JUDGMENT
Sahai, J.
1. Vide Judgment and Order dated 4-10-1993 passed in in Sessions Case No. 93/93, the Additional Sessions Judge, Nasik convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner stated hereinafter :-
(i) Under Section 302, I.P.C. life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100/- in default of payment of fine one month R.I.
(ii) Under Section 452, I.P.C. one year R.I. and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- in default of payment of fine, R.I. for one month.
(iii) Under Section 323, I.P.C. R.I. for one month.
The substantive sentences of the appellant had been directed to run concurrently.
Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid convictions and sentences, the appellant has come up in appeal before us.
2. The matter before us arises out of an incident which took place on 19-4-1993, at about 9 p.m. at the house of Informant Balu Narvade P.W. 1 situate in village Pimpalgaon Khamb within the limits of police station Nasik Road, District Nasik. During the incident, Smt. Jaivantibai aged 65 years, a paralytic patient, confined to bed, was killed and the informant sustained injuries; both as a result of an assault by axe made upon them by the appellant.
The appellant and the informant Balu Narvade P.W. 1 are residence of village Pimpalgaon Khamb in District Nasik. They are said to be neighbours. Two days before the incident, i.e. on 17-4-1993, some one had thrown stones in the house of the appellant. The appellant’s wife suspected that the same had been thrown by the informant. Ultimately, when the real culprit was caught the informant reprimanded the wife of the appellant for her unfounded suspicion upon him. On 19-4-1993 at about 8.30 or 9 p.m. when the informant was accusing the appellant’s wife for falsely suspecting him, the appellant and his younger brother Sham Dhurjad entered his house. The appellant threatened the informant that he would finish him. In the meantime, Karbhari Kute, P.W. 2 Sarpanch of village Belatgavan came to the informant’s house and intervened in the matter. Karbhari Kute is alleged to have taken the appellant and his brother to their house and advised the informant to go to his maternal aunt’s house to avaid further quarrel. Consequently, the inforamant and his wife went to the house of Munubai Paldhe (maternal aunt of informant). The informant narrated the incident to his maternal aunt. From Manubai’s house for sometime, one Shivaji Paldhe P.W. 6 took the informant to his house but, the informant thereafter, returned back to her house. Munubai Paldhe asked him to have dinner but, he replied that he would come within a short time after easing himself. At the time, the wife of the informant told him that the lambs at their house had to be tied and asked him to proceed to the house. The informant and his wife then came to their house. At about 9 p.m. to 9.15 p.m. the appellant and his brother Sham came inside the house. The appellant inflicted injuries on the left side of the chest of the informant with an axe who fell down as a result of the aforesaid assault. Understandably, his mother Smt. Jaivantabai who was sleeping on a quit on the floor asked the appellant and Sham as to what they were doing. At that, the appellant is alleged to have told the informant’s mother that he was her son and immediately, struck her on the forehead with the same axe. The wife of the informant came running to the place where the incident had taken place and strated raising cries. Many persons gathered there. The informant went to the house of Bhaskar Paldhe for making a phone call to the police. However, Bhaskar Paldhe told the informant that he would first see the situation at the house of the informant and would only thereafter make a phone call. Bhaskar Paldhe came to the informant’s house and saw that his mother was in a serious condition. He offered to take the mother of the informant to the hospital on the condition that he would not report the matter to the police. The informant however, did not accede to this request of Bhaskar Paldhe. Thereafter, the informant and Bhaskar Paldhe went to the house of the latter and made an unsuccessful bid to contact the police on phone. Then the informant requested his cousin Mamebhau to call the police patil but, he refused. Nobody from the village came forward to help the informant. Then, the informant went to village Sansari, where his brother-in-law Arun Pandharinath Godse resided. At that time, Arun Godse’s wife was not at the house and he suggested that she should first be contacted. Arun Godse and the informant went to Pimpalgaon where wife of the former had gone. At Pimpalgaon, the informant narrated the incident to his sister. Thereafter, all of them came back to the place of the incident. Ultimately, at about 2 a.m. two 2.15 a.m. the same night, the informant contacted police station, Nasik Road on telephone.
3. On 20-4-1993, at 2.15 a.m. on the basis of the telephonic message, conveyed by the informant to PSI Santosh Donar P.W. 7 of PSI Nasik Road, the latter went to the place of the incident and recorded the FIR on the narration of the informant. The FIR is Exhibit 18.
4. The investigation of the case was conducted by PSI Santosh Donar. He prepared the inquest panchanama and the spot panchanama, Exhibits 12 and 19 respectively. In the presence of panchas, he seized the plain earth and blood stained earth, one quilt, with blood stains, two pillows with blood stains, and one gunny cloth with blood stains from the place of the incident. He also seized under panchanama, the axe which was lying in a narrow lane behind the house of the informant. The axe was having blood stains on it.
