* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on : 04.04 2011
% Date of decision : 20.04.2011
+ LPA No. 742 of 2010
THE M.P. STATE MINING CORPORATION LTD. ... ... APPELLANT
Through : Mr. Viplav Sharma, Advocate.
-VERSUS-
SANJEEV BHASKAR & ORS. ... ... ... ... RESPONDENTS
Through : Ms. Kriti Mishra, Adv. for R - 1.
Mr. Anurag K., Adv. for R - 2.
Mr. Mallikarjuna for
Mr. Saleem Ahmed, Adv. for R - 3.
AND
+ LPA No. 284 of 2011
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ... ... ... ... APPELLANT
Through : Mr. Viplav Sharma, Advocate.
-VERSUS-
SANJEEV BHASKAR & ORS. ... ... ... ... RESPONDENTS
Through : Ms. Kriti Mishra, Adv. for R - 1.
Mr. Anurag K., Adv. for R - 2.
R - 3 : Proforma Party.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SHAKDHER
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers
may be allowed to see the judgment? YES
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be YES
reported in the Digest?
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LPA Nos. 742/2010 & 284/2011 Page 1 of 19
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. A mining lease was granted on 03.11.1966 to late Shri R.N.
Bhaskar, father of respondent No. 1 herein, in respect of an
area of 28 acres (11.331 hectares) for Pyrophyllite and
Diaspore minerals in Village Kari, Distt. Tikamgarh, Madhya
Pradesh for a period of 20 years from 03.11.1966 to
02.11.1986. A show-cause notice was issued to the lessee
alleging violation of two conditions of the mining lease on
18.09.1979, which was replied to by the lessee on
03.10.1979. The State of Madhya Pradesh (i.e., appellant in
LPA No. 284/2011) not being satisfied, determined the lease
on 05.04.1980.
2. The lessee assailed this order by filing a revision application
before the Central Govt., Ministry of Mines, but the same was
also dismissed on 06.04.1981. The determination of the
lease was, thus, assailed in a writ petition filed before the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 805/1981. It
may be noticed that during the pendency of this petition, the
original lessee died leaving behind his wife, two sons and two
daughters as his legal heirs. These legal heirs were brought
on record in the writ proceedings. The writ petition came to
be decided by the Division Bench on 16.07.1986. The said
Order noticed that from the stand of the State Govt., it
appeared that the determination of lease was only on
account of clauses (f) and (g) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 of the
Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as,
„the said Rules‟), which provided for commencement of the
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LPA Nos. 742/2010 & 284/2011 Page 2 of 19
mining operation within one year from the date of execution
of the lease deed unless the State Govt., for sufficient cause,
permits otherwise. There was also a requirement to erect
and maintain the boundary marks and pillars necessary to
indicate the demarcation of the leased area. The Division
Bench noticed that there was no finding by any of the
authorities that the lessee did not commence mining
operation within one year from the date of execution of the
lease and such a ground was not even mentioned in the
show-cause notice. In so far as the other aspect of erection
and maintenance of boundary marks and pillars was
concerned, the show-cause notice referred to the breaches
specified in the report of the Mining Inspector dated
28.05.1979. In this behalf, the Collector by his order dated
27.07.1979 had issued directions to all the lessees in the area
to have their area re-demarcated according to the directions
given in that order and the effect of such a direction was
required to be gone into which fact was not apparent from
the impugned orders. The Madhya Pradesh High Court, for
the reason set out hereinabove, held that the determination
of lease by the State Govt. and dismissal of the revision
application could not be upheld and the matter should be re-
examined and decided afresh by the State Govt.
3. We may notice that in the interregnum period between the
determination of lease on 05.04.1980 and the filing of
revision application before the Central Govt. on 06.04.1981,
The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to
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as, „the Forest Act‟) was enacted by the Parliament and it
came into force on 27.12.1980. Section 2 of the Forest Act
required prior approval of the Central Govt. by the State
Govt. inter alia in respect of utilization of any forest land or
any portion thereof for any non-forest purpose. The mining
lease is stated to be in the forest area.
