Supreme Court of India

State Of Punjab vs Iqbal Singh And Ors on 10 May, 1991

Supreme Court of India
State Of Punjab vs Iqbal Singh And Ors on 10 May, 1991
Equivalent citations: 1991 AIR 1532, 1991 SCR (2) 790
Author: Ahmadi
Bench: Ahmadi, A.M. (J)
           PETITIONER:
STATE OF PUNJAB

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
IQBAL SINGH AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/05/1991

BENCH:
AHMADI, A.M. (J)
BENCH:
AHMADI, A.M. (J)
RAMASWAMI, V. (J) II
RAMASWAMY, K.

CITATION:
 1991 AIR 1532		  1991 SCR  (2) 790
 1991 SCC  (3)	 1	  1991 SCALE  (1)923


ACT:
     Indian  Penal Code, 1860-Sections	107,  108-`Abetment'
Abettor'-Definition of.
     Words and Phrases-"Instigate","aid"-Meaning of.
     Indian  Evidence Act,  1872-Sections 113-A	 and  113-B-
Dowry  death-Presumption-Legislative  intention	 of-Duty  of
Court indicated.
     Indian Penal Code, 1860-Sections 107-10, 30, 304-B, 306
and 498-A-Married woman, subjected to cruelty or harassment-
Death-Presumption of-Punishment of persons responsible.



