JUDGMENT
S.K. Desai, J.
1. This appeal is preferred against the order of the Writ Judge giving interim relief in the Writ Petition. We need not repeat the facts as they have been fully set out in the order of the Single Judge. However, a few points may be noted. The petitioner before the Writ Judge, Who will be referred to as “the employer”, made an application before the 7th Labour Court, Bombay, under Sections 78, 79 and 97 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, which application was numbered as Application (LCB) No. 12 of 1988. In the application, a declaration was sought regarding an alleged strike resorted to by the workman in the employer’s Mills from 27th October, 1988 as illegal. An application for interim relief was filed purportedly under Section 119-D of the said Act. On 28th October, 1988. Fourfold interim relief was granted by the Labour Court. The employer asked for police assistance in carrying out the order of the Labour Court. The police did not assist the employer or to the extent he wanted and hence the writ petition was filed. The learned Writ Judge, after discussing the facts and law and considering the submission made before her by Senior Counsel for the State, granted interim relief in terms of prayers (d)(i), (d)(ii) and (d)(iii) of the writ petition. Prayers (d)(i), (d)(ii) and (d)(iii) granted read as under :
“(d) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the petition, the Respondents be directed to :-
(i) perform their statutory duties and do all acts and things necessary to ensure that the order of the 7th Labour Court dated 28th October, 1988 is obeyed;
(ii) give full protection to the Petitioner’s personnel/plant/machinery and property situated at the factory premises at Kandivali (East), Bombay 400 101.
(iii) The workman of the Petitioner and their supporters be removed and prevented from entering into the said factory premises situated at Kandivali (East), Bombay 400 101, and also at the factory gate of Dadar Unit of the Petitioner situated at Kasturchand Mills Estate, Bombay 400 028, except for the purpose of doing their normal work.”
It may be noted that prayer (d)(i) included in its ambit the entire four-fold interim relief granted by the Labour Court. Two additional reliefs are granted as interim relief under prayers (d)(ii) and (d)(iii).
A number of pleas have been urged before us and considered by us. However, Shri Rele appearing on behalf of the employer 1st respondent to the Appeal has stated that the employer does not wish to proceed further with the Rule and Rule may be discharged. In view of this statement, we intend to discharge Rule. Further discussion, therefore, will become somewhat academic, but, in our opinion, it is necessary to obviate difficulties.
2. During the course of the hearing, a number of aspects of the matter has struck us. These aspects are required to be stated and our views thereon. In the first place, we have some hesitation in upholding the grant of interim relief by the Labour Court under Section 119-D of the said Act. Section 119-D reads as under :-
“In any proceedings before it under this Act, the Industrial Court, a Labour Court or a Wage Board may pass such interim orders as it may consider just and proper”.
However, it would appear to us that interim orders which can be passed must be connected with the final orders which could be passed in the application and it is doubtful whether where a declaration as to illegality of strike is sought, the interim orders of the nature passed could be passed. The position is different under the allied Acts like M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act where there is a specific provision by due incorporation in the Schedule for the Court to entertain complaints against such action and for passing appropriate orders.
3. Assuming that the Labour Court did have some limited power to pass appropriate interim orders, it would appear to us that the interim orders which are passed go far beyond the scope of the application. A Court including the High Court is not at large. Once some matter comes before it, the orders which can be passed and directions which it can give are limited to the scope of the principal application and must normally be restricted to the final substantial prayers sought by the same. We hope in future Labour Courts will keep these principles in mind while entertaining applications under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946.
4. One of grievances of the workman indicated to us be Shri Kochar appearing for Shramik Utkarsha Sabha is that all those interim orders were passed without hearing the concerned workmen. In this connection, our attention was drawn to the provisions contained in Sections 27-A, 32 and 33 of the aforesaid Act. These provisions have been considered by the Supreme Court on a number of occasions. In this connection, we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Santuram v. Kimatral Printers (1978-I-LLJ-174) in which judgment earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in Girja Shankar Kashi Ram v. The Gujarat Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. (1962-II-LLJ-369) and Textile Labour Association, Bhadra Ahmedabad v. Ahmedabad Millowners’ Association, (1970) 3. S.C.R. 890, have been noted. The relevant observations are to be found in the said decision which would seem to suggest that where a representative Union has appeared as the representative of the employees, individual employees are debarred from appearing. The Court, according to the decision is also debarred from allowing such employees to appear, although it is they and not the Union who will be affected by the order. Now, in this connection, the second proviso to Section 33 of the said Act would seem to preclude the appearance of individual employees unless the Labour Court is considering the legality or propriety of an order of dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of service or suspension of an employee. A similar proviso is not to be found below Section 32 of the said act and prima facie there should not be any bar to Court allowing a workman or workmen directly concerned from appearing before it particularly when the recognised Union merely appears without effectively contesting the proceedings. Despite this, both the sections have been construed together in the Supreme Court judgments and a bar discovered for both.
