PETITIONER:
STATE OF PUNJAB
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SAT PAL DANG & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
30/07/1968
BENCH:
HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ)
BENCH:
HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ)
SHAH, J.C.
RAMASWAMI, V.
MITTER, G.K.
GROVER, A.N.
CITATION:
1969 AIR 903 1969 SCR (1) 478
CITATOR INFO :
R 1970 SC 765 (10)
R 1974 SC1533 (16)
R 1977 SC1361 (200)
RF 1988 SC 440 (23)
R 1992 SC 320 (31)
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 174, 189, 199, 208, 209,
212 and 213--Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in
the Punjab Legislative Assembly, rr. 7, 105 and
112--Prorogation of Assembly by Governor, how to be
notified--When commences-Governor's power of promulgation of
Ordinance--Scope of--If extends to making law under Art.
209--Punjab Legislative (Regulation of Procedure in Relation
to Financial Business) Ordinance, (1 of 1968), s.
3--Conflict with Art. 189(4) and r. 105 of Rules of
Procedure--If section unconstitutional--Speaker's ruling
how far final and beyond challenge in courts of
law--Deputy Speaker, if can certify Money Bills in place of
Speaker.
HEADNOTE:
On the 7th of March, 1968, the proceedings in the Punjab
Legislative Assembly led to rowdy scenes and the Speaker,
acting under r. 105 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of
Business in the Punjab Legislative Assembly made under
_Art. 208 of the Constitution, adjourned the Assembly
for two months. This led to an impasse. The Assembly was
in session but it was put in a state of inaction by the
adjournment. The Budget 'Session of the Assembly had to
reach a conclusion before 31st March, as, after that date,
no money could be drawn from the Consolidated Fund and no
expenditure in the State could be incurred. The Governor,
therefore, on 11th March prorogued the Assembly under Art.
174(2) (a). The order of the Governor was caused to be
printed in the State Gazette the same day by the Chief
Secretary under the Business Rules, and copies of the
Gazette were dispatched to the Secretary of the Assembly,
the Speaker and other members on the following day. On 13th
March, the Government promulgated the Punjab Legislature
(Regulation of Procedure in Relation to Financial Business)
Ordinance, 1968. Section 3 of the Ordinance provides that
the sitting of either House of Legislature was not to be
adjourned without the consent of the House until completion
of financial Business. On 14th March, the Governor
summoned the Legislative Assembly under Art. 174, fixing
18th March for its sitting, and, under Art. 175(2), directed
the Assembly to consider the Estimates of Expenditure, the
Demands for Supplementary Grants and two Appropriation
Bills. On 18th March, after considering certain other
matters, the Speaker ruled that the House was prorogued not
on the 11th March but on the 18th. and that in accordance
with his earlier ruling dated 7th March, the House stood
adjourned for two months. After some commotion the Deputy
Speaker occupied the Chair and the Assembly kept sitting.
The proceedings were conducted without demur even from the
opposition. The Bills were passed. The Bills were then
transmitted to the Legislative Council certified by the
Deputy Speaker that they were Money Bills. The Speaker
wrote to the Chairman of the Legislative Council pointing
out that there was no certificate by him as required Art.
199(4) and that he had adjourned the Assembly when the Bills
were adopted. The Legislative Council, however, considered
and passed the two Bills and the Governor assented to them.
On the questions whether: (1) the prorogation took
effect on 18th March and therefore the summoning of the
Legislature before prorogation was invalid; (2) the
Ordinance could not be passed by the Governor, because, the
prorogation was a fraud on the Constitution and since the
479
prorogation was invalid the House continued to be in
session; (3) The Governor's power to promulgate an Ordinance
is confined to Lists II and Iii of the Seventh Schedule to
the Constitution; (4) Section 3 of the Ordinance was
unconstitutional as there was a conflict with, (a) r. 105 of
the Rules of Procedure made under Art. 208 which gives power
to Speaker to adjourn the Assembly or suspend sitting in
case of grave disorder, and (b) Art. 189(4) which gives
power to the Speaker to adjourn the Assembly or suspend the
meeting for want of quorum; (5) ruling of the Speaker given
on 18th March was not open to challenge in courts; (6) the
further proceedings in the Assembly were illegal and (7) the
two Appropriation Acts were ultra vires because, the
Deputy Speaker and not the Speaker, certified them as Money
Bills to the Legislative Council and the Governor.
HELD: (1) Under r. 7 of the Rules of Procedure framed
under Art. 208. when a session of the Assembly is prorogued
the Secretary of the Assembly shall notify the order in the
Gazette and inform the members. The words indicate that
there is already a prorogation and the rest of the rule is
intended for communication of the fact to the public and
conveying the order to the members. It cannot be said from
this that only the Secretary of the Assembly could so notify
and that the Governor could not notify his order of
prorogation. [489 E-F; 490 B]
Article 174(2), which enables the Governor to prorogue
the Legislature does not indicate the manner in which he is
to make known his orders. The means open to him are
'public notification' that is, notification in the Official
Gazette and 'proclamation'. If he notifies in the Gazette
through his Chief Secretary acting under the Business Rules,
it becomes a public act of which the Court should take
judicial notice. Therefore, in the present case the
prorogation to place on the 11th March, '1968, the date of
publication in the Gazette, and the Legislature was
resummoned only thereafter. The resummoning of the
Legislature by the Governor was also a step in the right
direction as it set up once again the democratic machinery
which had been disturbed by the Speaker. [490 A-E]
(2) Under Art. 174(2) there are no restrictions on the
power of the Governor to prorogue. The power being
untrammeled and an emergency having arisen, there was no
abuse of power by him nor can his motives be described as
msla fide. In fact it was the only reasonable method of
getting rid of the adjournment and solving the political
crisis. The House, in fact, transacted other business
showing that the prorogation and resummoning were considered
valid. After the prorogation there was no further curb on
the legislative power of the Governor to promulgate the
Ordinance. [448 D, F-G; 490 E-F]
Kalyanam v. Veerabhadrayya, A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 243, referred
to.
