1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY:
NAGPUR BENCH: NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO.1417 OF 1999
PETITIONERS:
1] Subhash Nagar Education Society, Subhash Nagar,
Nagpur, by its Secretary
2] Ravindranath Tagore Bahudhushiya Shikshan Sanstha,
Pulgaon, through its President Sudhakar Ghode,
resident of c/o Ravindranath Tagore Bahudhushiya
Shikshan Sanstha, Pulgaon, Distt. Wardha.
VERSUS
RESPONDENTS:
1] Ku. Rekha Ramkrushnaji Rewatkar, aged - major,
resident of Pathan Layout, Plot NO.81, Parsodi, Ring
Road, Nagpur.
2] The Director of Education, Maharashtra State, Pune
3] The Deputy Director of Education Old Morris College,
Civil Lines, Nagpur.
4] The Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur
(Secondary),
5] Matoshri Savitribai Fule Vidyalaya, through its
Headmaster Shri Dilip Deorao Ingole, Subhash Nagar,
Nagpur.
6] The Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Nagpur.
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Shri H.A. Deshpande, advocate for petitioners
Shri A.R. Shelat, advocate for repsondent no.1.
Shri C.N. Adgokar, A.G.P. for respondent no.2 to 4.
None present for respondent no.5 & 6.
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CORAM: S.R.DONGAONKAR, J.
RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON:26.8.2009
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 10.9.2009
JUDGMENT
Heard Shri Deshpande, advocate for petitioner, Shri A.
Shelat, advocate for respondent no.1, Shri Adgokar, AGP for
respondent no.2 to 4. None present for respondent no.5 & 6.
2] By this petition, under articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, petitioners are challenging the order
passed by the School Tribunal, Nagpur in Appeal No.
STN/17/1996 filed by the respondent no.1 against the
termination of her services w.e.f. 9.5.1989.
3] Brief facts leading to this petition can be stated thus.
Respondent no.1 was appointed as Assistant Teacher with
the petitioner from the academic session 1985-86 to
1989-89. According to the petitioner, she was being
appointed every year on purely temporary basis as an
Assistant Teacher. Her services came to be terminated on
9.5.1989. The respondent no.1 then preferred appeal before
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the School Tribunal under section 9 of the Maharashtra
Employees of Private Schools [Conditions of Service
Regulation] Act 1977 [for short M.E.P.S. Act ] challenging
the her termination. This appeal was preferred on 16.1.1996.
In the proceeding of appeal before the School Tribunal,
Nagpur notices were issued to the present respondents and
the Deputy Director of education and Education Officer,
Nagpur. The management/ petitioner filed their reply to
resist the appeal. However other respondents including the
Education Officer did not file any reply. Learned Presiding
Officer, School Tribunal, found that the respondent no.1 was
wrongly terminated and order of termination issued was
illegal, so the School Tribunal set aside that order and
directed reinstatement of the appellant in the same post
immediately. However, her claim for back wages was
rejected.
4] When the matter was heard by this court at the time of
admission, the stay in terms of prayer clause (ii) was
granted. Prayer clause (ii) reads thus:
“(ii) pending decision of this petition, stay
the effect, operation and execution of the
Judgment of the School Tribunal, Nagpur
dated 1.4.1999 passed in Appeal No.
17/1996”
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Therefore, stay was granted to the effect, operation and
execution of the judgment and order passed by the School
Tribunal. Therefore, it so happened that the respondent no.1
was reinstated on 1.4.1999 and after an order of stay on
10.9.1999, she was away from the services. It is necessary to
extract the part of the relevant order of this court i.e. from
the order dated 9.10.2000 as under:
“Considered the contentions raised by the
respective learned counsel. It is, however,
true that the effect and operation of theJudgment of the School Tribunal is stayed by
this Court on 10th September, 1999.
However, in the intervening period i.e.1.4.99 to 10.9.99, the respondent no.1 was
reinstated. However, there is some confusion
of the fact that whether the respondent no.1has factually worked during the said period.
In that view of the matter, it will beappropriate to direct the Management to
deposit the salary of the respondent no.1 for
the period 1.4.99 to 10.9.99 in this Courtwithin a period of four weeks form today.