5. It is precisely for this reason that we would like to observe that if individual employees are not permitted to appear before the the Labour Court to justify or explain their individual actions not connected with the final relief, although these may be aspects thereof, the Labour Court should refrain from passing interlocutory order not connected with the final relief as these orders would be passed without giving a hearing to the concerned workmen and obviously, therefore, against the principle of natural justice, although the principle may have been excluded by statutory provision as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The Court would certainly be empowered to give a declaration about the illegality of the strike and it may not be open to any individual workman to appear and justify the strike. They can only be represented by a representative Union. In this connection, without affecting the binding character of the observations of the Supreme Court, we may like to point out that the proviso to Section 32 does not seem to contemplate a bar when the appearance of the representative Union is merely a formal or paper appearance. What it requires is an effective appearance as the representative of the representative Union. Merely to deny an opportunity of being heard to the employees without any further participation or effective participation in the proceedings can hardly be regarded as an effective or proper appearance. However, these are prima facie impressions. It would be open in another case for any aggrieved party to move the Supreme Court to review or clarify its observations if that party thinks proper.
6. We now come to the interim orders passed by the Single Judge of this Court which are directly the subject matter of this appeal. It is not every order of the Labour Court which would result in a threatened crime or apprehended crime calling for police action. Certainly, the very general statement by Counsel for the State made before the Single Judge cannot be accepted, but such submission need not necessarily be followed with a blanket order giving directions which perhaps are unworkable and, to a certain extent unwarranted. Even though there may not be proper representation or submission on behalf of the authorities, and indeed in many cases the submission made leave much to be desired, the Court is required to consider which part of the relief is required to be granted and which of the orders carried out with police assistance. Thereafter, as a matter of its discretion or rule, the High Court must only grant limited interim relief particularly when it is mandatory in character. In this background we will now consider the interim relief granted by the Single Judge. In the first place, we have the order in terms of prayer (d)(i) which includes within its ambit, as already indicated, the four interim orders given by the Labour Court. In our opinion; it was not necessary for the High Court to pass a mandatory order against the police compelling them to help the employer in terms of prayer (a) of the application. Similarly for prayer (d) of the application before the Labour Court. As regards prayers (b) and (c) of the application, the learned Single Judge was certainly within her right to give necessary directions to the police authorities and we will not interfere with the order passed by her in respect thereof. We are told that necessary police assistance has in fact been given.
7. We now come to prayers (d)(ii) and (d)(iii) of the writ petition. In our opinion, prayer (d)(ii) is in very wide terms. Only to a very limited extent can protection be afforded by the police authorities to the other employees (not on strike) plant and machinery. When orders are made to this effect, the Court must explain clearly in its order the ambit of the protection required to be given. As it reads, it would require maintenance of unlimited protection and if per chance only limited protection is given by the police authorities and as a result thereof some persons or property would buffer any damage, the police authorities might be hauled up for contempt. We do not think that the interim order in terms of prayer (d)(ii) was thus justified. There was already an order permitting removal of goods and also evicting the workmen who were on what may be called a sit down strike in the premises. These orders were to be carried out with police help. That was sufficient at that juncture. Similarly we feel that the drastic order against the police authorities in terms of prayer (d)(iii) was also not called for, although the same in a very much modified form could perhaps have been considered and granted.
8. In the result, though today the parties are not at great dispute, we only uphold the order in terms of prayer (d)(i) of the Writ Petition and that too restricted to the interim orders in terms of prayers (b) and (c) granted by the Labour Court. The rest of the interim relief granted was not justified and is required to be set aside. The appeal is allowed to that extent. Parties to bear their own costs of the appeal.
9. As stated earlier, the 1st respondent applies that Rule issued in the Writ Petition may be discharged. Order accordingly. Parties to bear their own costs in the Writ Petition also.