HEADNOTE:
     Respondent	 No. 1's wife setting herself and her  three
children  ablaze, died at her husband's	 house on  7.6.1983.
The marriage had taken place seven or eight years before the
incident.  The deceased wife was working as a teacher  while
her husband was a clerk.
     Soon  after  the marriage there were  disputes  between
them  on the question of dowry.	 The demand for extra  dowry
strained  the  relations between them them and	the  husband
began to ill-treat the deceased wife.
     The  deceased  had	 written  a  letter  to	 the  Deputy
Superintendent of Police on 12.10.1977 complaining about the
ill-treatment  meted out to her and apprehending  danger  to
her  life  and the lives of her children.  When	 the  police
came   to   inquire   into  the	 matter	  there	  was	some
understanding,	as  a result of which she had  informed	 the
police	that no further action be taken for the present	 but
her application may be kept pending.  Later, a divorce	deed
was  executed  but not acted upon.  The	 situation  did	 not
improved.
     On 7.6.1983, the very morning of incident, the deceased
wife  wrote  a letter addressed to  Deputy  Commissioner  of
Police,	 wherein she narrated how she and her children	were
ill-treated  by	 her husband, narrated how she and  and	 her
children were ill-treated by her husband, mother-in-law	 and
sister-in-law for dowry and why she took the decision to put
an  end to her life and the lives of her  children.  Another
letter
						       791
of even date was addressed to her mother stating the reasons
for her such act.
     A	First  Information  Report was	lodged	against	 the
Respondent  No.	 1  by the mother of  the  deceased.   After
investigation  the Respondent No. 1, his mother	 and  sister
were  put up  for trial.  The Trial Court on an	 examination
of the prosecution evidence convicted all the three  accused
persons under Section 306, IPC and sentenced the husband  to
rigorous  imprisonment	for  seven  years  and	a  fine	  of
Rs.5,000, in default, rigorous imprisonment for one year and
sentenced the two others to rigorous imprisonment for  three
years  and  a fine of Rs.1,000 each,  in  default,  rigorous
imprisonment for three months, against which order,  accused
persons preferred an appeal before the High Court.
     The High Court on a reappreciation of the evidence	 and
having	regard to the language of Section 306,	IPC came  to
the  conclusion that there was no evidence to show that	 any
of  the	 accused  was guilty of	 abetment  and	allowed	 the
appeal.
     The State has, therefore, approached this Court by	 way
of  special leave.  In the meantime the Respondent  No.	 1's
mother had passed away.	 The appeal was, therefore,  limited
to the Respondent No. 1 and his sister.
     Allowing the appeal, this Court,
     HELD: 1. `Abetment' as defined by Section 107 comprises
(i)  instigation to do that thing which is an offence,	(ii)
engaging  in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing	 and
(iii)  intentionally aiding by any act or  illegal  omission
the  doing of that thing.  An abettor is a person who  abets
an offence or who abets either the commission of an  offence
of  the	 commission  of an act which would  be	an  offence.
[798C-D]
     2. The word `instigate' in the literary sense means  to
incite,	 set or urge on, stir up, goad,	 foment,  stimulate,
provoke,  etc. The dictionary meaning of the word, "aid"  is
to give assistance, help, tec. [798D-E]
     3.	 Where	the death of a woman is caused by  burns  or
bodily	 injury	 or  occurs  otherwise	than  under   normal
circumstances  within  seven  years  of	 her  marriage	 and
evidence  reveals  that	 soon  before  her  death  she	 was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any  of
his relative for or in connection with any demand for dowry,
such  death  is described as dowry under Section 304  B	 for
which the
						       792
punishment  extends to imprisonment for life, but  not	less
than  imprisonment  for	 seven	years.	 By  Section   113B,
Evidence Act, the court has to raise a presumption of  dowry
death,	if  the same has taken place within seven  years  of
marriage  and  there is evidence of the	 women	having	been
subjected to cruelty and/or harassment. [800A-C]
     4.	 The  legislative  intent is  clearly  to  curb	 the
menance of dowry deaths, etc., with a firm hand. Court	must
keep in mind this legislative intent.  It must be remembered
that  since  such  crimes are  generally  committed  in	 the
privacy of residential homes and in secrecy, independent and
direct	evidence  is  not  easy to get.	  That	is  why	 the
legislature has by introducing sections 113A and 113B in the
Evidence Act tried to strengthen the prosecution's hands  by
permitting   a	 presumption  to  be   raised	if   certain
foundational facts are established and the unfortunate event
has taken place within seven years of marriage.	 This period
of  seven years is considered to be the turbulent one  after
which  the  legislature assumes that the couple would have
settled down in life. [800D-E]
     5.	 If  a	married woman is  subjected  to	 cruelty  of
harassment by her husband or his family members section 498-
A,  IPC would be attracted.  If such cruelty  or  harassment
was  inflicted	by the husband or his relative	for,  or  in
connection  with, any demand for dowry immediately preceding
death	by   burns  and	 bodily	 injury	  or   in   abnormal
circumstances  within seven years of marriage, such  husband
or relative is deemed to have caused her death and is liable
to be punished under section 304B IPC. [800E-F]
     6.	 When the question at issue is whether a  person  is
guilty of dowry death of a woman and the evidence  discloses
that immediately before her death she was subjected by	such
person	to cruelty and/or harassment for, or  in  connection
with,  any  demand  for dowry,	section	 113B  Evidence	 Act
provides  that the Court shall presume that such person	 had
caused the dowry death. [800F-G]
     7.	 In the present case section 113A or 113B,  Evidence
Act cannot be invoked as the prosecution has not brought the
exact date of marriage on record.  Yet where the husband  or
his relative by his wilful conduct creates a situation which
he  knows   will drive the woman to commit suicide  and	 she
actually  does so, the case would squarely fall	 within	 the
ambit of section 306, IPC. In such a case the conduct of the
person	 would	tantamount  to	inciting  or  provoking	  or
virtually  pushing the woman into a desperate act.  In	this
case it would seem from past events that it was a  carefully
chalked	 out  strategy	to provoke the	woman  into  killing
herself. [800H-801A, 801E]
						       793
     8. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
the  trial  court had rightly convicted	 the  husband  under
section	 306  IPC.  The High Court  committed  an  error  in
reversing  the	conviction.  The plea for reduction  of	 his
sentence cannot be countenanced.  [801F-G]



JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
325 of 1987.

From the Judgment and Order dated 9.11.1984 of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl. Appeal No. 132-SB of
1984.

Amita Gupta and R.S. Suri for the Appellant.
R.L. Kohli, R.C. Kohli, G.S. Rao and Ms. C. Markandeya
for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
AHMADI, J. Mohinder Kaur set herself and her three
children ablaze on the afternoon of 7th June, 1983, at the
residence of her husband Iqbal Singh. The marriage had
taken place seven or eight years before the incident. She
had given birth to two daughters and a son. The deceased
was working as a teacher while her husband was a clerk in
the Punjab State Electricity Board office at Amritsar. Soon
after the marriage there were disputes between them on the
question of dowry. The demand for extra dowry strained the
relations between them and the husband began to ill-treat
the deceased wife. It appears that in course of time there
was further deterioration in their relationship as a result
whereof the deceased had written a letter to the Deputy
Superintendent of Police on 12th October, 1977 complaining
about the ill-treatment meted out to her and apprehending
danger to her life and the life of her children. She
therefore, sought police protection. However, by the time
the police came to inquire into the matter there was some
understanding as a result of which has had informed the
police that no further action be taken for the present but
her application may be kept pending. Then on 31st December,
1977 a divorce deed Exh. D-2 was executed but was not acted
upon. It seems that the situation did not improve and as a
result she took the extreme step of putting an end to her
life as well as the lives of her three children since she
apprehended that their fate would be worse after her death.
However, before putting an end to her life she wrote a
letter that very morning which has been reproduced in
extenso in paragraph 13 of the judgment of the trial court.
The text of that letter dated 7th June, 1983
794
addressed to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Public
Dealing Branch, Amritsar, shows that her husband was
demanding Rs.35,000 to Rs.40,000 by way of additional dowry
and was ill-treating her under the influence of alcohol on
that account. She also alleged that her mother-in-law and
sister- in-law also conspired and made false accusations
against her and instigated her husband to beat her if she
refused to bring the additional dowry. She alleges that
they had conspired to kill her on the night of 6th June,
1983 by sprinkling kerosene/petrol on her but their plan
misfired. She was fed up on account of the beating given to
her that night. She further alleged that her children were
also ill-treated by her husband and his family members. On
account of these developments she had taken the decision to
put an end her life and the lives of her children to spare
them of the present and future agony. At the foot of the
letter she appended a note to the effect that even after
their death she apprehended that her husband and his family
members may try to cause physical harm to her mother and
younger brother and requested the police to extend to them
the necessary protection. She implores that her salary,
G.P. Fund and other monetary benefits to which she may be
entitled from the school authorities should not fall in the
hands of her husband and his relatives and may be given to
some school or orphanage and her ornaments, etc. may be
recovered from her in-laws and be returned to her parents.
Another letter of even date was addressed to her mother (her
father having since died) stating that she was fed up of the
continuous tension, suffering and agony that her mother had
to go through on her account as she could not meet the
demand for extra dowry. She also states that apart from her
husband demanding extra dowry he has started making false
accusations against her and beating her time and again on
that account. She further alleges that her husband’s mother
and sister were privy to this beating by her husband but she
had somehow survived. Then she adds `today I alongwith
three children am sacrificing by fire’. She ends the letter
by stating that her mother need not think that her daughter
was dead, in fact she will gain freedom from seven years of
hell. In the letter addressed to the Deputy Commissioner of
Police there is reference to the earlier application/letter
dated 12th October, 1977 by which she had complained about
possible risk to life. It appears from the said letter that
the police had gone to inquire into the matter two months
later on 11th December, 1977 but during that intervening
period the relatives of her husband had intervened and had
temporarily patched up the matter. It was for that reason
that she informed the police that no action was immediately
necessary but still she insisted that her application may be
kept pending, Thus this subsequent letter contains intrinsic
evidence about her
795
previous application dated 12th October, 1977.

After the unfortunate incident which took place on the
afternoon of 7th June, 1983 a First Information Report was
lodged against the husband Iqbal Singh, by the mother of the
deceased. After investigation the husband, his mother and
sister were put up for trial. The Trial Court on an
examination of the prosecution evidence convicted all the
three accused persons under Section 306, IPC and sentenced
the husband Iqbal Singh to rigorous imprisonment for seven
years and a fine of Rs.5,000, in default, rigorous
imprisonment for one year. So far as the other two accused
were concerned, having regard to their role and the fact
that the mother was an aged and frail woman, he sentenced
them to rigorous imprisonment for three years and a fine of
Rs.1,000 each, in default, rigorous imprisonment for three
months.