4. In pursuance of the aforesaid Order dated 16.07.1986 of the
Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, no suo
moto order was passed by the State Govt. and the next event
was the application filed by the legal heirs of the lessee on
02.09.1986 praying for them to be brought on record as the
legal heirs and to permit the mining operation to be carried
out for the balance period of 20 years, which came to 6
years, 6 months and 29 days. The lease could not be
operated for this balance period due to the action of the
determination of lease, which decision had been quashed by
the Order dated 16.07.1986. However, no order was passed
on the application.
5. Instead of passing any orders, a demand notice is stated to
have been sent from the Office of Collector, Tikamgarh
demanding dead rent for the period before expiry of the lease
deed in view of the audit / inspection note. This notice was
sent on 08.06.1990. The matter did not rest at this since
even subsequently demand notices were sent for dead rent
on 14.08.1990 and 08.12.1993, which according to the State
of Madhya Pradesh were inadvertently sent. The stand of the
State Govt. is that as per the terms of the lease, 20 years‟
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LPA Nos. 742/2010 & 284/2011 Page 4 of 19
period expired on 02.11.1986 due to efflux of time, i.e.,
couple months after the order was passed by the Division
Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court on 16.07.1986 and
the original lessee never made any application in the
prescribed form and manner for grant of the mining lease
either by way of a fresh grant or by way of renewal. It has
been, thus, stated that the lessee was not actually a holder of
a lease when the dead rent for subsequent period was
demanded. Such dead rent could have been demanded only
for an existing lease in view of the provisions of Section 9A of
the Mines and Minerals Development Regulation Act, 1957
(hereinafter referred to as, „the said Act‟).
6. Respondent No. 1 kept on making representations inter alia
on 28.08.1996, 14.04.1997 and 23.09.1997. Since these
representations were not leading to any fruitful result,
respondent No. 1 filed a contempt petition on 07.10.1998
before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which was
registered as Contempt Petition No. 186 of 1998. The
contempt petition was held to be barred by time and was,
thus, not entertained, but simultaneously the Division Bench
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court observed that it had hope
and trust that the Govt. would implement the Order passed
by the Court in 1986, if they had not implemented the same
so far.
7. The State Govt. for the first time responded only on
21.04.1999 declining to extend the mining lease on the
ground that in view of the Order passed by the High Court on
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LPA Nos. 742/2010 & 284/2011 Page 5 of 19
16.07.1986, the mining lease was automatically restored for
the remaining period upto 02.11.1986. The absence of any
direction by the High Court for extension / renewal of the
lease was cited in support of this stand and the direction
being only for the State Govt. to decide afresh the question of
determination of the lease of the lessee (i.e., respondent No.
1).
8. Respondent No. 1 filed a revision application before the
Central Govt., Ministry of Mines under Section 30 of the said
Act read with Rule 56 of the said Rules on 07.07.1999. It is
during the pendency of this application that the State of
Madhya Pradesh claims to have granted a lease for 5
hectares of the mining area out of 11.331 hectares to the
M.P. State Mining Corporation (i.e., the appellant in LPA No.
742/2010 and hereinafter referred to as, „the Corporation‟) on
30.07.1999. The Central Govt. granted interim stay directing
the State Govt. not to grant the mining lease to any third-
party on 12.08.1999, but without the knowledge of what
transpired on 30.07.1999. The Corporation filed a Writ
Petition No. 3914/1999 before the Madhya Pradesh High
Court on 24.08.1999 seeking directions against the
respondents to execute a lease deed for a period of 20 years
commencing from the date of execution in terms of the grant
made on 30.07.1999. Interestingly, respondent No. 1 herein
was not made a party though in one paragraph, there is an
allegation about the pendency of the revision application.
The respondents being the State Govt. and the Collector, who
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LPA Nos. 742/2010 & 284/2011 Page 6 of 19
were really supporting parties to the Corporation, failed to file
any return. It is in view of failure of this return that on
15.09.1999, interim mandamus was issued to execute the
mining lease in favour of the Corporation, which is stated to
have been so executed on 25.09.1999. We were informed
orally by the counsels that the writ petition was apparently
disposed of as infructuous and actually no final mandamus
was granted in the matter.
