JUDGMENT
Altamas Kabir and Jyotirmoy Bhattacharya, JJ.
1. This writ application is at the instance of the State of West Bengal and the Director of Personnel Ex-Officio Chief Engineer, Irrigation & Waterways Directorate, Government of West Bengal, in respect of the order dated November 23, 2000 passed by the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal on November 23, 2000 in O.A. No. 339 of 2000.
2. The aforesaid original application had been filed by Sri Samar Kumar Chowdhury questioning the authority of the State and its authorities in continuing with the vigilance enquiry against him despite the fact that he had applied for voluntary retirement on November 13, 1998, giving three clear months notice of his intention to do so. It also appears that while the applicant before the learned Tribunal was to retire on February 28, 1999, he sent a reminder on February 10, 1999, regarding his decision to retire voluntarily from service.
3. The learned Tribunal by its judgment and order dated August 25, 2000 was of the view that after the expiry of three months notice the applicant had retired voluntarily as per the rules and that he deserved to get his retiral benefits but that the vigilance case was pending against him. The learned Tribunal, however, went on to observe that in the larger interest of the public and for the ends of justice the enquiry should be allowed to be completed and the respondents should take a decision expeditiously since the applicant was no longer in service. In that view of the matter the learned Tribunal while disposing of the application directed that the vigilance case must be completed within the time limit and, thereafter, the matter of release of retiral benefits including pension would be taken up. In consequence of such finding the application was disposed of finally with a direction upon the respondents to complete the enquiry pending before the Vigilance Commission within three months from the receipt of the order and following the decision of the vigilance case to release the retiral benefits, including pension and G.P.F. as admissible under the rules, within the next three months.
4. As will appear from the judgment, the same was delivered on August 25, 2000. Before the expiry of three months the writ petitioners herein filed an application affirmed on November 21, 2000 which was disposed of by the learned Tribunal by the order impugned in this writ application on November 23, 2000 also within a period of three months from the date of the judgment. In other words, the petitioners herein approached the Tribunal for enlarging the time for completing the vigilance enquiry before the expiry of three months from the date of the judgment. The writ petitioners’ application was dismissed by the learned Tribunal which accepted the submissions made on behalf of the applicant that the Tribunal did not have the power and/or authority to extend the time granted by it since that would amount to reviewing its judgment in terms of Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
5. The same submission has been advanced on behalf of the applicant before the learned Tribunal by Mr. Das opposing the writ application. He has reiterated the submissions made before the learned Tribunal that the Tribunal being a creature of Statute could only act in accordance with the Statute and since in Section 22 it had been clearly indicated that the Tribunal would not be bound by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure but by the rules of natural justice and the rules framed by it, the concept of enlargement of time as conceived in Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure would have no application to the facts of the case.
6. Mr. Das submitted that since the application before the learned Tribunal for enlargement of time would really amount to review of the judgment of the learned Tribunal, the application for enlargement of time ought to have been made in the manner provided for review under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since the same had not been done in accordance with the said procedure as laid down, the application had been rightly rejected by the learned Tribunal and did not call for any, interference by this Court.
7. Mr. Das also urged that although direction had been given to the Vigilance Commission to complete the enquiry pending before it, the said Commission had not come forward to pray for extension of the time granted to it either before the learned Tribunal or before this Court.
8. However, in support of the writ petition Mr. Bidyut Kiran Mukherjee urged that the Tribunal had erred in holding that enlarging the time for completing the vigilance enquiry would amount to review of the judgment itself. Mr. Mukherjee pointed out that the learned Tribunal had recognised the authority of the writ petitioners herein to continue with the vigilance enquiry even after the applicant before the learned Tribunal had been accepted to have retired voluntarily from the service of the writ petitioners herein. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that since the said power of the writ petitioners had been duly recognised, the prayer for enlargement of time would not alter the said finding and would merely result in enlarging the time for completing the enquiry which had been directed by the parent order dated August 25, 2000.
9. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we are inclined to agree with Mr. Mukherjee that the application made by the writ petitioners herein, if allowed, would not amount to review of the judgment of the learned Tribunal which had, in fact, recognised the right of the writ petitioners to continue with the vigilance enquiry even after holding that the applicant must be held to have retired voluntarily from service after the expiry of the three months notice given by him. We are of the view that what the learned Tribunal was being requested to …….. was merely to enlarge the time limit within which to complete the enquiry. Section 22 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, makes it clear that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and subject to the other provisions of the Act and of any rules made by the Central Government. It also indicates that the Tribunal shall have the power to regulate its own procedure while discharging its functions. The said provision does not completely exclude the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure where no provision is made with regard to a particular matter, as in the instant case. Nothing has been shown to us by either of the parties that any rules have been framed and/or procedure has been laid down regarding extension of time for doing of any act directed by the learned Tribunal. In our view, in such a case the provisions of Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure and/or the principles analogous thereto may be pressed into service and the time to do a certain act fixed by the learned Tribunal may be enlarged for the ends of justice.
10. Regarding the submission of Mr. Das that the Vigilance Commission had not come forward to pray for extension of time, we can only observe that while disposing of the application filed by Sri Samar Kumar Chowdhury, the learned Tribunal had directed the respondents to see that the enquiry pending before the Vigilance Commission was completed within three months. There was no direction upon the Commission itself to complete such enquiry. Mr. Das’s submission on that score cannot also be accepted since a direction had been given to the respondents to complete the enquiry and the respondents have made an application before the learned Tribunal for extension of time and have also come up before this Court by way of the instant writ application for such relief.
11. Accordingly, we are unable to agree with the decision of the learned Tribunal that by applying for extension of time to complete the vigilance enquiry the writ petitioners had prayed for review of the judgment of the learned Tribunal. In our view, the learned Tribunal should have applied the principles embodied in Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure since the enlargement of time to complete the enquiry would not affect the findings and/or the finality of the judgment of the learned Tribunal.
12. It may also be pointed out that the applicant before the learned Tribunal had also not questioned the Tribunal’s direction to complete the enquiry even though it had accepted the fact that the said applicant must be deemed to have retired from service after expiry of three months from the date of notice of voluntary retirement given by him.
13. Having regard to the above, we set aside the order passed by the learned Tribunal on November 23, 2000 and give liberty to the writ petitioners to complete the vigilance enquiry within three months from date, failing which the applicant before the learned Tribunal will be entitled to apply for orders before the learned Tribunal.
14. Since payment of provident fund dues cannot be linked with the enquiry which is still pending, the same may be paid to the applicant, Sri Samar Kumar Chowdhury, within one month from date.
15. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.
16. There will however, be no order as to costs.
17. Let a xerox plain copy of the order, duly counter-signed by the Assistant Registrar (Court), be made available to the learned advocates, on record of both the parties for communication and compliance, on the usual undertaking.