Against this order of conviction and sentence all the
three accused persons preferred an appeal before the High
Court. The High Court on a reappreciation of the evidence
and having regard to the language of Section 306, IPC came
to the conclusion that the prosecution evidence did not
establish the ingredients of the section, in that, there was
no evidence to show that any of the accused was guilty of
abetment. In this view that the High Court took, it allowed
the appeal and set aside the order of conviction and
sentence passed against the appellants. The State has,
therefore, approached this Court by way of special leave.
In the meantime the accused Manjit Kaur has passed away.
The appeal is, therefore, limited to Iqbal Singh and his
sister Kulwant Kaur.

Counsel for the State of Punjab took us through the
evidence on record, particularly the letters dated 7th June,
1983 and submitted that this was a clear case of the husband
and his sister creating conditions which compelled the
deceased to take the extreme step of burning herself and her
children. The evidence of Dr. Harjinder Singh who performed
autopsy has not been disputed before us. His evidence shows
that the deaths of all had resulted on account of shock
sustained due to excessive burns. PW 2 Jasbir Kaur, the
mother of the deceased, says that her daughter complained to
her from time to time about the ill-treatment meted out to
her by her husband on his own and at the instigation of his
mother and sister. She has also stated that this ill-
treatment was due to failure of the deceased to meet his
demand for extra dowry. She received a message about the
incident while she was at her brother’s residence in
amritsar. She and her son went to the hospital and learnt
that her daughter and grand children had passed
795
previous application dated 12th October, 1977.

After the unfortunate incident which took place on the
afternoon of 7th June, 1983 a First Information Report was
lodged against the husband Iqbal Singh, by the mother of the
deceased. After investigation the husband, his mother and
sister were put up for trial. The Trial Court on an
examination of the prosecution evidence convicted all the
three accused persons under Section 306, IPC and sentenced
the husband Iqbal Singh to rigorous imprisonment for seven
years and a fine of Rs. 5,000, in default, rigorous
imprisonment for one year. So far as the other two accused
were concerned, having regard to their role and the fact
that the mother was an aged and frail woman, he sentenced
them to rigorous imprisonment for three years and a fine of
Rs.1,000 each, in default, rigorous imprisonment for three
months.

Again this order of conviction and sentence all the
three accused persons preferred an appeal before the High
Court. The High Court on a reappreciation of the evidence
and having regard to the language of Section 306, IPC came
to the conclusion that the prosecution evidence did not
establish the ingredients of the section, in that, there was
no evidence to show that any of the accused was guilty of
abetment. In this view that the High Court took, it allowed
the appeal and set aside the order of conviction and
sentence passed against the appellants. The State has,
therefore, approached this Court by way of special leave.
In the meantime the accused manjit Kaur has passed away.
The appeal is, therefore, limited to Iqbal singh and his
sister Kulwant Kaur.