(3) The Governor's power under Art. 213 of the
Constitution, of legislation by Ordinance is as wide as the
power of the Legislature of the State and therefore,
includes the power to pass a law under Art. 209 in relation
to financial business. [490 G-H]
(4) (a) The inconsistency between the section and r. 105
has to be resolved in favour of the section because the
latter part of Art. 209 itself provides that in cases of
repugnancy between the rules of procedure framed under
Art. 208 and a law made under Art. 209., the tatter shall
prevail; (b) As regards the conflict with Art. 189(4) the
rule of statutory interpretation--namely, that, even if the
language of a statute is prima facie wide it should be
understood, if possible, as not attempting something beyond
the competence of the legislative body--applies, because,
480
whether a provision should be struck down or read down
depends upon how far it is intended to go. In the present
case, the Ordinance could never provide for want of quorum
which is dealt with in the Article and in therefore a
constitutional requirement. The Article continues to
operate in situations contemplated by it and s. 3 of the
Ordinance can only deal with other situations. Therefore
the section could be read down so as to harmonise with the
Article. [492 B-C; F-H; 493 A]
Diamond Sugar Mills v.U.P. [1961] 3 S.C.R. 242; Romesh
Thappar v. State of Madras [1950] S.C.R. 594 and Kameshwar
Prasad v. State of Bihar, [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 369,
referred to
(5) Whether the Speaker adjourned the Assembly afresh or
declared that the former adjournment continued to operate
made no difference, because:
(a) the former adournment had come to an end by a valid
prorogation and [493 F-G]
(b) on the 18th March the Speaker was faced with a valid
Ordinance, which was binding on the Assembly, including the
Speaker, by virtue of Art. 209. Therefore, the Speaker was
powerless and the fresh adjournment by him of the session
with out taking the mandete of the Assembly by majority as
required by s. 3 of the Ordinance was null and void. [493 D-
E]
It could not be urged that whatever the merits of the
Speakers ruling may be, it should be treated as final and
beyond challenge in courts. A decision of the Speaker on a
point of order is final under r. 112 of the Rules of
Procedure, only if it is raised in relation to the
interpretation and enforcement of the rules and the
interpretation of the Articles of the Constitution
regulating the business of the House and if the question to
be decided was within/he Speakers cognizance In the present
case, the Speaker did not attempt to interpret Arts. 208,
209 and 213, and instead of a resolution (which was the
proper method of questioning the Ordinance) being passed
under Art. 213(2)(a) disapproving the Ordinance the Speaker
asserted himself against a law which was binding on him.
[494 A-B, G-H]
(6) The continuance of the proceedings under the Deputy
Speaker was vaild, complying as it did, with the law
promulgated by the Governor, and therefore. the finaneial
business transacted before the Assembly had legal
foundation. [495 C-D]
(7) A provision of law is usually regarded as merely
directory, even though a public duty is imposed by it and
the manner of performance is also indicated in imperative
language when general injustice or inconvenience result to
others if strict compliance is deemed mandatory, and they
have no control over those exercising the duty. Judged by
this test. Art. 199(4) requiring the Speakers certificate
cannot be viewed as mandatory but only as director in view
of the inconvenience to the State and to the public at large
that may be caused by holding the provision imperative and
not directory. If the Constitution s law the necessity of
providing a Deputy Speaker to act as the Speaker during the
latter's absence or to perform the office of the Speaker
when the office is vacant, it stands to reason that the
Constitution could never have reposed a power of mere
certification absolutely in the Speaker and Speaker along
Further Art. 212(1) provides that the validities of any
proceeding in the Legislature of a State shall not be called
in question on the t, round of any alleged irregularity of
procedure. [496 D-G; 497 B-C, D-E]
State of Bombay v R.M. 1). Chamarbauewala, [1957] S. R.
874, State of U.P. v Manbodhan Lal Srivastava [1958] SC.R.
533, State of
481
U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya [1961] 2 S.C.R. 679, M/s.
Mangalore Ganesh Bidi Works v. State of Mysore, [1963] Supp.
1 S.C.R. 275, Patna Zilla Brick Owners Association v. State
of Bihar, A.I.R. 1963 Pat. 16 and May's Parliamentary
Practice p. 842. referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1427
and 1428 of 1968.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated May 10, 1968
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writs Nos.
12261227 of 1968.
C.K. Daphtary, Attorney-General, Niren De,
Solicitor General, G.R. Majithia, Dy. Advocate-General for
the State of Punjab, R.N. Sachthey and S.P. Nayar, for the
appellant (in both the appeals).
R.K. Garg, S.C. Agarwal, Anil Kumar Gupta, N.M.
Ghatate, K.M.K. Nair, Chand Kishore, S.P. Singh, Baldev
Singh Khoji and B.P. Singh, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A.
No. 1427 of 1968).
S.K. Dholakia and K.L. Hathi, for respondents Nos. 2-4
(in C.A. No. 1427 of 1968) and respondents Nos. 2, 12 to 14
and 16 (in C.A. No. 1428 of 1968).
1. N. Kaushal, and Urmila Kapur, for respondent No. 6
(in C.A. No. 1427 of 1968),and respondent No. 8 (in C.A. No.
1428 of 1968).
M.C. Chagla, B.S. Dhillon and Hardev Singh, for
respondents Nos. 1 to 6 (in C.A. No. 1428 of 1968).
Rajender Sachar and 1. C. Talwar, for respondent No. 7
(in C.A. No. 1428 of 1968).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hidayatullah, C.J. These appeals arise from two
petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution questioning the
validity of Punjab Ordinance I of 1968 promulgated by the
Governor of Punjab on March 13, 1968 and Punjab
Appropriation Acts Nos. 9 and 10 of 1968. A Full Bench of
the High Court of Punjab & Haryana consisting of Mehr Singh
C.J. and Capoor, Harbans Singh, Mahajan and Bedi, JJ. held
unanimously that the two Acts were unconstitutional and, by
majority, that the Ordinance was also unconstitutional. The
High Court certified the cases under Arts. 132 and 133(1)(c)
of the Constitution and the State of Punjab appeals. The
relevant facts were these:
At the Fourth General Elections Congress won 43 seats in
the Legislative Assembly which has a membership of 104. The
other parties (none of which had a majority in the House)
combined and formed the United Front Party. A Ministry was
formed
482
under Sardar Gurnam Singh. Some of the respondents here
Minister and members supporting the Ministry. Lt. Col.
Joginder Singh Mann and Dr. Baldeo Singh were elected
Speaker and Deputy Speaker respectively.