9. Respondent No. 1 filed another revision application before the
Central Govt. on 15.12.1999 inter alia praying for quashing of
the grant made on 30.07.1999. The first revision application
was dismissed on 07.11.2001 by the Mines Tribunal, which
was assailed by respondent No. 1 by filing Writ Petition (Civil)
No. 8033/2002 before this Court. The second revision
application was dismissed on 31.12.2002 inter alia on the
ground that the lease was executed in favour of the
Corporation by the State Govt. in compliance of the Order
dated 15.09.1999 of interim mandamus by the Madhya
Pradesh High Court, which order was assailed by respondent
No. 1 by filing Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5809/2004 before this
Court. Counter affidavits were filed in both the matters and
by the common impugned judgment dated 21.09.2010, both
the writ petitions have been allowed holding that the grant
could not have been made in favour of the Corporation and
that respondent No. 1 was entitled to the benefit of the
remaining unexpired period of the original lease to begin
from the date the decision is taken by the State Govt.
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LPA Nos. 742/2010 & 284/2011 Page 7 of 19
pursuant to the impugned judgment, but subject to the
petitioner (respondent No. 1 herein) complying with all the
requirements of the said Act and the said Rules and any other
applicable law and paying the dead rent and other charges as
required by law. It is this Order, which is now assailed in the
two LPAs filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh and the
Corporation.
10. We may notice at the inception that a technical plea has been
sought to be raised that the rule was issued in both the writ
petitions and the writ petitions were directed to be listed on
the Regular Board. When these writ petitions came up for
hearing, the counsels for the respondents were not present
and the Registry was directed to issue court notices to the
respondents. The counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh
was served, but service to the counsel for the Corporation
was awaited. No fresh notice was issued to the counsel for
respondent No. 3 and it is the counsel for the State of Madhya
Pradesh who represented in the matter as the service of
respondent No. 2 on the State of Madhya Pradesh was also
treated as the service on the Corporation even though the
counsels were different.
11. In respect of the aforesaid, we may note that both the State
of Madhya Pradesh and the Corporation are represented by
the same counsel before us. Once rule was issued in the
matter, it was the responsibility of the counsels to keep track
of the matter and to appear when the matter was listed for
regular hearing. The counsel for both the set of appellants
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LPA Nos. 742/2010 & 284/2011 Page 8 of 19
before us failed to do so. Learned Single Judge was not
required to issue invitation letters to the counsels to appear
before him, but still took the precaution of issuing court
notices. This can hardly be stated to be any procedural
defect and we, thus, reject the plea based on the same
outright.
12. A perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the
reasoning of learned Single Judge is predicated on the
decision rendered by the Division Bench of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court on 16.07.1986 and the failure of the State
Govt. to take any action in pursuance thereof. The
conclusion reached is that once the determination of the
lease was held to be invalid, the period spent between the
determination of the lease and the decision of the High Court
when the lessee could not utilize the lease has to be naturally
compensated by permitting respondent No. 1 to utilize the
mining area for the remaining part of the statutory lease. It is
not even in dispute that the statutory lease is hereditary in
character as per the terms of the lease deed. The request
made by respondent No. 1 to include his name in place of his
father by giving no objection certificates from other legal
heirs was never rejected, but, on the other hand, the relevant
documents were sought from respondent No. 1. Rule 25A(2)
of the said Rules, in fact, provides that if a lessee in whose
favour an order is passed granting or renewing the lease dies
before the deed is executed, the order shall be deemed to
have been passed in the name of the legal representatives of
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LPA Nos. 742/2010 & 284/2011 Page 9 of 19
the deceased. The State Govt. also accepted the dead rent
from 1980 to 1999 for which the only explanation given is
that it was by error. The case was treated not as one for
renewal, but even assuming it was for renewal of lease, the
letter of respondent No. 1 dated 02.09.1986 was observed to
be liable to be treated as one for renewal and the delay could
have been condoned. Learned Single Judge has held that the
binding nature of the judgment delivered by the Madhya
Pradesh High Court on 16.07.1986 could not be ignored and
an interpretation, which would defeat the said Order, was
unjustified.