Thereafter, the appropriate orders will be
passed for withdrawal of the amount. In the
meanwhile, the parties are entitled to file
appropriate affidavit or reply. The EducationOfficer is directed to place the material on
record in this regard”
5] The learned counsel for the petitioner, while
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challenging the order of the learned Presiding Officer,
School Tribunal has mainly and seriously contended that the
appeal of the respondent no.1 under section 9 of the
M.E.P.S. Act was hopelessly barred by limitation. According
to him, such appeal should have been filed within a period
prescribed under section 9 of the said Act. In the present
case, the alleged termination of the respondent no.1 was in
the year 1989. She had preferred the appeal in 1996. There
was no sufficient reason for condonation of delay by the
learned Presiding Officer, School Tribunal. In fact the
reasons referred by him are not at all appearing from the
record and the inference is perverse to the record.
According to him, the claim made by the respondent no.1 to
show that he was preferring an application before the
Education Officer and Deputy Director of Education for her
grievance of illegal termination, were the documents which
could not have been relied by the learned Presiding Officer,
School Tribunal. According to him, those documents are got
up documents. Even otherwise, if they are to be taken into
consideration as they were xerox copies; the learned
Presiding Officer, School Tribunal should not have relied on
the same, inasmuch as those were pieces of secondary
evidence and there was no application for allowing to lead
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secondary evidence for justification of claim for
condonation of delay. According to him, the appointment of
respondent no.1 was not made in accordance with the
relevant rules. She was also not qualified for being
appointed on the post of Assistant Teacher as she was
untrained Teacher inasmuch as she had training qualification
of only “B.P.Ed.” According to him, respondent no.1 had
miserably failed to discharge her burden of proof that she
had bonafide reason for not preferring the appeal within the
prescribed period of 30 days, under section 9(2) of the
M.E.P.S.Act and there was no sufficient reason to seek
condonation of delay or sufficient cause for not preferring
an appeal within the said period under section 9(3) of the
said Act. According to him, she has also not discharged the
burden of proof to show that she was properly appointed and
was a trained teacher who can be appointed on the post of
Assistant Teacher. According to him further, the petitioner –
management had every right to appoint person on temporary
basis, even on permanent post. Therefore, when the
respondent no.1 was appointed on temporary basis, every
year and she had accepted the said appointment, her
termination could not be faulted with. In support of this
contention, he has relied on some authorities which I would
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discuss later on at the appropriate place. At this stage it is
necessary to note his further contention that the impugned
order is liable to be set aside as the School Tribunal has not
framed the preliminary issues as mandated in the Division
Bench Judgment of this court reported in 1997(3) Mh.L.J.
697 -Anna Manikrao Pethe ..vs.. Presiding Officer, School
Tribunal, Amravati and Aurangabad Division, Amravati &
others, wherein it been held as under:
“When applications under section 9 of the
Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools(Conditions of Service) Regulation Act,
1977, are filed before the School Tribunalsby the teachers challenging any act of
termination on the part of the management,
it will be necessary for the Tribunal to frame
and decide three preliminary issues viz.
whether the school was a recognized school
as defined under the M.E.P.S. Act; whether
the appointment of the concerned teacher
was made as per section 5 of the M.E.P.S.
Act and the Rules thereunder; and whethersuch an appointment has been approved by
the Education Officer in pursuance of the
provisions of the Act as well as the Rules
framed thereunder including theGovernment Resolutions issued from time
to time regarding reservations etc. These
preliminary points are required to be framed
and decided before the appeal proceeds on
merits and even if such points are not
raised by any of the parties to the appeal, it::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 14:59:54 :::
8would be proper on the part of the Tribunal
to frame such issues suo motu before
examining the merits of the case. In case thefinding to any of the preliminary issues are
in the negative, the appeal must fail thenand there itself, so far as the relief of
reinstatement / continuation in service is
concerned.”
