and holds civil post under the State of Karnataka has to get his age determined in case of arty dispute by making an application within 3 years from the date of his knowledge of his age recorded in the Service Register or any other records of service or within one year from the commencement of that Act whichever is later. That application will have to be considered by the Officer appointed by the State Government as provided for under S. 5(3) of that Act. The Jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly taken away under Section 4 of that Act for a limited purpose. Section 4 of that Act-reads as under:
“4. Bar of alteration of age except under ‘ the Act. – Notwithstanding anything’ contained in any law or any judgment, decree or order of any Court or other authority, no alteration of-the age or date of birth of a State servant as accepted and recorded or deemed to have been accepted and recorded in his service register or book or any other record of service under S. 3 shall, in so far as it relates to his conditions of service as such State Servant, be made except under S. 5.”
This is an indication of the fact that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to make a declaration regarding the date of birth or alteration of age of the Government servant in matters not relating to his conditions of service. That being so, either on principle or on authority; the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be questioned in the case of non-governmental employees or persons. Even in the case of Government servants, a suit for declaration of age or date of birth could be maintained if the relief claimed does not relate to his conditions of service.
For these reasons, the question referred to us for our consideration is answered in the affirmative. The matter now will have to be considered by the appropriate Bench on merits.
19. Reference answered in affirmative.