PETITIONER: STATE OF PUNJAB Vs. RESPONDENT: K. R. ERRY & SOBHAG RAI MEHTA(With Connected Appeal) DATE OF JUDGMENT21/09/1973 BENCH: PALEKAR, D.G. BENCH: PALEKAR, D.G. SHELAT, J.M. MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN DWIVEDI, S.N. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. CITATION: 1973 AIR 834 1973 SCR (2) 405 1973 SCC (1) 120 CITATOR INFO : R 1974 SC 87 (11) F 1976 SC 667 (3,4,5) RF 1976 SC 676 (12) R 1978 SC 803 (30) R 1987 SC 943 (8) ACT: Punjab Pension Rules-R. 6.4-Natural justice-Government imposing cut in pension-Allegation of it-regularities while in Service-Requirement of reasonable opportunity of being heard. HEADNOTE: Rule 6.4 of the Punjab Pension Rules provides "6.4 (a) The full pension admissible under the rule is not to be given as a matter of course, or unless the service rendered has been really approved. (b) If the service has not been thoroughly satisfactory, the authority sanctioning the pension should make reduction in the amount as it thinks proper. The respondents were employed in the service of the appellant State. On their retirement the State government imposed a cut in their pension and in the gratuity amount. It was alleged by the State government that the officers had committed major irregularities and that the records of the officers showed that their career were not altogether satisfactory. Thereupon the respondents filed writ petitions in the High Court contending that pensionary benefit with the right to superannuation pension were property to which the officers by reason of their service were entitled as a matter of right and therefore they could not be deprived of any part of that property without notices to show cause why the cut should not be imposed. The High Court quashed the orders imposing the cut. It held that the right to superannuation pension was a right vested in the government servant and before that right is prejudicially affected he is entitled to a notice to show cause against the proposed cut, In the appeal to this Court it was conceded on behalf of the St-ate government that in view of the decisions of this Court in Deokinandan Prasad v. The State of Bihar and Others [1971] 2 S.C.C. 330 it was no longer open to contend that a pension was a bounty. But it was contended that the order of the State government in applying the cut was an administrative order under rule 6.4 of the Pension Roles and therefore, the State government was not liable to issue a notice to show cause against the proposed cut. It was pointed out that the St-ate government had in its possession the confidential records of the officers and on consideration of the same it was open to it reduce the pens-ion in its discretion. Dismissing the appeals, HELD: The State government could not have applied a cut in the pensions of the officers without giving them a reasonable opportunity to make their defence. Where a body or authority is judicial or where it has. to determine a matter involving rights judicially because of express or implied provisions of principles of natural justice audi alteram partem applies. Where a body or authority is characteristically administrative the principle of natural justice is also liable to be invoked if the decision of that body or authority affects individual rights or interests, and having regard to the particular situation it would be unfair for the body or authority not to have allowed a reasonable opportunity to be heard. [413C] 406 Advani & Ors. [1950] S.C.R. 621 (725); Board of High School JUDGMENT:
Gupta and Ors. [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 36; State of Orissa v.
Dr. (Miss) Biapani Dei & Ors., [1967] 2 S.C.R. 625; In re.
R.K. (An Infant) [1967] 2 Q.B.D. 617; A. K. Kraipak & Ors.
v. Union of India & Ors. [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457 and Cooper v.
Wandsworth Board of Works [1963] 14 C.D.N.S. 180, referred
to.
M. Narasimachar v. The State of Mysore, [1960] 1 S.C.R.
981, distinguished.
&
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1893- 1894
of 1967.
Appeals by certificate from the judgment and order dated
October 25, 1966 of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in
Civil Writs Nos. 504 of 1964- and 723 of 1965 and Civil
Appeal No. 735 of 1968.
Appeal by certificate from the order dated March 8. 1967 of
the Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in L.P.A. No.
66 of 1967.
V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant (in
all the appeals).
Bhimsena Rao and S. Ramachandran, for the respondent (in
C. A. No. 735/68).
B. R. Agrawala, for the respondent (in C. A. No. 1893/67).
Respondent appeared in person (in C. A. No. 1894,/67).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-
PALEKAR, J.-These appeals raise, a common question of law as
to whether the State Government is entitled to reduce the
amount of pension and gratuity legally payable to its
officers on their superannuation without giving a reasonable
opportunity to the officers to show cause against the
proposed reduction.
In the first case the officer concerned is Shri K. R. Erry.