13. Learned Single Judge, thus, concluded that the original lease
cannot be said to have expired on 02.11.1986 when it was
made unworkable by wrongful determination of the lease as
held by the Order dated 16.07.1986, which Order became
final and binding not having been assailed any further. The
period of mining lease lost was, thus, liable to be
compensated by permitting mining activity for a further
period to the extent of the loss of the period as per the
original lease.
14. Another aspect taken note of is that respondent No. 1 was
never informed of the non-filing of any application, which
may be required. Learned Single Judge has taken due care
while granting the benefit for the remaining period of the
unutilized period of the lease by making it subject to the
decision of the State Govt. and subject to respondent No. 1
fulfilling all the requirements under the said Act, the said
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LPA Nos. 742/2010 & 284/2011 Page 10 of 19
Rules and any other applicable law apart from paying dead
rent and other charges as required by law.
15. The grant of 5 hectares of lease has been held to be illegal as
it was in the teeth of the order passed by the Tribunal on
12.08.1999. At least, no lease deed could have been
executed pursuant thereto.
16. Learned counsel for the appellants sought to contend that
when the determination of lease was challenged before the
Madhya Pradesh High Court, a stay application had been
filed, which was dismissed as withdrawn. It was submitted
that had respondent No. 1 obtained an interim relief, it could
have worked the lease for the remaining period, but it chose
not to do so. Such a plea, to say the least, is specious. The
non-grant of an interim order or withdrawal of the application
for interim relief certainly cannot defeat the final relief. To
accept a plea that the lease would have worked itself out if
interim orders were granted, but since no interim orders were
granted and the decision for the determination of lease has
been held to be invalid, the lessee is entitled only to the
remaining period of the lease as per the original lease, is
totally unsustainable.
17. A second limb of the argument, which flows from the Order of
the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated 16.07.1986, is that no
specific direction had been passed for renewal of the lease
for the period when it was not enjoyed. We may note that
the determination was quashed and the State Govt. was
called upon to decide the question afresh. The State Govt.
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LPA Nos. 742/2010 & 284/2011 Page 11 of 19
chose not to pass any fresh order, but sat over the matter
despite repeated representations made on the part of the
lessee / legal heirs (i.e., respondent No. 1). The State Govt.
seeks to take advantage of its own silence / inaction. The
fact that respondent No. 1 did not approach the Court earlier
in contempt proceedings and the consequent dismissal of the
contempt petition on the ground of limitation cannot
strengthen the hands of the State Govt. in this behalf apart
from the fact that a pious hope was expressed by the Bench
while dismissing the contempt petition on grounds of
limitation that the State Govt. would pass an appropriate
order in compliance of the Order dated 16.07.1986, if it had
not done so.
18. Learned counsel for the appellants also sought to raise the
issue of non-compliance of the Forest Act. It was submitted,
before us, that introduction of the Forest Act in the
interregnum period made it mandatory for respondent No. 1
to take necessary clearances, as was done by the Corporation
from the Central Govt. and then make an application.
Respondent No. 1 ought to have known the said fact, but
failed to make such an application. Once again, this plea is
only to be stated to be rejected. The occasion for the same
would arise after the State Govt. would have passed a fresh
order in pursuance of the Order of the Division Bench dated
16.07.1986 or would have mutated the lease in favour of the
legal heir(s) as requested for on 02.09.1986. The State Govt.
failed to do so. In any case, learned Single Judge, as
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LPA Nos. 742/2010 & 284/2011 Page 12 of 19
observed above, has taken due precaution to make the order
conditional on grant of all permissions and we find force in
the contention of learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that
they would get the benefit only after they have obtained the
permissions for which they have even taken steps post the
impugned decision, but the interim order granted by the
Division Bench in the present appeals came in the way. The
issue of these compliances would, thus, arise much later and
the State Govt. need not to have any worry on that account
as the obtaining of requisite permissions is a pre-requisite to
the operation of mining lease by respondent No. 1.
