JUDGMENT
A. Lala, J.
1. The petitioner company M/s. Sugandha Industries Limited is carrying on business as manufacturer and exporter of calcium carbonate and calcium stearate. According to them, on 17th October, 2001 some Officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (hereinafter called as D.R.I.) led by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 came to the office and factory premises of the petitioner and ransacked the place in the name of search. As and when the search was conducted at the factory-cum-registered office of the company, the Calcutta office situated at 228A, AJC Bose Road, 5th Floor, Calcutta-700 020 was also searched by another group of Officers. The petitioner’s Officers and employees were not allowed to know what documents the respondent authorities were searching and no reason or ground of such purported search was disclosed to the petitioner company. No notice or memo was served upon the petitioner. No order authorising such search was served upon the petitioner. Such search was conducted for several hours. The petitioners were not aware the materials or documents they were carrying when they entered into office premises, what documents and materials they collected in the course of search, what materials and documents they took away with them and what materials and documents were planted by them at the said office premises. Since about 3 p.m. of 17th October, 2001 till the evening of 18th October, 2001 the entire office was under the control of the persons who had conducted such search. It was led by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. In course of such search they assaulted one purchase Officer of the petitioner company. They slapped him, pushed him and then in the evening of 18th October, 2001 took him with them to another office of the petitioner company at 2/7, Sarat Bose Road, Calcutta-700 020 from where he was taken to the office of D.R.I. at Ho Chi Minh Sarani. Similar allegations are also made in respect of other employee or employees. The allegations are made that they have behaved in unruly manner and obtained tutored statements under the threat of further assault. One of the employees was detained even 24 hours. Likewise various other allegations are made against the respondents.
2. The respondents contended that the petitioner company is not the manufacturer of calcium stearate. They are actually manufacturer of calcium carbonate. In the product of calcium carbonate percentage of availability of calcium stearate is 3% whereas in the product calcium stearate such percentage is 90%. At the material point of time, the export quantity of product calcium stearate of the company was boost up apprehensively. Therefore, there is a
reason to believe that calcium stearate must have been purchased from the local market instead of manufacturing the same. In such case, the petitioner company is not entitled to any benefit under the Duty Exemption Scheme.
3. In reply thereto, the petitioner contended that it is not obligatory upon the company that it has to manufacture calcium stearate and then export it to get benefit under Duty Exemption Scheme. Even merchant exporter can get such benefit. The Duty Exemption Passbook (hereinafter called as DEPB) Scheme is made by the Union Government as a policy to boost up the export and to have more foreign exchange. There is a limit of getting foreign exchange under DEPB Scheme. However, the action on the part of the respondents is speculative in nature.
4. Although no interim order was passed by this Court interfering with the investigation but when the affidavit was filed by the respondents investigator/s the Court expressed desire not to disturb the status of the parties till the finalisation of writ proceedings. However, it has complained by the petitioner company that even thereafter enquiry/investigation was conducted in violation of the desire of the Court derived on a consensus between the parties. Accordingly, a contempt application was made. However, it has not formally entertained by the Court since the hearing of the main writ petition was going on.
5. In the course of hearing of the main writ petition again the petitioner company and its ally moved two separate writ petitions challenging notices issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Customs both dated 12th November, 2001 whereunder such authority refused to release DEPB licences with a request to get ‘no objection’ certificate from D.R.I. local unit.
6. Frankly speaking the Court turned around from that stage. Why so much of actions were necessary to be taken at a time? When only purported offence is export of goods without manufacturing in the own unit of the petitioner company?
7. There is a gulf difference between policy of ‘import’ and policy of ‘export’. In ‘import’ goods are available in the country even after final importation. Therefore, if there is a reason to believe that goods are not properly imported, municipal laws of the country are available for its application unlike the exports. In exports, municipal laws of this country are applicable till the export is finally made i.e. through proper channel beyond the territorial sea water of the country. In turn, law of importing country will start operation so far as the exported goods are concerned. If we carefully look into the nomenclature we shall be able to find that there is a marked distinction between Sections 111 and 113 of the Customs Act made for the import and export respectively. Section 111 is made for confiscation, of improperly imported goods and Section 113 is made for confiscation of goods attempted to be exported. First one regulates past events when last one regulates future events. Therefore, if one future event wanted to be made past, law cannot be turned around to apply the same.