He joined the Punjab P.W.D. Irrigation Branch as an
Assistant Engineer in 1926. In due course he was posted as
a Central Designs Officer and remained attached to the
Central Designs Office first in the capacity of Deputy
Director from 6-11-1951 to 30-4-1952 and then as an
Executive Engineer (Designs) from 1-5-1952 to 1-11-1955. He
was promoted from P.S.E. Class II to P.S.E. Class I with
effect from 22-9-1954 and was confirmed as an Executive
Engineer with effect from 12-8-1956. Early in 1958, he was
promoted to the rank of an officiating Superintending
Engineer and was posted as Director of Central Designs. In
November, 1958
407
he retired from service on reaching the age of
superannuation. Shortly, thereafter he was reappointed by
the Government as a Professor and Head of the Department of
Civil Engineering in the Punjab Engineering College,
Chandigarh, which post he held for about 16 months. The
question of his pension was taken up by the Government in
the normal routine and on 29-7-1963, Government informed him
that though he was entitled to a superannuation pension of
Rs. 423.05 n.p. per month and death-cum-retirement gratuity
of Rs. 16,320/- the Government was pleased to impose a cut
of 20% in the pension and Rs. 2,000/- in the gratuity amount
under Rule 6.4 of the Punjab, Civil Services Pension Rules,
since, in the opinion of the Government, the service record
of Shri Erry was not satisfactory. It is an admitted fact
that before this cut was applied Shri Erry had not been
furnished the grounds nor had he been given an opportunity
to show cause against the-proposed cut.
The second case also runs on parallel lines. The officer
concerned is Shri Sobhag Rai Mehta. He joined the Punjab
Irrigation Department as a temporary Engineer in 1939 and
was confirmed as Assistant Engineer in P.S.E. Class II in
1946. He was promoted to P.S.E. Class I and as an
officiating Executive Engineer in 1949. After a few months
he was reverted as S.DO. as he was declared unsuitable for
the promotion by the Punjab Public Service Commission. Two
years thereafter i.e. in 1951 he was again promoted as
Officiating Executive Engineer and confirmed as an Executive
Engineer with effect from 1-9-1956. Thereafter he was
promoted as an Officiating Superintending Engineer with
effect from 12-3-1959 and earned a year’s increment. On 12-
12-1960 he attained the age of superannuation. As his
pension papers were not finalized soon thereafter he was
allowed to draw anticipatory pension in the sum of Rs. 190/-
per month and Rs. 6,158/- as death-cum-retirement gratuity
pending final disposal of his case. On 4-7-1964 Government
decided that whereas the pension admissible to him under the
rules was Rs. 211.35 n.p. per month along with death-cum-
retirement gratuity of Rs. 8,211/- it was necessary to
impose a cut of 15% in his pension under rule 64 of the
Punjab Civil Service Rules, as in the opinion of the
Government the service record of Shri Mehta was not
satisfactory. His pension was thus reduced from Rs. 211.35
n.p. to Rs. 179.60 per month. It is admitted that while
applying the cut to the pension, no opportunity was given to
Shri Mehta to show cause against the proposed cut.
In the third case the officer concerned was Shri Khaushal
Singh. He was appointed as an Agriculture Assistant in the
Punjab Government in 1926. Thereafter, he worked in the
Department of Agriculture in various capacities and finally
in 1955 he was promoted to the post of District Agriculture
Officer
408
which was P.A.S. Class 11 post. He was confirmed in the
post of the District Agriculture Officer with effect from
13-1-1958. Shri Khaushal Singh also acted for sometime as
the Deputy Director of Agriculture before retirement on 10th
November, 1960 on reaching the age of superannuation. After
his retirement the Accountant General, Punjab calculated and
declared that he was entilled under the rules to be paid
pension of Rs. 175.50 np. per month and death-cum-retirement
gratuity amounting to Rs. 5,589/-. But on 7-10-1963 he was
informed that his pension had been reduced from Rs. 175.50
to Rs. 160/- per month and the amount of death-cum-gratuity
of Rs. 5,589/- had been forfeited by the Punjab Government.
In this case also it is admitted that Shri Khaushal Singh
had not been given any notice to show cause ‘why his pension
should not be reduced or death-cum-retirment gratuity
forfeited.
In all these three cases the aggrieved officer filed writ
petitions in the High Court of Punjab at Chandigarh. The
principal contention was that pensionary benefits, with the
right to superannuation pension, which, it is admitted,
included death-cum-retirement gratuity under the rules, were
property to which the officers by reason of their service
were entitled as a matter of right. They could not be
deprived of any part of that property without notice to show
cause why the cut should not be imposed.
