JUDGMENT
H.H. Kantharia, J.
1. The petitioner’s services as a Librarian working in the Central Railway Library were terminated with effect from 31st March, 1984. A reference with regard to his demand for reinstatement and continuity of services with full back wages was made by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Conciliation) to the Second Labour Court at Bombay under Section 10(1) read with Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The reference was numbered as Reference (IDA) No. 163 of 1985. On appreciation of the evidence adduced before him, the learned Labour Judge came to the conclusion that the petitioner could not prove that his services were illegally and wrongfully terminated by the Library. He also held that he had no jurisdiction to try the said reference as it was not maintainable. His further conclusion was that the Library could not prove that it had given all the terminal dues of the petitioner and that it had paid to the petitioner only some dues. In the ultimate analysis of the reference the learned Labour Judge was of the view that the petitioner was not entitled to re-instatement with continuity of service with effect from March 31, 1984 and that he was not entitled to any back wages. He accordingly by his Award dated April 29, 1987, rejected the reference with no order as to costs.
2. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution by filing this writ petition.
3. One of the grounds on which the learned Labour Judge non-suited the petitioner was that the Central Railway Library was not an industry as defined in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. With a view to appreciate whether this finding of the learned Labour Judge is correct or not it would be relevant here to mention the activities carried on by the Central Railway Library. This Library is managed by the Managing Committee formed from the employees of the Central Railway. The Senior Deputy General Manager of the Central Railway is the ex-officio Honorary Secretary of the Library. It appears that the non-gazetted members of the staff of the Central Railway who were the members of the said Library were contributing Rs. 2/- per month by way of subscription and the gazetted officers Rs. 3/-. From the money so collected, books were purchased and the Library was looked after by the petitioner and one Peon. The books so purchased were circulated among the members only. The Library is functioning in the premises belonging to the Central Railway. As was urged before the learned Labour Judge, it was urged before this Court that the said Library would be an ‘industry’ as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board, etc. etc. v. A Rajappa and Ors. etc. etc. 1978 I LLJ 349.
4. In order to substantiate his argument, Mr. Puri, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, relying upon this judgment of the Supreme Court, urged that where there was systematic activity which was organised by co-operation between employer and employee, the direct and substantial element being commercial, for the services rendered in order to satisfy human wants and wishes and hence the activities would fall within the definition of the word ‘industry’ as defined by Section 2(J) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is no doubt true that so long as the present case is concerned there is an element of systematic activity which is organised by co-operation between the employer and the employee for the purpose of rendering services to the members of the Library but there is no direct and substantial element of commerce in its activities for satisfying the materialistic needs of human beings. It may be noted here that for an activity to be an industry its object should be the satisfaction of material needs of human beings and the said activity must not be of casual nature for pleasure. The substantial activity of the Library in question was of casual nature of buying books from the subscription of nominal amounts collected from the employee-members of Central Railway and circulate those books among the members for the sake of getting pleasure out of reading of those books and the object of this Library is not for the satisfaction of materialistic human needs. Therefore, the learned Labour Judge was right in coming to a conclusion that the Library was not an “industry”.
5. Mr. Puri invited my attention to a judgment of the Delhi High Court in case of Suresh Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. : 1989-II LLJ 110 and submitted that it was held in the said case that the Central Research Institute for Yoga which was an agency of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India was an “industry” and in the same manner the Library in our case should also be held to be an industry. It is not possible to agree with Mr. Puri for the simple reason that the activities of the Central Research Institute for Yoga which was an agency of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution carried on activities which were absolutely in the nature of industry and cannot be compared with the activities carried on by the Library in our case.
6. Mr. Puri then relied upon a judgment of the Patna High Court in case of Bihar Relief Committee v. State of Bihar and Ors. 1979 (38) F.L.R. 333 and urged that the Bihar Relief Committee was held to be an “industry” and there is no reason why on similar grounds the instant Library should not be held to be an “industry”. It is once again difficult to agree with Mr. Puri because the facts of the said case disclose that the petitioner therein (Bihar Relief Committee) had undertaken, among other things, minor irrigation schemes in the State for which it opened various centers for constructing open bore wells, tanks and tube wells after obtaining the advice of technical experts and it stored articles for such works and maintained plants and machineries for which depreciation, wear and tear and running charges were charged. The said Relief Committee also charged the farmers for supplying pipes to them and expenses incurred in transportation and storing of those instruments. For the purpose of its enterprises the said Relief Committee employed a number of employees and its activities disclosed that there was distribution of goods and services Which in turn fulfilled the human wants and wishes. Such an activity would no doubt be an “industry” within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the facts of such case cannot be compared with the facts of the present case.
7. And lastly Mr. Puri relied upon a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in case of Abdul Rashid v. Indian Sailors Home Society and Ors. 1989 I LLJ 6 which judgment I do not think, helps Mr. Puri in any manner. Indian Sailors Home Society which was situated at Masjid Bunder siding Road at Bombay was a charitable organisation which catered to the needs of Indian Merchant Navy ratings below the rank of Officers who come to Bombay in search of work. The Society provided lodging facilities at reasonable rates to about 1,000 sailors and the inmates of the Society’s hostel managed their cooking on a co-operative basis. The Society was run by a Managing Committee headed by the Chairman of the Bombay Port Trust and some 18 prominent members including Directors of various Shipping Companies. The contribution from the ratings being nominal, the expenses of running the hostel was met through donations. As the society at the relevant time was not receiving adequate donations it had suffered a deficit of Rs. 88,140/- as on July, 1987 and right from 1982 it was running in deficit. The Labour Court in that case had held that the Indian Sailors Home Society was an “industry” following the Supreme Court judgment in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage case after distinguishing an earlier judgment of this Court in the case of the very same society reported in 1974 II LLJ at page 227. The Division Bench of this Court found that the matter was no longer res Integra in view of the Bangalore Water Supply case (supra) and that the Labour Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the Society was an industry as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act. The activities of Indian Sailors Home Society cannot be compared with the activities of the Library in question,
8. In this view of the matter, I find no infirmity in the impugned order passed by the learned Labour Judge. At any rate, it cannot be said that the finding arrived at by him that the Library was not an “industry” was perverse. I find no error apparent on the face of the record and I have no hesitation in upholding the impugned award passed by the learned Labour Judge in the facts and circumstances of the case.
9. In the result, the writ petition fails and the same stands rejected. Rule is accordingly discharged but there shall be no order as to costs.