PETITIONER: STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. RESPONDENT: VEDANAYAGAM DATE OF JUDGMENT23/11/1994 BENCH: REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J) BENCH: REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J) PUNCHHI, M.M. CITATION: 1995 SCC (1) 326 JT 1994 (7) 559 1994 SCALE (4)1038 ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K.JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J.- The question that arises for
consideration in this appeal filed by the State of Karnataka
is whether the offence committed by the respondent, the sole
accused in the case, amounts to murder punishable under
Section 302 IPC or culpable homicide punishable under
Section 304 Part 11 IPC and whether the High Court is right
in holding that whenever there is only single injury the
offence would be only culpable homicide though the medical
evidence is to the effect that the same is necessarily fatal
and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death?
2.The deceased Sugumaran, PW 1 Pooswamy and other material
witnesses were all workers in Kolar Gold Field and were
residing in a place called Gorgaum. The house of the
accused was about 26 feet from PW 1’s house. The deceased,
who was son of PW 1’s sister, was living with his mother PW
3, Muniyamma in another house. The accused developed
illicit intimacy with Chudamani, wife of PW 1. On 9-7-1984
at about 11 p.m., PW 1 saw the accused making signs to his
wife Chudamani and seeing PW 1, he ran away. On 13-7-1984
at about 3 p.m., PW 3 and the mother of the accused were
quarrelling near the house of PW 1. PW 1 rushed to the house
of PW 3 and fetched her son, the deceased. The accused in
the meanwhile, on hearing the quarrel, entered the scene
with a knife MO 1 in his hand and on seeing the deceased the
accused gave a knife blow on the left side of his chest as a
result of which the deceased fell down and died
instantaneously. PW 1 chased the accused but could not
catch him. Thereafter he went to the police station and
gave a report, Ex. P-1. PW 10 SI took up the
investigation, held the inquest and sent the dead body for
postmortem. The doctor, who conducted the postmortem, found
one stab injury on the left side of the chest and opined
that the death was a result of the said injury to the vital
organs. After completion of the investigation, the charge-
sheet was laid. The accused pleaded not guilty. The trial
court accepted the prosecution case and held that a clear
case under Section 302 IPC is made out and accordingly
convicted the accused and sentenced him to undergo
imprisonment for life. On appeal the High Court confirmed
the finding of the trial court namely
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that it was the accused who caused the fatal injury but
relying on the judgment of this Court in Tholan v. State of
TN. 1, however, held that having regard to the genesis of
the matter i.e. that there was no premeditation and since
the accused inflicted only one blow with the dagger MO 1
which unfortunately landed on the chest, it cannot be said
that “the accused intended to cause the death of the
deceased”. The High Court also observed that on seeing the
deceased the accused who had already a knife in his hand ”
gave only one blow to Sugumaran and unfortunately it landed
on the chest of the deceased” and that “there are no
circumstances placed before us to indicate that the accused
wanted to finish off Sugumaran or intended to finish off
Sugumaran. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is
rather very difficult to infer that the accused inflicted
the blow on the chest of the deceased with an intention to
bring about his death”. The High Court further held that
“[t]herefore, according to the principle laid down in Tholan
case1, we think that the offence, however, unfortunate it
may be, would come down to Section 304 Part II IPC”.
3.It is the above finding of the High Court that is
challenged in this appeal by the State. Both the courts
below have held that on seeing the deceased, Sugumaran, the
accused who was armed with a dagger MO 1, plunged it into
the left side of the chest of the deceased as a result of
which he died instantaneously. The doctor, who conducted
the postmortem, noted the following injury:
“(a) a punctured wound 2″ by 1/2″ over the
chest on the left side over the 2nd costal
cartilage 1” from the mid-sternum situated
obliquely. It has clean cut edges and sharp
angles at both the extremes. Edges are over
cut. The edges of the wound clean not
bruised. On probing the wound with a blunt
probe it had freely entered the thoracic
cavity.
On dissection it is noticed that the wound had
passed through the substance (T) of the
sternum, 2nd costal cartilage anterior border
of the lower lobe of the left lung and entered
the chamber of the right ventricle 2″ above
the … (not clear) of the heart.”