The contention on behalf of the State was that pensionary
benefits were in the nature of a bounty and under rule 6.4
clauses (a) & (b) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules
(Pension Rules) it was open to the Government to impose a
cut, if in the opinion of the Government, the service record
of the officers was not thoroughly satisfactory. It was
also contended that the order imposing the cut was an
administrative order and the Government was not, therefore,
bound to give notice to the officers about the proposed cut.
The writ petitions of Shri Erry and Shri Mehta were heard
together by a full bench of the High Court and were disposed
of by a common judgment on October 25, 1966. The High Court
held by majority that the right to superannuation pension
was a right vested in the Government servant and before that
right is prejudicially affected he is entitled to a notice
to show cause against the proposed cut. In view of that
finding the orders imposing the cut were quashed.
The Writ Petition filed by Shri Khaushal Singh came on for
hearing before a single Judge of the High Court on December
22, 1966. The learned Judge held that the case was covered
by the decision of the full bench in the, above two cases
and the only
409
order he could pass was to quash the order by which the
State Government had imposed the cut in his pension. The
State of Punjab went in appeal to the Division Bench of that
court but, as was to be expected, that appeal was dismissed
in limini on 8-3-1967.
The present three appeals are filed by the State Government
challenging the view taken by the full bench.
Much of the argument which would have been otherwise
addressed to us has been cut short by a decision of this
Court in Deokinandan Prasad v. The State of Bihar and
Others(1). It was a petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution by which the petitioner maintained that denial
of pension was an infringement of his fundamental rights
under Article 31(1) and Article 19(1) (f) of the
Constitution. This Court held that the right of a Govern-
ment servant to receive pension is property under Article
31(1) and by a mere executive order the State did not have
the power to withhold the same. It was also held that the
claim to pension was property under Article 19(1)(f) and was
not saved by sub-Article 5 of Article 19. In coming to this
decision a number of cases of the Punjab High Court were
referred to and the view taken by that court in Shri Erry’s
case, which is now in appeal before us’ was affirmed. Mr.
Mahajan who appeared before us on behalf of the State
conceded that in view of the decision in Deokinandan’s case
it was no longer open to him to contend that pension was a
bounty.
Mr. Mahajan, however, contended that the order of the State
Government in applying the cut was an administrative order
under rule 6.4 of the Pension Rules and, therefore, the,
State Government was not liable to issue a notice to show
cause against the proposed cut. It was pointed out that the
State Government had in, its possession the Confidential
records of the officers, and on a consideration of the same
it was open to it to reduce the pension in its discretion.
It was alleged in the written statements filed in the,
petitions that their official careers were not without
blemish, that there were ups and downs in their service and
all these matters were considered by the State Government
before applying the cut. It was conceded that these
officers earned promotions and increments in due course of
their service but it was submitted that did not prevent the
State Government from applying the cut to the pension if, on
a consideration of the official career as a whole, the
officers were not entitled to unqualified approbation.
Rule 6.4 of the Punjab Pension Rules is as follows :
“6. 4(a) The full pension admissible under the
(1) [1971] (2) S.C.C. 330.
410
rule is not to be given as a matter of course,
or unless the service rendered has been really
approved.
(b) If the service has not been thoroughly
satisfactory, the authority sanctioning the
pension should make such reduction in the
amount as it thinks proper.”
There are five notes appended to this rule. But we are not
concerned with the same in dealing with the general
principle.
Some indication was given in the written statements field on
behalf of the State suggesting that the careers of the three
officers were not thoroughly satisfactory. In the case of
Shri Erry it was alleged that he had prepared the design of
the Ghaggar Syphon and when the same was constructed in
accordance with the design, a defect was discovered to
remedy which the Government had to spend an extra amount of
rupees seven lakhs. The State Government was of the opinion
that the defect was in the design and not the construction.