6] He has pointed that in 2007(1) Mh.L.J. 597 ST. Ulai
High School & another ..vs.. Devendraprasad Jagannath
Singh, the Full Bench of this Court has considered the
direction of framing the issue whether such appointment has
been approved by the Education Officer in pursuance to the
provision of the Act as well as the rules framed thereunder
including the G.Rs. issued from time to time. According to
him in the present case, the Tribunal was obliged to frame
two issues as referred in Anna Pethe’s case as preliminary
issues and as the same was not done, matter was required to
be remanded, in case, if the objection of the petitioner as
regards appeal of the respondent of being time barred is not
upheld. Thus, according to him, the petition needs to be
allowed by setting aside the order impugned in this petition
on the ground that the appeal of the respondent was
hopelessly barred by limitation and if it is found that there
was sufficient cause to prefer the appeal after the period of
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limitation, then the matter be remanded back to the School
Tribunal for fresh disposal according to law after framing of
preliminary issues as laid down in Anna Pethe’s case which
was approved by the Full Bench of this Court in 2007(1)
Mh.L.J. 597 ST. Ulai High School & another ..vs..
Devendraprasad Jagannath Singh.
7] Learned counsel for the respondent Shri Shelat, has
submitted that respondent no.1 had preferred representations
before the Deputy Director etc. to get redressal of her
grievances. She has filed relevant documents on record to
show that in fact her representations were pending before
the concerned authorities and after she was informed by the
Deputy Director that he has no authority to deal with the
grievance of the respondent no.1, she had preferred the
instant appeal under section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act.
8] Therefore, according to him, while preferring the
appeal, the delay has been properly explained demonstrating
sufficient cause for condonation of delay and the learned
Presiding Officer, School Tribunal accepting the same
decided the appeal on merits. Therefore, according to him,
the impugned order can not be assailed on the ground of
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delay. He has relied on certain authorities to contend that the
pursuation of remedy before other authority is a good
ground or sufficient ground for condonation of delay in
preferring the appeal. He has particularly relied on 2008(2)
Mh.L.J.494 Sandeep s/o Hiralal Netke ..vs.. State of
Maharashtra & others and 2009 (4_ Mh.L.J. 457 Kisanrao
Khobragade Education Society, Armori, Gadchiroli and
another ..vs.. Bhojraj s/o Kevalram Motghare and others.
9]
It is further his contention that the scope of article 227
can not be enlarged so as to interfere with the discretion of
the Tribunal. According to him in view of judgment in
2001(2) Mh.L.J. 881 Hotel Rosalia Private Limited ..vs..
M/s Metro Hotels & others, powers under article 227 of the
Constitution are to be used sparingly and only in appropriate
case. According to him appropriate documents were
produced before the School Tribunal upon which School
Tribunal had taken a view that the delay in the matter needs
to be condoned and therefore, condonation of delay in this
case is justified. To the interesting submissions made by
learned counsel for petitioner for mentioning of the
applications which are produced by respondent no.1 before
the Tribunal to show that she was pursuing remedy before
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other authorities, he has also stated that all the applications
were submitted to the concerned officers. According to him,
respondent no.1 was duly qualified for appointment as
Assistant Teacher inasmuch as she was graduate and
having B.P.Ed. training qualification. Such appointments
were regularized as per Government Resolution of 1985.
Therefore, according to him, her appointment was proper
and continuous for more than 2-3 years and therefore, she
was permanent teacher whose services could not have been
terminated by respondent by the relevant order without
appropriate inquiry.
10] As regards the framing of preliminary issues, and
decision on the same, before the Presiding Officer starts to
decide the appeal under section 9 of the Act, on merits on
the basis judgment in case Anna Pethe, his submission is
that this submission was not raised by learned counsel in the
proceedings of an appeal and therefore, it can not be raised
for the first time before this court. He has also argued that
the answers to the preliminary issues which are expected to
be framed as per the Anna Pethe’s case are obvious so also
their answers and therefore, merely because those issues are
not framed by the Tribunal, matter cannot be remanded
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back. According to him, the reasons recorded by the learned
Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, are well justified from
the facts of the case.
11] He has relied on the judgment reported in 2007(2)
Mh.L.J. 105 President Mahila Mandal, Sinnar and
another ..vs.. Sunita Bansidhar Patole, to contend that
merely because the management chooses to issue
appointment orders every year, the appointment of the
respondent can not become a temporary one. Thus, it is
submitted by the learned counsel for respondent that the
grounds of appeal have been dealt with properly by the
School Tribunal. Respondent was qualified and eligible for
the appointment as an Assistant Teacher and her termination
could not be without any enquiry as her appointment would
be treated as appointment on permanent basis.
12] Learned A.G.P. Shri Adgokar, has submitted that,
respondent was in service from June 1985 to 1989 and after
the school was admitted to grants in June 1992, hence there
was no necessity of approval to her appointment by
Education Officer nor was so granted to the appointment of
respondent from 1985 to 1989. Reply was not filed in the
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appeal proceeding by the Education Officer inasmuch as his
stand there was that it was a matter between management
and employee inasmuch as the school was on no grant basis.
According to him respondent was terminated in 1989.
Appeal was preferred in 1996, it was decided on 1.4.1999.
He submitted that the point of limitation should have been
considered by the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal in
proper perspective. Respondent no.1 appears to have joined
services on 9.4.1999. She was there till 10.9.1999 and the
salary for that period was paid. Now there is no vacancy in
the school. According to him; delay can be said to be rightly
condoned, though as it was discretion of the School
Tribunal. He has however, pointed out that there is
possibility of respondent no.1’s leaving school as it was on
no grant basis at the relevant time and therefore, she might
have filed the appeal after the school came on grant basis.
He has however, not made any submission as to whether the
respondent no.1 was duly qualified and eligible for the
appointment on the post of Assistant Teacher.
13] Respondents have also relied on some authorities
which I would discuss at appropriate places as may be
necessary. Few admitted things however that need to be
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noted in the present petition are that the appellant /
respondent no.1 was working with the petitioner from 1985
to 1989. She was terminated on 9.5.1989.
14] Relevant provisions regarding limitation as regards
the appeals before School Tribunal can be found in section
9(2) of the M.E.P.S. Act which read as under:
“9(2) Such appeal shall be made by the
employee to the Tribunal within thirty days
from the date of receipt by him of the order
of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination
of service or reduction in rank, as the case
may be;
Provided that, where such order was made
before the appointed date, such appeal may
be made within sixty days from the said date.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (2), the Tribunal may entertain an
appeal made to it after the expiry of the said
period of thirty or sixty days, as the case may
be, if it is satisfied that the appellant has
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal
within that period.”
Admittedly the appeal has been filed in 1996 i.e. after more
than 6 years of her termination. Therefore, she was required
to make out a case to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that
she had sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal within
that period. The crucial question in the present case is
whether it can be said that the appellant had sufficient cause
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to prefer the appeal after such a long delay.
15] In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned
counsel, it is necessary to peruse the observations of the
School Tribunal, contained in paragraph 7, 8, 9 and 10
which reads thus:
“7. In this case, it is obvious that the appeal
has not been preferred within the prescribed
limitation. Therefore, it is to be seen if theappellant had sufficient cause for not filing
the appeal within limitation. The appellanthas explained that she had approached the
various educational Authorities and whenultimately she was informed by the Deputy
Director of education vide his letter dated
8.1.1996, she has filed the appeal on
18.1.1996 which according to her is withinthe prescribed limitation. She has also filed
copies of her representation, alleged to have
been sent by her to the Educational
Authorities after terminating of her services.
8. The management has however, denied
the appellant’s contentions that she was
prosecuting her remedy before the Education
Authorities. It has even questioned thegenuineness of the copies of the
representations filed on the record of this
appeal. There are in all copies of twenty
representations alleged to have been sent by
the appellant to the Education Authorities
between 14.5.1989 to 2.1.1996 and there is a::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 14:59:54 :::
16copy of the Deputy Director’s letter dated
8.1.1996 informing the appellant that there
was no provision for preferring appeal to hisoffice against termination of services. There
appears no any doubt about those documentsand as such, there is no reason to disbelieve
the same.
9. The learned Advocate for the
Management has vehemently contended that
the appellant has even not filed any
application for condonation of the inordinatedelay of 80 months and hence according to
him, since the appellant has failed to explainthe delay, the appeal can not be entertained.
However, as it is held in an authorityreported in AIR 1966 Madrass 137, Meghraj
..vs.. Jesrats, written application for
condonation of delay is not necessary and
even section 9(3) of the Act does notcontemplate any such application.
Therefore, it is not possible to agree with the
contention of the learned advocate for the
management in that regard.
10. Consequently, I am satisfied that the
appellant had sufficient cause for not
preferring the appeal within the prescribed
limitation therefore, I hold that the appeal isnot barred by limitation and answer this
point in the negative.”