Both the courts below have clearly noted that the injury was
a very serious one which brought about instant death. From
the above description, it can be seen that the blow was
aimed at the chest and the injury was inflicted with great
force with a deadly weapon on the vital part. It entered
the thoracic cavity, passed through the substance of the
sternum, injured the lower lobe of the left lung and entered
the chamber of the right ventricle. It is not a case where
there was a quarrel between the accused and the deceased or
where they grappled with each other so that it cannot be
definitely said that the accused aimed the blow at a
particular part of the body and therefore intended to cause
that particular injury which was objectively found to be
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
No doubt there may be scope to contend that there was no
premeditation and therefore clause Istly of Section 300 IPC
namely that the accused intended to cause death, is
1 (1984) 2 SCC 133: 1984 SCC (Cri) 164: AIR 1984 SC 759
329
not attracted. But the important question is whether clause
3rdly of Section 300 IPC is attracted.
4. The scope of clause 3rdly of Section 300 IPC has been
the subject matter of various decisions of this Court. The
decision in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab2, has throughout
been followed in a number of cases by all the High Courts as
well as the Supreme Court. In all these cases the approach
has been to find out whether the ingredient namely the
intention to cause the particular injury was present or not?
If such an intention to cause that particular injury is made
out and if the injury is found to be sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death, then clause 3rdly
of Section 300 IPC is attracted. Analysing clause 3rdly and
as to what the prosecution must prove, it was held in Virsa
Singh case2 as under:
“First, it must establish, quite objectively,
that a bodily injury is present;
Secondly, the nature of the injury must be
proved; These are purely objective
investigations.
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an
intention to inflict that particular bodily
injury, that is to say, that it was not
accidental or unintentional, or that some
other kind of injury was intended..
Once these three elements are proved to be
present, the enquiry proceeds further and,
Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of
the type just described made up of the three
elements set out above is sufficient to cause
death in the ordinary course of nature. This
part of the enquiry is purely objective and
inferential and has nothing to do with the
intention of the offender”
It was further observed as under:
“If they inflict injuries of that kind, they
must face the consequences; and they can only
escape if it can be shown, or reasonably
deduced that the injury was accidental or
otherwise unintentional.”
(emphasis supplied)
Thus it is clear that ingredient of clause 3rdly is not the
intention to cause death but on the other hand the
ingredient to be proved is the intention to cause the
particular injury that was present. It is fallacious to
contend that wherever there is a single injury only a case
of culpable homicide is made out irrespective of other
circumstances. In Emperor v. Sardarkhan Jaridkhan3, it was
observed as under:
“Where death is caused by a single blow, it is
always much more difficult to be absolutely
certain what degree of bodily injury the
offender intended.”
Commenting upon this observation Justice Bose in Virsa Singh
case2 held thus:
2 1958 SCR 1495 : AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri LJ 8 1 8
3 ILR (1 917) 41 Bom 27: 18 Bom LR 793
330
“With due respect to the learned Judge he has
linked up the intent required with the
seriousness of the injury, and that, as we
have shown, is not what the section requires.
The two matters are quite separate and
distinct, though the evidence about them may
sometimes overlap.”
As to how the intention is to be inferred even in a case of
single injury, Justice Bose further held as under:
“The question is not whether the prisoner
intended to inflict a serious injury or a
trivial one but whether he intended to inflict
the injury that is proved to be present. If
he can show that he did not, or if the
totality of the circumstances justify such an
inference, then, of course, the intent that
the section requires is not proved. But if
there is nothing beyond the injury and the
fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only
possible inference is that he intended to
inflict it. Whether he knew of its
seriousness, or intended serious consequences,
is neither here nor there. The question, so
far as the intention is concerned, is not
whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an
injury of a particular degree of seriousness,
but whether he intended to inflict the injury
in question; and once the existence of the
injury is proved the intention to cause it
will be presumed unless the evidence or the
circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion.
But whether the intention is there or not is
one of fact and not one of law. Whether the
wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious,
how serious, is a totally separate and
distinct question and has nothing to do with
the question whether the prisoner intended to
inflict the injury in question.
It is true that in a given case the enquiry
may be linked up with the seriousness of the
injury. For example, if it can be proved, or
if the totality of the circumstances justify
an inference, that the prisoner only intended
a superficial scratch and that by accident his
victim stumbled and fell on the sword or spear
that was used, then of course the offence is
not murder. But that is not because the
prisoner did not intend the injury that he
intended to inflict to be as serious as it
turned out to be but because he did not intend
to inflict the injury in question at all. His
intention in such a case would be to inflict a
totally different injury. The difference is
not one of law but one of fact.”