So far as this allegation is concerned Shri Erry has given
an, answer. According to him the design for the Syphon was
prepared by him under the able supervision and guidance of
his superiors viz. Shri Handa who was the Chief Engineer,
Bhakra Canals and Shri R. K. Gupta, Chief Engineer, who held
charge of the post of Director, Central Designs. Both these
officers had signed the design in token of its correctness
and approval. Shri Erry himself was not concerned with the
later construction in accordance with the design. The
construction was entrusted to Shri A. G. Kalha,
Superintending Engineer, Bhakra Main Line and his allegation
was that it was a constructional defect which caused loss to
the Government and not the design. The matter was actually
investigated by a ‘Committee of Enquiry’ which consisted of
three Chief Engineers presided over by Shri S. D. Khunger,
I.S.E. General Manager, Bhakra Dam, and in the view of that
Committee the defect was not in the design but in the
construction. That finding was questioned by Shri Kalha and
thereupon the Government set up a high-powered Commission
presided over by Mr. Justice Dulat. Mr. Justice Dulat held,
contrary to the finding of the Committee of Enquiry, that
the damage to the Ghaggar Syphon was due to faulty design
and not due to faulty construction. The complaint of Shri
Erry is that in the enquiry before the high-powered
Commission of Mr. Justice Dulat he was not. even called to
explain how his design was right and the construction was
wrong. Moreover, he contended it was wrong on the face of
it to hold him responsible for the design when, in fact the
design was not the sole creation of Shri Erry but also of
the two high officers Shri Handa and Shri Gupta who
411
had specifically examined and approved the design. It
is the grievance of Shri Erry that while these two officers
had retired and had been given their full pension it was
wrong to blame Shri Erry for the defect, if any. Indeed,
the High Court could not possibly have undertaken an
investigation into the blameworthiness of Shri Erry in the
Writ Petition. But it is obvious that the finding of Mr.
Justice Dulat that there was a fault in the design and not
in the construction was a finding arrived at without giving
an opportunity to the petitioner to explain. In other words.
if the defect in the design of the Syphon was the sole
reason for making a cut in the pension, Shri Erry would be
justified in his contention that Such a finding would have
been appropriate only if his explanation had been obtained
by Mr. Justice Dulat in the Course of the enquiry or by the
State Government before the cut was imposed.
So far as Shri Mehta is concerned the State Government also
gave an indication indication in para 5 of its written
statement that Shri Mehta was involved involved ill Some
official irregularities and these had attracted the comments
of the Public Accounts Committee. We do not know what were
the findings and whether those findings were arrived at
after notice to Shri Mehta.
So far the third officer namely Khaushal Singh is concerned
Government stated in para 4 of its written statement that
the State Government had Suffered a loss of Rs. 11,399.50
p. on account of irrecoverable fertilizer loss issued by
Shri Khaushal Singh to bogus persons and also a further loss
of Rs. 12,770,/- on account of irregularities committed by
the petitioner in the purchase of seed in the year 1959. It
does not appear that the State Government had instituted any
enquiry into these losses with a view to bring home the
guilt to Shri Khaushal Singh.
The above allegations in respect of all the three officers
concerned are undoubtedly serious. But they have remained
mere allegations. The officers could have been properly
charged for their delinquency. This was not done either
when they were in service or after they retired. Were
these matters taken into account, as the State Government
claims to have done before the imposition of the cut, it
would have beer) fair to have given an opportunity to the
officers to put forward their defence before depriving them
of a large share in their pensionable benefits which.
as we have already seen, are not mere bounty but property to
which they were entitled.
It was also alleged by the State Government in the written
statements that apart from the major defaults referred to
above. the records of all the three officers showed that
their careers were nor altogether satisfactory and here and
there were draw
9–L498Sup.Cl/73
412
that he was not allowed to cross the efficiency bar for a
year in 1953 and in the case of Shri Mehta he had been
superseded by his juniors on a number of occasions. At the
same time it cannot be ignored that in spite of some small
set backs here and there in their long official career these
officers earned promotions and were selected on merit to
fill high offices. Shri Erry started as an Assistant
Engineer in Class It service and in due course was promoted
as Executive Engineer in Class I service. At the end of his
career lie was appointed as a Superintending Engineer, the
post being a selection post. Similar is the case with Shri
Mehta. The latter has pointed out that as early as 6-4-1951
Government had framed rules for the preparation of a ranking
list in respect of the selection posts and under the rules
no person could get a selection post unless he was fit and
his record of service was satisfactory. He contended that
the very fact that he got the selection post of
Superintending Engineer on 11-3-1959 showed that he was fit
and his record of service was satisfactory.