On November 22, 1967, 18 members of United Front Party
including Sardar Lachman Singh Gill defected and formed a
new party–Punjab Janta Party. With the support of the
Congress a new Ministry was formed under Sardar Lachman
Singh Gill on November 25, 1967. The Legislative Assembly
was then summoned to meet on February 22, 1968. As the
budget was to be considered, the Financial Statement was
discussed on 4, 5 and6 March. On the last day, following
some disturbance in the House and consequent disciplinary
action, a Resolution was moved expressing non-confidence in
the Speaker. The House granted leave and then adjourned
itself to the following day.
When the Session commenced Sardar Gumam Singh raised a
point of order under rule 112(1) of the Rules of Procedure
made under Art. 208 of the Constitution that there was a
contravention of Art. 179(c) in moving the Resolution. It
is not necessary to go into the merits of the point of
order. Suffice it to say that the Speaker declared the
motion of non-confidence to be unconstitutional and deemed
not to have been moved. Another Resolution was then moved
which led to rowdy scenes. The
(1) “112. Points of order and decisions
thereon.
(1) A point of order relate to the
interpretation or enforcement of these rules
or such Articles of the Constitution as
regulate the business of the House and shall
raise a question which is within the
cognizance of the Speaker.
(2) A point of order may be raised in
relation to the business before the House at
the moment:
Provided that the Speaker may permit a
member to raise a point of order during the
interval between the termination of one item
of business and the commencement of another if
it relates to maintenance of order in or
arrangement of business before the House.
(3) Subject to conditions referred to in
sub-rules (1) and (2) a member may formulate a
point of order and the Speaker shall decide
whether the point raised is a point of order
and, if so, give his decision thereon, which
shall be final.
(4) No debate shall be allowed on a point
of order, but the Speaker may, if he thinks
fit, hear members before giving his decision.
(5) A point of order is not a point of
privilege.
(6) A member shall not raise a point of
order :–
(a) to ask for information, or
(b) to explain his position, or
(c) when a question on any motion is
being put to the House,or
(d) which may be hypothetical, or
(e) that division bells did not ring or
were not heard.
(7) A member may raise a point of order
during a division only on a matter arising
out of the division and shall do so sitting.”
483
Speaker purporting to act under Rule 105 (1) adjourned the
Assembly for two months.
A political crisis then arose. The budget had to be
adopted before March 31, 1968 but the House stood adjourned
to May 6, 1968. No expenditure in the State could,
therefore, be made from April 1, 1968. The Governor then
acted under his constitutional powers. On March 11, 1968
the Governor prorogued the Assembly under Art. 174(2) (a)
(2). The order of the Governor was caused to be printed in
the State Gazette the same day by the Chief Secretary and
copies of the Gazette were dispatched to the Secretary of
the Assembly, the Speaker and other members on the following
day. On March 13, 1968 the Governor promulgated Ordinance
No. I of 1968 (The Punjab Legislature Regulation of
Procedure in Relation to Financial Business Ordinance,
1968). On March 14, 1968 the Governor summoned the
Legislative Assembly under Art. 174(2) fixing March 18, 1968
for its sitting and under Art. 175(2)(a) directed the
Assembly to consider:
(i) Supplementary Estimates, 1967-68
(Second Installment).
(ii) The Punjab Appropriation Bill, 1968,
relating to the Supplementary Estimates,
1967-68 (Second Installment).
(iii) Demands for Grants as included .in
the Budget Estimates for the year 1968-69.
(1) “105. Power of Speaker to adjourn the
Assembly or suspend sitflag.
In the case of grave disorder in the
Assembly. the Speaker may. if he thinks it
necessary to do so adjourn/he Assembly or
suspend any sitting for a time to be named by
him.”
(2) “Art. 174. Sessions of the Legislature.
prorogation and discussion.
(1) The Governor shall from time to time
summon the House or Houses of the Legislature
of the State to meet at such time and place as
he thinks fit. but six months shall not
intervene between its last sitting in one
session and the date appointed for their first
sitting in the next session.
(2) The Governor may from time to time–
(a) prorogue the Houses or either
House:
(b)
(3) “Art. 175. Right of Governor to
address and send messages to the House or
Houses.
(1) …..
(2) The Governor may send message to the
House or Houses of the Legislature of the
State, whether with respect to a Bill then
pending in the Legislature or otherwise. and a
House to which any message is so sent shall
with all convenient despatch consider any
matter required by the message to be taken
into consideration.”
484
(iv) The Punjab Appropriation Bill (No. 2)
1968, relating to the Budget Estimates for the
year 1968-69.”
When the Legislative Assembly met it began by
considering certain other matters such as privilege motions,
arrangement for Watch and Ward’ Staff. The Speaker then read
the Message of the Governor referred to above. Sardar Gumam
Singh rose to move a point of order but the Speaker asked
him to wait and the House attended to some other matters. It
granted leave of absence to one member who was ill and the
Speaker named the Panel of Chairmen. The Ordinance was then
placed on the Table of the House. The text of the Ordinance
is given in an appendix to this judgment. It consisted of
four sections. Section 3 provided that the sitting of
either House of Legislature was not to be adjourned without
the consent of that House until completion of financial
business, and section 4 provided that the annual financial
statement laid before the House under Art. 202 or the
statement showing the estimated amount of any supplementary
or additional expenditure had been laid under Art. 205 was
not to lapse by reason. of the prorogation of the House and
that it would not be necessary to relay such statements
before the House.
Sardar Gurnam Singh again rose to urge his point of
order. He was reminded that a Resolution to the same effect
was to be brought before the Assembly, but he continued with
his point. He stated that the Ordinance was issued when the
Assembly was in Session and the House was summoned by the
Governor before it was prorogued. He elaborated his point
of order on the same lines as was done in the arguments
before us and we shall come to these in due course. A
debate, punctuated with uproar in the House, followed. It
appears that the Speaker at first was of the opinion that he
had no power to adjourn the House in view of section 3 of
the Ordinance but Sardar Gumam Singh maintained that he had
such power under Rule 105. The Speaker observed: “Yes, I
can adjourn the (House) but what about the Ordinance ?”
Sardar Gumam Singh opined that there was no Ordinance. The
Speaker then ruled that the House was prorogued not on 11th
March but on the 18th and gave the ruling in the following
words:
“The order by the Governor dated 14-3-
1968 summoning the House is also illegal and
void and he had no power to resummon the House
once adjourned under Rule 105 of the Vidhan
Sabha Rules referred to above. Therefore in
accordance with my earlier ruling dated 7-3-68
the House stands adjourned for two months from
that date.
485
(The Sabha then adjourned)
5.05 p.m.”
The meeting had lasted 3 hours.
What followed may be extracted from the
proceedings.
“(At 5.05 P.M. the Speaker declared that
the House stand adjourned for two months and
left the Chair. The Members continued to sit
in the House. There was uproar and furor in
the House. One of the Han. Members occupied
the Speaker’s Chair and some members rushed to
the Speaker’s dais and stood there. The Hon.
Deputy Speaker came and occupied seat No. 15
in the House to conduct the proceedings. As
the seats of the Secretary/other officers of
the Punjab Vidhan Sabha Secretariat and
Reporters were also occupied by the Members of
the Opposition, they all occupied seats
adjoining seat No. 15).
(Noise and uproar in the House-voices
of ‘shame’ ‘shame’ from the Members of the
Opposition).
Mr. Deputy Speaker:
As the Speaker had adjourned the House.
(sic) When he had no authority to do so
(InterrUptions and Uproar) under the Ordinance
promulgated by the Government, any such
adjournment ordered by the Speaker, is,
therefore, null and void (Uproar and renewed
noise in the House). The House will now
resume Consideration of business before it and
I now call upon the Chief Minister to move the
motion.
(Uproar and furore in the House)
(At this stage, the Speaker’s dais was
clear and the Hon. Deputy Speaker occupied the
Speaker’s Chair at the Dais).
The Chief Minister then moved that the consideration of the
Financial Business be completed within half an hour. There
was uproar in the House. The motion was carried. Next the
Estimates of Expenditure, the Demands for Supplementary
grants, the two Appropriation Bills and the other demands
were passed. A Resolution that the Speaker be removed from
office was moved and forwarded to the Leader of the House
after granting leave and the Assembly was adjourned to meet
at 2 p.m. on April 5, 1968. The time taken is not stated but
there is reason to think that the limit of 1/2 hour was not
exceeded.
The Bills were then transmitted to the Legislative
Council certified by the Deputy Speaker that they were Money
Bills. An
486
objection was raised that the certificate under Art.
199(4)(1) must be signed by the Speaker of the Legislative
Assembly. This was overruled by the Chairman and the Bills
were passed. They were then placed before the Governor with
another certificate of the Deputy Speaker. The Governor
signified his assent.
Two writ petitions were then filed in the High Court.
Civil Writ Petition (1226/68 was filed by Shri Satya Pal
Dang, M.L.A. against the State of Punjab. the Chief
Minister, the Finance Minister, the Secretary to the
Governor, the Secretary Legislative Assembly and the Deputy
Speaker. The second petition (1227/ 68) was filed by 6
members and was directed against those named in the other
petition and also joined the Speaker, the Chairman and
Deputy Chairman of the Legislative Council, the Controller
of Printing and Stationery and one Sardar Kirpal Singh,
M.L.A. The arguments in the High Court ranged over a wide
field. They were summarized into eight points by Justice
S.B. Capoor which, it is common case, represent the essence
of the matter. Stated briefly, the arguments were that the
prorogation took effect on the 18th March. As a consequence
the summoning of the Legislature before prorogation was
invalid. These points go together Since both the
prorogation and resummoning of the Legislature were
invalid the House continued to be in session although
adjourned. Since the Legislature was in “Session”, the
Ordinance could not be passed and it was a fraud upon the
Constitution. Section 3 of the Ordinance was specially
attacked as unconstitutional. The ruling of the Speaker
given on March 18, 1968 was not open to challenge in courts
and the further proceedings in the Assembly were illegal.
Even if everything was regular it was in issue whether the
Speaker alone was entitled to endorse a Money Bill and
certify it to the Legislative Council and the Governor and
since the certificates were by the Deputy Speaker, the two
Acts were said to be ultra vires.
In the High Courts the Full Bench unanimously held
against the petitioners on the question of the prorogation
and resummoning of the Legislature which were held to be
regular and legal. The Full Bench also held unanimously that
the ruling given by the Speaker on the 18th March made the
later proceedings illegal. There was a difference ‘on the
point that the certification by the Deputy Speaker in place
of the Speaker was valid. The majority holding that it was
not. Similarly a majority of Judges held that
(1) “199. Definition of “Money Bills”
(1) .
(4) There shall be endorsed on every Money Bill when it
is transmitted to the Legislative’ Council under Article
198, and when it is presented to the Governor for assent
under Article 200, the certificate of the Speaker of the
Legislative Assembly signed by him that it is a Money Bill.”
487
section 3 of the Ordinance was unconstitutional and invalid
and the Full Bench unanimously held the Appropriation Acts
to be unconstitutional. ‘
In dealing with these appeals we shall follow the
sequence of events and examine the legality and
constitutionality of each happening. That would show that
the matter lies in a narrower compass than what has been
made to appear. We begin with the prorogation.
The question here is did the Governor possess the power to
prorogue the Legislature and was his action bad merely
because he was making way for the resummoning of the
Legislature after passing an Ordinance under Art. 213(1)
exercising the power
(1) “213. Power of Governor to promulgate
Ordinances during recess of Legislature. (1)
If at any time, except when the Legislative
Assembly of a State is in session, or where
there is a Legislative Council in a State,
except when both Houses of the Legislature are
in session the Governor is satisfied that
circumstances exist which render it necessary
for him to take immediate action, he may
promulgate such Ordinances as the
circumstances appear to him to require:
Provided that the Governor shall not, without
instructions from the President,
promulgate any such Ordinance if :–
(a) a Bill containing the same provisions
would under this Constitution have required
the previous sanction of the President for the
introduction thereof into the Legislature; or
(b) he would have deemed it necessary to
reserve a Bill containing the same
provisions for the consideration of the
President; or
(c) an Act of the Legislature of
the State containing the same provisions would
under the Constitution have been invalid
unless, having been reserved for the
consideration of the President, it had
received the assent of the President.
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this
Article shall have the same force and
effect as an Act of the Legislature of the
State assented to by the Governor, but
every such Ordinance :-
(a) shall be laid before the Legislative
Assembly of the State, or where there
is a Legislative Council in the State, before
both the Houses, and shall cease to
operate at the expiration of six weeks from
the reassembly of the Legislature, or if
before the expiration of that period a
resolution disapproving it is passed by the
Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the
legislative Council, if any, upon the passing
of the resolution or, as the case may be, on
the resolution being agreed to by the Council;
and
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the
Governor.
