JUDGMENT
S.P. Srivastava, J.
1. Heard the learned Govt. Advocate representing the appellant/State.
2. Perused the record.
3. The dispute in the present case relates to the title in respect of certain agricultural holdings. The respondent in this appeal had filed a suit seeking a declaration that he was the owner in possession of the aforesaid agricultural holdings and for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants including the State of M.P. through the Collector, and the Tahsildar, Gwalior from either dispossessing him from the land in dispute or interfering in his possession thereof.
4. The aforesaid suit was contested by the defendants denying the right title and interest of the plaintiff. They had also asserted that the Patta claimed to have been granted in favour of the plaintiff, dated 20-4-1947, was farzi. The Trial Court had decreed the suit. The decree was affirmed in appeal. Thereafter, the State of M.P., and the other defendant the Tahsildar, filed a Second Appeal No. 487/1998, which was disposed of vide the judgment and order dated 25-1-1999, whereunder, it was dismissed.
5. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment dismissing the second appeal, indicates that Tahsildar, Gwalior had held an enquiry and disposed of the case vide his judgment and order dated 4-5-1973. After examining the voluminous evidence led before him, the Tahsildar had come to the conclusion that the land in dispute could be leased out and in fact, the Patta had been granted in favour of plaintiff after following the prescribed procedure. It was also found that the rental required to be paid by the plaintiff Patta-holder was also duly
deposited by him with the State. It was also found that the plaintiff was continuing to be in possession of the land in dispute pursuant to the patta executed in his favour. The aforesaid order dated 4-5-1973 had attained finality.
6. It is not disputed that feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order, the State had challenged the same before Hon’ble the Supreme Court but the petition for special leave to appeal (Civil No. 11776/99) was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 18-11-99.
7. It was thereafter, that the Collector taking suo motu action purporting to exercise the jurisdiction envisaged under Section 50 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, had registered a revision against the order dated 4-5-1971, passed by Tahsildar in the mutation proceeding. This action had been taken as noticed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order after a period of 28 years.
8. In the aforesaid revision, the Collector while allowing the same, had set-aside the order dated 4-5-1971 passed by Tahsildar and had directed him to re-register the proceeding under Sections 115 and 116 of M.P. Land Revenue Code which provides for correction of a wrong entry in Khasra and any other land record by superior officers and after examining the legality of the Patta, dispose of the case, in accordance with law within a period of three months.
9. It was the aforesaid order, passed by the Collector, which was challenged by respondent No. 1, by means of writ petition, which had been allowed by a learned Single Judge with costs quantified at Rs. 5,000/-, which was made recoverable from the State, providing however, that if deemed fit the said amount may be recovered from the Collector, Gwalior as the order passed by him was in colourable exercise of powers contrary to the settled principles of law.
10. In the impugned order, the learned Single Judge, has observed that the Collector, had no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the order passed by the Civil Court which had even been approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and direct further enquiry in regard to the validity of the lease, which question had been settled upto the stage of Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11. It may be noticed at this stage that as has already been indicated hereinabove, the question in regard to the validity of the lease and the same having been acted upon, was gone into by Tahsildar and the order passed in those proceedings dated 4-5-1973, had attained finality, long ago. It may further be noticed that the Collector Gwalior, in his impugned order conveniently omitted to even refer to the order of the Tahsildar, the competent authority dated 4-5-1973.
12. Further the plea in regard to the Patta relied upon by the respondent being farzi which plea had been specifically taken in the written statement, is concerned the said plea had been negatived not only by the Revenue Court
but also by the Civil Courts and the finding in this regard remained intact up to the stage of Hon’blc Supreme Court. In the aforesaid circumstances, the learned Single Judge was of the view that the Collector in a colourable exercise of power, had interfered in revision holding incorrectly that the judgment of Civil Court was not binding upon the Revenue Courts. It was also observed that since the question of title had already been examined and determined by the Court of competent jurisdiction, the question of examining validity of the lease as directed in the impugned order, passed by Collector, did not arise. The learned Single Judge on the aforesaid observations had quashed the order of the Collector, holding the same to be without jurisdiction.
