Sudhir Kumar Jain And Ors. vs State on 9 May, 1994

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Delhi High Court
Sudhir Kumar Jain And Ors. vs State on 9 May, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1994 IIAD Delhi 706, 1994 (2) Crimes 954, 55 (1994) DLT 56, 1994 (29) DRJ 405, 1994 RLR 319
Author: J Singh
Bench: J Singh

JUDGMENT

Jaspal Singh, J.

(1) On November 19, 1989 Sushma Jain entered into wed lock with Sudhir Kumar. On May 30, 1991 she lodged a report with the police alleging cruelty at the hands of her husband and his other relations. On September 8, 1993 the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate framed charges under section 498A read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the husband Sudhir Kumar, his brother Pawan Kumar Jain, sister Ms.Punam Jain and mother Smt. Supla Devi. By this joint petition they are seeking to get the charges quashed.

(2) Is it that the material on the record spells nothing against the petitioners? Let us have a look at it. First, the First Information Report lodged by the estranged wife Sushma Jain. Its bare perusal would go to show that right from the very start of her matrimonial life her husband Sudhir Kumar, mother-in-law Supla Devi, brother-in-law Pawan Kumar and sister-in-law Punam had been expressing unhappiness over the dowry brought by her and on that score had been taunting and beating her. They would pick up faults with her on trifles and pester her to bring in more cash. She minces no words in mentioning that she was subjected to mental and physical cruelty.

(3) Bimal Prasad Jain is the father of Sushma Jain. He has been examined under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. His statement too makes it clear that Sushma Jain used to be taunted, teased and beaten and that when petitioners were approached, instead of showing remorse, they claimed that his daughter was a curse on the family and that they would continue to subject her to the same treatment. The cause, of course, was dissatisfaction over the dowry brought.

(4) Almost to the same effect is the statement of Deepak Jain brother of Sushma Jain. Of course, he also tells us that though after the marriage cash payments of Rs.90,000.00 had been made yet the in-laws of his sister were not satisfied and continued to treat her cruelly. As per him on January 20, 1991 when the petitioners and other relatives were approached, it was asserted that Sushma Jain was a curse to the family and had brought bad luck and that she would continue to be treated cruelly.

(5) Besides the persons referred to above, the Investigating Officer has also recorded the statements of Shakuntala Jain and Paras Dass Jain.Their statements too lend support to the claim of Sushma Jain that on account of dissatisfaction over the dowry brought and on account of lust for more, she was subjected to mental and physical cruelty. It may be noticed that Shakuntala Jain is the mother and Paras Dass Jain, a close relation of the complainant. It need also be mentioned that Paras Dass Jain too was present on January 20, 1991 when she was damned as a curse on the family and when it was further asserted that they would continue to subject her to cruelty.

 (6) Besides the statements referred to above, there are .four letters also. One of those letters is dated January 15, 1991 and is written by Sushma Jain to her mother. The relevant portion of that letter runs as under:    "I am very tense here. Everybody is harassing me here. Earlier also I had written letters but you were assuring me that everything would be solved by passage of time. But they are harassing me more day by day. I am very tense."  

 Yet another letter which is undated but bears the postal stamp of January 3, 1991 also needs to be mentioned. Sushma Jain wrote it to her father. It runs as under:    "RESPECTEDDaddy, I am not all right here and you also must be worried there. Here they are troubling me a lot. Two times they have even tried to kill me. lam able to write to you with great difficulty because they do not allow me to go anywhere. My mother-in-law accompanies me even when I go to the tample. They neither allow me to ring up from here and whenever you ring up, they refuse. They tell me that you have no need to touch the phone and neither will you go anywhere. They beat me any time they want. Daddy, I cannot bear it any more. Call me back. My all jewellery is being kept by Jeth and Sarees which you people send me they do not even let me wear those. I ask for jewellery but they do not give. They do not give me even Rs. ten as my pocket money and neither do they get me essential things. If I ask for something, I get beatings. They ask me to get cash from parents. I hope Daddy that you shall come soon. Your unfortunate daughter Sushma Jain."  

(7) On the material noticed above, should the petitioners have been discharged? An accused is to be discharged under section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only if the Magistrate considers the charge against him to be groundless. The word “groundless” connotes absence of any ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. It would mean a case where the materials collected by the Investigating agency are found to be not even remotely sufficient to raise strong suspicion against the accused. The Apex Court in C.S. & Mfg. Co. vs. State of Maharashtra held that when the provision says that the charges must be considered to be groundless, it means ” the same thing as saying that there is no ground for framing the charges”. Section 239 of the Code has to be read along with section 240 of the Code according to which, if after considering the documents and hearing the accused the Magistrate thinks that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence friable as a warrant case which he is competent to try and adequately punish, he has to frame in writing a charge against the accused. Surely at the stage envisaged by sections 239 and 240 of the Code the Court has to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. It cannot and must not blindly adopt what the prosecution claims. However, at the same time while looking into the matter the court is not to apply the standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before’ recording a finding of guilt or otherwise. At the stage of sections 239 and 240 of the Code if there is a strong suspicion which makes the court think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the court would not be justified in saying that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.This being the law, can it be said that the learned trial Magistrate has violated it? The answer, to my mind, must be in the negative.

(8) What Mr. Sud wants me to do is to make copious reference to the evidence collected and to meticulously dissect the same. This would not be justified. All that is required to be seen is whether a prima facie case regarding the commission of the offence is made out. The question whether the charges will eventually stand proved or not can be determined only after the conclusion of the evidence. In the case before me the material collected establishes prima facie that Sushma Jain was subjected to cruelty by her husband and his other relatives who are petitioners before me causing thereby grave injury to her mental health a and further that she was subjected to harassment with a view to coercing her and her relatives to meet unlawful demand for property and so also on account of failure on her part and on the part of her relatives to meet such demands. Her letters, and her statement besides the statements of the persons noticed above unfold a pathetic story of cruelty falling within the four corners of section 498A of the Penal Code,

(9) Relying upon three judgments of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which I shall be dealing with presently, it was contended by Mr.Sud that the charges framed deserved to be quashed as the allegations of cruelty were not specific and were vague.

(10) In Devi Lal and Others vs. State of Haryana 1993 (1) All India Criminal Law Reporter 416 the First Information Report and the proceedings arising there from were quashed as: “THE allegations are not specific and were vague. No particulars of cruelty were given. A perusal of the First Information Report shows that demand of dowry was made by in-laws of the daughters of the- complainant but it is not mentioned whether it was the father-in-law, mother-in-law or brother-in-law of the daughters who demanded more dowry. It is not likely that demand was made simultaneously by all of them. There-were not specific particular regarding, time, place and manner of any beating, cruelty or harassment as well as demand of dowry and in these circum stances it cannot be said that ingredients of the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code were spelled out.”

(11) Coming to the second judgment namely Bulbir Singh & Others vs. Hurpeet Kaur 1993 (1) All India Criminal Law Reporter 762 it was a petition against the order of summoning. However, it does not spell out the facts in sufficient detail to shed any light.

(12) The last judgment relied upon by Mr.Sud is Anurao Ahuja and another v. State of Haryana 1993 (1) All India Criminal Law Reporter 531. It appears from the judgment that there was no allegation of cruelty at alt against the petitioners and it was on account of this that the charge framed under section 498A was quashed.

(13) As would be borne out from above, while the judgment in Balbir Singh’s case is of no assistance, as far as the judgment in Anurao Ahuja’s case is concerned it is clearly distinguishable as whereas in the said case the learned judge found no evidence at all against the petitioners, in the case before me the petitioners are specifically named and there are allegations of mental and physical cruelty against them. The material collected further goes to show that this was all on account of dissatisfaction over the dowry brought and unsatisfied lust for more.

(14) It was argued by Mr.Sud that as in the First Information Report and so also in the letters of the petitioner and statements recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the particulars of cruelty including the “time, place and manner of any beating, cruelty or harassment as well as demand of dowry” were not given, therefore, the judgment in Devi Lal & Ors. vs. State of Haryana referred to above was clearly attracted.

(15) Each judgment has its own peculiar facts as its bastion. Where an hopeless woman complains of continuing unending acts of cruelty, physical as well as mental, covering a long period and shows her life having become unbearable on thatscore,hcrcomplaint, to my mind, cannot be thrown out merely on the ground that she has failed to furnish the dates, time and month when the acts of cruelty were allegedly perpetrated or on account of her failure to detail how and in what manner she was taunted and teased. When the suffering is a long continuing process such particulars pale into insignificance. Anyhow, as already noticed by me above, every case is an island unto itself. In the case before me the allegations seem to be more than sufficient to make out a prima facie case for framing of the charges and as such the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate cannot be faulted on that score.

(16) The petition is dismissed.

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