(emphasis supplied)
5. This question was again considered in
Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana4 by a Bench
of this Court consisting of Justice D.A. Desai
and Justice A.P. Sen and following the ratio
laid down in Virsa Singh case2 it was held as
under: (SCC pp. 619-620, para 6)
“There is no justification for the assertion
that the giving of a solitary blow on a vital
part of the body resulting the death must
always necessarily reduce the offence to
culpable homicide not amounting to murder
punishable under Section 304 Part II of the
Code. If a man deliberately strikes another
on the head with a heavy log of wood or an
iron rod or even a lathi so as to cause a
fracture of the skull, he must, in
4 (1981) 3 SCC 616: 1981 SCC (Cri) 768
331
the absence of any circumstances negativing
the presumption, be deemed to have intended to
cause the death of the victim or such bodily
injury as is sufficient to cause death. The
whole thing depends upon the intention to
cause death, and the case may be covered by
either clause Istly or clause 3rdly. The
nature of intention must be gathered from the
kind of weapon used, the part of the body hit,
the amount of force employed and the
circumstances attendant upon the death.”
(emphasis supplied)
Therefore there is no legal basis whatsoever for the High
Court to hold that since the respondent-accused gave only
one blow, though found to be sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, clause 3rdly of Section 300
is not attracted.
6. In Tholan case1 as well as other cases relied upon by
the learned counsel for the defence, it was found that the
genesis of the occurrence was such that there was a sudden
quarrel, intervention or grappling or fight which threw a
doubt about the necessary ingredient namely intention to
cause that particular injury being there. In Jai Prakash v.
State (Delhi Admn.)5 all the cases including Tholan case1
have been considered in the light of the principles laid
down in Virsa Singh case2 and ultimately it was concluded as
under: (SCC pp. 46-47, para 18)
” In all these cases, injury by a single blow
was found to be sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. The Supreme
Court took into consideration the
circumstances such as sudden quarrel,
grappling etc. as mentioned above only t
o
assess the state of mind namely whether the
accused had the necessary intention to cause
that particular injury i.e. to say that he
desired expressly that such injury only should
be the result. It is held in all these cases
that there was no such intention to cause that
particular injury as in those circumstances,
the accused could have been barely aware i.e.
only had knowledge of the consequences. These
circumstances under which the appellant
happened to inflict the injury it is felt or
at least a doubt arose that all his mental
faculties could not have been roused as to
form an intention to achieve the particular
result. We may point out that we are not
concerned with the intention to cause death in
which case it will be a murder simplicitor
unless exception is attracted. We are
concerned under clause 3rdly with the
intention to cause that particular injury
which is a subjective inquiry and when once
such intention is established and if the
intended injury is found objectively to be
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, clause 3rdly is attracted and it
would be murder, unless one of the
exceptions to Section 300 is attracted. If on
the other hand this ingredient of ‘intention’
is not established or if a reasonable doubt
arises in this regard then only it would be
reasonable to infer that clause 3rdly is not
attracted and that the accused must be
attributed knowledge that in inflicting the
injury he was likely to cause death in which
case it will be culpable homicide
punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC.”
5 (1991) 2 SCC 32: 1991 SCC (Cri) 299 : JT (1991) 1 SC 288
332
7. In the instant case, the accused had illicit intimacy
with the wife of PW 1. From this it can be said that there
was hostility between PW 1 and the accused. On the fateful
day PW 3, the mother of the deceased and the mother of the
accused were quarrelling with each other, and even by then
the accused hearing the quarrel came out of his house armed
with a dagger. Seeing this PW 1 went and brought the
deceased. Then the accused shouted that: “You have defamed
me. I would not leave you. I will kill.” Saying this he
stabbed on the left side of the chest of the deceased and
the deceased fell down and died instantaneously. It is
important to note that there was neither a quarrel nor a
fight between the deceased and the accused. The words
uttered by the accused against the deceased followed by the
stabbing with the dagger on the left side of the chest of
the deceased, would clearly indicate that he intended to
cause that particular injury which was objectively found to
be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death.
8.From all the above facts, there is no doubt whatsoever
that the accused intended to cause that particular injury on
the chest which necessarily proved fatal. Therefore clause
3rdly of Section 300 IPC is clearly attracted. The High
Court erred in holding that “the accused did not intend to
cause his death by inflicting the injury on the chest
because there was no premeditation and therefore the offence
would be culpable homicide”. This view of the High Court is
not correct and as discussed above clause 3rdly of Section
300 IPC is clearly attracted. For all these reasons we set
aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the
judgment of the trial court convicting the accused under
Section 302 IPC and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment
for life. Accordingly the appeal is allowed.
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