It clearly appears that the Presiding Officer was influenced
by the fact of many representations which had been sent by
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appellant to the authorities between 14.5.1989 to 2.1.1996
and the copy of the letter sent by Deputy Director dated
8.1.1996 informing the appellant / respondent no.1 that
there was no provision of preferring an appeal to his office
against termination of services.
16] It is necessary to have a glance on the said letters.
Needless to say that all of them are xerox copies. The first
letter is dated 14.5.1989 addressed to the Education Officer,
Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, which seems to have been received
by Shri B.K. Mule, which bears no date of receipt. Next
representation is dated 30.4.1989 which also bears
acknowledgment of Shri B.K.Mule, it bears no date.
Similarly is the case of representations dated 25.6.21989,
23.7.1989, 27.8.1989, 20.10.1989, 5.10.1990, 22.4.1990,
27.10.1991, 15.3.1992, 13.7.1993, 14.3.1994, 7.7.1995.
Thus, it will be seen that all these letters are allegedly
acknowledged by Shri B.K. Mule who is stated to be
Superintendent, Education Department, Zilla Parishad,
Nagpur by way of stamp below his signature. Only
representation dated 10.7.1992 seems to bear the date
8.8.1997. Coincidence of accepting all the material letters by
the same person in the office for all those years and his not
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putting dates below his signature was required to be
satisfactorily explained.
17] As already dated above, all these are xerox copies.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised objection that
the xerox copies should not have been considered by the
School Tribunal inasmuch as the permission for leading
secondary evidence was not sought. He has strongly relied
on the judgment of this court reported in 2009(1) Mh.L.J.
282 Bank of Baroda, Bobmay ..vs.. Shree Moti Industries,
Bombay and others, wherein the procedure of leading
secondary evidence was explained. According to him,
therefore, the learned Presiding Officer, School Tribunal
should not have considered these documents as sufficient
proof of her representations to the Education Officer, in
view of the observations of this court in that judgment and
therefore, there was no proof of sufficient cause for delay in
filing appeal by respondent no.1.
18] It is obvious that there is nothing on record in the
shape of affidavit of this B.K. Mule. He has not mentioned
dates and on these representations except one dated
10.7.1992, as to when they were received. In these
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circumstances, those representations are not prima facie free
from doubts.
19] Even if it is assumed for a moment that the xerox
copies can be referred for the purpose of justification of
condonation of delay as sufficient case, fact remains that it
does not suggest as to when these representations were
received by particular office and that they were not
considered and lastly after representation which was
received on 8.3.1997, the letter was issued by the Deputy
Director of Education, upon which the appellant claims that
she was advised that there was no provision of appeal
against termination or for restoration of her services, with
the office of the Deputy Director.
20] This takes me to consider the relevant letter of the
Deputy Director of Education upon which it claimed that
she was intimated that the remedy of appeal is not with the
office of the Education Officer, or Deputy Director.
Relevant letter seems to be dated 8.1.1996. Same reads thus:
" No. Madhya/A/ /96
Office of the Deputy Director
of Education, Nagpur Division,
Nagpur
Date: 8th January 1996
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To,
Smt. R.R.Revatkar,
Plot No.81, Pathan Layout,
Parsodi Ring Road,
Nagpur -22
Subject: Regarding allowing the
applicant-teacher to join duties
Reference: Your application dated 2.1.96
With reference to above referred letter
you are informed that there is no provision for
appeal with this office against the termination of
services.
sd/- Deputy Director of Education,
Nagpur Division, Nagpur”
It is obvious that this letter gives reference to the application
of the respondent no.1 to the letter dated 9.1.1996.
Therefore, at the most, it can be said that the representation,
if any, issued by the respondent to the Deputy Director,
which was considered was dated 9.1.1996. It is obvious that
this was about six years after her alleged termination.
21] Coming to the letter/ representation of the respondent
no.1 which bears the date of the acknowledgment as
dated10.7.1992 which seems to have been received on
8.8.1997. Learned counsel for respondent no.1 has tried to
suggest that the date is not 8.8.1997, it can be only 8.8.1993
or some other date. Prima facie it is difficult to accept this
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submission on bare perusal of the said date below
acknowledgment. But even otherwise, the fact remains that
the said Shri B.K. Mule’s evidence is not on record as to
show, when he received earlier representations. It is also not
known as to whether the respondent no.1 had tried to pursue
the matter when the Deputy Director prior to her letter
which is referred in the communication by the Deputy
Director.