13. The learned Government Advocate has tried to assail the findings returned against the appellant by learned Single Judge in the impugned order. He however, has not disputed that the order dated 4-5-73 passed by the Tahsildar, which had attained finality had been conveniently omitted from the consideration by Collector, It was also not disputed that the question in regard to the validity of the lease and the title of the petitioners/respondent had been gone into, and had already been examined by the Courts of competent jurisdiction and the claim of the State had been negatived.
14. It may further be noticed that the provision contained in Section 50 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, provides inter alia that :
“the Board or the Commissioner or the (Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or the Settlement Officer) may at any time on its/his motion or on the application made by any party for the purpose of satisfying itself/himself as to legality or propriety of any order passed by or as to the regularity of the proceedings of any Revenue Officer subordinate to it/him call for and examine the record of any case pending before, or disposed of by such officer and may pass any such order in reference thereto as it/he thinks fit : Provided that : (i) no application for revision shall be entertained;
(a) against an order appealable under this Code;
(b) against an order of the Settlement Commissioner under Section 210;
(c) against an order passed in revision by the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner in respect of cases under Section 170-B, nor shall any such order be revised by Board on its own motion.
15. Although for exercising suo motu action, no limitation has been prescribed but the limitation of 60 days, stands prescribed for entertaining any application for invoking the jurisdiction contemplated under Section 50 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, in case, it is presented to the Commissioner or to the Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or the Settlement Officer and the hundred and 90 days is prescribed in case it is presented before the Board of Revenue.
16. A perusal of the provisions contained in Section 50 of M.P. Land Revenue Code, clearly stipulated the exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged thereunder, either on the application or mo motu.
17. So far as the exercise of power “on application”, is concerned, the limitation is prescribed as indicated hereinabove.
18. However, so far as exercise of power “on its/his own motion” or “suo motu” is concerned, it is qualified by the expression “at any time” this expression “at any time” has to be understood as to mean “within a reasonable time”.
19. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Usha Devi v. State, reported in AIR 1990 MP 268, had observed that the power of revision suo motu as involved in the present case, has to be exercised within a reasonable time. The Full Bench drew ample support for the aforesaid view taking into account the observations made by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Gujarat v. P. Raghav, reported in AIR 1969 SC 1297. It was however, added that what should be the reasonable time for the exercise of the power, must be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case and the nature of the order, which is being revised. It was however, observed that such a power is meant to be exercised for the purpose and object of that the enacted law, is not defeated and powers exercised by the subordinate authorities under the relevant enactments do not transgress the prescribed parameters producing forbidden results.
20. The Full Bench, however, did not indicate any specific period within which alone, such a power could be exercised.
21. A Division Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Ram-mulal v. State of M.P., reported in 1990 RN 407, taking note of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat (supra) indicating that such suo motu power must be exercised within a few months, had come to the conclusion that the mo motu action registering a revision taken after the period of about eight years could not be deemed to have been taken within a reasonable time.
22. In the present case although, no period of limitation has been prescribed for taking suo motu action yet the action ought not be taken beyond unreasonably long period. What should be the reasonable period, has been the subject matter of consideration in various decisions. The controversy now stands settled by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mohammad Kavi v. Fatima Ibrahim, [1998 (I) MPWN SN 26]. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court had an occasion to consider the implications arising under Section 50 of M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. The Apex Court in its aforesaid decision, while referring to its earlier decisions, had indicated that where no time limit is prescribed, for exercising the power under a statute, it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time.
23. In the present case, suo motu power was exercised after 28 years.
This period could not by any stretch of imagination be taken to be a reasonable period. The suo motu action cannot therefore, be taken to have been exercised within a reasonable time. In the case of Mohammad Kavi (supra), suo motu action was taken after the lapse of about three years which was not approved to be reasonable.
24. Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances as brought on record, and also those noticed in the impugned order as well as indicated hereinabove, we are not satisfied that sufficient ground can be said to have been made out for interfering in the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge.
25. This appeal consequently, failed and is dismissed.
26. However, before parting with this judgment, we may observe that the present case is an example of gross abuse of authority. The appellant State shall conclude the enquiry in regard to the liability in the matter of recovering costs at the earliest and recover the same from the erring official,
27. L.PA. dismissed.