5. Going backwards, the injuries of the informant were medically examined on 20-4-1993 at 4.15 p.m. by Dr. B. R. Gaikwad. Dr. Gaikwad found the following injuries on the person of the informant :-
(1) Two liner abrasions over left side of the chest 20 cm. long redness around abraisons present.
(2) Abrasions in an area of 2 cm in diameter. Injury (1) is because of hard and blunt object within 12 to 24 hours and may be self inflicted injury. Injury (2) is because of hard and blunt object and more than 24 hours.
At this stage, we cannot restrain our indignation at the manner in which Dr. Gaikwad has prepared the injury report of the victim. In our experience, docotors never mention in the injury report as to whether the injuries could be self-inflicted.
6. The autopsy of the dead body of the deceased was conducted on 20-4-1993 between 9.30 a.m. and 10.30 a.m. by P.W. 5 Dr. Ramakant Patil. Dr. Patil found the following external injuries on the corpse of the deceased :-
(1) Contused lacerated wound above right eye brow of the size of 2 cm x 1.5 cm x 1 cm.
(2) C.L.W. above nasal bridge, of the size of 4 cm x 4 cm x 3 cm.
(3) C.L.W. on nasal bridge of the size of 2 cm x 2 cm x 1 cm.
On internal examination, the doctor found fracture of frontal bone.
According to Dr. Patil, the deceased died on account of intracerebral haemorrhage due to the head injury. The weapon of assault namely are (article 6) was shown to the doctor during his deposition and he opined that the injuries of the deceased could be caused by it.
7. After the submission of the charge-sheet, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, where charges under Sections 302, IPC, 452 IPC and 323 IPC were framed against the appellant to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
The defence of the appellant was that of denial. In the trial Court, the appellant examined himself and the burden of his song was that he had not participated in the incident and at that time of the incident, he was at Nasik Road police station, where he had gone to lodge a complaint against the informant.
During the trial, apart from tendering some documentary evidence, the prosecution adduced the evidence of as many as eight witnesses. Out of them the informant Balu Narvade is the solitary eye-witness of the incident.
The learned trial Judge believed the evidence adduced by the prosecution, rejected the defense of the appellant and passed the impugned judgment. Hence, this appeal.
8. We have heard Ms. Anita Agarwal, learned counsel, for the appellant and Mr. K. H. Chopda, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State of Maharashtra, Respondent. We cannot refrain from expressing our admiration for the very thorough manner in which Ms. Anita Agarwal has argued this appeal. Her submissions coupled with those made by Mr. Chopda have been of tremendous assistance to us, in deciding this appeal.
After hearing the learned Counsel on both the sides, and perusing the oral evidence as well the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, and the statement of the appellant. We regret to observe that we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed.
9. The controversy in this appeal is a very short one namely, as to whether the testimony of the informant Balu Narvade P.W. 1 who is an injured witness inspires confidence or not ? We have gone through the testimony of the aforesaid witness. It was on the basis of his examination-in-chief that we have narrated the prosecution story in para 2 of this judgment. We find that the manner of assault given by this witness is not only in confirmity with the medical evidence but, is also in tune with probabilities. The statement of this witness regarding the main incident is that at about 9 p.m. on 19-4-1993, the appellant and his brother Sham entered inside his house and the appellant assaulted him with an axe. He further stated that when his mother who was lying on a quilt protested the appellant also assaulted her with axe on her forehead.
In the earlier part of our judgment, we have mentioned the injuries received by this witness and the deceased and their perusal would show that both of them had injuries on their person which could be caused by an axe.
We feel it imperative to point out that although this witness was subjected to a very long and searching cross-examination by the defence counsel, not a single question has been put to him challenging his claim of receiving injuries in the incident. Neither any suggestion has been given to this witness to the effect that he either himself manufactured his injuries or got them inflicted, through someone else. In other words, the defence has submitted to the factum of this witness receiving injuries during the course of the incident. Once we find this, we dare say, that the fate of the appellant is sealed.
10. Assurance is also lent to the statement of informant Balu Narvade by the circumstance that he telephonically informed the police station Nasik Road at 2.15 a.m. on 20-4-1993 (i.e. within five hours of the incident) about the incident. This witness has also explained as to why he took so much time in informing the police. That explanation, we have referred to in para 2 of our judgment, and it appears to be convincing to us.
11. The presence of a plausible motive also lends weightage to the evidence of the informant. We have referred to it in para 2 of our judgment.
12. For the reasons stated in paragraphs 9 to 11, we are of the view that the evidence of Balu Narvade P.W. 1 is implicitly reliable and can be the sole basis for confirming the conviction of the appellant in the instant case.