Shri Khaushal Singh started his career as an Agriculture
Assistant in 1927 in class III Service and in 1955 was
promoted to a class 11 post and appointed the District
Agriculture Officer. He was confirmed in that post and also
officiated for sometime as the Deputy Director of
Agriculture. When the career of an officer is assessed as a
whole the fact that an officer, though with some impediments
in his long career, has obtained Successive promotions to
higher and yet higher posts may well raise the question
whether the State Government, at the time of granting him
pension which is normally determined by the years of service
and the last pay he receives at the end of his career, would
be entitled to forfeit rights acquired by length of service
on the ground that faults, which, at the time, were either
overlooked or condoned had now become so rave as to justify
punishing him by inflicting a severe cut in the pension. It
is not necessary for us to deal with this point here except
to suggest that this aspect of the case could well have been
urged by the officers before the Government if notice had
been issued to them to show cause against the proposed cut
and the State Government would have had necessarily to apply
its mind to that question.
In short it must be conceded that though the State Govern-
ment may have had some material before it for imposing a
penalty by way of a cut in the pension it had failed to give
a reasonable opportunity to the officers to put forward
their defence or facts in extenuation before the cut was
imposed. The case of Ridge v. Baldwin(1) comes to mind in
this connection. Baldwin who was the Chief Constable of the
borough police force was prose-
(1) [1964] A.C. 40.
413
cuted on grave charges. Donovan J, the trial Judge made,
while acquitting him, some observations about his moral
incompetence to afford leadership to the police force.
Acting on this severe criticism by a Judge of the High Court
the Watch Committee. entitled under Section 191. of the
Municipal Corporations Act 1882 to dismiss him on a charge
of unfitness, dismissed him from service. This dismissal
practically at the end of his official career had the
consequence of depriving him of his pension. The House of
Lords held that the order had to be set aside because
Baldwin was not afforded an opportunity to defend himself,
though the statute itself did not require any such
opportunity being given.
The question for our consideration now is whether the orders
imposing a cut in the pension should be set aside for the
reason that the officers were not given reasonable
opportunity to show cause. The law on the point is not in
doubt. Where a body or authority is judicial or where it
has to determine a matter involving rights judicially
because of express or implied provision, the principle of
natural justice audi ailteram partem applies. See Province
of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani & others(1) and Board of
High School & Intermediate Education, U.P. Allahabad v.
Ghanshyam Das Gupta and others (2). With the proliferation
of administrative decisions in the welfare State it is now
further recognised by courts both in En-land and in this
country, (especially after the decision of House of Lords in
Ridge v. Baldwi that where a body or authority is
characteristically administrative the principle of natural
justice is also liable to be invoked if the decision of that
body or authority affects individual rights of interests.
and having regard to the particular situation it would be
unfair for the body or authority not to have allowed a
reasonable opportunity to be heard. See : State of Orissa
v. Dr. Binapani Dei & Ors.(3) and In re H. K. [An
Infant(4)]. In the former case it was observed it page 628
as follows
“An order by the State to the prejudice of a
person in derogation of his vested rights may
be made only in accordance with the basic
rules of justice and fair play. The deciding
authority. it is true, is not in the position
of a Judge called upon to decide an action
between contesting parties, and strict
compliance with the forms of judicial
procedure may not be insisted upon. He is
however under a duty to give the person
against whom ‘in enquiry is held an
opportunity to set up his version or defence
and an opportunity to correct or to controvert
any evidence in the possession of the
authority
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 621 (725)
(2) [1962] Sup. (3) S.C.R. 3.
(3) [1967] (2) S.C.R. 625.
(4) [1967] 2 Q.B.D. 617.
414
which is sought to be relied upon to his
prejudice. For that purpose the person
against whom an enquiry is held must be
informed of the case he is called upon to meet
and the evidence in support thereof. The rule
that a party to whose prejudice an order is
intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing
applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies
of persons invested with authority to
adjudicate upon matters involving civil conse-
quences. It is one of the fundamental rules
of Our Constitutional set up that ever),
citizen is protected against exercise of
arbitrary authority by the State or its
officers. Duty to act judicially would
therefore arise from the very nature of the
function intended to be performed; it need
not be shown to be super-added. If there is
power to decide and determine to the prejudice
of a person, duty to act judicially is
implicit in the exercise of such power. If
the essentials of justice be ignored and an
order to the prejudice of a person is made the
order is nullity. That is a basic concept of
the rule of law and importance thereof
transcends the significance of a decision in
any particular case.”
These observations were made with reference to
an authority which could be described as
characteristically administrative. page 630 it
was observed :
“It is true that the order is administrative
in character, but even an administrative order
which involves civil consequences as already
stated, must be made consistently with the
rules of natural justice after informing the
first respondent of the case of the State, the
evidence in support thereof and after giving
an opportunity to the first respondent of
being heard and meeting Or explaining the
evidence.”
