Allahabad High Court High Court

State Of U.P. And Anr. vs Rajendra Prasad And Ors. on 1 October, 2003

Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P. And Anr. vs Rajendra Prasad And Ors. on 1 October, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2004 (1) AWC 73, (2004) ILLJ 980 All, (2004) 1 UPLBEC 60
Author: M Katju
Bench: M Katju, U Pandey


JUDGMENT

M. Katju, J.

1. This special appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge dated 24.6.1998.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

3. The writ petitioners (respondents in this appeal) were appointed as daily rate employees in the P.W.D. and the Minor Irrigation Department of U.P. Government. They filed a writ petition with a prayer for regularization of their services and grant of pay as regular employees. That writ petition has been allowed. Hence, this appeal.

4. We have already held in Writ Petition No. 691 of 1988, State of U.P. v. U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad Shramik Sangh and Ors., decided on 29.9.2003, that the principle of equal pay for equal work cannot be applied to the daily wage employees and they cannot be given the same pay scale as the regular employees. The matter has been discussed in great detail in the aforesaid Division Bench judgment and most of the relevant rulings of Supreme Court and this Court have been referred to therein and hence they are not being repeated.

5. The learned counsel for writ petitioner relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, JT 1992 (5) SC 179 ; Khagesh Kumar and Ors. v. I.G. Registration and Ors., 1996 (1) AWC 69 (SC) : JT 1995 (7) SC 545 ; State of U.P. and Ors. v. Putti Lal, (1996) 1 UPLBEC 313 and Dharvad District P.W.D. Literate Daily Wages Employees’ Association and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., 1990 (3) UPLBEC 2151. On the strength of those decisions the writ petitioners contended that they were entitled to be considered for regularization and for grant of same salary as the regular employees.

6. On the other hand learned standing counsel submitted that the U.P. Regularisation of Ad hoc Appointments (on Post Outside the Purview of the Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979, had no application to the facts of the present case and in the absence of any scheme for regularization and requisite number of posts the petitioners are not entitled for regularisation or to claim parity with the regular employees.

7. It is well-settled that all public posts have to be filled in after advertising the same in well known newspapers and thereafter holding a selection so as to comply with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

8. In R.N. Nanjudappa v. T. Thimmiah, (1972) 2 SCR 799, it was observed :

“Regularisation cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of the rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules.”

9. In the above decision the Supreme Court held that if an appointment is made by infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, such appointment, being illegal, cannot be regularized, as there has been non-compliance with the procedure of appointment, which goes to the root. In Ashwani Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1997 SC 1627. the Supreme Court held that if the initial entry is itself unauthorized and is not against any sanctioned vacancy the question of regularizing the incumbent on such non-existent vacancy does not arise, and even if such purported regularisation or confirmation is given it would be an exercise in futility. In Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi and Ors., JT 1992 (1) SC 394, the pernicious consequences of the direction of regularisation has been pointed out in great detail and it was mentioned that a good deal of illegal employment market has developed resulting in a new source of corruption and frustration to those who are waiting registered in the Employment Exchange for years.

10. In State of U.P. v. Ajay Kumar, (1997) SCC 88, it was held that there must exist a post, and there must be statutory rules or administrative instructions for appointment on the post. Daily Wage appointment will obviously be in relation to contingent establishment in which there cannot exist any post and it continues so long as the work exists. Hence the High Court was clearly in error in directing the regularisation of the service of the respondents.

11. In Union of India v. Uma Maheshwari, (1997) 11 SCC 228, it was held that a claim to regularisation by a daily wager is not sustainable if no regular work or no regularisation scheme is in operation. In absence of a scheme of regularisation and regular work the Tribunal cannot direct regularisation of the daily wagers.

12. The learned single Judge in the impugned judgment has hence, rightly observed that the question of regularisation does not arise and the provisions of the regularisation of ad hoc appointment rules have no application. In State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh, 1997 (1) AWC 2.145 (NOC) : (1996) 11 SCC 77, the Supreme Court held that daily wagers are not entitled to get pay parity with regular employees since they were not selected by the same selection process through which the regular employees were recruited. The same view has been taken in the various decision of the Supreme Court referred to in the Division Bench decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 691 of 1988, State of U.P. v. U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad Shramik Sangh and Ors., decided on 29.9.2003.