Explanation–where the Houses of the
Legislature of a State having a Legislative
Council are summoned to reassemble on
different dates, the period of six weeks shall
be reckoned from the later of those dates for
the purposes of this clause.
(3) If and so far as an Ordinance under this
article makes any provision which would not be
valid if enacted in an Act of the Legislature
of the State assented to by the Governor, it
shall be void:
Provided that, for the purposes of the
provisions of this Constitution relating to
the effect of an Act of the Legislature of a
State which is repugnant to an Act of
Parliament of an existing law with respect to
a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List, an
Ordinance promulgated under this article in
pursuance of instructions from the President
shall be deemed to be an Act of the
Legislature of the State which has been
reserved for the consideration of the
President and assented to by him.”
488
under Art. 109(x) ? The power under Art. 213 ‘is available
to the Governor when the Assembly is not in session, The
position after the 7th March adjournment of the Assembly was
this: The Assembly was in session but it was put in a state
of inaction for 2 months by the adjournment which the
Governor had no power to rescind and the Speaker would
apparently not be prepared to recall. Time was running out
and the Budget Session of the Assembly had to reach a
conclusion before March 31. After that date no money could
be drawn from the Consolidated Fund [Art. 266(3)]. The
Governor thus had to act and act quickly to put back the
Legislative machinery of the State into life. Only two
courses were open. One was for the Ministers to ask the
Speaker under Rule 16 to recall the Assembly which was,
perhaps, attempting the impossible. The other was to
prorogue the Assembly to get rid of the adjournment and then
to resummon the Assembly. The second was not only a
reasonable solution but the one most properly adapted to
achieve a constitutional result and it was followed. The
action of the Governor may now be considered.
Article 174(2) which enables the Governor to prorogue
the Legislature does not indicate any restrictions on this
power. Whether a Governor will be justified to do this when
the Legislature is in session and in the midst of its
legislative work, is a question that does not fall for
consideration here. When that happens the motives of the
Governor may conceivably be questioned on the ground of an
alleged want of good faith and abuse of constitutional
powers. We do not go as far as the learned Judges in Re
Kalyanam v. Veerabhadrayya (A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 243). But that
is not the case here. The bona fides of the Speaker’s
ruling adjourning the Assembly for so long as 2 months when
the Financial Statement and the budget were on the agenda
and time was running out are more in question than the
conduct of the Governor. No mala fides were attributed to
the Governor except to say that he acted in excess of his
powers or in colorable exercise of them. The power being
untrammeled by the Constitution and an emergency having
arisen, the action was perfectly understandable. We shall
presently show that the Governor acted not only properly but
in the only constitutional way open to him. There was thus
no abuse of power by him, nor can his motives be des-
(1) “209. Regulation by law of procedure
in the Legislature of the State in relation to
financial business.
The Legislature of a State may, for the
purpose of the timely completion of financial
business, regulate by law the procedure of,
and the conduct of business in, the House or
Houses of the Legislature of the State in
relation to any financial matter or to any
Bill for the appropriation of moneys out of
the Consolidated Fund of the State and if and
so far as any provision of any law so made is
inconsistent with any rule made by the House
or either House of the Legislature of the
State under clause (1) of article 208 or with
any rule or standing order having effect in
relation to the Legislature of the State under
clause (2) of that article, such provision
shall prevail.”
489
cribed as mala fide as has been said by one of the learned
Judges in the judgment under appeal. It is a matter of
regret that such a conclusion was reached without any plea
or material.
Much energy was, therefore, spent in tiffs Court and in
the High Court in an attempt to establish that the
prorogation came into effect either on the 18th or the 16th
March at the earliest. This was not accepted by the High
Court and in our opinion rightly. The argument is based upon
rule 7(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business
in the Punjab Legislative Assembly and the fact that the
notification of the Secretary of the Assembly must be deemed
to have reached members on the 16th March or thereafter.
This requires examination
Article 174(2) which enables the Governor to prorogue
the Legislature does not indicate the manner in which the
Governor is to make known his orders. He could follow the
well-established practice that such orders are ordinarily
made known by a public notification which means no more than
that they are notified in the official Gazette of the State.
There was such a notification on the 11th March and
prorogation must be held to have taken effect from the date
of publication. It was not necessary that the order must
reach each and every member individually, before it would
become effective. Rule 7, which is framed under Article 208
of the Constitution regulates the procedure of the
Legislature but is not intended to add a clause to Art.
174(2) so as to make it incumbent on the Governor to wait
till the Secretary takes his time and issue the notification
(if at all) and informs members. The words of the seventh
rule ‘when a session of the Assembly is prorogued’ indicate
that there is a prorogation and the rest of it is intended
for communication of the fact to the public and conveying
the order to the members. The communications is by
notification in the Gazette. The action of the Secretary in
sending copies of the Gazette to the members is merely
ministerial. Rule 7 cannot be read as a condition precedent
for the efficacy of the Governor’s order provided it was
duly notified. It is significant that while Mr. Chagla
based his entire case on Rule 7, Mr. Garg did not rely on it
but questioned the very power to prorogue in the
circumstances of the case. We can understand Mr. Garg’s
argument although we do not accept it, but we find it
difficult to appreciate the stand taken by Mr. Chagla.
We are, therefore,, clearly of the opinion (which the
High Court also unanimously entertained) that the
prorogation became
(1) “7. When a session of the assembly is prorogued the
Secretary shall issue a notification in respect thereof in
the Gazette and inform the Members. On prorogation all
pending notices subject to the provisions of the
Constitution and these Rules shall lapse.”
490
effective on the 11th when the Governor issued a public
notification. The means open to the Governor under the
Constitution are ‘public notification’ and ‘proclamation’.
Article 174 does not state what procedure is to be followed
and rule 7 says that the Secretary to the Assembly shall
notify the order. If the Governor followed the same
procedure no exception can be taken. The argument that only
the Secretary to the Assembly can notify the order is to
further refine a point already very fine, and ignores the
Business Rules. Under the business Rules, the Chief
Secretary deals with all questions relating to the Assembly
and the Council and the Governor in notifying it in .the
Gazette through the Chief Secretary was acting under the
Business Rules. As a matter of fact copies of the
notification were dispatched on the 12th and presumably
reached the Secretary of the Assembly and also the Speaker
the same day. We are bound to take judicial notice of the
prorogation and presume the regularity of these actions
which must be interpreted as far as possible so that the
thing done may be valid rather than invalid. This is not the
extreme case, propounded by Mr. Chagla, of a Governor
passing an order and keeping ‘it locked in his drawer. It
is significant that even in England where prorogation used
to be through a writ or writ patent or a commission under
the Great Seal of the United Kingdom read in the House now a
proclamation by the Queen suffices under the Prorogation Act
of 1867. Therefore, the Governor’s act became a public act
after the notification. This was on the 11th March 1968.
