JUDGMENT
M.G. Mukherji, C.J.
1. Shri Bahadur Singh Chandrawat was District & Sessions Judge at Pratapgarh. The members of the Bar Association and specially its President Sri Babulal made a complaint before the Chief Justice of the High Court alleging misbehavior by the District & Sessions Judge in relation to the day to day conduct of cases. This led admittedly to an enquiry by the Registrar of Vigilance before whom several affidavits were filed by the members of the Bar Association including the President. Besides denying the allegations made against him, Shri Bahadur Singh Chandrawat has very categorically stated that the complaint in question is virtually not the complaint by the Bar Association, Pratapgarh but the same has been engineered by the complainant by misusing the name of Bar Association, since the President of the Bar Association was involved in the matter. In support of his contention, Shri Bahadur Singh Chandrawat has sent photostat copies of affidavits of as many as 15 advocates practicing in the Bar testifying to the effect that they had no complaint or grievance whatsoever against Shri Bahadur Singh Chandrawat and no such complaint was brought to their notice by the Bar Association, Pratapgarh. Shri Bahadur Singh Chandrawat has also made out a case for contempt against the complainant and prayed for his comments to be treated as a reference under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
2. We have for our consideration whether the complaint lodged against Shri Bahadur Singh Chandrawat by the President and Members of the Bar alleging his misbehaviour in the Court in some of the matters placed before him, amounted at all to contempt of court.
3. We had assistance in the matter, not only of learned Addl. Advocate General, Shri L.S. Udawat but also of Mr.M.Mridul, Senior Advocate of this Court who at our request appeared as Amicus Curiae and both of them rendered assistance to this Court for which the Court is thankful to them.
4. Under Section 6 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, a person shall not be guilty of contempt of Court in respect of any statement made by him in good faith concerning the Presiding Officer of any subordinate court to the High Court to which it is subordinate. The main thing to appreciate in this matter is whether the statement made by the President of the Bar Association and certain members was so done in “good faith” to the Chief Justice of this Court. According to the General Clauses Act, Section 3(22) “the thing shall be deemed to be done in “good faith” where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not.” Section 52 of the Indian Penal Code states that “nothing is said to be done or believed in “good faith” which is done or believed without due care and attention.” The element of honesty which is there within the purview of Section 3(22), is however not there in Section 52 of Indian Penal Code, because under the latter, the proper point to be decided is not whether the allegations put forward by the person complained against in support of defamation are in substance true, but whether he had good reason after due care and attention. It may well be contended that good faith does not require logical infallibility but merely due care and attention. But as regards erroneous actions or statements which were to be imputed to want of due care and caution, one has to consider with reference to general circumstances and the capacity and intelligence of the person whose conduct is in question. It is only to be expected that honest conclusions of a calm and philosophical mind may differ from the honest conclusions of an over-zealous person, who is not properly trained to habits of precise reasoning. Bonafide complaints against judicial officers addressed to authorities to seek redress for some grievances and not intended to exert pressure upon such judicial officers in the exercise of judicial functions or to diminish their authority as Judges or vilifying them cannot be treated as contempt. In State v. Harihar Sukhla 1976 Cr.L.J. 507 when the learned Advocate made certain complaints against a particular Magistrate regarding involvement in politics, misbehaving, creating groupism, discrimination and prayed for inquiry and transfer by sending telegram to the Administrative Judge of the Allahabad High Court and ultimately learned Judicial Magistrate after securing a copy of the telegram made a complaint for bringing the learned Advocate within the ambit of contempt of court, the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court observed that since the learned Advocate merely made a complaint to the Administrative Judge and he did not take any steps to communicate the contents of the telegram in question to the learned Magistrate and it was the Magistrate who fished out its contents, if would be said that the action of the learned Advocate in sending the telegram had no tendency to intimidate the Magistrate into dealing with the case in a particular manner or to interfere with him fair decision of any case. There was nothing on record to show that learned Advocate did anything to publish the telegram in a manner that its contents became generally known to the public and the dignity of the court be lowered in their eyes.
5. In C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee and Ors. , it was observed that criticism of a Judge’s conduct or of the conduct of a Court, even if strongly worded, is however, not contempt provided that the criticism is fair, temperate and made in good faith and is not directed to the personal character of a Judge or to the impartiality of a Judge or Court. A libel upon a Judge in his judicial capacity is a contempt, whether it concerns what he did in court, or what he did judicially out of the Court. Scurrilous abuse of a Judge or court, or attacks on the personal character of a Judge, are punishable contempts and there punishments are inflicted not for the purpose of protecting either the Court as a whole or the individual Judges from the repetition of the attack, but for protecting the public and especially those who either voluntarily or by compulsion are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the court is undermined or impaired. In consequence, the Court has regarded with particular seriousness allegations of partiality or bias on the part of a Judge. That unfortunately, is not the case here. The allegations were mostly of improper behaviour of the Judge in his day to day conduct of cases, where certain members of the Bar felt aggrieved in subjective assessment of the situations.
6. In Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India , it was observed that fair criticism of the judicial proceedings outside the pleadings of the Court is democratic feature so as to enable the Court to look inward into the correctness of the proceedings and the legality of the orders of the Court by the Court itself for introspection. But a party has a duty and responsibility to plead a part of the averments or the prayer in the relevant portion with language befitting with the dignity of the Court and the judicial process and not in self-abuse of the freedom of expression given under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. Abuse of the process of the Court is self-evidence. As such Article 19(2) creates an embargo on the freedom of expression and excludes from its operation, the power of contempt of Court. When an advocate is appearing before the Court he should maintain dignity and decorum of the Court and he cannot have free licence to indulge in writing by way of pleadings the scurrilous accusations or scandalisation against the Judge. If the reputation and dignity of the Judge, who decides the case, are allowed to be prescribed in the pleadings, the respect for the Court would quickly disappear and independence of the judiciary would be a thing of the past.
7. Taking an over all view of the situation, we do think that the learned Advocates including the President of District Bar Association, Pratapgarh by making complaint before the Chief Justice of the High Court, have transgressed limits of permissibility in making the complaint, even though they might have been erroneous in their subjective appreciation of the acts and behaviour of the learned Judge. We would however, make it clear that as and when members of the Bar in their representative capacity make a complaint before the Judge or the Presiding Officer, they should in good faith be acting with due care and caution in the matter and they are not to make any indiscreet statement which may create a misgiving in the mind of the learned Judge or the Presiding Officer that he has not been given due respect which behoves the judiciary.
8. With these observations, we drop the proceedings for contempt and the contempt petition reference stands disposed of. Let a copy of this order be sent to Shri Babulal, President of Bar Association, Pratapgarh and also to Shri Bahadur Singh Chandrawat, who is at present the District Judge, Jaisalmer.
