In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh
VATAP No. 36 of 2009
Date of Decision: October 28, 2009
State of Punjab and another
...Appellants
Versus
M/s Fair Deal Filing Station
...Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.M. KUMAR
HON'BLE MS JUSTICE NIRMALJIT KAUR
Present: Mr. Piyush Kant Jain, Addl. AG, Punjab
for the appellants.
1. To be referred to the Reporters or not?
2. Whether the judgment should be reported in
the Digest?
M.M. KUMAR, J.
This appeal filed by the revenue under Section 68(2) of the
Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (for brevity, ‘the VAT Act’) challenges
order dated 1.12.2008 (A-3) passed by the Value Added Tax Tribunal,
Punjab, Chandigarh (for brevity, ‘the Tribunal’) in Appeal No. 309 of 2006-
07. The Tribunal has reached the conclusion that input tax credit in respect
of the stock held by the dealer-respondent on the appointed date was to be
allowed as per the provisions of Section 14 of the VAT Act. The Tribunal
also found that the tax had already been paid by the dealer-respondent and
merely because the application was not filed within the prescribed time limit,
it could not have been denied the ITC claim and penalised for delay by
burdening with costs.
VATAP No. 36 of 2009 2
2. The controversy raised in the instant appeal is no longer res
integra and the same has already been set at rest by a Division Bench of this
Court in the case of State of Punjab v. M/s City Petro, (2009) 33 PHT 167
(P&H). The Division Bench after noticing the provisions of Rule 25 of the
Punjab Value Added Tax Rules, 2005, Section 14 of the VAT Act and the
judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Chairman,
Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd.,
(2007) 8 SCC 705, dismissed the appeal of the revenue in M/s City Petro’s
case (supra) by observing as under:-
“9. It is further appropriate to mention that the period
of 30 days was extended to 45 days by Act No. 11 of 2006 with
effect from 24.4.2006. The respondent had filed its input tax
credit claim on 18.6.2005 which was before the date of
publication of the VAT Rules. By virtue of the use of
expression ‘appointed day’ for counting the period of 30 days,
used in Rule 25(1)(b), an argument was raised by the revenue
that the period of 30 days or 45 days have to be counted from the
‘appointed day’ i.e. 1.4.2005. The Tribunal did not accept the
aforementioned argument because by no stretch of imagination
an impossible act could be permitted to be done. The VAT
Rules were published on 21.6.2005 and the ‘appointed day’ of
1.4.2005 would require a dealer to file his return within 45 days,
which would expire on 15.5.2005. This could never be intention
of the legislature which has provided by Sections 13 and 14 of
the VAT Act that a dealer can file his statement of input tax
credit claim subject to certain conditions. Moreover, it is a
transitory statute repealing the earlier Sales Tax Act. The goods
VATAP No. 36 of 2009 3
which have already suffered sales tax could not be subjected toanother doze of tax.
10. It is, thus, evident that even if period of 45 days is
given from the ‘appointed day’ i.e. 1.4.2005, no dealer could
have filed his input tax credit claim nor could the claim be filed
w.e.f. 24.4.2006 when further period of 15 days was granted
from that date. It is well settled that the law does not
contemplate doing of an impossible act. The legislative intent is
clear from the reading of Sections 13 and 14 of the VAT Act,
which allow a dealer to claim input tax credit subject to various
other conditions. It is also clearly made out that period of 45
days is intended to be given to the dealer to make input tax
credit claim. However, the period of 45 days has to be counted
from the date of publication of the VAT Rules on 21.6.2005.
Any other interpretation would defeat the basic object of
Sections 13 and 14 of the VAT Act and the VAT Rules. If the
intention of the legislature and the rule making authorities is
gathered from the aforesaid provisions then the period of 45
days have to be granted from the date of publication of the VAT
Rules. Therefore, it would be appropriate to apply the rule of
purposive construction to a statute of this nature which would
make VAT Rules workable, as has been laid down in para 82 of
the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of
Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial
Coke & Chemicals Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 705. Such an
interpretation would be consistent with the intention of the
VATAP No. 36 of 2009 4
legislature and the rule framing authorities and would advancethe object of the statute.
For the reasons aforementioned, this appeal fails
and the same is dismissed.”
Similar view has been reiterated in subsequent Division Bench
judgments rendered in the cases of State of Punjab and another v. M/s
Indian Colour Centre (VATAP No. 80 of 2008, decided on 25.5.2009) and
Lahori Mal Bimal Chand Jain v. State of Punjab and another (VATAP
No. 17 of 2008, decided on 5.9.2009).
In view of above, we are of the considered view that the instant
appeal is squarely covered by the Division Bench judgment rendered in the
case of M/s City Petro (supra). Therefore, following the same reasoning the
appeal is dismissed.
In view of the fact that the appeal has been disposed of on merit,
we do not feel the necessity of passing any order in the civil miscellaneous
application filed alongwith the appeal and the same are disposed of as such.
(M.M. KUMAR)
JUDGE
(NIRMALJIT KAUR)
October 28, 2009 JUDGE
Pkapoor