Sudhir Chadha vs Union Of India And Ors. on 3 February, 1994

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Delhi High Court
Sudhir Chadha vs Union Of India And Ors. on 3 February, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1994 IAD Delhi 585, 53 (1994) DLT 479, 1994 (28) DRJ 420
Author: U Mehra
Bench: U Mehra


JUDGMENT

Usha Mehra, J.

(1) By this writ petition Sh. Sudhir Chadha has sought the quashing of the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter called. the Act) issued vide notification No.F.9(20)/85-L&B, dated 27.5.85, pertaining to Village Satbari, Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi.

(2) Petitioner possesses land bearing Khasra No.860-861, measuring 10 Bighas and 14 Biswas in Village Satbari, Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi. Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued and published in the Delhi Gazette of 25.11.80. Petitioner did not file any objection under Section 5A of the Act, nor filed writ petition challenging the said notification. Subsequent thereto the respondent made a declaration vide notification dated 27.5.85. This declaration was made after a lapse of more than 3 years from the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act has been assailed primarily on the ground that in the case of BR.Gupta V. Union of India & Ors. C.W.No.1639/85, . The declaration in question already stood quashed and further proceedings set aside. The declaration pertaining to this village also having been quashed in the case of B.R. Gupta (Supra), petitioner’s case is covered by that judgment, and therefore, he is entitled to the relief prayed. He has not received any compensation till date.

(3) MR.S.K. Mahajan appearing for the respondent contested this petition, inter alia, on the ground that the judgment of B.R.Gupta was in relation to those petitioners who were party in that case. Hence the said judgment cannot apply nor present petitioner can take any help there from. Judgment in B.R.Gupta’s case is a judgment in persona and not in rem. The present petitioner cannot lake benefit of the same. Counsel for the respondent further contended that in B.R.Gupta and in the connected cases those petitioners had filed objections under Section 5A of the Act but the Land Acquisition Collector, who heard the parties on those objections, did not deliver the order. It was another Land Acquisition Collector, who infact passed the order. It was in this background that the Court observed that the order had been passed mechanically without application of mind, hence the declaration was quashed. But in the present case petitioner did not file objection, and therefore, question of its consideration by a different person does not apply. Hence judgment of B.R.Gupta cannot be taken benefit of by the petitioner.

(4) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Admittedly in the present case objection under Section 5A had not been filed by the petitioner after the notification, nor this petitioner was party to the proceedings in the case of B.R.Gupta. The short point for consideration is “whether the decision of B.R.Gupta will automatically apply to this case?” Mr. Lal, appearing for the petitioner contended that the decision in B.R.Gupta’s case would automatically apply because once a declaration has been set aside pertaining to the same village then the subsequent petitioners need not file separate writ petitions. In order to strengthen his arguments reliance on the decision of S.B.Wad, J. in the case of Mahender Kumar Jajodia Vs. Union of India & Ors C.W.No-2568/87, decided on 9.3.89 and subsequent decision dated 2.5.89 in the case of Moghul Travels & Transport Company (P) Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors., . In both these cases, the Single Judge by relying on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of BR.Gupta (Supra) held that the notification under Section 6 having stood quashed, the petitioner need not have to claim separate order of quashing thereof. Notification as a whole stood quashed, therefore, the said judgment would be operative in respect of lands referred to in the notification. No separate writ petition need be filed by other land owners. So much so it would be operative irrespective of the fact whether compensation has been received by the owners or has not been received. The moment the notification under Section 6 of the Act is quashed then the entire land covered by that notification, would stand de-acquired forthwith. The respondents would stand divested of the land subject matter of such notification and cannot retain any hold thereupon. Therefore, relying heavily on these observations Mr. Lal contended that the judgment in the case ofB.R.Gupta cannot be held to be a judgment in persona. S.B.Wad, J. who delivered the Division Bench judgment in the case of B.R.Gupta (Supra), subsequently in Mahender Kumar Jajodia’s case held that the Division Bench Judgment of B.R.Gupta will be a judgment in rem. The judgment in the case of B.R.Gupta would automatically apply to all other petitioners and no separate writ petition is required to be filed by other land owners. Reliance was also placed on the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Balak Ram Gupta V. Union of India Air 1987 Delhi, page 239, where this Court while dealing with the stay proceedings granted in one case, was posed with a question as to whether that would operate for the entire proceedings or not? While considering that aspect the Full Bench observed that the words used in the explanation are of the widest amplitude and there is no justification whatsoever to combine its terms and operation only to the cases in which the stay order was actually obtained. Mr.Lal, therefore, contended that the court was considering the amplitude and implication of the action taken under the Act. Relying on this judgment, he further contended that once the declaration under Section 6 had been quashed, it is a settled law that the judgment would apply to all the persons who are effected by such a declaration and notification. In the very judgment of Balak Ram Gupta (Supra), the Full Bench observed that Section 4 notifications if challenged in a writ petition, in such like proceedings the principle of locus standi stood considerably diluted. It was observed that:- “ANY public spirited person can challenge the validity of proceedings of acquisition on general grounds and when he does this the litigation is not inter parties simpliciter it is a public interest litigation which affects wider interests. The grounds of challenge to the notification may be nothing personal to the particular landholder but are, more often than not, grounds common to all or substantial blocks of the land owners. In fact, this ground of petitions now listed before us raise practically the same contentions just as the previous batch of writ petitions challenging the notifications under S.4 raised certain common contentions. To accept the contention that the challenges and interim orders in such petitions should be confirmed to the particular petitioners and their lands would virtually provide persons with common interests with a second innings. If the initial challenge succeeds, all of them benefit; and, if for some reason that fails and the second challenge succeeds on a ground like the one presently raised, the first batch of petitioners also get indirectly benefitted because of the impossibility of partial implementation of the scheme for which the acquisition is intended.”

(5) Mr. Mahajan on the other hand contended that the bare reading of B.R.Gupta’s judgment and the short order passed clearly show that court quashed the declaration/ notification under Section 6 qua only those petitioners who filed that writ petitions. Therefore, the judgment of B.R.Gupta cannot be a judgment in rem. He also placed reliance on the decision of Division Bench in the case of Chhote and Ors. Vs. union of India (1993) 1 Lal 53. In that case the notification and declaration under Sections 4 & 6 of the Act were sought to be quashed on the ground that the same notification having been quashed earlier and this case pertained to the same village. Therefore their’s was covered matter. The Court rejected this contention and observed that the quashing of the declaration in earlier case will not automatically cover the case of subsequent petitioners. Hence present petitioner’s case is not a covered case by the judgment of B.R.Gupta. The observations made by the Single Judges of this Court in Moghul Travels & Transport Company (P) Ltd. and Mahender Kumar as well as Full Bench judgment in Balak Ram Gupta’s case were only by way of obiter. The Judges were not called upon to decide the question whether in a subsequent petition challenging the declaration, earlier decision would automatically apply even if the petitioners had not filed any objections. Mr.Mahajan then placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar Dhingra V. State of Punjab , to support his arguments that there can be a case where one brother may challenge the acquisition and the other may not. Second brother may be satisfied with the acquisition and the compensation awarded. He may not ask for enhancement of compensation. Merely because one brother had challenged the acquisition, the other brother who accepted the acquisition, cannot take advantage of the writ petition filed by other brother. Mr. Mahajan very competently and strenuously argued that this is not a covered matter, but I am afraid, the facts of this case are such where it cannot be said that it is not a covered matter or that the observations made by the Single Judges of this Court in the cases of Mahender Kumar and Moghul Travels and transport Co.(P) Ltd. (Supra) were in the nature of obiter. It is an admitted case of the parties that the land of present petitioner is situated in Village Mehrauli. Village Mehrauli is covered by the notification/declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The said declaration stood quashed vide judgment of B.R.Gupta. Therefore, the observations in Mahender Kumar and of Moghul Travels and Transport Co.(P) Ltd. case with all force apply to the facts of this case. These cannot be called obiter. In those cases the petitioners had challenged the declaration and court held that their case was covered. Mr.Mahajan’s contention that in those cases petitioner had filed objections under Section 5A, and therefore, matter was covered, to my mind, the argument is without force. Court in those cases dealt with the question of declaration under Section 6 and held that once the declaration stood quashed then automatically cases of subsequent petitioners/landlord would be covered. These observations cannot be called obiter. That was the law laid down in those cases. The relevancy of filing objection under Section 5A became irrelevant as the declaratio stood quashed. Hence, it cannot be said that the case of the petitioner is not a covered matter or that the judgment of B , is not a judgment in rem. The Division Bench judgment relied by Mr.Mahajan in the case of Chhote & others Vs. Union of India (Supra) is of no help to him. That writ petition was dismissed on the short ground of concealment of facts by that petitioner from the Court regarding filing of some previous petition. The question of subsequent petition being a covered matter has not been decided in that case. Some observations in this regard, while discussing the argument of the counsel were by way of obiter and not a decision. As regards Ashwani Kumar Dhingra’s case, I am afraid that judgment is also of no help to Mr.Mahajan. There the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where one brother accepted the compensation and was satisfied with the acquisition and the amount of compensation paid to him. Whereas Ashwani Kumar Dhingra, the second brother, was not satisfied, hence he challenged the acquisition. Union of India took the objection that since one brother had accepted the acquisition, Mr.Dhingra being co-owner could not challenge the same. Supreme Court repelled these arguments and held that simply because one brother accepted the compensation, it would not operate as a bar nor disentitle the other brother from challenging the acquisition. That is not the case in hand. It is nobody’s case that present petitioner was satisfied with the acquisition, or that he accepted the compensation and hence be deprived from challenging the same. The law laid down in Ashwani Kumar Dhingra’ s case will not apply to the facts of the present case. Rather during the pendency of B.R.Gupta’s case the petitioner filed this writ petition challenging the declaration. This shows he never accepted the acquisition even though he did not file the objection under section 5A of the Act. Since the declaration under Section 6 of the Act has already been declared null and void the petitioner cannot be deprived of the benefit p73 flowing from the decision of B.R.Gupta. The Court in its short order though observed that “the order of Land Acquisition Collector under Section 5A and the notification issued by the Lt. Governor under Section 6 of the Act together with further acquisition proceedings in all the above writ petitions are quashed and set aside with cost. The words “above writ petitions would not mean that the declaration was quashed only with regard to the petitioners in B.R.Gupta’s case. The order passed on their objection under Section 5A and the further proceedings which were quashed pertained to those writ petitioners, but so far as the notification/ declaration was concerned that stood quashed for all the landlords/land owners of the 12 villages mentioned in that declaration. Once the notification/ declaration is quashed on whatever ground, that benefit cannot legally be denied to similarly situated land owners whose land fall in that declaration. Petitioner cannot be deprived of that benefit. In this regard reliance can be placed on the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority V. Union of India 45 (1991) Dlt 602 (SC). In that case the Union of India and the Dda had gone in appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of this Court in the case of B.R.Gupta (Supra). The Supreme Court while disposing of the appeal observed that “We get to the conclusion that the notification under Section 6 relating to 12 villages had been quashed and thus all necessary consequences arising there from had to follow”. These observations of the Supreme Court clearly help the contention of the petitioner that his land falling in one of the villages mentioned in the notification under Section 6 having been quashed, the judgment of B.R.Gupta will automatically apply to his case.

(6) For the reasons stated above the writ is allowed to the extent that notification/ declaration No.F.9(20)85-L&B dated 27.5.85 under section 6 of the Act in respect of the petitioner’s land in Village Satbari,Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi, squashed as illegal, null and void and of no consequences whatsoever and the respondents are restrained from interfering with the petitioner’s peaceful occupation, possession, user, enjoyment, right and interest of the said land. Parties are left to bear their own costs.

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