This case And the English case in re H. K. (An Infant) were
specifically referred to with approval in a decision of the
constitution bench of this Court in A. K. Kraipak & Ors..
etc. v. Union of India & Ors(1).
It is, therefore, clear that the State in the case of these
three officers could not have applied a cut in the pension
of the officers without giving them a reasonable opportunity
to make their defense. The rule which declares that even an
administrative authority has to act fairly after giving an
opportunity to the person rights and interests are affected
by its decision is no more than an extension of the well-
known rule which courts in England had recognised in the
19th century. In Cooper v. Wandsworth
(1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457.
415
Board of Works(1) the Board, which had, under the Act of
1855, the authority to demolish any building constructed if
the owner thereof had failed to give proper notice, was held
bound to give the owner an opportunity of being heard before
the demolition, It was contended in that case by the Board
that their discretion to order demolition was not a judicial
discretion. But the court decided unanimously in favour of
the owner. Erle C. J. held that the power was subject to a
qualification repeatedly recognised that no mean is to be
deprived of his property without his having an opportunity
of being heard. and that this had been applied “to many
exercises of power which in common understanding would not
be at all a more judicial proceeding than would be the act
of the district board in ordering a house to be pulled
down.” Wills. J. observed: “that the rule was of universal
application, and founded upon the plainest principles of
justice.” In the case before us the officers are being
deprived of part of their property by applying a cut to the
pension. Therefore, it was quite essential in all fairness
and elementary justice that they should have been given
reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed
action.
Reference was made on behalf of the State to M. Narasimha v.
The State of Mysore(2) and particularly the following
observations at page 889. “Next the appellant contends that
as his pension has been reduced to two-thirds, he was
entitled to notice in view of the provisions of Art. 311(2)
of the Constitution, before the Government decided to
inflict that punishment on him and that this was not done in
the notice dated December 30, 1954. It is enough to say
that this contention is also baseless. Article 311 (2)
does not deal with the question of pension at all; it deals
with three situations, namely (i) dismissal, (ii) removal,
and (iii) reduction in rank. The appellant says that the
reduction in pension is equivalent to reduction in rank.
All that we need say is that reduction in rank applies to a
case of a public servant who is expected to serve after the
reduction. It has ‘nothing to do with reduction of pension,
which is specifically provided for in Art. 302 of the
Regulations. That article says that if the service has not
been thoroughly satisfactory the authority sanctioning the
pension should make such reduction in the amount as it
thinks proper. There is a Note under this article, which
says that ‘,he full pension admissible under the Regulations
is not to be given as a matter of course but rather to be
treated as a matter of distinction. It was under this
article that the Government acted when it reduced the
pension to two-thirds. Reduction in person being a matter of
discretion with the Government, it carrier therefore be said
that it committed any breach of the Result
(1) [1863] 14 C,13,N.S,. 180.
(2) [1960] 1 S.C.R.
416
in reducing the pension of the appellant.” Particular
reference was made to the last two or three sentences in the
above observations for the contention that payment of
pension was a matter of discretion with the Government. It
is enough to say that the question did not arise in the case
as to whether pension is bounty or property. In that case
the appellant M. Narasimhachar had been charged in respect
of seven irregularities committed by him when he held the
post. An enquiry was held and six of the irregularities
were found proved. A final notice was served on him to show
cause why he should not be compulsorily retired and 50 % of
his pension should not be adjusted towards the amount clue
from him on account of the shortage caused by the irregula-
rities. He did not show cause. In the meantime he reached
the age of superannuation and the Government passed an order
directing that he be retired from service from the date on
which had reached superannuation and given a reduced pinion
of two-thirds to which he would be ordinarily entitled in
view of the irregularities committed by him. One of his
contentions was that Article 311(2) applied to his case and,
therefore, lie was entitled to a notice before his pension
was reduced to two-thirds. To that the answer was that
Article 311(2) did not apply to him and. under Article 302
of the Regulations his pension was liable to be reduced Lit
Government’s discretion. He had known what the charges
there against him and what punishment was proposed to be
inflicted upon him. Therefore, lie was not in a position to
come that his pension was reduced without notice to him.
In the result we hold that the three writ petitions were
correctly decided by the High Court and the appeals must
fail. They are dismissed with costs.
K. B. N. Appeals dismissed.
417