19. Learned counsel for the Corporation laid great emphasis on
the fact that the mining lease executed in its favour by the
State Govt. was a sequittur to the Orders passed in the writ
petition filed by it before the Madhya Pradesh High Court
being Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3914/1999. We may notice that
the said writ petition was filed without impleading respondent
No. 1 as a party though the challenge laid to the order passed
by the Central Govt. on 12.08.1999 directly affected
respondent No. 1. There was only a passing reference in one
paragraph about the order being passed and the State Govt.
conveniently failed to file any return as is apparent from the
Order dated 15.09.1999. Not only that, the counsel for the
State Govt. stated that he had no instruction in the matter. It
is in view thereof that an interim mandamus was granted at
the back of respondent No. 1 by not bringing the clear picture
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LPA Nos. 742/2010 & 284/2011 Page 13 of 19
and thereafter writ petition is stated to have been disposed of
as infructuous without any final mandamus being issued.
20. The material fact is that both the appellants seemed to be
under a mistaken belief that the present case is one of
renewal of a lease. It is really not so. No doubt, the original
period of lease expired, but the decision of the determination
of lease by the State Govt. was held to be invalid. Thus, the
benefit, which is sought to be given to respondent No. 1, is
for the period when dead rent was being charged and
respondent No. 1 could not operate the lease on account of
the invalid decision of termination till the same was set aside
by the High Court.
21. The last aspect urged by learned counsel for the appellants is
arising from the plea of lack of inherent jurisdiction in Delhi
High Court. In this behalf, learned counsel relied upon the
decision of the Supreme Court in Sushil Kumar Mehta v.
Gobind Ram Bohra (Dead) Through His LRs, (1990) 1 SCC 193
wherein in para 26, it has been observed that a decree
passed by a court without jurisdiction over a subject matter
goes to the root of its exercise of jurisdiction as the court is
coram non judice and the decree would be nullity. Such plea
of invalidity can be raised at any time. This judgment has
been cited as in the impugned judgment, there is no
discussion on the aspect of any lack of inherent jurisdiction
and this plea was obviously not urged at the stage of
arguments as otherwise it would have certainly been dealt
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LPA Nos. 742/2010 & 284/2011 Page 14 of 19
with. No review application was filed before the learned
Single Judge alleging that any plea urged had been left out.
22. We can hardly disagree with the aforesaid principle and are
rather bound by it, the legal principle being enunciated by the
Supreme Court. However, this would be so if there is such an
inherent lack of jurisdiction. We, thus, squarely put to
learned counsel for the appellants as to how can he argue
such a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. Learned counsel
for the appellants submitted that since the mine was located
in Madhya Pradesh, respondent No. 1 had approached the
Madhya Pradesh High Court earlier, this Court would have no
territorial jurisdiction. Reliance was sought to be placed on
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Stridewell Leathers (P)
Ltd. & Ors. v. Bhankerpur Simbhaoli Beverages (P) Ltd. &
Ors., (1994) 1 SCC 34. In our considered view, the said
judgment has no application in the facts of the present case.
The judgment related to the expression “the High Court”
used in Section 10-F of the Companies Act, 1956, which was
held to mean the High Court having jurisdiction in relation to
the place at which the registered office of the company
concerned was situated in view of Section 2(11) read with
Section 10(1)(a) of that Act.
23. An interesting aspect is that both the learned counsels, i.e.,
learned counsel for the appellants as well as learned counsel
for respondent No. 1, seek to rely upon the judgment in
Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr., (2004) 6
SCC 254. In our considered view also, that is the judgment
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which would govern the matter in issue. Learned counsel for
respondent No. 1 drew our attention to para 27 of that
judgment, which reads as under :-
“27. When an order, however, is passed by a court
or tribunal or an executive authority whether under
provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause
of action arises at that place. Even in a given case,
when the original authority is constituted at one
place and the appellate authority is constituted at
another, a writ petition would be maintainable at
both the places. In other words, as order of the
appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of
action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the
High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situated
having regard to the fact that the order of the
appellate authority is also required to be set aside
and as the order of the original authority merges with
that of the appellate authority.”
