JUDGMENT
R.L. Anand, J.
1. This Civil Revision has been filed by the State of Punjab and has been directed against the order dated 3.6.1998 passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Gurdaspur who dismissed the application of the State under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and consequently the appeal of the State was also dismissed as barred by time.
2. The brief facts can be noticed as under:-
The decree by the Civil Court was passed on 20.5.1997. The State moved the application for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and decree on 21.5.1997. The copies were ready for delivery on 6.6.1997 and thus were actually delivered to the office of District Attorney on 10.6.1997. The District Attorney sent the copies of the judgment and decree along with his comments to the Director Prosecution on 21.6.1997 who sent the papers to the Home Secretary on 27.6.1997 for seeking his approval. The Home Secretary on 26.8.1997 directed the District Attorney to file the appeal and necessary sanction to file the appeal was also accorded on the same date and the appeal was actually filed on 6.9.1997. Along with the appeal on application was moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in which all the facts were narrated. Notice of the application was given to the respondent who contested the application and the Court framed the issue, whether the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is liable to be accepted by condoning the delay in favour of the State?
3. The learned Court for the reasons given in para No. 7 of the judgment dismissed that application and aggrieved by the order dated 3.6.1998 the present Civil Revision has been filed. Before I deal with the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, I would like to quote para No. 7 of the impugned order in verbatim:
“I have considered the arguments raised on both sides. There is absolutely no explanation as to what department had been doing during the period 27.6.1997 to 26.8.1997. The applicant did not examine any witness from the Home Department who could depose about the proceedings conducted in that department. In this connection a reference may be made to the Full Bench Judgment of Gujarat High Court Municipal Corporation of Ahmadabad v. Voltas Limited. In which case it was held that Government Departments and statutory bodies could not claim for condonation of delay on the ground of administrative follow up delays. Now a reference may also be made to the Division Bench authority of our own High Court reported in case 1995 P.LJ. 336 (D.B.), The Chief Administrator Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Darshan Lal Garg and Ors. In which case it was held that State could not be placed above ordinary litigations and that the delay could not be condoned solely for the reasons that the State was the appellant. The observations made in these cases fully apply on the acts of the case in hand. There is absolutely no explanation as to what the Department had been doing for the period 27.6.1998 to 26.8.1997 and as such the applicant is not entitled for the condonation of delay. Accordingly the issue is decided against the applicant.”
4. Learned G.P. appearing on behalf of the State submitted that the dates which I have re-produced above would show that there was no culpable negligence on the part of the State authority and pragmatic approach should be taken while dealing with the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In support of his contention, the learned G.P. cities State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors., (1996)3 Supreme Court Cases 132, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para No. 11 of the judgment has laid down as follows:-
“Section 5 of the Limitation Act gives power to the Court to admit the appeal or application after the prescribed period. The Supreme Court generally adopts a liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology inabued with the note-making, file pushing and passing on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. Decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay-intentional or otherwise-is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. Litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner.
The government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases required adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal the needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally inured while State is an impersonal machinery Working through its officers or servants.
Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay. The delay is accordingly condoned. The High Court is requested to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible.”
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon Secretary, Home Department, Punjab v. Paramjit Singh, 1997(4) S.C.T. 288 and submitted that there can be delay on the part of the Government if two authorities do not concur as to whether the appeal should be filed or not. On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that there was an unexplained negligence on the part of the Government when the Director Prosecution had sent the papers on 21.6.1997 and the Home Secretary kept the matter with him upto 26.8.1997 inspite of the fact that he received the papers in his office on 27.6.1997. Learned counsel submitted that there is no plausible explanation even on the part of the office of the District Attorney who filed the appeal on 6.9.1997 when the sanction was accorded by the State Government on 26.8.1997. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported as P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1998-3)120 P.L.R. 605 (S.C.) where the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down as follow:
“Law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs.”
6. I have considered the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. It is settled principle of law that while interpreting the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, liberal approach should be adopted for coming to the conclusion whether the State was so negligent that it was never interested to file the appeal. It is true that with the expiry of the time successful litigant can always take into this head that his litigation has come to logical conclusions. We have to see in each and every case whether there was negligence on the part of the authorities or not while dealing with the case of State. It is settled principle of law that State is not above the law but the Law Courts can always take a judicial notice about the style of the working of the Union of India and the State Departments and the Corporation. These departments work at snail pace and therefore, a strict approach should not be invariably adopted until the things are so bad or negligent on the part of the department.
7. It was then submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent that there is justification about the delay starting from 27.6.1997 upto 26.8.1997 when the Home Secretary gave directions to the office of District Attorney to file an appeal and further there is no justification while the appeal was filed on 6.9.1997. The argument is not acceptable to the Court. We all know that the office of Home Secretary performs multifarious duties. Files are supposed to be dealt from one table to the other. Even in the office of District Attorney there was no culpable negligence on his part because he had to arrange Court fee etc. in order to file an appeal. In view of the judgment of the Supreme court, I am of the opinion that the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Gurdaspur cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. Resultantly, the revision is allowed. Impugned order dated 3.6.1998 is set aside and directions are given to Additional District Judge to readmit the appeal to its original number and dispose of the appeal according to law within six months. State shall also pay a sum of Rs. 200/- by way of costs to the respondent. Parties are directed to appear on 16.9.1999.