Counsel for the State of Punjab took us through the
evidence on record, particularly the letters dated 7th June,
1983 and submitted that this was a clear case of the husband
and his sister creating conditions which compelled the
deceased to take the extreme step of burning herself and her
children. The evidence of Dr. Harjinder Singh who performed
autopsy has not been disputed before us. His evidence shows
that the deaths of all had resulted on account of shock
sustained due to excessive burns. PW 2 Jasbir Kaur, the
mother of the deceased, says that her daughter complained to
her from time to time about the ill-treatment meted out to
her by her husband on his own and at the instigation of his
mother and sister. She has also stated that this ill-
treatment was due to failure of the deceased to meet his
demand for extra dowry. She received a message about the
incident while she was at her brother’s residence in
Amritsar. She and her son went to the hospital and learnt
that her daughter and grand children had passed
796
away. She then deposed to have received a letter of 7th
June, 1983 on 9th June, 1983. In her cross-examination it
was brought out that she had not pointed an accusing finger
at the mother and sister of accused Iqbal Singh. She tried
to explain the absence of allegation against the said two
persons on the ground that she was confused on account of
the tragedy. She further deposed that she had omitted the
names of two ladies because of pressure exerted on her by
Iqbal singh. Obviously her explanation cannot carry
conviction because it is difficult to believe that she would
submit to the pressure of Iqbal Singh whom she considered
primarily responsible for the death of her daughter and grand
children. It may also be mentioned at this stage accused
Kulwant Kaur is a married women who lives with her husband
in another village. There is no evidence on record to show
that she was at the residence of her brother on the date of
the incident or immediately prior thereto to instigate her
brother. PW Santosh Singh, brother of the deceased, has
maintained that accused Iqbal Singh was ill-treating his
sister soon after marriage as the latter was not able to
meet his demand for extra dowry. He further deposed that
after the death of his father his mother had received a sum
of Rs.60,000 or thereabouts by way of provident fund and
gratuity and when the accuse Iqbal Singh learnt about the
same he pressurised the deceased to secure a sum of
Rs.40,000 or thereabouts from that amount to meet his demand
for extra dowry. He had gone with his mother PW 2 Jasbir
Kaur to the hospital after learning about the incident. In
cross-examination he was questioned about the purchase of a
plot in the name of the deceased by Iqbal Singh. He,
however, stated that his father had given a sum Rs.20,000 or
21,000 for purchase of this plot although he could not state
the exact price at which it was purchased. The two letters,
one addressed to the Deputy Commissioner of Police and the
other to the mother dated 7th June 1983, have been duly
proved by the prosecution. These letters were written
immediately before she put an end to her life and the lives
of her three children. These letters reveal her plight
immediately before the incident. There is a mention about
an attempt on the part of her husband to kill her on the
preceding day. She apprehended that her children would
suffer intolerable miseries if they survived her and,
therefore, she took the extreme decision to put an end to
their lives also along with her. This letter clearly brings
out her turmoil whereunder she took the extreme step of
putting an end to her life. The earlier letter of 12th
October, 1977 also shows that she was being ill-treated soon
after her marriage. The divorce deed produced at Exh. D-2
is dated 30th November, 1977. This would show that by that
time the relatives had intervened and, therefore, when the
police came to inquire on 11th December, 1977 she told them
that
797
there was no immediate danger but her application should be
kept pending. Considerable emphasis was laid by the learned
counsel for the respondents on the statement in Exh. D-2
attributed to the deceased that she had been forced to marry
Iqbal Singh. Emphasis was also laid on the post-script at
the foot of the said document made by Iqbal Singh to the
effect that he has agreed to a divorce since his wife
desires it. From these two statements counsel for the
respondents argued that the accused Iqbal Singh had no
grudge against his wife and had expressed his willingness to
put an end to the marital relationship as his wife so
desired. He also submitted that the statement of the
deceased that she was forced to marry Iqbal Singh went to
show that it was she who was keen to put an end to the
relationship as she did not desire to live with Iqbal Singh.
But counsel overlooks the fact that there is intrinsic
evidence inthe divorce deed that their marital life was
unhappy and she apprehended blood shed as well as harm to
the children even after they parted company. Counsel then
referred to letter Exh. D-1 April, 1983 written by the
deceased to one Gopal Singh complaining about the behaviour
of the Headmaster towards her. By that letter she expressed
her desire to secure a transfer from the school to get rid
of the harassment meted out to her by the Headmaster. In
this letter there is a mention that her husband Iqbal Singh
was spending considerable time in correspondable time in
correspondence with the Headmaster. From this letter
counsel for the respondents submitted that the deceased
could have committed suicide on account of the harassment
caused to her by the Headmaster of the school. But that
does not explain the killing of the children. This letter
was written on 17th April, 1983 whereas the incident in
question occurred on 7th June, 1983 i.e. more than 1-1/2
months thereafter. The immediate cause for the extreme step
taken by the deceased is clearly reflected in the two
letters of 7th June, 1983. Therefore, the inference drawn
by the learned counsel for the respondents from the letter
of 17th Aril, 1983 cannot advance the defence set up by the
accused persons. Iqbal Singh filed a written statement
jointly with Kulwant Kaur wherein he stated that he had not
helped his wife to secure a transfer as the family was
having a good residence in the village and this was the real
cause of quarrel between the two. The statement shows that
the factum of quarrel between the husband and wife is not
seriously disputed. The nature of correspondence he was
carrying on with the Headmaster is not difficult to judge.
He then states that he had purchased the plot in the name of
his wife for Rs. 12,500 but he does not disclose the source
from which the consideration for the plot came. He further
states that his wife was earning Rs.900 per month and,
therefore, he could never have entertained an intention to
push her to committing suicide. It
798
would, therefore, appear from the evidence placed on record
that the relations between the deceased and Iqbal Singh were
strained because of the latter’s demand for extra dowry and
they worsened to such an extent that the deceased decided to
put an end to her life.