We are also satisfied that there was no other motive than to
set right the constitutional machinery by the invocation of
the powers conferred expressly on the Governor.
After the prorogation there was no further curb on the
legislative power of the Governor. The power of legislation
by Ordinance is as wide as the power of Legislature of the
State. Article 213 (2 ) provides that an ordinance
promulgated under that Article has the same force and effect
as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the
Governor except that it must be laid, before the Legislative
Assembly of the State and the Legislative Council (where
there is one) and expired after the expiration of 6 weeks or
earlier if it is withdrawn by the Governor or disapproved by
the Legislature of the State. Counsel argued that the power
of the Governor is only to pass a law under the second and
third of the Legislative Lists and not under ‘Art. 209. We
see no force in this submission which is not supported by
any provision of the Constitution or authority Of this
Court. In fact, the powers of the legislature are expressly
indicated in Art. 209 and the Governor must therefore
possess an equal power unless there be an expression of
intention to the contrary in the Constitution. There is no
such expression of intention and none can be implied from
Arts. 245 and 246 in the face of the special provisions of
491
Art. 213(2). The Ordinance was therefore, validly enacted
under the power derived from Arts. 209 and 213.
Article 209 is intended to speed financial business in
the legislatures so that attempts to filibuster, adjourn or
otherwise delay such business may be avoided. If ever there
was an occasion ,for the regulation of procedure in the
legislature of the State in relation to the financial
business by a law under Art. 209, it was this. The
Legislature could not be allowed to hibernate for 2 months
while the financial business languished and the
constitutional machinery and democracy itself were wrecked.
To suggest that the President’s rule should have been
imposed instead, it is to suggest a line of action which a
party not in majority would have obviously preferred but it
would have cut at the root of parliamentary government to
which our country is fortunately committed. If by adopting
the present course parliamentary government could be
restored there was neither an error of judgment nor a mala
fide exercise of power. There was nothing colourable about
it. It was intended to achieve a definite purpose by using
the constitutional power of the Governor. We are therefore
quite clear that the action of prorogation cannot be
questioned on any of the grounds suggested by the
respondents.
The resummoning of the Legislature immediately
afterwards was also a step in the right direction. It set
up once again the democratic machinery in the State which
had been rudely disturbed by the action of the Speaker.
Knowing that it would ordinarily take much time to finish
the Financial Business, that time was short and attempt
would be made to delay matters, the Ordinance created a law
which Art. 209 enables to be enacted for the speedy disposal
of financial business. The matters were, therefore, left in
the hands of the Legislature with the only restriction that
the Legislature would not adjourn except when a House by a
majority desired it. This respected the democratic right of
the Legislature but put down the vagaries of action
calculated to delay the business. The measure was eminently
healthy and as it was also legal the Assembly was bound by
the law thus enacted.
Therefore, the next attempt was to challenge s. 3 of the
Ordinance (see appendix). The learned Chief Justice upheld
the validity of the section but he was overruled by his four
colleagues. We are in entire agreement with the view
expressed by the Chief Justice. What is the complaint here
? It is argued that s. 3 of the Ordinance conflicts with
the Rules of Procedure particularly
492
Rule 105 and Art. 189(4)(1). Article 189(4) is a provision
of the Constitution and_ can never be abrogated by an
Ordinance or even a law passed by the Legislature and so
there is no repugnancy Article 189(4) continued to operate
in situations contemplated by it. Rule 105 confer two
powers, when, on grave disorder arising in the Assembly, the
work cannot be carried on. One is a power to suspend for a
time the sitting of the House and the other is to adjourn
the House. What the Ordinance did was to put out of action
the power to adjourn the session of the Legislature. The
inconsistency between Rule 105 in so far as it concerned
such adjournment was to be resolved in favour of the
Ordinance because the latter part of Art. 209 itself
provides that in cases of repugnancy between the rules of
procedure framed under Art. 208 and the law made under Art.
209, the latter provision shall prevail. Article 209 gave
full authority to s. 3 of the Ordinance and it was not ultra
vires
It is argued that we cannot read down the provisions of
section 3 of the Ordinance to make room for the application
of Art. 189(4) and Rule 105 in regard to quorum and
suspension of business respectively. Reference is made to
the case of Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. v.U.P.(1) where the
expression ‘local area’ was not read down to make it accord
with the Constitution. That case was concerned with excess
of legislative power under an entry. The general words were
read as they were and pointed to an excessive power being
conferred. In Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras(2) the
law offended Fundamental Rights and there was no escape from
the operation of Art. 13 of the Constitution when there was
no room for severability. In Seth Bikhraj Jaipuria v. Union
of India(3) the capacity to contract was involved and that
case hardly applies. In Kameshwar Prasad and Others v. The
State of Bihar and Another(4) there was difficulty in the
way of reading Rule 4-A of the Bihar Government Servants’
Conduct Rules 1956 because of its general words and hence
the whole rule was struck down. We can read down section 3
of the Ordinance because the Ordinance could never provide
for want of quorum which is a constitutional requirement.
Rule 105 gets out of the way by the operation of Art. 209.
It depends always on how far the provision of a law is
intended to go. There is a canon of construction that the
language of a statute, even if it is prima facie wide, is to
be understood as not attempting something
(1) “189 voting in Houses, power of Houses to act
notwithstanding vacancies and quorum.
(4) If at any time during a meeting of the Legislative
Assembly or the Legislative Council of a State there is
no .quorum, it shall be the duty of the Speaker or Chairman,
or person acting as such, either to adjourn the House or to
suspend the meeting until there is a quorum.”
(1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 242.
(2) [1950] S.C.R. 594.
(3) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 880.
(4) [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 369
493
beyond the competence of the legislative body. In such a
case the. overriding law must have its play. Article 189(4)
was outside the law-making power of the Governor and his
Ordinance must be read to harmonize with it. Similarly, the
power of adjournment was curtailed but not the power to
suspend business. Even an adjournment was possible provided
the House agreed. We see, no force in the argument that s.