13. So far as the defence of the appellant namely that at the time of incident, he was at Nasik Road police station, where he had gone to lodge a N.C. report (Exhibit 34) against the informant, is concerned, we find the same to be a tissue of lies. A perusal of Exhibit 35 which is report by a Police Inspector of Nasik Road police station to the Additional Sessions Judge, Nasik, shows that Exhibit 34 was lodged at 10.30 p.m. on 19-4-1993. We have mentioned in paragraph 2 that the time of the incident, was about 9 p.m. to 9-15 p.m. Hence, in our view after participating in the incident, it was possible for the appellant to go to police station, Nasik Road and lodge a N.C. report against the informant by way of peshbandi (creating a false defence). In the trial Court, the appellant examined himself and a perusal of his statement shows that he had gone to police station Nasik Road to lodge his FIR on a cycle. From the cross-examination of the informant Balu Narvade, it emerges that police station Nasik Road is at the most at a distance of about 7 km. from village Pimpalgaon where the appellant resided. Hence, we find it extremely plausible that after participating in the incident, the appellant went to police station Nasik Road to lodge his FIR.
In our view, the defence of the appellant has no legs to stand on and we reject the same.
14. Ms. Anita Agarwal learned Counsel for the appellant made a number of contentions before us. We may mention that her contentions have been rendered very weak by the circumstance that the claim of the informant of receiving injuries during the course of the incident has not at all been challenged during his cross-examination in the trial Court.
Firstly, Ms. Agarwal contended that the FIR in the instant case was lodged after an inordinate delay. Her contention is that the evidence on record shows that the police station, Deolali Camp fell on the way when the informant had gone to inform his brother-in-law Arun Godse and the appellant should have lodged the FIR there. In his cross-examination in the trial Court, the informant has frankly stated that he had thought it necessary to first inform his sister as his mother was alive and that was the reason as to why he did not lodge the FIR. Different people behave differently in a given situation. The question which Criminal Courts have to examine is whether the behavior of a person can be described as natural and understandable in that situation in which he is placed. In our view, such behaviour of the informant was both natural and understandable. Hence, we find no merit in the first contention of Ms. Agarwal.
Secondly, Ms. Agarwal contended that the conduct of the informant in not immediately disclosing the incident to any person is unnatural. We regret that we cannot accede to this contention either. The informant’s mother at that time was hovering between life and death. In such a situation, the informant must have been very mentally perturbed and his anxiety must have been to consult his sister and to decide what should be the immediate course of action instead of disclosing the incident to others. For this reason, we do not find any merit in this contention.
We also do not find any merit in the third contention of Ms. Agarwal that on account of the two infirmities pointed out above, the solitary statement of the informant would not be a safe basis for sustaining the conviction of the appellant. As said earlier, the informant is an injured witness, the factum of his receiving injuries has not been challenged by the defence; and we find his evidence to be implicitly reliable.
15. Finally, Ms. Agarwal contended that even assuming the prosecution case to be true, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, IPC would be unsustainable and instead he should be convicted under Section 304(ii), IPC. To substantiate her submission, Ms. Agarwal placed before us the following decisions of the Apex Court :-
(1) Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab; (2) Kulvant Rai v. State of Punjab; (3) Singh v. State of U.P.; (4) Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab.
We regret that none of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court would have application to the facts of the present case. Excepting the decision (supra), where a child was thrown on the ground and he died and the Apex Court held that the appellant had the knowledge of death contemplated by Section 304, Part (ii), IPC. In all other cases, in a sudden quarrel, a solitary blow was inflicted by the accused. In the peculiar facts of each case, the Apex Court held that the offence would only fall within the ambit of Section 304(ii), IPC.
16. In the instant case, in the earlier part of our judgment, we have mentioned that P.W. 5 Dr. Ramakant Patil who conducted the autopsy of the dead body of the deceased found three injuries situated above right eyebrow, above nasal bridge and on the nasal bridge. We cannot accede to the contention of Ms. Agarwal, that looking to the close proximity in which these injuries are situated, they could have been caused by one blow and that a reading of the statement of the informant shows that only one axe blow was inflicted on the forehead of the deceased. We find that in cross-examination no suggestion was made to Dr. Patil that all the three injuries could have been caused by one axe blow. We also cannot accede to Ms. Agarwal’s submission that the evidence of the informant shows that only a solitary blow with an axe given to the deceased. In paragraph 2 of his statement, the informant has deposed as follows :-
“Accused Sudam inflicted injuries on the left side of my chest with a weapon in his hand. I fell down my mother asked the accused and his brother, as to what they were doing. Thereupon, accused Sudam said to my mother that, I was her product and immediately struck my mother on her forehead, with the weapon with which I was assaulted.