8. Section 2(39) of the Act which is made for smuggling is controlling both the above sections. Therefore, from the plain reading it appears that there must have been reason to believe of smuggling of the goods wrongly attempted to be exported liable for confiscation. In the instant case, neither there is question of attempt nor there is availability of goods for such attempt. It is a case of final export reached to its destination of a different country. No objection was raised by the importing country about the export. DEPB licences are pending for respective clearances. Even thereafter if the authority concerned not only starts search, seizure, enquiry, investigation but also withhold clearances of DEPB licences on the ground of possibilities, element of high-handedness or colourable exercise of power cannot be ruled out.
9. Under the aforesaid circumstances, I have given direction for analogous hearing of all the matters.
10. Before going to the other part I have to say that there is a appropriate procedure of export. Goods which are to be exported will have to brought to the customs zone as per bill of entry. Such goods cannot be allowed to be exported only on a seal and signature of the customs authority. There are various methods of checks and re-checks. One has to pass through such checking. Even thereafter goods cannot be allowed to be exported finally but provisionally. There is a reason for making provision for provisional export. The reason is one genuine exporter should not delayed due to any cumbersome procedure and at the same time a wron gdoer should be escaped even after provisional export. This case is not falling under such category. Therefore, Court cannot refrain from taking judicial notice that in two occasions these types of activities are forthcoming. Once when authorities are at fault and they want to cover-up the same out of fellow feeling at the cost of the citizens and the other is when there is huge drainage from public exchequer which by hook or by crook, has to be covered up on the basis of own internal arrangements of the Government. In both the cases there are possibilities of victimising innocent citizens. Therefore, writ lies against them in the appropriate cases like the personal one.
11. The DEPB Scheme is independent policy of the Government of India controlled by the Ministry of Commerce. The authority under the scheme i.e. Director General, Foreign Trade (hereinafter called as DGFT) is the final adjudicating authority to determine any issue as regards licences. Dispute, if any, is quasi civil in nature. The customs authority deals with the ‘smuggling’ which is defined under Section 2(39) of the Customs Act. This section has a flavour of criminal law. The dispute as regards Value’ of the product comes under Section 2(41) of the Customs Act. The value of a product cannot be equated with smuggling. The word ‘smuggling’ is related to the product not in respect of the value of the product. Value may follow from the smuggling but smuggling cannot follow from the value. Therefore, inflation of any amount etc. is the domain of the DGFT. There is a thinner line in between these two subjects. If one thinks that search and seizure will be conducted in a factory or office of the company suspecting non-availability of desirable quantity of the goods at the relevant point of time which is a subject matter of past final export, such action, under no stretch of imagination, can be said to be the reason to believe of alleged smuggling. Therefore, in finally cleared up goods DEPB licences cannot be withheld on such ground, and if it is done then the same will have to be declared as an action against own policy of the Government. Moreover, if one has exported a quantity of goods without manufacturing the same but buying from the market cannot be said to be the reason to believe that the goods were smuggled. It may so happen that to keep commitment to the foreign buyers it has been done. DEPB scheme is made for both the manufacturer and merchant. In any event, the goods exported properly or not will be in the hands of the importing country. If the importing country says that exported goods are properly received then the same cannot be treated as ‘smuggling’ as alleged or at all. ‘Value’ of the goods are either to be fixed internationally or to be fixed as per the local present market value which is called PMV. Therefore, if there is any dispute with regard to valuation the same can be brought to the notice of the DGFT. A civil dispute in respect of money claim cannot be converted to a quasi criminal dispute of smuggling at the rigour of the administration. It is a fundamental mistake of the administrative authority. When such fundamental mistake is available there cannot be any plinth of search and seizure or enquiry and investigation far to say about withholding DEPB licences.
12. In the instant case there are various stages of releasing of DEPB licences bereing. Some of the licences are pending in the department of the DGFT. Some of the licences have already been issued but pending in the Customs House for verification. Some of the licences not issued for want of finalisation of shipping bills pending at Customs House. Some of the licences already issued and verified by the Customs authority but pending for necessary credit. Therefore, movement of clearance of all the DEPB licences cannot be kept pending by a stroke of pen. It is necessary to mention hereunder that the Deputy Commissioner of Customs, under the order impugned, appears to be very much apprehensive in releasing the DEPB licences. There is no scope of apprehension when the law is clear and explicit. A governmental authority cannot go beyond the law. One has to remember that one mistake by them may cause interference with the personal liberty of a citizen in doing business as protected under Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India.