3 is ultra vires.
The adjournment of the Assembly on 18th March by the,
Speaker is next presented as a valid and binding ruling. A
word may be said here about what the Speaker decided. The
Speaker in his ruling of the 18th based himself on the fact
that in his opinion the order proroguing the Assembly on the
11 th March was illegal and void. Therefore the Governor
had no power to resummon on the 14th the Assembly which
stood adjourned for 2 months under Rule 105. It appears
from the proceedings that the Speaker was of the opinion
that the Legislature was prorogued on the 18th and not the
11th. We have shown above that the Legislature was
prorogued not on the 18th but on the 11th and the
resummoning of the Legislature on the 14th after the
Ordinance was promulgated on the 13th was perfectly valid.
His ruling, therefore, was based on wrong assumption. But
can his ruling be called in question ? Our answer is in the
affirmative. On the 18th the Speaker was faced by the
Ordinance. That Ordinance, as we have shown above, was a
valid law binding on the Assembly (including the Speaker) by
virtue of Art. 209. The Speaker was, therefore, powerless
and his adjournment of the session without taking the
mandate of the Assembly by majority as required by s. 3 of
the Ordinance was null and void and of no effect. The
proceedings clearly show that the Speaker himself was
reluctant to adjourn the House till he was prompted by
Sardar Gurnam Singh. He doubted his own powers. The
Speaker did not attempt to order a fresh adjournment but
only ruled that his earlier adjournment stood. Whether the
Speaker adjourned the Assembly afresh or declared that the
former adjournment continued to operate makes no difference.
The former adjournment had come to an end by a valid
prorogation and the fresh adjournment was null and void.
The House transacted other business showing that the
prorogation was considered valid. If this was so the
session had to continue unless adjourned by the House by
majority.
Reference was made to Rule 112 which says that a point
of order once raised must be decided by the Speaker and his
decision thereon is final. It is thus urged that whatever
the merits of the Speaker’s ruling it must be treated as
final. This is a claim which is unfounded. Points of order
can only be raised in relation to the interpretation and
enforcement of the rules and the interpre-
494
tation of the Articles of the Constitution regulating the
business of the House and the question’ which is to be
decided by the Speaker must be within his cognizance (Rule
112(1). The finality of the ruling applies subject to this
condition (Rule 112(3). Now the exact point of order
concerned the validity of the Ordinance. The Speaker did not
attempt to interpret Arts. 208, 209 and 213. He did not
confine his ruling to matters within his cognizance. He
asserted himself against a law which was binding on him. If
the Ordinance was to be questioned this was not the method..
A resolution had to be passed under Art. 213 ( 2 ) ( a )
disapproving it. In fact he was told that a resolution was
to be made. Perhaps the Speaker was not sure that a such
resolution would be passed. Democratic process and
parliamentary practice demanded that the Speaker should have
waited for a resolution to be moved for the consideration of
the Assembly. If he was at all sure that the majority was in
favour of disapproving the Ordinance he would undoubtedly
have waited. Not being sure, he proceeded to nullify the
Ordinance by a ruling which he was not competent to give.
Therefore, his ruling was only not final, but utterly null
and void and of no effect.
It is significant that the Deputy Speaker on occupying
the Chair declared on the validity of the Ordinance in words
which may be quoted again:
“Mr. Deputy Speaker:
As the Speaker had adjourned the House,
when he had no authority to do so
(Interruptions and Uproar) under the Ordinance
promulgated by the Government, (sic) any such
adjournment ordered by the Speaker, is,
therefore, null and void (Uproar and renewed
noise in the House). The House will now
resume consideration of business before it and
I now call upon the Chief Minister to move the
motion.
(Uproar and furore in the House)
(At this stage, the Speaker’s dais was
clear and the Hon. Deputy Speaker occupied the
Speaker’s Chair at the dais).
This ruling had more content under Rule 112 than the ruling
previously given. It was also eminently correct. There was
no reason why it should not prevail when the other ruling
was null. and void. The Assembly kept sitting since (as is.
quite apparent) the members too thought that the ruling of
the Speaker was to be ignored. All the proceedings were
conducted without demur even from the opposition. One is
tempted to think that the Speaker was not sure of his own
position in a House in which he had probably lost a
sustaining _majority. But even if the most liberal view of
the-action of the Speaker is taken, one is, forced
495
to the conclusion that he acted contrary to law and the
injunction of the Constitution that the law made under Art.
209 is to prevail over the rules of procedure. We regret to
record this conclusion which we would have willingly avoided
but for some arguments advanced on the lines indicated
although somewhat hesitatingly by the counsel representing
the Speaker. Before tall claims are made which cannot stand
against law and the Constitution, those that make them
should reasonably be sure that they are right.
The necessary result of our findings is that the
continuance of the proceedings under the Deputy Speaker was
valid complying, as it did with the law promulgated by the
Governor. Each item on the agenda was properly passed and
there was no objection either during the proceedings in the
House or in the argument before us regarding the regularity
of the action. We, therefore, hold that the financial
business transacted before the Assembly had legal
foundation.
This brings us to the last point which is that the
certificate of the Deputy Speaker under Art. 199 was of no
effect. That certificate was issued under the fourth clause
of that article. The argument is that the provisions of
this clause are mandatory and only the Speaker of the
Legislative Assembly should sign the Money Bill. To this
there are many replies. The Speaker was not present when
the Bills were passed. Under Art. 180(2) (1) the Deputy
Speaker acts as the Speaker when the Speaker is absent. Thus
the Deputy Speaker was validly acting as the Speaker of the
Assembly which continued to be in session. No doubt Art.
199 mentions only the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly
but the question remains still whether the Deputy Speaker
could not certify the Money Bills effectively. Counsel for
the answering respondents drew attention to the difference
in the language of the two clauses. In the first clause the
Deputy Speaker or such member of the Assembly as the
Governor may appoint for the purpose, performs the duties of
the office of the Speaker, when the office is vacant, while
in the second the Deputy Speaker merely acts as Speaker
during the absence of the Speaker from a sitting of the
(1) “180. Power of the Deputy Speaker or other person to
perform the duties of the office of or to act as, Speaker.