The charge against the accused was under section 306,
I.P.C. That section must be read in the backdrop of the
above facts. Underthat section if any person commits
suicide the person who abets the commission of suicide shall
be liable to be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years and
fine. The question is whether on the facts proved it can be
said that either Iqbal Singh or his sister were guilty of
abetment. Chapter V of the Penal Code is entitled `Of
Abetment’ and comprises sections 107 to 120 of which we may
notice sections 107 and 108 only. `Abetment’ as defined by
section 107 comprises (i) instigation to do that thing which
is an offense (ii) engaging in any conspiracy for the doing
of that thing and (iii) intentionally aiding by any act or
illegal omission the doing of that thing. Section 108
defines an abettor as a person who abets an offence or who
abets either the commission of an offence or the commission
of an act which would be an offence. The word `instigate’
in the literary sense means to incite, set or urge on, stir
up, goad, foment, stimulate, provoke, etc. Since there is
no question of parties being engaged in any sort of
conspiracy we have to consider whether there was any
intentional aiding for committing suicide. The dictionary
meaning of the word aid is to give assistance, help, etc.
Before we come to grips with the question at issue it
is necessary to notice a few legislative changes introduced
in the Penal Code to combat the menance of dowry deaths.
The increasing number of such deaths was a matter of serious
concern to our law-makers. Cases of cruelty by the husband
and his relatives culminated in the wife being driven to
commit suicide or being done to death by burning or in any
other manner. In order to combat this menance the
legislature decided to amend the Penal Code, Criminal
Procedure Code and the Evidence Act by the Criminal Law
(Section Amendment) Act, 1983 (No, 46 of 1983). So far as
the Penal Code is concerned, Section 498A came to be
introduced whereunder `cruelty’ by th husband or his
relative to the former’s wife is made a penal offence
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years and fine. The explanation to the section
defines `cruelty’ to mean (i) wilful conduct which is of
such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb
or health or (ii) causing harassment of the woman with a
view to coercing her or any person
799
related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property
or valuable security. Thus, under this newly added
provision if a woman is subjected to cruelty by her husband
or his relative it is a penal offence and by the insertion
of section 198A in the Code of Criminal Procedure a Court
can take cognizance of the offence upon a police report or
upon a complaint by the aggrieved party or by the woman’s
parents, brother, sister, etc. The offence is made non-
bailable. In so far as the Evidence Act is concerned, a
new section 113A came to be introduced which reads as under:
“113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a
married woman. When the question is whether the
commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted
by her husband or any relative of her husband and
it is shown that she had committed suicide within a
period of seven years from the date of her marriage
and that her husband or such relative of her
husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may
presume, having regard to all the other
circumstances of the case, that such suicide had
been abetted by her husband or by such relative of
her husband.

Explanation-For the purposes of this section,
`cruelty’ shall have the same meaning as in Section
498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

On a plain reading of this provision it is obvious that if a
wife is shown to have committed suicide within a period of
seven years from the date of marriage and there is evidence
that she was subjected to cruelty by her husband or his
relative, it would be permissible for the court to presume
that such suicide was abetted by her husband or by such
relative of her husband. The Amendment Act 46 of 1983
received the assent of the President on 25th December, 1983
and was published in the Gazette of India, dated 26th
December, 1983. The trial court rendered its Judgment on
23rd February, 1984 and it does not appear if the
prosecution concentrated on section 113A, Evidence Act, for
otherwise it would have tried to place on record the exact
date of marriage to take advantage of the presumption
arising thereunder. The High Court referred to this
provision but did not say anything in regard to its
application. Being a rule of evidence it could perhaps
have been invoked if proof regarding the exact date of
marriage was laid. Since there is no cogent evidence that
the marriage was solemnised within seven years from the date
of incident we need not dilate on that point.