13. The authority concerned may feel that if the Court interferes even at the stage of enquiry and investigation they will not be in a position to investigate the matter properly. But Court cannot behave like a silent spectator in the given situation nor the ratio decidendi of the Bhajanlal’s case reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 supports the same. In the instant case search and seizure were claimed to be made under Section 105 of the Customs Act and in summons and investigation were claimed to be made under Section 108 of the Customs Act. A question was asked by the Court to the respondents as to whether both summons and investigation as well as search and seizure are simultaneous action or independent from other. It was answered that Section 108 is independent from Section 105 of the
Act. It is further contended that even if the investigation seems to be bad the same cannot be stopped by the Court of law otherwise the truth will never come forward. The authorities have proceeded on the basis of the information of an informer. Had the information not been there, there cannot be any question of enquiry or investigation. The investigation stage is not yet complete. No showcause notice has yet been issued. Therefore, it is a premature stage. It may so happen in future that the authority release the petitioners from any charges levelled against them. I shall discuss the point little later but I am very much candid to say that Court cannot remain from passing any order of quashing the notices withholding DEPB licences. There is no law existable that unless the D.R.I., Calcutta give ‘no objection’, DEPB licences cannot be released by the appropriate authority. When there is no law there is no authority and when there is no authority the action is contrary to law. Therefore, the impugned notices both dated 12th November, 2001 cannot justifiably stand.
14. Now, I particularly confine myself to the episode of search and seizure, issuance of summons and investigations etc. Section 105(1) of the Customs Act, says that if the appropriate Officer empowered under section has a reason to believe that any goods liable for confiscation or any documents or things which in his opinion will be useful for or relevant to any proceeding under this Act are secreted in any place he may authorise an Officer of Customs to search or may himself search of goods, documents or things. Sub-section (2) says that provision of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 under Section 165(5) will be applicable in such case. Such section is corresponding to Section 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 which is more or less similarly placed, Section 165(5) says that copies of the record shall forthwith be sent to the nearest Magistrate (hereinafter called as Commissioner of Customs) empowered to take cognizance of the offence and the owner or occupier of the place of search shall, on application, be furnished free of cost, with a copy of the same by the Commissioner of Customs. Therefore, right of the citizens about service is/are fully protected under the law. In the instant case, no copy of the record was served upon the petitioner to take a defence. According to the respondent, an authority always acts upon some secret information which normally comes from acquittance of such person. Therefore, secrecy has to be maintained. Such secret information cannot be disclosed. Even it cannot be disclosed to the Court. This should have to be done to protect the informer. Proceeding, if any, based upon such information cannot be said to be illegal. I am sorry to say that Court under high prerogative writ of certiorari entitled to seek any document to see for its scrutiny to come to a definite conclusion. There is no wrong in it particularly when the final hearing of the matter is directed to be proceeded. The wrong in it, is non-production of such documents before the Court when called upon. In such circumstances Court may presume adversely against such authority. I have called upon the learned counsel appearing for the authority to produce the same under sealed cover to know the exact nature and strength of the information but I find nobody was eager to produce the same from the date of adjournment of verdict till
the date of delivery of the judgment inspite of giving assurance. It clinched the mind of the Court in drawing adverse inference against them apart from other illegality. The document being annexure ‘B’ to the affidavit of Jitendra Kumar, dated 7th January, 2002 speaks about the information. There, I find the Additional Director General himself recorded all information on 6th October, 2001 and place for left hand thumb impression of the informer is there. The place of giving thumb impression in blank. Therefore, the original has to be looked into. Moreover, the manner in which the authority proceeded it is become essential to know whether statement appears to be voluntary or involuntary. The Additional Director General, named as H.V. Chouhan, who obtained such statement in the form of information did not come forward with any affidavit before this Court explaining the facts and figures of the case being true to his knowledge. Moreover, the search orders were issued on 17th and 18th October, 2001 and I find from the seizure list that search and seizure were conducted even on 18th October, 2001 itself. The evidences were taken on 18th and 19th October, 2001. It further appears that the investigation was made and statements were recorded even on 17th October, 2001. Further, it was conducted on 30th October, and 2nd November, 2001. Therefore, although it has argued that the proceedings under Sections 105 and 108 are independent but both were directed to be proceeded simultaneously. Even sometimes search and seizure were conducted prior to enquiry or investigation. It is a general principle of investigation that when an information received it will be examined first to form an opinion of reasonable belief to proceed further with the same. If in the process of such enquiry, investigation it comes forward that the persons are concealing certain statements and trying to hide certain documents, the office or factory can be searched and documents appeared to be hidden be directed to be seized. But if without having a plinth of such reasonable belief a search and seizure is conducted the Court of equity obviously will be curious to know the cause of hurry of such search and seizure particularly when the export was finally concluded prior thereto. Thus, the element of a reason of suspect appears to be the plinth of entire proceedings which can not be sustained. Fishing out evidence in the garb of search and seizure cannot be construed as reason to believe but reason to suspect. Applicability of Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 is required further discussion. It is abundantly clear that the Customs Officer shall have power to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in an injury which such Officer is making in connection withe this smuggling of the goods. Therefore; either smuggling has to be established or there should be reason to believe that smuggling of goods is likely to be happened in the attempted export. Therefore, in a case of smuggling two things are required i.e. (a) Goods; (b) confiscation. When there is no goods there cannot be any question of smuggling and when there is no smuggling there is no question of confiscation. Therefore, entire attempt of the authority is futile. Such futile attempt cannot be allowed to be regularised by the Court. Section 2(41) of the Customs Act, 1962 deals with Value in relation to any goods to be
determined in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section 1 of Section 14. Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 gives an impression as regards the valuation of the goods for the purpose of assessment to be made under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 or any other law for the time in force. Chapter 5 of the Customs Act, deals with levy of, and exemptions from Customs duties etc. which is totally different chapter from the smuggling, confiscation, search and seizure etc. under the Act. Therefore, dispute if any, as regards valuation cannot be forcibly made fit under Section 2(39) of the Customs Act provided for smuggling and confiscation.
15. Section 113 of the Customs Act deals with 13 export specifications for confiscation process. In most of the cases, the same is made applicable where goods attempted to be exported but none of the cases are made applicable where the final export has already been made. Further provisions are made for confiscation of dutiable or prohibited goods when carried out for export physically bypassing the customs zone. I have taken note with utter surprise that neither the calcium stearate is dutiable nor prohibited goods under the Customs Act, or the Customs Tariff Act nor it has been exported physically bypassing the Customs zone. It is also surprising that there is no question of drawback duties applicable herein for manufacturing the goods. Therefore, it is no necessary to construe that the exporter must have of be the manufacturer. Hence, the challenge appears to be justifiable.
According to me, for development and regulation of foreign trade by facilitating imports into and augmenting exports from India and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto a policy was adapted by the policy makers. As a result whereof on 7th August, 1992 an Act was introduced which is known as Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 (No. 22 of 1992). The power of the Central Government to make orders and provisions of export or import policy are made therein. Even the powers of issuance, suspension and cancellation of licence are available there. Provisions of search and seizure and contravention of the Act, Rules, Orders and the policy are also available there. Such Act has rule making power. Rules are also adequate in connection with the application or giving effect of the Act. Certain notifications are also provided in connection thereto. Therefore, this is a chapter in respect of controlling the export and import policy. The Duty Exemption/Remission Scheme is part and parcel of the foreign trade. The Director General of Foreign Trade is the authority appointed by the Central Government being the authority to exercise power as given thereunder. It appears in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, the Central Government notified the export and import policy for the period 1997-2002. Excepting others, the main object of the policy is to accelerate the country’s transition to a global oriented vibrant economy with a view to deriving maximum benefits for expanding global market opportunities. The Duty Exemption Scheme enables to import of inputs required for export production. The Duty Remission Scheme enables post export replenishment/remission of duty of inputs used in the export product. There are two types of exporters. One is ‘manufacturer exporter’ and another
is ‘merchant exporter’. The objective of DEPB scheme is to neutralise the imposition of customs duty on the import contained the export product. The neutralisation shall be provided by granting of duty credit against the export product. The exporter may apply for credit as a specified percentage of free on Board (hereinafter called as FOB) value of exports, made in freely convertible currency. The credit shall be available against such export products and at such rates as may be specified by the DGFT by way of public notice issued in this behalf for import of raw materials, components, parts packaging material etc. The holder of DEPB shall have the option to pay additional customs duty, if any, in cash as well. The licence is followed for a period of 12 months from the date of issue. It is transferable. The obligations under DEPB licences are fixed under chapter 7.38 of the scheme. The verification of customs is also fixed under chapter 7.38 therein. The licencing authority shall ensure, while issuing the DEPB, shipping bills and descriptions of export product are to be endorsed on the DEPB. Before allowing the imports against DEPB Customs are verifying the details of the exports as given by the DEPB as per their records.
