Subhash Soni & Anr vs State Of M.P on 6 May, 2009

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Supreme Court of India
Subhash Soni & Anr vs State Of M.P on 6 May, 2009
Author: D A Pasayat
Bench: Arijit Pasayat, Asok Kumar Ganguly
                                                                        REPORTABLE

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 639 OF 2008



Subhash Soni & Anr.                                        ....Appellants

                                    Versus


State of M.P.                                              ....Respondent




                                 JUDGMENT

DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the

Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench, upholding conviction of the

appellant for offence punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34

the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC’).

2. Prosecution version, in a nutshell, is as follows:
On 20.9.1995 Anil (hereinafter referred to as the `deceased’) left his

house for some work and told his brother Rajendra (PW.1) that he will be

returning within 10 minutes. He left the house at 8.30 p.m. Just after 15

minutes of his departure, somebody informed Rajendra (PW.1) that deceased

was assaulted with a sword. Having heard the news, Rajendra immediately

rushed in the direction where the deceased had gone on his motor cycle. He

saw a crowd of people in front of Laxmi Market surrounding the deceased

who having suffered many injuries on his person was lying on the road. At

the same time Dr. Komal Chandra Kothari (PW.4) reached near the crowd

and on request deceased was taken to Civil Hospital in his car. On the way

to the Hospital deceased was questioned by Rajendra (PW.1) as to who had

assaulted him, deceased replied that accused Ramesh, Subhash and Heeralal

had assaulted him by sword. Deceased was admitted in the hospital where he

succumbed to the injuries during treatment. The FIR (Ex. P.l) was recorded

in the night at 9.40 p.m. Police recorded the statements of two eye witnesses

Radhesyam (PW.2) and Prakash Jadhav (PW.3) on 9.10.1995 along with

other eye witnesses Manohar @ Babu, Balraj, Premsingh and Satish

Shrivastave on 21.9.1995. On 22.09.1995 statements of witnesses Nankdas,

Ghanshyam, Parmanand, Govindram and Jaikishore were also recorded by

Investigating Officer R.S. Chundavat (PW.8). Postmortem was performed

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by Dr. D.K. Rathore (PW.7). Report is Ex.10. Police also seized the true

copy of the documents (Ex. P.2-C) regarding civil litigation pending

between deceased Anil Soni, his brother Rajendra Soni (PW. l) and appellant

Heeralal. Crime No. 715/ 1995 was registered by the police and after

necessary investigation, the charge sheet was filed against the accused

persons for commission of offence punishable under Section 302 read with

34 of the IPC and under Section 4 read with Section 25 (1-B), and 27 of

Arms Act, 1959 (in short the `Arms Act’).

The appellants abjured their guilt and their defence was of false

implication, therefore, they were put on trial. They stated in their statements

recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in

short `Cr. P.C.’) that deceased and his brother Rajendra (PW.1) were doing

colonizing business and on their behalf Radheshyam (PW.2) and Parkash

(PW.3) used to collect money from the concerned persons. About three years

ago one Babulal was got murdered by the deceased and Rajendra (PW.1).

Dr. Komal Chandra Kothari (PW.4) was having family terms with deceased

and his brother Rajendra (PW.1). They also submitted that Prakash Jadhav

(PW.3) was convicted for murder of one Prabhakar Kadam and sentenced to

life imprisonment by the learned Sessions Court of Dewas. In the said case,

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appellant Ramesh appeared as a witness against Parkash Jadhav. Because of

all these reasons, appellants pleaded their false implication. Appellants

examined Balraj Tiwari (DW. 1) in their defence whereas prosecution

examined eight witnesses and proved 17 documents to prove its case.

The trial Court while acquitting Ramesh under Sections 4 read with

25(1-B), (b) and 27 of the Arms Act convicted the three appellants under

Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The trial Court mainly relied on the

evidence of PWs. 2 and 3 who were eye witnesses and the dying

declarations.

In appeal, the primary stand was the evidence of PWs. 2 and 3 should

not have been relied upon by the trial Court because of their conduct in not

informing the police being eye witnesses of the incident and keeping mum.

It was also submitted that the FIR Ex. P1 was ante time. The High Court

held that the core question was whether the evidence of PWs.2 and 3 is

credible and whether it was in line with the evidence of Rajendra Soni (PW-

1) and doctor (PW-4) on the point of oral dying declaration. The High Court

held that the eye witnesses version should not have been relied upon because

of highly unnatural conduct of the accused and unexplained silence for long

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19 days. However, the High Court found that the evidence relating to dying

declaration was reliable. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed in part as the

conviction of Hiralal was set aside. However, the appeal was dismissed qua

accused Ramesh.

3. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant submitted

that after having discarded the version of the so-called eye witnesses, the

High Court should not have placed reliance on the so-called dying

declaration.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, supported the

judgment.

5. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile

to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is

essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the

reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a

nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court

has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of

either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be

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further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear

opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied

that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its

conviction on the same without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid

down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the

sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring

corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in

several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could

be summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992(2)

SCC 474) (SCC pp.480-81, paras 18-19)

(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying

declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. [See: Munnu

Raja v. State of M.P.(1976 (3) SCC 104)]

(ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and

voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See:

State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav (1985(1) SCC 552) and Ramawati

Devi v. State of Bihar 1983(1) SCC 211))

(iii) The court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and

must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting

or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and

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identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration.

[See: K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor(1976(3) SCC

618)])

(iv) Where a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted

upon without corroborative evidence. [See: Rasheed Beg v. State of

M.P.(1974(4) SCC 264)]

(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make

any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected.

[See: Kake Singh v. State of M.P.(1981 Supp. SCC 25)]

(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form

the basis of conviction. [See: Ram Manorath v. State of

U.P.(1981(2)SCC 654]

(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the

details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of

Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu [1980 Supp. SCC

455)]

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be

discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself

guarantees truth. [See: Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar (1980

Supp.SCC 769)]

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(ix) Normally, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased

was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to

the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness said that the deceased

was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the

medical opinion cannot prevail. [See: Nanhau Ram v. State of

M.P.(1988 Supp. SCC 152)]

(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given

in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon.

[See: State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan (1989 (3) SCC 390)]

(xi) Where there are more than one statements in the nature of

dying declaration, the one first in point of time must be preferred. Of

course, if the plurality of the dying declaration could be held to be

trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. [See: Mohanlal

Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982 (1) SCC 700)]

6. In the instant case opinion of Dr. Srivastava was given after admission

of deceased in the intensive care ward during course of treatment. On the

basis of this it cannot be said that while taking him to the hospital Rajendra

Son (PW1) and Komalchandra Kothari (PW.4) could not have spoken to him

or that the deceased was in an unconscious condition. Place of injuries were

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thigh and leg. Therefore, loss of unconscious can be progressive.

Therefore, the conclusions of the trial Court and the High Court that the

deceased was not unconscious and was in a position to give name of the

assailants while he was being taken to the hospital cannot be faulted. In the

instant case it has to be noted that one dying declaration was made before

the Doctor Kothari (PW.4), an independent witness who had no reason to

falsely implicate the accused persons. Doctor (PW4) has categorically stated

that he was driving the car himself when he heard the deceased telling PW1,

the names of the assailants. Doctor (PW4) has also stated that there was loss

of consciousness for a few minutes whereafter the deceased regained

consciousness.

7. That being so there is no infirmity in the conclusions of the High

Court.

8. There is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.

………………………………J
(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

…………………………………J.

(ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)
New Delhi,
May 06, 2009

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