800

The law underwent a further change with the
introduction of section 304B in the Penal Code and section
113B in the Evidence Act by the Dowry Prohibition
(Amendment) Act, 1986. Where the death of a woman is caused
by burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under
normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and
evidence reveals that soon before her death she was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any of
his relative for or in connection with any demand for dowry,
such death is described as dowry death under section 304B
for which the punishment extends to imprisonment for life
but not less than imprisonment for seven years. By section
113B, Evidence Act, the court has to raise a presumption of
dowry death if the same has taken place within seven ears of
marriage and there is evidence of the woman having been
subjected to cruelty and/or harassment.

The legislative intent is clear: to curb the menance of
dowry deaths, etc., with a firm hand. We must keep in mind
this legislative intent. It must be remembered that since
such crimes are generally committed in the privacy of
residential homes and in secrecy, independent and direct
evidence is not easy to get. That is why the legislature
has by introducing sections 113A and 113B in the Evidence
Act tried to strengthen the prosecution hands by permitting
a presumption to be raised if certain foundational facts are
established and the unfortunate event has taken place within
seven years of marriage. This period of seven years is
considered to be the turbulent one after which the
legislature assumes that the couple would have settled down
in life. It a married woman is subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or his family members section
498A, I.P.C. would be attracted. If such cruelty or
harassment was inflicted by the husband or his relative for,
or in connection with, any demand for dowry immediately
preceding death by burns and bodily injury or in abnormal
circumstances within seven years of marriage, such husband
or relative is deemed to have caused her death and is liable
to be punished under section 304B, I.P.C. When the question
at issue is whether a person is guilty of dowry death of a
woman and and the evidence discloses that immediately
before her death she was subjected by such person to cruelty
and/or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for
dowry, section 113B, Evidence Act provides that the court
shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Of course if there is proof of the person having
intentionally caused her death that would attract section
302, I.P.C. Then we have a situation where the husband or
his relative by his wilful conduct creates a situation which
he knows will drive the woman to commit suicide and she
actually does so, the case would
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squarely fall within the ambit of section 306, I.P.C. In
such a case the conduct of the person would tantamount to
inciting provoking or virtually pushing the woman into a
desperate situation of no return which would compel her to
put an end to her miseries by committing suicide. In the
present case the facts clearly reveal from the divorce deed
Exh. D-2 that the relations between the husband and the
wife were strained even in 1977. There is intrinsic
evidence in that document that the wife apprehended blood
shed and harm to her children. Before the execution of this
document she had sought police protection by her
application/letter dated 12th October, 1977. Then in April,
1983 her efforts to secure a transfer from the school where
she was harassed by the Head Master were frustrated by her
husband. Her husband had kept up the pressure for extra-
dowry since her marriage and had stepped it up after the
demise of her father on learning that her mother had
received the G.P. Fund, Gratuity, etc., due to her father.
Since she and her mother and brother were not able to meet
this demand she was subjected to considerable torture.
Added to that was the anxiety caused by her husband’s
conduct at trying to frustrate her efforts to seek a
transfer from the school where she was serving. The last
straw on the camel’s back fell when she was severely beaten
on the previous day, i.e. 6th June, 1983 as is evident from
her letter of 7th June, 1983. An atmosphere of terror was
created to push her into taking the extreme step. It would
seem it was a carefully chalked out strategy to provoke her
into taking the extreme step to kill herself and her
children as she apprehended that they will be much more
miserable after she is dead and gone. In this
fact/situation can it be said that the husband had not been
responsible in creating circumstances which would provoke or
force her into taking the only alternative left open to her,
namely suicide? Can it be said that the husband did not
realise where he was leading her by his wilful conduct? We
think in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
the trial court had rightly convicted the husband under
section 306 I.P.C. We think that the High Court committed
an error in reversing the conviction. We, therefore, allow
this appeal, set aside the High Court’s order and restore
the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial
court. We cannot countenance the plea for reduction of his
sentence. No order on his C.M.P.

So far as his sister’s involvement is concerned, we
think the evidence falls short of proof beyond reasonable
doubt and, therefore, we see no reason to interfere with the
High Court’s order. We, therefore, dismiss the State’s
appeal directed against her. Her bail bonds will stand
cancelled.

V.P.R.					     Appeal allowed.
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