22] All these aspects does not seem to have been
considered by the learned Tribunal, though this objection
seems to have been raised by the respondent counsel for the
petitioner.
23] It seems that the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal has
cursorily disposed of these issues by holding that the
representations are properly proved. That show that the
appellant was making representation to the educational
authorities for such long period and lastly she was informed
that the Deputy Director had informed on 8.1.1996 that there
was no provision for preferring the appeal to his office
against termination of services. Application for condonation
of delay was also not sought, holding that section 9(3) of the
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M.E.P.S.Act does not contemplate such application. In my
opinion, such an approach of the Tribunal while passing
impugned order was not at all warranted.
24] As regards the framing of the preliminary issues, it
would be seen that in Anna Pathe’s case [cited supra] in
paragraph 15, it was observed thus:
“15. While disposing of this petition, we
deem it appropriate to observe that when such
applications under section 9 of theMaharashtra Employees of Private Schools
(Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977
are filed before the School Tribunals by theteachers challenging any act of termination
on the part of the management, it will be
necessary for the Tribunal to frame anddecide three three preliminary issues viz.
whether the school was a recognized schoolas defined under the M.E.P.S. Act; whether
the appointment of the concerned teacher was
made as per section 5 of the M.E.P.S. Act andthe Rules thereunder; and whether such an
appointment has been approved by the
Education Officer in pursuance of the
provisions of the Act as well as the Rules
framed thereunder including the GovernmentResolutions issued from time to time
regarding reservations etc. These preliminary
points are required to be framed and decided
before the appeal proceeds on merits and
even if such points are not raised by any of::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 14:59:54 :::
23the parties to the appeal, it would be proper
on the part of the Tribunal to frame such
issues suo motu before examining the meritsof the case. In case the finding to any of the
preliminary issues are in the negative, theappeal must fail then and there itself, so far as
the relief of reinstatement / continuation in
service is concerned.”
This judgment was reported in 1997(2)Mh.L.J.168
Mathuradas Mohta College of Science, Nagpur ..vs.. R.T.
Borkar & others. The impugned order appears to have been
passed on 1.4.1999. Needless to say the decision of this
court should have been followed by the School Tribunal.
25] The learned Presiding Officer has framed only
following points for consideration :
“1] Whether the appeal is barred by
limitation?
2] Whether appellant’s services
have been terminated illegally?
3] What reliefs?”
It is obvious that he has failed to take into consideration the
law laid down by this court in Anna Pethe’s case at the
relevant time.
26] Judgment of Full Bench of this Court reported in 2007
(1) Mh.L.J. 597 [St. Ulai High School & another ..vs..
Devendraprasad Jagtannath Singh and another],
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has not overruled the whole of the judgment in Anna Pethe’s
case. Therefore, in my opinion, the preliminary issues
should have been framed by the learned Presiding Officer
School Tribunal before embarking on the decision of the
appeal on merits.
27] Therefore, even without referring to the other
contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it would
be necessary, in the interest of justice, to remand the matter
to the School Tribunal, Nagpur by setting aside its order;
for a consideration of matter afresh in order to grant fresh
opportunity to all parties, to present their case before the
School Tribunal.
28] In my opinion, in these circumstances of the case, if
would be necessary; rather compelling; to remit the matter
to the School Tribunal for disposal according to law afresh
after hearing parties and allowing them to lead proper
evidence on the point of sufficient cause for condonation of
delay and all other points which are necessary, in view of
the preliminary issues that are required to be framed. In this
view of the matter petition partly succeeds. Judgment &
order of the School Tribunal, Nagpur is hereby quashed and
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set aside. The matter is remitted back to the School tribunal,
Nagpur for fresh consideration after allowing parties to lead
evidence as may be necessary and hearing parties afresh on
merits. Issue of limitation is kept open to be considered by
the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, besides the
preliminary issues he has to frame in pursuance to the
judgments of this court, referred above.
29] it is made clear that the observations made above shall
not in any manner influence the learned Presiding Officer,
School Tribunal, Nagpur, while deciding the matter on
merits.
30] School Tribunal is directed to dispose of the said
appeal as expeditiously as possible in any case within a
period of six months from the date of appearance of parties.
JUDGE
smp.
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