(emphasis supplied)
24. It is, thus, obvious from the aforesaid observations of the
Apex Court that given the location of the appellate authority
in Delhi, the Delhi High Court could hardly be said to be
coram non judice and a writ petition would be maintainable
both in the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Delhi High
Court. We enquired from learned counsel for the appellants
as to in what manner this judgment supported his case. We
found no satisfactory answer other than the endeavour of the
counsel to read other paragraphs which have no relevance in
the present case. Those paragraphs were relating to the
issue of law enacted by Parliament being assailed in the Delhi
High Court merely because the situs of the Parliament was in
Delhi. It was, thus, held that the facts pleaded must have a
nexus on the basis of which a prayer is granted and the
passing of legislation by itself does not confer any right to file
a writ petition unless a cause of action has arisen thereof. A
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distinction was, thus, made between a legislative action andan executive action. Learned counsel for the appellants once
again sought to shift the focus to the judgment in Stridewell
Leathers (P) Ltd. & Ors.‟s case (supra) by contending that
that was also a Supreme Court judgment. This is hardly a
plea expected of the counsel when the judgment dealt with
the matter in respect of the Companies Act, 1956 and the
subsequent judgment of a Bench of three Judges in Kusum
Ingots & Alloys Ltd.‟s case (supra) had squarely dealt with the
issue and, thus, would be the governing law.
25. Learned counsel for the appellants sought to refer to Article
214 of the Constitution of India to contend that there has to
be a High Court for each State and, thus, the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Delhi High Court goes to the root of the
federal structure! We just fail to understand this kind of plea;
which is sought to be raised when the matter pertains to the
issue as to whether the Delhi High Court would also have the
jurisdiction in the matter by reason of the situs of the
statutory appellate authority. We, in fact, put to learned
counsel for the appellants that there is a Full Bench judgment
of this Court in this behalf in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
Union of India & Ors., 161 (2009) DLT 55 = AIR 2010 Delhi 43
but the learned counsel is unaware of the same. Ignorance is
bliss!
26. In the end, we would like to emphasize that we expect the
counsels to adhere to the directions passed by the Court. On
the last date of hearing, we had clearly observed that
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LPA Nos. 742/2010 & 284/2011 Page 17 of 19
counsels for the parties should keep ready short synopsis
running into not more than two pages each. The objective of
this is to ensure that both the counsels in the Court can focus
on the matter in issue. This was not done. The result was
that the counsel for the appellants strayed from one aspect to
the other intermingling different issues and to the extent
arguing on matters which were not even urged before the
learned Single Judge. All that the learned counsel said was
that they were mentioned in certain grounds. The Court is
not expected to read each ground, but bases its conclusions
on the submissions advanced in the Court. Thus, only
matters, which are urged, are expected to be decided and if
some matter urged has been left out, an approach must be
made to get the matter rectified by pointing the same out to
the relevant court. This was also not done. We have
emphasized this fact because the net result is that larger
consumption of judicial time before the appellate forum like
us without any focus on the matter in issue.
27. We are clearly of the view that the apprehensions of the
appellants, especially the State of Madhya Pradesh, arising
from the Forest Act are also without any basis, even though
they were never urged before the learned Single Judge. In
our considered view, the learned Single Judge has worded the
impugned judgment in a manner which takes care of the
interest of parties. The effect of the impugned judgment is
that the decision of the determination of lease having been
quashed by the competent court vide Order dated
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16.07.1986, the lessee must get the benefit of that decision
by being able to enjoy the lease for the period he was
deprived of on account of the decision struck down. It is,
thus, not a case of a fresh lease or a renewal of lease in that
sense. Learned Single Judge has also taken due care to
incorporate the compliance required of respondent No. 1 by
making it obligatory on him to comply with all the
requirements of the said Act, the said Rules and “any other
applicable law” apart from paying dead rent and other
charges as required by law. This is clearly set out in para 24
of the impugned judgment.
28. In view of the aforesaid, we find the appeals meritless and
dismiss the same with costs quantified at Rs.25,000/- for
each appeal. Interim orders stand vacated.
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
APRIL 20, 2011 RAJIV SHAKDHER, J. madan
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