16. In this case when there is no dispute in respect of past final export and when the manufacturer-exporter and merchant-exporter both are entitled to have credit facility, there is no scope other than verification of DEPB licences by the Customs authority and return it to the concerned DGFT for the purpose of releasing the same. Director of Revenue Intelligence (D.R.I.) is trying to say that even if the export has been finally made but even then if information received about non-manufacturing of the product at the factory during the relevant point of time, search, seizure and enquiry, investigation in respect of such prior final export can be made simultaneously giving a complete go bye to any norms. This is highhandedness. There the dispute lies. This type of action for fishing out the evidence is contrary to law.
17. It appears from appendix HC that there is a format of making application for duty entitlement passbook on past export basis. The words past export is very important for the purpose of coming to conclusion. Past export cannot be necessarily mean a future export or provisional export but past final export alone. The final export must have to be made on the basis of the physical verification of the goods and sample test which normally Customs authority keeps with them before releasing the goods by way of provisional export. Fixation of the rate as per the respective list under Duty Entitlement Passbook Scheme (DEPB) is also fixed. The DEPB rate and the value cap shall be applicable as existing on the date of export. The value cap whereever existing shall be with reference to the FOB value of exports. The DEPB rate shall be applied on FOB value or value cap whichever is lower. If the value cap is fixed at the lower rate than the FOB value, the DEPB credit will be given on the basis of the value cap. Even if an exporter wants to enjoy the benefit he cannot enjoy more than the ceiling limit or value cap fixed by the authority.
18. Therefore, taking into totality of the facts and circumstances of this case I am not impressed with the arguments put forward by the respondents.
I have already held that after final export is over there is no scope of making any enquiry and investigation in respect of the goods already exported. See judgment reported in 2001(133) ELT 280 (Cal) (Kanhaiya Exports v. Commissioner of Customs). I do not find any reason to deviate from my own reasoning. However, let me also discuss other judgments to come to a definite legal conclusion in respect of interference or non-interference of the writ Court in the facts and circumstances of the case. The petitioner company relied upon a single Bench judgment of this Court which is supported by the five Judges Bench judgment of the Supreme Court. Such Judgment is reported in 1987(27) ELT 369 (Cal) (Bishna Krishna Shrestha v. Union of India and Ors.). There, the basic feature is difference between ‘reason to believe’ and ‘reason to suspect’. A search and seizure cannot be made on the ground of reason to suspect to fish out the evidence. The authority concerned should be firm about the reason to believe to proceed with the search and seizure. In case of any failure, the order of search and seizure has to be quashed and/or set aside. By accepting the five Judges’ Bench judgment (Commissioner of Commercial Taxes Board of Revenue, Madras v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver etc.) this High Court distinguished the view of the three Judges’ Bench judgment (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Chandra Trivedi). I have come to know that such judgment was appealed from but failed. No special leave petition had been made to the Supreme Court from such order. I find Section 37 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act was placed para materia with the Section 105 of the Customs Act.
19. According to me, firstly there should be an information. Secondly, there should be an enquiry or investigation in connection with such information. Thirdly, there should be any concealment of facts and documents in respect of enquiry and investigation. Lastly, there should be making of search and seizure etc. If the facts are placed chronologically with the legal sanction obviously it will be construed that there is a reason to believe of such authorities. But I find contrary facts hereunder. There is no question of confiscation of goods attempted to be improperly exported. Search and seizure or enquiry and investigation are based on mere pretence. Therefore, there is no legal sanction for any enquiry or investigation. Even both the process of enquiry or investigation and search and seizure cannot run simultaneously because in the process of enquiry and investigation there should be availability of the factum of action concealment of facts based on documents which is prime consideration for search and seizure. If there is no question of concealment there cannot be any need of search and seizure. If both go simultaneously then it ought to have been declared as fishing out evidence on the basis of a reason to support. Hence, such search and seizure ought to be declared as bad. Respondents contended that when there are some materials, there is a basis of proceedings. But availability of some material contrary to law cannot have any independent leg to stand. The fact of having some materials for the purpose of the proceedings will have to be borne out from the legal sanction. If the law is not available the very foundation of the process is without jurisdiction.
