JUDGMENT
R.D. Gattani, J.
1. The respondent is a partnership firm duly registered and carrying on business in grain at Rajgarh. As the firm had to expert some quantity of grams out of Rajasthan, it deposited with the Government of Rajasthan a sum of Rs. 3700/- on 5-2-1953 as super administrative charges required under a notification made by the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan under Section 4 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. This amount was deposited at the rate of Rs. 21- per maund. It so happened that the Central Government on 5-8-1953 by a notification of the said date relaxed the restriction of the export of grams so far as the State of Rajasthan was concerned. In other words from 5-8 1953 no restriction in connection with the export of grams from Rajasthan remained and a free movement in respect of export of grams come into operation. In the year 1956 the plaintiff firm filed a representation for the refund of the amount of Rs. 3700/- deposited by it on 5-2-1953 on the ground that with the operation of the free movement in respect of the grams from 5-2-1953 the State of Rajasthan was not entitled to any super administrative charges in connection with the export of grams from that day. This representation of the plaintiff was decided by the Administrative Officer, Civil Supplies, Rajasthan, Jaipur on 3-1-1957 and he ordered a refund of the sum of Rs. 3237/-8/- out of the sum of Rs. 3700/-. Inspite of this order the plaintiff firm could not get this amount of Rs. 3237/-8/. As such it had to file the suit for this amount after due notice under Section 80 C.P.C.
2. This suit was filed in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Churu on 1-3-1960 basing the claim upon the order of the Administrative Officer dated 3-1-1957 and further relying upon Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) The State of Rajasthan denied the claim. The trial Court dismissed the suit. The first appellate Court decreed the plaintiff’s suit for the sum of Rs. 3237/-8/- with costs of both the Courts. Hence this appeal.
3. Only two points have been urged by the learned Deputy Government Advocate in this appeal. The first is regarding limitation and the second is that there is nothing on the record to show that the plaintiff firm exported or not any amount of grams. So far as the second point is concerned, suffice it to say that the State is not entitled to raise it as this is a question of fact and was not raised in the written statement. Moreover, even if the plaintiff did not export the quantity of grams desired by the plaintiff firm, there is no reason why the plaintiff firm cannot claim the refund of the amount so deposited.
4. Coming to the question of limitation, the amount of Rs. 3700/- was deposited by the plaintiff firm on 5-2-1953 and Ex. 1, the refund order of the Administrative Officer relied upon by the plaintiff firm is dated 3rd January, 1957. It is farther urged that Ex. 1 can at the most serve as an acknowledgement and this acknowledgement being beyond three years from 5-2-1953 was of no avail to the plaintiff On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent has urged that the plaintiff’s suit is based upon Ex. 1, which can be taken as a contract under Section 5 sub Clause (3) of the Act. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced by both the parties, it will be proper to recite Ex. 1 in full:
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER,
CIVIL SUPPLIES, RAJASTHAN.
No. 71/F.
Jaipur, the 3rd Jan, 1957.
OFFICE ORDER
Sanction is hereby accorded to the refund of Rs. 3237-8/- (Rupees three thousand, two hundred and thirty seven and annas eight) only to M/s Banwari Lal Ram Prasad of Sadulpur out of Rs. 3700/- deposited by them as Super administration charges vide challan No. 112 dated 5-2-53 for export of 1850 maunds gram outside Rajasthan. This is subject to the verification of the deposit and other formalities as laid down in Finance Department Rules.
This is in final settlement of the claims as agreed by the party.
Sd/-
Administrative Officer,
Civil Supplies, Rajasthan,
Jaipur.
5. The argument of the Deputy Government Advocate is that because this document speaks of certain formalities of verification etc which were to be gone into even after the passing of this order before the plaintiff could claim the refund of Rs. 3237/-8/- this document was an acknowledgement only. I am afraid, I am not in agreement with this contention. In my opinion, this document is not an acknowledgement and was rightly made by the plaintiff as the basis of the suit. It not only speaks that out of the sum of Rs. 3700- deposited by the plaintiff, the plaintiff firm was entitled to the refund of a sum of Rs. 3237-8/-, but it further states that this was in the final settlement of the claim as agreed by the party. So far as the portion of the document which refers to the verification of the deposit and further formalities, suffice it to say that it was written in a most formal manner otherwise a few lines above even challan number and the date of the deposit of the amount has been given in the order.
6. Section 25(3) of the Act runs as under:
Section 25. Agreement without consideration void unless it is in writing and registered. – An agreement made without consideration is void, unless – …(3) it is a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, or by his agent generally or specially authorised in that behalf, to pay wholly or in part debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for limitation of suit.
In any of those cases, such an agreement is a contract.
7. The lower Court also relied upon this very provision of law. The learned Deputy Government Advocate urged that the deposited amount cannot be treated as a debt because the State of Rajasthan did not borrow any loan from the plaintiff firm. In my opinion, the word ‘debt’ is not to be taken in the technical sense as urged by the learned Deputy Government Advocate. It is to be taken in its ordinary meaning and viewed from that angle this would mean any ascertained some of money recoverable by action. A similar point arose in Doraisami Padayachi and Anr. v. Vaithilinga Padayachi and Ors. A.I.R. 1918 Mad. 1145 (F.B.), wherein it was held that the word ‘debt’ used in Section 25 of the Act must be taken to have been used in its ordinary meaning of a sum payable in respect of a money demand recoverable by action. This view was followed in Bharat National Bank, Ltd. v. Bishan Lal and Anr. A.I.R. 1922 Lah. 212, wherein it was laid down that debt for purposes of Section 25 of the Act can be defined as a sum payable in respect of money recoverable by action. In the instant case also the aim is ascertained. It is Rs. 3287/-8/-. It is recoverable by action and as such the disputed amount can very easily be treated as a debt.
8. No other point was urged. The result, therefore, is that this appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs.