Supreme Court of India

State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr vs Abdullah Kadher Batcha & Anr on 12 November, 2008

Supreme Court of India
State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr vs Abdullah Kadher Batcha & Anr on 12 November, 2008
Author: . A Pasayat
Bench: Arijit Pasayat, P. Sathasivam, Aftab Alam
                                                                        REPORTABLE


                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 231 OF 2001



State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.                             ...Appellants


           Vs.


Abdullah Kadher Batcha & Anr.                          ...Respondents



                             JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a

Division Bench of the Madras High Court quashing the order of detention

passed under the provisions of Section 3(1)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign

Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter

referred to as the `Act’) in respect of one Abdullah Kadher Batcha

(hereinafter referred to as the `detenu’) who was directed to be detained.

The order of detention was passed on 11.8.1999. The detenu made a

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representation on 4.9.1999. It is the stand of the detenu that he had sought

for some documents including the judgment passed by the High Court in

Writ Petition No.13514 of 1999 which was dismissed on 10.8.1999. The

Writ Petition was filed by the detenu on the apprehension that he may be

detained under the Act. In the representation the detenu made a reference to

the judgment dated 10.8.1999 and also to the writ petition. It was pointed

out in paragraph 7(x) that in order to make the effective and meaningful

representation, the detenu requires the copy of the order passed by the High

Court. A request was made to supply the copy at an early date. It was stated

in the representation that the detenu did not know English and, therefore,

representation which was made in English language was prepared under his

instruction and was read over and explained to him in Tamil. State

Government rejected the request by communication dated 21.9.1999 and it

was indicated that the documents were not relied upon for the purpose of

detention. Copy of the order of the writ petition was however supplied. High

Court observed that in view of non supply of the documents a protection

available, under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the

`Constitution’), was violated.

2. The High Court further held that in the absence of the required

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documents the detention was rendered illegal and accordingly the habeas

corpus petition was allowed.

3. In support of the appeal it has been stated that the documents in

question which were requested by the detenu to be supplied had nothing to

do with the order of detention. It was pointed out that there is a difference

between the narration of facts and the ground of detention. Undisputedly, the

copy of the order in the writ petition which was sought was in fact supplied

though at a later point of time. It is not understood as to how the order

passed in writ petition which was dismissed can be a document about which

the detenu had no knowledge. The High Court erroneously came to the

conclusion that the relied upon documents were not supplied. Actually, the

factual scenario is just to the contrary.

4. As rightly contended by learned counsel for the State the

documents were read over and an endorsement to that effect has been made

by the detenu.

5. In Radhakrishnan Prabhakaran v. State of T.N. and Ors. (2000

(9) SCC 170, it was observed as follows:

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“8. We may make it clear that there is no legal require-

ment that a copy of every document mentioned in the or-
der shall invariably be supplied to the detenu. What is
important is that copies of only such of those documents
as have been relied on by the detaining authority for
reaching the satisfaction that preventive detention of the
detenu is necessary shall be supplied to him. It is admit-
ted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order
granting bail has been supplied to him. Application for
bail has been submitted by the detenu himself when the
order of detention was passed which was subsequent to
the order granting bail. We cannot comprehend as to how
a prior order rejecting bail would be of any relevance in
the matter when it was later succeeded by the order
granting bail. But learned counsel emphasised that the
counter filed by the Department was a relevant docu-
ment, a copy of which has not been supplied to him.”

6. The view in Radhakrishan Prabhakaran’s case (supra) was

reiterated in J. Abdul Hakeem v. State of T.N. and Ors. (2005 (7) SCC 70)

and Sunila Jain v. Union of India and Anr. (2006 (3) SCC 321).

7. The Court has a duty to see whether the non supply of any

document is in any way prejudicial to the case of the detenu. The High Court

has not examined as to how the non supply of the documents called for had

any effect on the detenu and/or whether non supply was prejudicial to the

detenu. Merely because copies of some documents have been supplied they

cannot by any stretch of imagination be called as relied upon documents.

8. While examining whether non supply of a document would

prejudice a detenu the Court has to examine whether the detenu would be

deprived of making an effective representation in the absence of a document.

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Primarily, the copies which form the ground for detention are to be supplied

and non supply thereof would prejudice to the detenu. But documents which

are merely referred to for the purpose of narration of facts in that sense

cannot be termed to be documents without the supply of which the detenu is

prejudiced.

9. The High Court has lost sight of the relevant factors and,

therefore, the impugned order of the High Court is clearly unsustainable and

is therefore set aside.

10. In State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. Alagar (2006(7) SCC 540) it

was noted as follows:

“The residual question is whether it would be appropri-
ate to direct the respondent to surrender for serving re-
maining period of detention in view of passage of time.
As was noticed in Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of In-
dia [2000(3) SCC 409] and State of T.N. v. Kethiyan
Peruma
[2004(8) SCC 780] it is for the appropriate State
to consider whether the impact of the acts, which led to
the order of detention still survives and whether it would
be desirable to send back the detenu for serving remain-
der period of detention. Necessary order in this regard
shall be passed within two months by the appellant State.
Passage of time in all cases cannot be a ground not to
send the detenu to serve remainder of the period of deten-
tion. It all depends on the facts of the act and the continu-
ance or otherwise of the effect of the objectionable acts.
The State shall consider whether there still exists a proxi-
mate temporal nexus between the period of detention in-
dicated in the order by which the detenu was required to
be detained and the date when the detenu is required to
be detained pursuant to the present order.”

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11. Considering the nature of the order of detention which is

essentially preventive in character, it would be appropriate for the State

Government and the detaining authority to consider whether there is any

need to take the detenu back to detention for serving the remainder of the

period of detention which was indicated in the order of detention. The

exercise shall be undertaken within two months.

12. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

………………………………………J.
(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

…… ……………………………….J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)

………………………………………..J.
(AFTAB ALAM)
New Delhi,
November 12, 2008

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