13. In State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj, (2003) 6 SCC 123, the Supreme Court held that a pay scale is attached to a definite post, and a daily wager, holds no post. Hence he cannot be compared with the regular and permanent staff for any or all purposes including claim for pay parity. In State Bank of India v. M.R. Ganesh Babu, (2002) 2 UPLBEC 1680, the Supreme Court observed that the principle of equal pay for equal work must depend upon the nature of work done and it cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. The functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. In State of West Bengal v. Manirujjaman Mullik and Ors., (1996) 10 SCC 56, the Supreme Court observed that where the method of appointment, source of recruitment, etc. are different the principle of equal pay for equal work would not apply. In State of Haryana v. Surendra Kumar, 1997 (3) AWC 1492 (SC) : (1997) SCC 633, the Supreme Court observed that the respondents were appointed on contract basis on daily wages and hence they cannot have any right to regularization or pay parity until they are duly selected and appointed. In State of U.P. v. Ramashyraya Yadav, AIR 1996 SC 1188, the Supreme Court observed that the employees appointed to a temporary post are not entitled to the pay scale equivalent to the regular employees.

14. In view of the above we are clearly of the opinion that the learned single Judge has erred in law by giving directions for giving regular posts to the daily rated employees and by directing that they should be given salary not less than the minimum of the pay scale prescribed for the post.

15. In fact the direction of the learned single Judge that the daily rate employees should be given the minimum pay scale of regular employees is directly contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh (supra). In Union of India v. P.V. Hariharan, JT 1997 (3) SC 569, the Supreme Court observed that the Tribunals and the Courts are often interfering with pay scales without being cautious of the fact that fixation of pay is not their function. It is the function of the Government, which normally acts on the recommendations of the Pay Commission. Change of pay scale of a category has a cascading effect. Several other categories similarly situated, as well as those situated above and below will put forward their claims on the basis of such change. The Tribunal should realize that interfering with the prescribed pay scales is a serious matter. Very often the doctrine of equal pay for equal work is also being misunderstood and misapplied freely revising and enhancing the pay scales across the board.

16. No doubt in certain decisions the Courts have given directions for regularizing dally wagers or casual/ temporary employees but in our opinion such directions do not amount to a precedent vide Indian Council of Agricultural Research v. Raja Balwant Singh College, 2003 (1) ESC 424 ; Delhi Administration v. Manoharlal, AIR 2002 SC 3088, etc. What is a binding precedent is a principle of law, which has been laid down in a decision of the Court, and a mere direction without laying down any principle of law is not a precedent. A case is an authority for what it actually decides vide Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1990 SC 781 ; Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P., AIR 1983 SC 1246 (Para 29) ; Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44 (Paras 9 and 10) ; Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab and Ors.. AIR 1985 SC 218, etc. Everything in a decision is not a precedent vide State of Punjab v. Baldeo Singh. 1999 (2) ACrR 1694 (SC) : 1999 SCC (Crl) 1080.

17. Hence, a mere direction of the Supreme Court to regularize an employee without laying down any principle of law will not amount to a binding precedent.

18. We are also of the opinion that the learned single Judge was not justified in directing the State Government to make rules. It may be mentioned that making rules under Article 309 of the Constitution is basically a legislative function (though exercised by the Governor). Similarly issuing of Government orders is an executive function under Article 166 of the Constitution. It is not for this Court to direct that a law which it thinks proper should be made by the concerned authority or that a Government order should be Issued. At most the courts can make recommendations to these effect, but it cannot act as a Legislature or Executive.

19. In our Constitution the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary have their proper sphere of operation, and the judiciary should exercise self-restraint and not encroach upon the fields of the Legislature or Executive, otherwise there is bound to be a reaction, vide Division Bench decision of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 34022 of 2002, XL-IIT Forum and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. decided on 27.5.2003, in which it was held that judicial restraint enhances the image and prestige of the judiciary. S.L.P. against that Judgment has been dismissed by the Supreme Court.

20. We are of the view that the learned single Judge gravely erred in law by directing the State Government to frame Rules as directed by him. The Governor frames rules under Article 309 of the Constitution and this Court cannot direct the Governor to frame such Rules. In Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294 (vide para 19), it was held that the Court cannot direct amendment of the Act or rules, as that is a legislative function.

21. No doubt social justice has to be administered in our country, but social justice does not mean that the law should be violated. At most the learned single Judge could have made some recommendations to the Government to consider his suggestions for framing rules for regularisation or grant of pay scale to the employees who have been in service for many years, but he could not have given directions for framing of such Rules.

22. For the reasons given above this special appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside. No orders as to costs.