A perusal of the aforesaid passage would show that by no stretch of imagination, can be said that the informant stated that only a solitary blow, was given to the deceased. In our view, the injuries received by the deceased do not show that they were the result of one blow.
17. Hence, none of the four decisions of the Apex Court have any application to the facts of the present case.
In the instant case, not only more than one axe blow was given to the deceased but, she was also a bedridden patient of paralysis aged 65 years who was assaulted with such forcibility by the appellant that her frontal bone was fractured and she died within a couple of hours of being assaulted.
In our view, the act of the appellant would squarely fall in the ambit of the second, third and fourth clauses of Section 300, IPC; the breach of which is punishable under Section 302, IPC. In our judgment, the appellant has been rightly convicted under Section 302, IPC.
18. Section 300, IPC reads thus :-
Section 300 :
Murder – Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or
Secondly – If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or
Thirdly – If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or
Fourthly – If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
19. The act of the appellant would squarely fall within the ambit of clause secondly of Section 300, IPC which as seen above provides that culpable homicide would be murder, if the act is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death of the person to whom the harm is caused. When the appellant assaulted with axe on the forehead of the deceased who was aged about 65 years, was a patient of paralysis and was confined to bed and the severity of that assault was such that it resulted in the fracture of her frontal bone, it can be safely presumed that the appellant had the intention of causing such bodily injury, which he knew was likely to cause the death of the deceased.
20. The act of the appellant will also fall within the ambit of clause fourthly of Section 300, IPC.
Clause Fourthly of Section 300, IPC as we have seen in paragraph 18 provides that culpable homicide would be murder, if the person committing the act knew that it was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and commits such an act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. When the appellant with an axe assaulted the deceased on her forehead, who as mentioned earlier, was aged about 65 years, was bed-ridden on account of paralysis and the severity of the assault was such that it resulted in the fracture of her frontal bone it can safely be presumed that he knew that his act was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause the death of the deceased or such bodily injury as was likely to cause her death.
21. The act of the appellant shall also fall within the ambit of clause Thirdly of Section 300, IPC. A perusal of the aforesaid clause would show that culpable homicide would be murder if the act was done, with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. An analysis of the aforesaid clause would show that firstly, there should be an intention to inflict the bodily injury actually inflicted (the bodily injury inflicted should not be accidental) and secondly, the bodily injury inflicted must be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death.
So far as the intention to cause the bodily injury inflicted on the person of the deceased in concerned, the same is crystal clear for the informant has categorically stated in his examination-in-chief in the trial Court that the axe blow was struck by the appellant on the forehead of the deceased. There is no evidence to show that the aforesaid blow was accidental.
So far as the second requirement namely of the sufficiency of the injury to cause death in the ordinary course of nature is concerned, it is true that the autopsy surgeon Dr. Ramakant Patil P.W. 5 has not stated in his deposition in the trial Court to that effect. We are surprised that no question was put to him in his examination-in-chief and very rightly the learned cross-examiner tried to take advantage of this lapse by the prosecution and hence, did not put this question to Dr. Patil. However, in our view, this lapse would not prove fatal for the prosecution. Nothing precludes the Court from itself examining the injuries of the deceased and in reaching a conclusion one way or the other. In the instant case since a lady aged 65 years who was bed-ridden with paralysis, was assaulted on her forehead with such force by an axe that her frontal bone was fractured and she died within a few hours of the assault, it can be safely presumed that her injuries must have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause her death. The expression in ordinary course means in common course or in usual course. The requirement of this clause is that the injuries inflicted should be “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death”. In other words, the injuries inflicted should in the common course of nature or in the usual course of nature be sufficient to cause death. In our view, the requirement under this clause is not that there should be an absolute certainty of death being caused on account of the injuries inflicted.
For the reasons given earlier in this paragraph, there can be no matter of doubt that the injuries of the deceased must have been sufficient to cause her death in the ordinary course of nature. Hence, the act of the appellant would also fall within the ambit of clause Thirdly of Section 300, IPC.
That we can reach our own conclusion on the basis of the injuries as to whether they were capable of causing death in the ordinary course of nature has been settled beyond doubt by Their Lordships of the Apex Court in paragraph 6 of their judgment Brij Bhukhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh. The Apext Court has observed that nothing precludes the Court from examining the nature of injuries itself and in reaching its own conclusion as to whether they were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
22. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in the contention of Ms. Agarwal that the act of the appellant would only fall within the ambit of Section 304 (Part 11) of the IPC.
23. The result is that we find no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same. We are informed that the appellant is in jail. He shall remain there till he serves out his sentence.
24. In case an application for certified copy of this judgment is made by the learned counsel for the parties, the same shall be issued at an early date.
25. Appeal dismissed