JUDGMENT
R.L. Gupta, J.
(1) This revision is directed against an order dated 23-9-89 of the learned Additional Rent Controller, Delhi by which he passed an order of eviction against the tenant, respondent 2, who is the husband of the petitioner, from the premises bearing Flat No. 37, Sfs, Dda, M.B. Road (Ground and first floor) New Delhi in favor of the landlord respondent 1 and also rejected an application of the petitioner under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(2) The brief facts leading to this revision petition arc that on 26-8-89 the landlord executed a lease agreed in favor of the tenant for letting out the- aforesaid premises to him on a monthly rent of Rs. 1400.00 . The petitioner Along with her husband came into possession of the premises on 1-9-88. The husband left the premises on 1-6-1989 and started residing in another premises. The landlord is then alleged to have filed the eviction petition under Section. 14(l)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act for eviction of respondent 2 at his behest knowing it fully well that he was not residing .in the house and it was only the petitioner who was residing there. She was a necessary party and, therefore, she made an application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code- which was also rejected by the learned Arc while passing an order of eviction against respondent 2.
(3) Along with this revision, the petitioner also filed Cm No. 574/90 under Section 151 of the Code read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condoning the delay in filling this revision. It is alleged in this application that the petitioner had instructed clerk of her counsel to obtain a certified copy of the impugned order. She was informed by the clerk that the application for obtaining the certified copy bad been filed and the copy will be handed over to her as soon as it was obtained. On 22-2-1990, the clerk told her that the slip issued by the Copying branch for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment got misplaced and so certified copy could not be obtained. Instead, he provided her a plain copy of the impugned order. She then applied for a certified copy of the impugned order on the same date i e. 22-2-90. Therefore, she alleged that the delay in filing the revision was neither intentional nor deliberate and was on account of the reasons beyond her control and, therefore, prayed that the delay be condoned.
(4) Show cause notice was issued to the respondents in the revision as well as the application for condoning the delay. The eviction order was stayed in the meanwhile. On putting in appearance respondent I, landlord contested the revision as well as the application.
(5) I have heard arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties, Learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to the affidavit of her counsel Sh. T.N. Jha appearing for her before the trial court and her own supplementary affidavit. It may be noted that in the application the petitioner did not disclose on which date she had instructed the clerk of her counsel to obtain a certified copy. It is also not stand in this application that her signatures were obtained upon any application for obtaining a certified copy or that any application had been signed by her counsel in her presence for obtaining the certified copy. Under the law either an aggrieved party or her counsel only can apply for certified copy by affixing their signatures The clerk of a counsel has no authority to apply for obtaining a certified copy under his own signatures. Since it is not disclosed in this application that either the petitioner gave an application for obtaining the certified copy under her signatures to the clerk or that her counsel signed any such application in her presence, the inference has to be drawn that there could be no occasion for applying for any certified copy by the clerk of the learned counsel Even in the affidavit of the counsel Sh. T N. Jha, it is not stated that either he himself obtained any such signed application from the petitioner or he himself made any such application for obtaining the certified copy. It is simply stated that on or about 26 9 89 he himself paid a sum of Rs. 200.00 to his clerk. It is not even stated in this affidavit that this amount of Rs. 200.00 was paid by the learned counsel for obtaining the certified copy. Then he alleges in para 3 of his affidavit that on several dates the petitioner contacted his clerk but on all such dates she was told by the clerk that the application for obtaining the certified copy of the impugned judgment had been made Nowhere he has alleged in the application that he under his own signatures had handed over any such application io the clerk for obtaining the certified copy If the amount of Rs. 200.00 is believed to have been handed over by the learned counsel to the clerk on 26 9-89 and several attempts were made by the petitioner to obtain the certified copy, it is not understood why the learned counsel for the petitioner became active only on 21-7-90 i.e after almost ten months of the banding over of Rs 200/ and made enquiries about the date of the application for certified copy from the Receipt and Issue Branch of Tis Hazari courts. Learned counsel for the petitioner has tightly pointed out that it is not the aforesaid Branch which is responsible for supplying certified copies to litigants but it is, in fact. the Copying Branch which supplies certified copies. Therefore, the