20. Learned counsel appearing in support of the respondents while defending the matter relied upon a five Judges’ Bench judgment of the Supreme Court (R.S. Seth Gopikisan Agarwal v. R.N. Sen, Assistant Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Raipur and Ors.) and contended that under Section 105 of the Act the Customs Authority either fix the search personally or through the authorities of the Officer of the Customs to do so if he has reason to believe the facts therein. Under Section 165(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the reason for believing the facts is only to enable him to make a search urgently in a case where search warrants in the ordinary course cannot be obtained. It is, therefore, not possible to invoke the condition and apply it in a situation arising under Section 105 of the Act. It is not necessary in this case to particularise whether all the other clauses of that section can be applied to a search under Section 105 of the Act. Therefore, according to him, when there is a reason to believe the matter is to be expedited as per the suitability of the authority concerned ignoring the formalities. Otherwise the whole purpose of search and seizure will be frustrated. This ratio, according to him, is still subsisting. In contradicting the argument of the petitioners, he brought my notice to the three Judges’ Bench judgment of the Supreme Court (Dr. Pratap Singh and Anr. v. Director of Enforcement Foreign Exchange Act and Ors.) and stated that the expression ‘reason to believe’ is not synonymous with subject to satisfaction of the Officer. The belief must be held in good faith. It cannot really be a pretence. However, it is not obligatory to an Officer to record in writing prior to issuance of warrant the grounds of entertaining a reasonable belief that the documents useful for the investigation of the recording under the Act are secreted and also to specify in such writing, as far as possible, the thing for which search is to be made. According to me, a principle of law is not an abstract formula. It has to be a factual foundation. In the instant case can the fact say that the authorities have proceeded in good faith but not on pretence. At least narration of the facts does not say so. Therefore, the cited decisions are really helping the petitioners not to the authorities. I have never said that all the procedures have to be followed strictly in making enquiry and investigation or search and seizure but I have said rate of guilt or mens rea has to be adjudged before doing so. If it is correctly noted it is to be construed as done in good faith if it is not then it has to be construed as mere pretence. A governmental authority cannot terrorise the people in the garb of law only to convert pretence to good faith.
21. He further added that adequacy of material is not for the Court to investigate by relying upon a judgment (Indru Ramchand Bharvani and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.). According to me, it is bad practice to cross the road without observing the traffic signal. Having no materials or some materials or justifiability of the explanation of search and seizure or technicality of issuance of warrant or having formal order or adequacy of investigations will travel provided traffic of law permit the same but when traffic of law prohibits the same, the discussion, in my view is purely academic.
22. Even after such threadbare analysis parties were not in a position leave any inch of place to other. As a result whereof, both the contesting parties were allowed to cite two more judgments as per their desire. One is reported in 1997(90) ELT 241 (K.I. Parumy v. Asst. Collector (HG) C. Ez. Collectorate, Cochin) and other is (Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Rajamundry v. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd. and Ors.). However, in observing the cited portions I find that the Supreme Court is unanimous in one point that test of reasonableness as provided under Section 24 of the Evidence Act has to be followed. According to me, reasonableness is variable state of affairs of the mind as per the circumstances. I am not a moment want to say it is to be taken leisurely in a given situation. But is it the given situation where goods are allowed for final export, accepted by the importing country, DEPB issued, make and wishful thought that goods were not supposed to be manufactured in the factory in comparison to the export quantity as if merchants are not entitled for benefit, and not having so there is a cause of smuggling, hence confiscation and that too in a simultaneously proceeding with enquiry and investigation? An authority only try to do so when there is necessary of using colourable exercise of power to connect the missing link. Court cannot support such action at the cost of the rights of the citizens.
23. Therefore, the actions on the part of the authorities, whatever stages it would be, cannot be allowed to continue. Hence, taking into totality of the matter I am of the view that the following orders are needed to be passed and accordingly passed:
(a) Summons and notices stand quashed;
(b) Proceedings of enquiry, investigations and search and seizure stand set aside;
(c) All the documents lying with the authority concerned are to be returned forthwith to the petitioner;
(d) Proceeding in respect of DEPB Licences will be proceeded from the stage where it were rested independently without being influenced with such notices and without being timebarred;
(e) The contempt application being CPAN 40 of 2002 stands infructuous and thereby dismissed;
(f) Accordingly, all the writ petitions under the cause title are disposed of. No order is passed as to costs.
Let an urgent xeroxed certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned advocates for the parties within 2 weeks from the date of putting the requisites.