(1)
(2) During the absence of the Speaker from any sitting of
the Assembly the Deputy Speaker or, if he is also absent,
such person as may be determined by the rules of procedure
of the Assembly. or, if no such person is present, such
other person as may be determined by the Assembly, shall act
as Speaker.”
496
Assembly. They suggest that in the latter case the Deputy
Speaker’s powers come to an end as soon as the sitting is
over and the mandatory language of Article 199(4) compelled
that the certificate of the Speaker ought to have been
obtained.
The short question here is whether the provisions of
Art. 199 (4) must be read as imperative or merely directory.
The distinction between a mandatory provision of law and
that which is merely directory is this that in a mandatory
provision there is an implied prohibition to do the act in
any other manner while in a directory provision substantial
compliance is considered sufficient.
There are several tests to determine when the provision
may be treated as mandatory and when not and they have been
called from books and set down by Subbarao, J. (as he then
was) in The State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Babu Ram
Upadhya:(1) and earlier by Venkatarama lyer, J. in State of
Bombay v.R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala(2). For our purpose it is
necessary to emphasise only one distinction. In those cases
Where strict compliance is indicated to be a condition
precedent to the validity of the act itself, the neglect to
perform it as indicated is fatal. But in cases where
although a public duty is imposed and the manner of
performance is also indicated in imperative language, the
provision is usually regarded as merely directory when
general injustice or inconvenience results to others and
they have no control over those exercising the duty.
Judged from this test the provisions of Art. 199(4)
cannot be viewed as mandatory but only as directory. If
the. Constitution saw the necessity of providing a Deputy
Speaker to act as the Speaker during the latter’s absence or
to perform the office of the Speaker when the office of the
Speaker is vacant, it stands to reason that the Constitution
could never have reposed a power of mere certification
absolutely in the Speaker and the Speaker alone. The
happenings in the Assembly lend support to this inference.
It is reasonable to think that the Speaker in his then mood
might have declined to certify and a second impasse would
have ensued. A similar situation may arise not because of
intransigence but because of illness or absence. The
inconvenience to the State and the public at large is
avoided by holding the provision to be directory and not
imperative.
It might be mentioned that this Court has on occasions
read apparently imperative provisions as directory, only.
In the case of State of U.P.v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava(3)
the provisions of
(1) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 679, 710.
(2) [1957] S.C.R. 874, 950.
(3) [1958] S.C.R. 533.
497
Arts. 311 ( 2 ) and 3 20 ( 1 ) ( c ) were read as directory
notwithstanding the mandatory language. Further it is
interesting to note that the Parliament Act of 1911 in
England has an identical provision enjoining. certification
by the Speaker. However May in his ‘Parliamentary Practice’
gives numerous instances of Money Bills (from 1914 onwards)
certified by the Deputy Speaker (see p. 842).
Further again, there is Article 212 clause (1) which
provides that the validity of any proceeding in the
Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on
the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. This
clause was invoked in respect of a Money Bill in Patna Zilla
Brick Owners Association and others v. State of Bihar and
others(1) following a case of this Court in M/s. Mangalore
Ganesh Bedi Works v. The State of Mysore & Another(2). We
are entitled to rely upon this provision. Our conclusion
gets strength from another fact. There is no suggestion
even that the Appropriation Bills were not Money Bills or
included any matter other than that provided in Article 199
or were not passed by the Assembly. It is ‘also significant
that the Speaker wrote to the Chairman of the Legislative
Council that there was no certificate by him and that he had
adjourned the Assembly when the Bills were adopted but the
Legislative Council in spite of objection considered and
passed the two, Bills and the Governor assented to them. We
are of opinion that the two Bills were duly certified.
This concludes the whole case and the-events on which it
is based. Mr. Garg contended for a larger issue. He said
that the Legislature should not be at the mercy of the
Governor and the absolute field of action open to the
Legislature and the Speaker would be unreasonably cut down
and thus lead to assumption of absolute powers by Governors.
We do not entertain any such apprehensions. The situation
created in the State of Punjab was unique and was
reminiscent of happenings in the age of the Stuarts. The
action of the Governor appears to be drastic. It was,
however, constitutional and resulted from a desire to set
right a desperate situation. As Bacon once said, no
remedies cause so much pain as those which are efficacious.
For the reasons given above we allow the appeals, set
aside the judgment of the High Court and order the dismissal
of the two petitions with costs.
V.P.S.
Appeals allowed.
(1) A.I.R. 3963 Pat. 16.
(2) [3963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 275.
498
APPENDIX
“PUNJAB ORDINANCE NO. 1 OF 1968
2. Definitions. In this Ordinance :-
(a) “article” means an article of the Constitution of India;
(2) “Financial business” means any business relating to any
of the financial matter referred to in articles 202 to’206
(both inclusive) including Bills for appropriation of moneys
out of the Consolidated Fund of State.
3. Sitting of either House of Legislature not to be
adjourned without consent of that House until completion of
financial business.
Notwithstanding anything contained in any rules made, or
rules or standing order having effect, under Article 208,
when any financial business is pending or is to be
transacted in a House of the Legislature of the State of
Punjab during any session thereof, then :-
(a) Until the completion of such business
during that session a sitting of that House
shall not be adjourned unless a motion of that
effect is passed by a majority of the members
of that House present and voting;
(b) Any adjournment of that House in
contravention of the provisions of clause (a)
shall be null and void and be of no effect;
(c) The Leader of the House, may, for the
timely completion of the Financial business,
move a motion specifying the time within
which the consideration of such business
shall be completed and if the motion is
adopted (whether with or without modification)
by a majority of the Members of the House
present and voting, consideration of the
business shall be completed within the time
specified in the motion as so adopted and for
that purpose, the Rules of Procedure and
Conduct of Business (including the standing
orders, if any) relating to that House shall
have effect subject to the modifications
thereof, if any, specified in the motion. and
any such motion may be moved without giving
any prior notice thereof and shall, unless
the majority of the members of the House
present and voting determine otherwise, be
taken into consideration and voted upon on the
same day on which it is moved.
4. Financial statements not to lapse.
For the removal of the doubts it is hereby declared that
if an annual financial statement has been laid before a
House under Article 202 or a statement showing the estimated
amount of any supplementary or additional expenditure has
been laid under article 205 such statement shall not be
necessary to relay such statement before the House.
D.C. PAVATE
Governor of Punjab.
Chandigarh, the 13th March, 1968
JASMER SINGH
Secretary to Government,
Punjab Legislative Department.”
499