further contention of the learned counsel for respondent I that since six months’ time had been granted by the impugned order to vacate the premises the petitioner willfully did not lake any steps till about only one month was left in recovering the possession The eviction order was made in this care on 23-9-89 and by 22-2- 90 full five months had expired Therefore, the story of the clerk of the counsel having assured the petitioner that he had applied for the certified copy seems to be untenable If in fact, the certified copy had been applied for, the petitioner must have alleged that she affixed her signatures on such application or that her counsel gave such an application under his signatures to his clerk The inference, therefore, is that an application for obtaining the certified copy had not been made at all till 22-2-90 I am therefore,of the view that this revision being filed after a delay of 63 days is hopelessly barred by time
(6) Even on merits, there is no case in favor of the petitioner. It is an admitted case that respondent I had given the premises in dispute to her husband respondent 2 as a tenant at the rate of Rs. 1400.00 per month. The petitioner. therefore being the wife of respondent 2 started living in this premises Along with her husband. It is correct that the husband has deserted the petitioner, it is really unfortunate However, the fact remains that the tenancy was in ihe name of her husband. She cannot be deemed to be his heir because the husband is still alive. She cannot also be deemed to be his legal representative because a legal representative is one in whose favor some right is created by a person having a right. The husband is not stated to have created any such right in favor of the petitioner. Under Section 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, “tenant” means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is, or, but for a special contract, would be, payable, and includes: (a) spouse as had been ordinarily living in the premises with such person as a member or members of his family up to the date of his death. Since the husband-tenant is still alive, therefore, the concept of tenant as widened in the definition of the tenant cannot be extended to the petitioner Moreover, according to Section 25 of the Act, where the interest of a tenant in any premises is determined for any reason whatsoever any order is made by the Controller under this Act for the recovery of possession to such premises, the order shall; subject to the provisions of Section 18, be binding on all persona who may be in occupation of the premises and vacant possession thereof shall be given to the landlord by evicting all such persons there from: But the rigour of Section 25 will not be applicable to a person who claims an independent title to the premises. Section 18 speaks of certain categories of sub-tenants who can be deemed tenant in certain cases.
(7) Learned counsel for the petitioner drawing the course of arguments. submitted that the petitioner, her husband, respondent No. 2 and their children, if any, will all be deemed to be joint tenants. He further argued that this Court should go into the depth of the wisdom of the legislature because it extended the benefit of tenancy to the heirs after the death of the tenant and if such benefit could accrue to the heirs after the death of the tenant, such benefit should be available to the dependents of the tenant in his. lifetime in the circumstances of the present case. I am afraid that this argument. cannot be accepted The Courts are only to interpret the law and are not competent to legislate It may also be noted that if such an interpretation. as advance on behalf of the petitioner is accepted, it is capable of being misused by undesirable elements. Let us suppose that there is a lawfully passed eviction order against a particular tenant. When in execution the landlord seeks to recover the possession of the premises, the tenant in collusion with his wife and children may pretend to sever his relations with the family so that the eviction order which he could not escape by himself may be circumvented by him by bringing his wife and children in the fore-frcnt. The wife or children of such a tenant may always say that they have been abandoned by the tenant and, therefore, they should be deemed to be joint tenants so that the landlord may not be able to reap the fruits of the eviction order obtained by him after a long contest. Therefore, unless, there is some legislative enactment adopted by the Parliament in its wisdom in this respect, it is difficult for this Court to widen the definition of tenant as suggested on behalf of the petitioner. Moreover, such a ground is not taken up in the revision petition.
(8) Now it is an admitted case of the parties that the husband of the petitioner was a tenant of respondent 1. He put in appearance through a counsel before the learned Arc but did not file any application for leave to defend under Section 25-B of the Act. The inescapable conclusion would, therefore, be that the allegations as made in the petition would be deemed to be admitted as correct and in consequence thereof an eviction order will have to be passed. Learned Arc rightly rejected the application of the petitioner under Order 1 rule 10 of the Code because she had no privity of contract with respondent 1. In these circumstances, I do not find any merit in this revision petition which is accordingly dismissed. The eviction order is maintained.